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Argument 
Under the political system as it operates in contempor-
ary Japan the Diet is the central point of public decision-
making power. For this reason a study of the substance and 
the form of policy-making in t he Liberal-Democratic Party 
(which since its formation in 1955 has dominated the Diet) is 
relevant to an understanding of public decision-making in 
contemporary Japan. 
The thesis, 'The Liberal-Democratic Party and Policy -
making', attempts to explain the patterns of policy-making 
in that party in terms of four variables: the Party 's member-
ship composition, formal organization, intra-party factions, 
and relationships with extra-party groups and influences. 
These four categories of variables are assumed to define the 
basic character of the process involved. The principal points 
of the argument are as follows. 
In the sense that its non-parliamentary member ship is 
largely nominal and unstable, that its national organization 
is extremely weak and that all positions at the Party Head-
quarters are monopolized entirely by members of t h e Diet, the 
Liberal-Democratic Party is a typical parliamentary party. 
Two important characteristics of the Party's behaviour derive 
from this fact. On the one hand , it is compelled to depend 
upon various extra-Party groups for the acquisition of funds 
and votes which are vital to its survival as an effective 
party organization o On the other hand , its formal decision-
making process constitutes a closed circuit originating and 
terminating within the confines of the parliamentary party and 
hardly influenced by the wills or actions of the non-parlia-
mentary members or the nationa"l organization. 
An important part of Party decision-making is concerned 
with rewarding the extra-Party groups which thus supply the 
Party and its individual members with funds and votes. The 
technical needs of such policy-making activity require the as-
sistance of the various ministries of the national public ser-
vice andthe acceptance of the latter's help in turn obliges 
the Party to reward them also with legislative actions design-
ed to enlarge their powers and budgetary appropriations o The 
efforts of the Party relating to such actions make up another 
important part of its decision-making activity. The formal 
policy-making organs of the Party tend to be preoccupied with 
satisfying the demands of these two broad categories of extra-
Party groups. The interests and opinions of tkEe who belong 
t~h~~; g"hOLL'It::la-J.. POJ..lcy=-maKlng aCl:lVll:Y. 
Of the principal kinds of Party decision mentioned above , 
the bulk may be regarded as 'routine' and non-controversial. 
These are dealt with by a chain of formal policy-making organs 
consisting of the fifteen Divisions (bukai) of the Policy 
Affairs Research Council (Seimuchoosakai) (Hereafter referred to 
a s tiE PARd, and the Executive Council (Soomukai). When de-
clared as 'Party decisions' by the last, they are usually in-
troduced as Cabinet-sponsored bills into the Diet by the 
Party's Diet Policy Committee (Kokkai taisaku iinkai) or re-
ferred to the appropriate ministry to be translated into ad-
ministrative action. In this process former high-ranking pub-
lic servants, who have unique educ a tional and occupational 
background and experience, playa leading part, while former 
local politicians , who are numerically as important but whose 
training and experience is very different from that of the 
bureaucrats, tend to playa subordinate and much less conspi-
cuous role. The fact that each ministry has its parallel 
Division of the ~ARC symbolizes the relationship between the 
Party policy-making process andthe bureaucracy in routine 
decision-making situation. 
Decisbns cannot be easily made through this ch ain of for-
mal policy-making organs if the issues involved are controver-
sial. The Divisions of the PARC are much too preoccupied with 
routine decision-making to deal adequately with such issues . 
It therefore becomes necessary for those interested in causing 
the Party to make a decision concerning a controversial issue 
to create an ad hoc 'Investigating Committee' (Tokubetsu 
choosa iinkai) within the organizational framework of the 
PARCo Furthermore, intra-Party factionalism often interferes 
with the functions of the PARC Deliberation Commission and the 
Executive Council to the extent of making it impossible for 
them to deal effectively with such issues. 
The factions (which have grown up as the basic units for 
distributing office in the party) divide themselves into two 
opposing alliances - an alliance of dominant factions and one 
of dissident factions. A controversial issue is apt to be used 
by the latter as an excuse to intensify its opposition to the 
former. The PARC Deliberation Commission and the Executive 
Council are both constituted on the principle of inter-faction-
al coordination and compromise . For this reason they often 
find themselves unable to make decisions when opinion is di-
vided between the factions , particularly when the division is 
between the dominant and dissident alliances. When they man-
age to make decisions, they may prove unsatisfactory from the 
point of view of the dominant factions. The factions thus 
play a negative role of great importance in a decision-making 
situation involving a controversial issue o Built neither on 
the basis of ideology nor polic y , they are incapable of func-
tioning as units of positive action in such a situation. For 
this reason an intra-Party group primarily interested in posi-
tive action concerning a controversial issue tends to be form-
ed on a supra-factional or cross-factional basis. 
Factionalism also considerably weakens the authority and 
prestige of the Party President, particularly because of the 
manner in which he is elected and his short term of office 
(two years). As a result, the President is usually unable 
to exercise strong leadership concerning decisions involving 
controversial issues. 
In order to cope with the adverse effects of factionalism 
and make up for the weakness of presidential power, a semi-
official decision-making organ controlled by the dominant 
factions, called the Leaders Meeting (Yakuinkai) , supplements 
or supercedes the Executive Council (and frequently t he PARC 
Deliberation Commission as well) when the Party faces a con-
troversial issue. Thus an alternative chain comprising an 
ad hoc PARC Investigating Committee, the Executive Council and 
the Leaders Meeting (or simply a PARC committee and the Staff 
Meeting) has developed. The intervention of the Leaders Meet-
ing does not prevent but merely minimises the effects of a 
division of opinion in the Party over the controversial issue. 
Such a division of opinion is likely to be used not only by 
opponents outside the Party but also by the dissident factions 
to discredit the Party President and the dominant factions. 
For this reason the top Party leadership , represented by the 
Leaders Meeting, tends to adopt a negative and evasive atti-
tude towards a controversial issue. It takes tremendous ef-
forts on the part of an interested intra-Party or extra-Party 
group to get the Party to deal officially with such an issue 
against the resistence of the top leadership. 
Presentation 
The sequence of presentation is as follows: the histori-
cal background, an examination of the four variables, and a 
series of three case studies. 
The opening chapter dealing with the historical background 
of the subject focusses on two particular aspects of the his-
torical evolution of Japanese parties up to 1955: (i) many 
of the characteristics associated with the behaviour of the 
four selected variables of po licy-making in the Liberal-Demo-
cratic Party had been well developed by the late 1920's in 
both major prewar parties (the Seiyuukai and the Kenseikai -
Minseitoo) ; (ii) these characteristics survived the Second 
World War and the Occupation to be handed down remarkably in-
tact to the Liberal-Democratic Party in 1955. The main theme 
of the introductory chapter is, in other words, the importance 
of the aspects of continuity in the evolution of Japanese con-
servative parties and their patterns of behaviour. It empha-
sizes the elements of stability and rigidity in the character-
istics of the four variables. 
In Part II of the thesis each of the four variables 1S 
described in detail with decision-making as the frame of re-
ference. 
Part III consists of the following three case studies il-
lustrating the action of the four variables: the enactment of 
the bill to compensate former landowners, the proposed revis-
ion of the Constitution of Japan, and relations with the 
People's Republic of China. The cases were chosen mainly on 
the following grounds: (i) they represent three different types 
of controversial issues - one which is almost purely domestic 
and economic (non-ideological), another which is primarily 
domestic and almost purely ideological (non-economic) and a 
thrd whic h is a foreign polic y issue with both ideological 
4 
and economic implications ; ( ii) none of them has yet been 
studied in depth either by Japanese or foreign scholars; (ni) 
there is a sufficient amount of information about each to pro-
vide a firm empirical basis for an analy tical disc ussion in 
terms of the policy-making proc ess in the Party . 
Source Material 
The material for the thesis was derived from both written 
sources and from personal interviews conducted by the author 
in Tokyo in the period December 1965 - March 1966 . 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
VOLUME I 
PREFACE 
CONVENTI ONS AND ABBREVIATI ONS 
I NTRODUCTION 
PART I. HISTOR ICAL BACKGROUND 
10 The Evolution of t he Prewar Party Models 
The Transmission of the Prewar Heritage 
to Po stwar Parties 
IV 
vi 
1 
10 
10 
45 
PART II . FACTORS UNDERLYING LDP POLI CY-MAKING 80 
Membership 81 
4 . P arty Organisation III 
The Intra-Party Factions 149 
Connections with External Groups 193 
PART III. CASE STUDIES 
7 0 Compensating Former Landowners 225 
I • Background 225 
II. The Liberal-Democratic P arty Respons e 237 
8 0 Constitutional Revision 259 
I 0 Background 260 
110 The L iberal -Democratic P ar ty Respons e 279 
9. Rel ations with the P eo pIe ' s Republ i c of China 294 
10 Background 295 
I I 0 The L iberal -D emocratic Party Response 30 8 
CONCLUSION 334 
VOLUME II END OTES, APPEND ICES AND B I BLI OGRAPHY 
END NOTES 
Notes for Chapter 1 1 
Notes for Chapter 2 12 
Notes for Chapt er 3 21 
ii 
Notes for Chapter 4 32 
Notes for Chap ter 5 42 
Notes for Chapter 6 59 
Notes for Chapter 7 70 
Notes for Chapter 8 82 
Notes for Chapter 9 94 
APPENDICES 
Appendix I The Occupa tional Backgrounds of 
Conservative M.HoRo's (1890-1965) 114 
Appendix II The Occupational Backgrounds of 
Conservative M.H.Co's (1947-1965) 117 
Appendix III Classification of LOP Diet Members 
by Occupational and Educational Backgrounds 
(November 1965) 118 
Appendix IV Percentage Distribution of 
Higher Public Servants by Univers ities 
Attended (19 65 ) 119 
Appendix V 'New Face' - 'Old Face' Ratios 
of Candidates in House of Representatives 
Elections ' U946-1963) 120 
Appendix VI ' New Face' - 'Old Face' Ratios 
of Elected Members in House of Repres-
entatives Elections (1946-1963) 122 
Appendix VII ' New Face' - 'Old Face' Ratios 
of Candidates in House of Councillors 
Elections (1947-1965) 124 
Appendix VIII 'New Face' - 'Old Face' Ratios 
of Elected Members in House of Councillors 
Elections (1947-1965) 125 
Appendix IX Percentage Distribution by Pref-
ectures of the Population in Primary 
Industry and LOP Votes 126 
Appendix X Factions in the LOP (1955-1967) 127 
Appendix XI The Survival Ratios of Candid-
ates by Electoral Distri cts i n the House 
of Representatives Election of 1967 128 
Appendix XII Sour ces of LOP Income by Cate-
gories of Donations 129 
Appendix XIII Donor Groups Classified by the 
Combined Values 0 f Thei'r Dona ti ons and 
Categories of Recipients (1965) 130 
Appendix XIV Sources of Factional Income by 
Categories of Donors (1965) 131 
Appendix XV Comparative Consistencies in 
Donors ' Choice of Recipients by Categor-
ies of the Latter (1960, 1962 and 1965) 133 
iii . 
Appen dix XVI The Distribution of the Official 
LOP Leaders Associated with the National 
Farmland League (1 January 1958 - 5 June 
1962) 134 
Appendi x XVII The Distribution by Occupational 
Categories of LOP Di et Members Appointed 
Advisers or S tanding Advisers to the 
National F armland League (1 January 1958-
5 J une 1962 ) 135 
Appendix XVIII The Dis tribution by Ministries 
of Former Public S ervants Appointed 
Advisers or S t an ding Advisers to the Nat -
ional Farmland Le ague (1 January 1958 _ 
5 June 1962 ) 136 
App endix XIX The Distribution of the League ' s 
Advisers by Factions (1 January 1958 _ 
5 June 1962 ) 137 
App endix XX 
Revision 
Public Op inion on Constitutional 
(1952-1963) 138 
Appendix XXI Prewar and Wartime Diet Members 
Among the Conservative Party Members 
Elected to the Po stwar House of Repres-
entatives (1946-1965) 139 
Appendi x XXII Prewar and Wartime Diet Members 
Among the Conservative Party Members 
Elected to the House of Councillors (1947-
1965) 140 
Appendix XXIII The Occupational Backgrounds of 
the Members of the LOP Investigation 
Committee on the Constitution (10 
November 1965 ) 142 
Appendix XXIV The Factional Distribution of the 
Members of the LOP Investigation Committ ee 
on the Constitution (March 1964) 143 
Appendix XXV The Oc cupational Backgrounds of 
the LOP Members Associated with the 
Soshink ai (July 1963) 144 
Appendi x XXVI The Factional Distribution of 
the LOP M. H.R.' s Associated with the 
So shinkai ( July 1963) 145 
Appendix XXVII Si no-Japanese Exchange of 
P ersons : 1949-1965 146 
Append i x XXVIII Japanese Exports To and Imports 
From Mainland China , Taiwan and the 
United S tates of America (1946-1966) 147 
App endix XX I X The Occupational Background s of 
the Asian and the Afro -Asian Group 
Memb ers (July 1966 ) 148 
Appendix XXX The Distribution of the Asian 
and the Afro -Asian Group Members by Fact -
ions ( July 1966 ) 14 9 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 150 
1V o 
PREFACE 
In prepa ing and wr iti ng his hesis in he 
Dep artment of Internat i onal Rela ti ons, the Australian 
National Universi Y9 I have enjoyed the generous assis-
tance of a large number of indjviduals and 0 ganisations, 
bo th in Canberra and in Japan o Espec ially deeply in-
debted am I to Mro D oCe S o S i ssons g who, as my superviser, 
has helped me throughout the th ee years of resear c h and 
writing I hav e spent in he Aust rali an Nat i onal Unive _ 
s i t Yo Not only with the general planning and execution 
of the research prog amme but also with the presentati on 
o f the arguments and evidence in the thesis, Mr. S issons 
has offered me most v aluable advic e and innumerable 
sugges t ions 0 I owe very grea ly also to Dro Jo A.Ao 
S tockwin for his generous ass i stance, parti cularl wi th 
the problem of language whi c h has been one of the mos t 
diffi cu lt r have had t o solv e i n writing the thesis
o 
But 
for the unfail i ng ass ist an c e rendered by th ese two com~ 
petent s cholars, this thesis woul d never hav e been 
written in anything clos e to its pre sent formo 
r mus t also exp ess my hanks to the Australian 
Na t i onal Uni v ers i y and through it he governmen t of 
Australia for hav ing made it po ~ sible for me to undertake 
and complete the research by offering me not only a 
generous scholarship grant but also a mos t congenial 
environment in wh ich to wo rk . Both the Oriental S e ction 
o f the University L i b r a r y and the Na ti onal L i brary of 
Australia have greatl faci l i tated m work by let t ing me 
freely use their valuable collec tions and also in many 
cases by purch as ing new ma t er i als s pe c i fi c ally for the 
s a ke of my research o 
In Japan so man pe l e hav e ontributed ei her 
informat ion , useful advice or both t o the preparati on 
o f the thesis, espe i ally du ring my three-month f i eld 
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work in Tokyo from December 1965 to Marc h 19 6 6 , that it 
is difficult to acknowledge them indi v iduall y . I should 
like , however , to ' me n t i on the spe c ial co-oper a t ion and 
courtesy I recei v ed from the Commit tee on Publi c Relat-
ions and the Committee on Nation~ Or ganisation of the 
L iberal - Democrat ic Party , the Kokumin kyookai, the 
Kokumin seiji kenkyuukai and the political affairs sec -
tions of the principal n a t ional dail i es . It is also 
appropria t e that I should express my sincere gratitude 
to the Liberal-Democratic Party member s of the National 
Diet , their secretaries, and the officials of vari ou s 
factions , who not only responded willingly to my request 
for interviews but often helped me attend and observe 
Party func tions and meetings , including the 17th Party 
Conference of January 1966 0 
vi. 
CONVENTIONS AND ABBREVIATIO S 
(1) Lon g vowels In Japanese names and words : 
Long vowels are indicated by spelling the same 
letters representing the vowels twice, as in 
'Jiyuuminshu too ' (the Liberal-Democratic Party). 
( 2) J ap an e sen arne s : 
All Japane s e names are spelled wi th the surname 
first, as in 'Ikeda Hayato' (former Prime Mini ster Ikeda). 
(3) Citation of newspapers: 
In citing the principal Japanese daily newspapers 
the word ' shimbun ' is omitted, as in 'A sahi ' for the 
Asahi Shimpuno 
(4) Citation of Diet Proceedings : 
The proceedings of the Plenary Meetings of either 
House are ci ted under the titles beginning with the 
sequential number of the Di et session , follo 'Ned by the 
abbreviated name of the House , the sequential number of 
the Meeting and the date given in a parenthesis, as in 
' 22nd Diet-J H.Co, No. 32 (4 July 1955) 1 for the proceed -
ing s of the 32nd Plenary Meeting of the House of Counc-
illors in the 22nd Di et session held on 4th July 1955. 
The proceedings of the S tanding Committees of 
either House are cited similarly except for the Japanese 
name of the Committee given after the abbreviated name 
of the House, as in ' 43rd Diet, H.R •• Yosan. No . 6 (4 
Febru a ry 19 63 ) 1 for those of the 6th meeting of the 
House of Repre sentatives Committee on Budget I n the 43rd 
Di et session held on 4 February 19630 
In the case of a Special Committee proceedings 
the full name of the Commi ttee is spelled, as in ' 2nd 
Diet. H . R.., Sei too - hoo oyobi senkyo -hoo n i kansuru 
tokubet su -iinkai , No . 4 (1 7 April 1943)1 for the 4th 
meeting of the House of Representatives Spec ial Comnittee 
vii. 
on the P ar ty Bill and the Election Law in the 2nd Diet 
session held on 17 Apri 1 1948 . 
( 5) Abbreviation s : 
CC Commission on the Constitution (Kempoo-
choo sa!s.s:.~) • 
CG Consultative Group 
CHINCOM China Committee 
COCOM 
GSS 
JCP 
JSP 
LOP 
MHC 
MHR 
PARC 
Co-ordinating Committee 
~ai-seido shichijuu-nen shi 
Japan Communist Party 
Japan Socialist Party 
Liberal-Democratic Party 
Member of the House of Councillors 
Member of the House of Representatives 
Policy Affairs Research Council . 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous articles and several books have ~een 
already written on various aspects of party politics ln 
postwar Japan, including treatments of the conservative 
parties o These have been mainly in Japanese by Japanese 
authors but some also have been written by foreign scholars
o 
Few detailed studies, however, of the actual process of 
policy-making in the Liberal-Demo cratic Party, have yet 
been undertaken despite the growing awareness of the urgent 
need for a better understanding of the government and pol -
itics in contemporary Japan , of which this is an important 
aspect. 
The reasons for the scarcity of such studies are both 
numerous and understandable . The lack of reliable and 
readily available information concerning the organisational 
and behavioural details involved is one of the more obvious 
obstacles o The size and complexity of the Party ' s organis -
ation and activities make it difficult to draw neat and 
clear-cut generalisations about the processes involved . As 
far as Japanese academics are concerned , there may also 
have been a reluctance to take positive interest in the 
conservative party on the grounds that conservative polit-
icians are somehow not really worth studying because of 
their reactionary and , perhaps, secretive inclinations o 
In spite of such real or imagined obstacles, several 
c onsiderations lead one today to make some initial attempts , 
albeit tentative and inconclusive, at a description and 
interpretation of the Party ' s structure and behaviour in 
terms rather more specific and inclusive than those 
offered so far . One reason for doing this concerns the 
enhanced status and role of the parties, especially the 
ministerial party , in the postwar system of Japanese govern-
ment. Another is the development in recent years of a 
2. 
comparative approach to the study of politics with 
emphasis on parties and interest groupso A third is the 
actual availability of empirical information about the 
selected aspects of the Part y 9 s organisati on and behaviour 
and the feasibility of making some meaningful, if tentqtive, 
generalisations about their nature on the basis of this 
information o 
The first of these considerations has been implicit 
in virtually all discussions, whether academic or otherwise, 
of the parties and, indeed, politics in general in contem-
porary Japan o Even in the days of the prewar Imper ia l 
Constitution, parties no doubt played an import ant , often 
crucial, role in determining the course of the government's 
actions and the fate of the nation o This was especially 
true in the years between Hara Takashi' s appointment as 
Prime Minister in 1918 and the May 15th Incident of 19320 
Under the new Constitution the status of the parties has 
been vastly enhanced and their role in g overnmental 
decision-making has become truly central o Now that the 
National Diet is 9 the highest organ of the state power' , 
the parties have put themselves in control of the n~rve­
center of the nation's public decision-making , for it is 
they, and they alone, that dominate and speak in the name 
of that highest or gan . It is true today, as it was in 
pr~war times, that the national bureaucracy with its 
tight control of the administrative machinery of the 
state decisively influences the process of gove r~mental 
deci~i on-makin g o In its competition with the parties 
the bureaucracy is the winner more often than not o 
It is equally true, however, that no decisions can 
be made with ease by the bureaucracy or any other g roups 
whi~~ clearly contravene or ignore the wishes and inter-
ests of the partieso In practice , moreover, the relationship 
3. 
between a ministerial party and the bureaucracy usually 
takes the form of collaboration rather than competition. 
Under the present parliamentary cab i net system in theory 
a majority and in practice virtually all of the Ministers 
who make up a Cabinet and head the Ministries are drawn 
from the membership of the ministerial party. As a res-
ult, they are morally responsib le to the party as much 
as they are legally responsible to the bureaucracy. Such 
collaboration at the summit is supplemented and reinforced 
at the base by the institutionalised custom of constant 
day-to-day contact and consultation between party members 
and senior public servants. This takes place at various 
levels of party and government decision-making, notably 
in the Diet standing committees and the policy-making 
organs of the party, especially the Policy Affairs 
Research Council. 
It is therefore medningless, even impossible, to 
discuss contemporary Japanese politics without referring, 
explicitly or implicitly, to the role of the parties, 
especially the ministerial party. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on the role of the parties in governmental 
decision-making has become increasingly evident as time 
passes and is likely to continue to do so. This is the 
first of the considerations which call for a fuller 
examination of the Liberal-Democratic Party as a pre-
requisite to a better understanding of contemporary 
Japanese government and politics as a whole. 
The second consideration relates to the encouraging 
developments in the postwar years in the social sciences 
in general and political science in particular _ 
developments which have resulted from the growing interest 
in cross-cultural comparative analysis of various social 
4. 
structures and functions , inc luding parties o These d ev-
elopment s have involved efforts to expand the area of both 
theoret ical and empirical investigat i on beyond the tradit -
ionally a ccep ted geographi cal limits of the Western world. 
As is well known , the research efforts inspired by such 
an interest have already produced a series of highly sig -
nificant wo rks and many more of a comparable or even 
higher qual ity are bound to follow in the years ahead. l 
A sound development of i nvestigation with a cross-
cul tural and comparative emphasis naturally depends on the 
presenc e not only of raw da ta but also of some analytica l 
mode ls or working hypotheses built on a firm empirical 
basis p relating to each area involved. From this point 
of view , it is regretable that both description and 
analysis of the major Japanese parties should have 
remained , with rare exceptions , so incomplete and unsys -
tematic that it is difficult to make even a few meaningful 
generalisations about their actual behaviour . The problem 
involved here is not that many of the assumptions held 
about the nature of con temporary Japanese p arties , 
spec ia lly the Libera l -D emocratic Part y , are necessarily 
wrong or unfounded. It is that many of these assumptions 
are based on such limited evi d ence and presented in a 
manner so unsystematic and conjectural that one cannot be 
certain how relevant or how important they are to the 
actual proce ss of party or government d e c ision~making o 
What is needed is , therefore , an effort to re-e amine and 
explicitly spell out such assump tions on the b asis of as 
much reliable empir ical information as is available o 
The scarcity of reliabl e and readily accessi bl e info r-
mation concerning the organisation and behaviour of the 
con temporary Japanese parties has no doubt been a very real 
5 . 
obstacle to any attemp t to make a scientific inv estigation 
of them o It should be pointed out , however , that all the 
parti es , including the Liberal -D emocratic P arty , have taken 
steps in recent y ears to increase the numbe r and diversify 
the content of the ir off ici al publications which are, as a 
rule , available to the general pu b lic . In S eptember 1965 , 
for example , the L iberal-Democratic P arty alone was regul -
arly publ ishing five periodi cals and the three opposition 
parties a c ombined total of thirty , 2 apart from a large 
number of v a rious occasional pUblications o It is also 
well known that officials of the parties have shown , at 
least privately if not officially , considerable willingness 
to respond to requests for p ersonal interviews from out -
siders , especially l arge n ew s pap ers and magazines , and to 
furnish information concerning certain s pecific issues and 
their person al views on them o 
There are some important limitations to the use of 
information thus mad e available to a research e r in the form 
of party publications and interv iews with party officials . 
One of these limitations is that most party pUbli c ations 
deal almost exclusively with doctrinal or policy matters 
for purposes of d issemination or propaganda and seldom with 
the pro cess of party deci s ion- making or organisational 
problems . Nor is it easy to ob t ain specific and detailed 
informati on regarding such problems th ough pe sonal inter -
views . As a rule , party off icials are e tremely cautious 
and timi d about d iscussing with an outsi d er questions 
which inevitably involve reference 0 the mo re unpleasant 
and undignified aspects of party a ctivity , such as the 
deli cate matters of intra-par ty factionali sm , inter-
pe rsonal rivalries , financial ar angements , and so forth . 
Notwi thst a n d ing such limitations and numerous othe r 
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difficulties that spring to mind , one may well question 
whether al l possible approaches have yet been tried in 
order to collect enough relevant empirical information to 
be able to study party organisation and decision-making . 
The impr ession that sufficient has not been done in this 
respect is strengthened by the realisation that much 
information may also be found in the many biographies 
written by or for party politicians , which have tradition-
ally been an important part of publishing and book- reading 
in modern Japan. A judicious use of information collected 
through the above - mentioned sources - party publications , 
interviews with party officials and biographies - should 
make possible a reasonably detailed and accurate descript-
ion and analysis of contemporary Japanese parties . 
The present study of the Liberal-Democratic Party was 
undertaken with the foregoing considerations in mind. Its 
primary purpose is to describe and analyze with as much 
specificity and accuracy as possible the actual behaviour 
of that party in various decision-making situations . The 
focus of its attention centers on the processes involved 
in the formulation of policies over issues of a more or 
l ess controversial character, as i nterpreted in terms of 
the organisational framework and inter-personal and inter-
group interactions, rather than of doctrinal or ideological 
factors . This is not because the latter are deemed to be 
less important or less worth exammmg, but simply because 
it is felt that the former set of factors has so far been 
most inad equately treated and analyzed. Underlying this 
view is the assumption that in contemporary Japanese 
politics the organisational and g roup environment influences 
public dec ision-making as important ly as do elements of an 
ideo logical and doctrinal nature . 
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The thesis which has resulted from research premised 
on the above considerations consists of two fairly dis-
tinct parts, the first dealing with four selected factors 
in policy- making in the L iberal -D emocratic Party, preceded 
by a description of relevant historial antecedents. The 
second part consists of three case studies . On the assum-
ption that different individuals a nd groups are likely to 
play leading roles in the process of party policy- making 
when these involve different kinds of i ssue, two basically 
domestic issues and one foreign policy issue were chosen . 
One of the domestic issues (that of compensating former 
landlords) is pre- eminently practical and socio-economic 
in its implications, whereas the other (the issue of con-
stitutional revision) is primarily political and ideological . 
The issue of China policy , chosen to represent foreign 
policy issues, is both highly ideological and practical 
and presents a most complex pattern of interactions between 
the factors . 
The three case studies are used to illustrate the 
relative significance and roles of the four selected fac-
tors in the context of dynami c party policy-making proc -
esses . As mentioned above , they were chosen taking into 
consi deration their representativeness in three fairly 
distinct fields of policy-making . Their selec tion , 
however , cannot be justified on a strictly logical and 
categorical basis alone , for it was made without making 
very careful comparisons with other issues fallin g in the 
same categori es , as would have been required to justify 
a claim for true representativeness in each case . In 
fact I the choice was dictated in part by ease of collect -
ing relevant empirical information in the limited space 
of t ime available . For this reason , the possibility is not 
denied that in any of the three fields a more representat -
ive case mi ght be found , or hat any possible bias might 
be reduced by increasing the number either of categories 
or of c ase s in each category to be examined o In any 
event , t he presen t stu d y should be considered not as a 
finished product in itself , but merely as a preliminary , 
explo ratory step towards a fuller description and analysis 
of this pa rticular par t y o 
In order to make the best use of such insights as 
have been provi d ed by the relatively small number of schol -
ars and somewhat larger number of journalists c oncerning 
the behaviour of the Liberal-Democratic P arty , e isting 
books and articles relevant to the study have been con-
sulted with s ome tho roughness o The three big national 
newspapers of contemporary Japan - the Asahi , the 
Mainichi and th e Yomiuri - have been ch ecked with care 
and the Asahi in particular was used as the s t andard 
source of reference for ma jor historical events involved o 
The per iodical and occasional pu b li ations of the P arty 
were examined with even greater care . Bi ographies rele-
vant to the thesis as a whole or to its sections have been 
read and considered as thoroughly as possi ble o 
During the period be tween December 1965 and March 
1966 a series of personal interviews were conducted by the 
writer in Tokyo o Twenty- four members of the National 
Diet affiliated with the L i b eral -D emocratic P arty , about 
ten secretaries to Diet members , t he S ecretaries -Genera l 
or their equivalent in si factions 3 and about twenty 
journalis ts ( includ ing reporteTs of the p olitical affairs 
departments of the large daily newspapers ) were personally 
interviewed and most contri buted a subs tantial amount of 
relevant informat ion whi ch had been sought b y the autho r o 
Several non-parliamentarian officials a nd clerks of the 
Party Headquarters, including two leading officials of 
the Pol icy Af fairs Research Council, also helped the 
author both directly and ind irectly . S everal incumbent 
and former Cabinet Ministers were heard at the exclusive 
weekly meetings of the Kokumi n Seiji Kenkyuukaio Inter-
views were held also with the offi ci als of the Kokumin 
Kyookai (the fund-raising a g ency of the Liberal-Democratic 
Party), the Kokusaku Kenkyuukai (a private research 
organisation allegedly having enormous influence on both 
t he Party and the successive Cabinets), the No o chi Do omei 
(the pressure group of former landlords ), and so fortho 
The specific con t ributions of individuals and groups 
who consented to direct attributions will be explicitly 
acknowledged in the relevant parts of the thesis. The 
contributions of those who expressed a desire to remaln 
anonymous were accepted with equal gratitud e and profitably 
used as part of the background information. 
PART I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
10. 
CHAPTER 1: THE EVOLUTION OF THE PREWAR P ARTY MODELS 
The organisational and behavioural characteristics of 
the Liberal-Democratic Party (hereafter referred to as the 
LDP throughout the thesis) are defined by and explicable 
in terms of its historical background in the same way as 
any other contemporary institutional structures. It is 
impossible , indeed, to understand or explain many of the 
most salient and interesting aspects of its behaviour 
without referring to the weight and role of tradition, 
custom and habit, which stretch back into the first years 
of the Meiji era. 
In the fOllowing description of the LDP's historical 
background we shall concentrate on the evolution of the 
basic organisational framework and characteristics of 
conservative party politics in modern Japan. This will 
be considered primarily wi t h reference to the developments 
associated with the four particular factors chosen for 
intensive analysis in the subsequent chapters - party 
membership, organisation, intra-party groups and c onnect-
ions with extra-party groups o 
The purpose of the two chapters contained in this 
Part is not to trace in great detail the development of 
parties and party politics in modern Japan for its own 
sake, but merely to examine the evolution of the factors 
considered responsible for the LDP' s organisational and 
behavioural characteristics as they are found tod ay . 
The Original Forms and Structures 
The first embryonic forms of party emerged in post -
Restoration Japan during the first phase of the movement 
for fre edom and popular rights (Jiyuu-mink en- undo o ) in 
the mid-1870' so At first these groups , known frequent l y 
as s e isha (political company) rather than seitoo ( party ), 
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we re formed ma inly by d iscontented members of the shi class 
(o rig i n a lly th e warrior class ) and relat i v ely well - to - do 
own er - f a r mers who had t r ad itionally dom i nated villag e pol -
iti c s unde r th e Toku gawa sys tem of gov ernment . l Th e s e 
p ri mordial g r ou ps sprang u p throughou t the country a nd 
pro b ab ly numb e r ed nearly two hundred in the middle of the 
1880 ' s o 
Mo st of these early seisha group s were formed at the 
vill a g e or county level o Their organi sat i on was v ery 
simp le a n d membership small . In Fu kush ima Prefecture ~ for 
exampl e , the earliest and best known of s u c h g roups wa s the 
S ekiyoosha , formed in 1875 in Ishikawa vil lag e wi th Koon o 
Hironak a as P resi d ent (shachoo ) and 20 7 members . 2 Simil-
arly , the Hokushinsha , formed in 1877 and located in Odaka 
vi llage , had a P resi d ent , a Secretary (kan j i) , a Treasurer 
(shukei - g akari) and a total of 170 memb ers o The S anshisha , 
forme d in the same year , had a P resi d en t, a S ecr e tary-
Gener a l (kanjichoo) , t wo S ecretaries ( kan ji) , a Clerk 
( s h ok i ), a Treasurer (shutsunoo-gakari ) and 79 members . 
It wa s not until after l8 80~ howev er, that the many 
smal l sei sha groups scattered allover the country beg an to 
be g r a dually b rought together to f o r m lar ger units of 
organi sation op erating at the p re f e c tu ral , regional and 
eventually national levels . This p rocess of amal gamation 
and co nsoli d ation co rresp ond ed r oughly t o the growth of the 
movemen t t o es tab l ish a p opul arly e lect ed national assembly 
which reached its climax in Octob er 1881 when an imperial 
rescript promised the convocation o f such an as s embly in 
1890 . Many of these groups formed origi nally in the 1880' s 
were subsequently incorpo rated into a few national party 
organisations , notably the L i b eral P a r ty ( J iyuutoo l and the 
Constituti onal Progres ive P arty (Rikk en- k a ishintoo l o The 
proces s of t ransition involved was no doubt extremely 
compl ex and variable from place to p lace and group to 
group , bu t its organisational implications may be illus-
trated by the e ampl e of the Ai koku sha o 
The Ai kokusha (patr iotic company) originally formed 
in Osaka i n February 18 75 , quickly lapsed into inaction , 
was revived in S eptember 1878 and was renamed the Kokkai 
kisei doomei ( t he league for the establishment of a nat-
ional assemb ly) in Marc h 1880 0 According to its origi~al 
Constituti on , i t ~as essential l y a federation of seisha 
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groups and each of its p refectu al affiliates was to 
send three pe r man ent Rep res en atives to its Headquarters 
in Tokyo and a few delegates, includi ng its P resident , 
twice a year t o meet at a National Con ference o3 The 
first Con ference ~ however, was attend ed by only about 
f orty Repre sentatives f rom half a dozen prefectures. The 
second Confer ence held in March 18 89 fared much better 
and was attended by orne eighty Representatives from 
twenty-one local 4 ~s~e~i~h~a~ groups in eighteen prefecture s o 
Wh en its two le ad ers , Ka taoka Kenkichi and Koono Hironaka , 
pr e sented to the Cab inet (dajookan) in April 1880, a 
petition on its behalf for the es t ablishment of a national 
assembly, t hey cl aimed to r ep res en t some 87 ,000 members 
5 in t wen ty - f ur prefecture 0 The Conference held in 
November of the s am e year was attended by 64 delegates 
said to represent some 130,000 p eopl e in twenty-two 
6 p refectur e s o 
It is imp o ss"ble to d etermine e actly what percentage 
of these 8 7 ,000 or 130,000 p eop le was a c tually affiliated 
with the local seisha grou ps rna ing u p the Aikokusha o 
The e is no doub t , how ev er , tha i t was significantly 
larger than its p edece ss s, in so fa as its membership 
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is conc erned . Th is d evelo pmenta l process involved , 
more ov er , an impo t ant chan ge in th e gen eral class basis 
of the membership a s we l l a s i ts geographical distribution . 
Whereas the part i ci pants of i ts 1878 Conference all 
belong ed t o the ~ cl ass and c ame almost exclusively from 
Western Japan(espe c i a l l y t he Sh i k oku and the Kyuushuu 
regions ) a t l eas t 34 o f t he 64 de lega t es attending the 
Novemb e r 1880 Conferenc e we re t hose of the commoner class 
(heimin) and man 7 c ame f r om t he eastern prefec tures o As 
the Ai koku s ha i s o ~ ganis a t i on 1 s ope and membership grew to 
inc lud e i n c r ea i ng ly mo e het e rog eneou s geographical ele-
men t s, g eogr aphi a lly =b a s ed f actional i sm emerged within 
it and began 0 influen c e its b eha vi ou r0 8 The effects of 
th i s k i nd of int a- group c onf l i c t b e c ame v ery pronounced 
i n the Libera l P arty (J i yuu t o o ) wh ich was formed in 
October 18810 
I n t he ef for t to bu ild t h e Liberal Party four differ-
en t g r ou ps i n it ial l par t ici p at ed o Subsequently , however , 
sharp d i vi s ions of op inion d evel oped between them and two 
d ropped ou to As a re ul t , t wo g r o ups ~ the Risshisha of 
Tos a and t h e To y o were the sole components 
f th P h · t . t b' 9 o · e ar t y w en c am e I n 'O e l ng o 
Ac cording to it s Cons titut ion, the Liberal Party con-
s isted of Headqua ~ e s in Tok 0 and lo cal Branches 
e st ablished at t he p e f e c tura l l evel ol O A P resi d ent , a 
V ice-President ~ ev era l S tand i ng Co mmit tee memb ers 
(joo g i i n ) and f ive S ec~ e t r i e anj i ) were selected for 
a t e r m f one ea r e a c ho In e e s ti ng ly , no treasurer or 
a c count an t wa s pro i ded f o r as n o f f ici al p arty post , and, 
i ns t ead, t h e S e re t ie s were charged wi th the ta s k of 
1 00 ing after p ar ·'· . ' i n nc e o I Ea .... h l oc al Branch was t o 
en n o more t h an C v e d e l eg t es to the annual P arty 
Conference o Fund s needed by the local Branches had to be 
raised by themsel ves , wherea s those for the Headquarters 
were to be collected from the Branch e s o 
Mos t of the above-mention ed P arty posts were init-
ially filled by Itagaki and hi s followers from the Tosa 
region associated with the Risshisha o This domination of 
the P arty organisation by a par ticular geographical group 
continued officially until Ap ril 1883, when the P arty 
Conference nominated new officials , a majority of whom 
12 came from Branches other than that in Tosa . It should 
be noted, however , that the move on the part of the 1883 
Party Conference and the re sulting composition of the 
Liberal Party's leadership group did not appreciably lessen , 
much less end , the fact ional p ower struggle but merely 
drove it und erground where it was reactivated a bout a yea r 
later with the formation of the Constitutional Liberal 
Party (Rikken-jiyuutoo)o 
Despite the apparently national character of the 
Liberal P arty , its member shi p was very smal l in the b eginn -
ing , In fact ev en smaller than those claimed by some o f 
the local seisha grou ps which had preceded it , not to 
s peak of the Aikokushao When it was formed in October 1881 , 
it had 10 1 members and by May 1884 this figure had increased 
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to about 2 , 350 0 It should be noted , however , that its 
membership was based in principle on ind ivi dua l affi l iat -
ion in contrast to the Aikokusha (renamed Kokkai kisei 
doomei) whi ch had been a loosel bound fed eration of 
autonomous local seisha groups o 
The Consti tutional Progressi v e Party (R ikken- kaishint oo), 
formed in Mar ch 1882 by Ookuma Shig enobu and his associat e s 
diffe ed from the L iberal P arty both organisati onally and 
. .. 14 I t t t In reference to membe ' ship composl tlon . neon r as 0 
the extensive geog aphical b asis on wh i ch the Liberal 
Party was built~ the Constitutional Pro gressive P arty 
consi sted exclusively of grou p s of pu b l i c servants , 
journalists and bus ines smen who were personally acquainted 
15 with Ookuma and mo st of wh om lived in Tokyoo Its rel-
ativel y high d egree o f intellectual sophistication and 
moderate progressivism gave the P arty a distinctive air 
of urbanity and cosmopo lit anism in contrast to the rural , 
even parochial , ou tl ook which characterised the Liberal 
Party . 
The Rules (naiki) of t he Constituti onal P rogressive 
Party ado p ted a t its inaugural mee ting of 16 Apr il 1882 
provi ded f o r an e tr emely simp le l eadership structure 
c onsi sti ng of on ly t wo k ind s of off ice - P arty Pres i dent 
and Secre taries (shopi i )o These offi ce s were filled 
respective ly by Ookuma, and Ono ~ Mutaguchi and Haruki 
Yoshiak i . 1
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The P a ty Constitution ( k iyaku) which replaced 
t he Rules in Februar 188 5 abolished the p o st of Presi dent 
and subst itu ted for i t a seven-man Admin istra tiv e Commit te e 
( jlmu-i i n) to be el e cted by P ar ty members at large by a 
° 1 .. t 17 slmp e maJorl y v o t e . In S ep t ember 1889 a Local Affairs 
Commi tte e ( chihoo-iin) was newly es t ablished and each pref-
ectural Branch wa s obliged t o send at least one of its 
members to par t icipate in °t 18 t the P arty Headquarters. 
Orig i nally membe s of the Const itutional P rogressive 
Party paid membership fee s on an annu al basis, bu t an 
amendment of the Consti 'ution in 18 89 aboli shed such fees 
and made the Head qua te dependent entir ely on voluntary 
contributi on s for its inc ome o It is not cer tain, however , 
h ow and f rom wha s u c es s u c h cont . ibut ions came. 
The member hi p of he Constitutional P rogres s ive Party 
was i nitial l y ju s t a sma ll in number as that of the Liberal 
Party and thereafter did not grow as quickly as did the 
1atter'so It seems to have started off at slightly over 
100 in April 1882 , grown to about 1,700 by the spring of 
1884 and then dropp ed to about 1,500 by 18890 19 Charact-
eristically, a v ery high percentage of these members came 
from Tokyo o Of the 116 memb ers, for example , Officially 
reported to the government in June 1882 , 60 came from 
Tokyo, followed by eight from Nagasaki (which was 
Ookuma's birth-place) and seven from Niigata . This geog-
raphical distribution, however , did not last very long 
as the Party grew gradually from a Tokyo-based intellect-
u als' debating society into a nationa l part y o By 1889 
Tokyo 's contribution dropped to a mere 2 0 7%, while outside 
the Kantoo region, Hyoo go and Osaka in Kinki, Ehime in 
Shikoku , Toyama in Hokuriku and Miyagi in Toohoku contrib-
uted fairly substantial numbers o20 Compared with the 
situation in the Liberal P arty, the percentage of prefect -
ural assembly member s in the membership of the Constitutional 
Progressive Party was significantly higher, accounting for 
about 10 per cent in the middle of 1883 against two or three 
per cent in the cas e of the Liberal Party.2l 
The formation in S eptember 1890 of the Constitutional 
Liberal Party (Rikken-iiyuutoo) marked a turning point in 
the history of Japane se parties and party politics. Up to 
this point, the parties and their antecedent prototypes 
had necessarily operated outside any parliamentary organ 
of the State . From this time onwards , however , thei r 
principal forum became the ationa1 Diet,which was estab-
lished in 1890 0 The impact of the institutional change 
brou ght about by this event was bound to cause t he exist -
ing parties some difficult problems of adjust ment wh ich 
they had to solve if they were to survive and establish a 
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status and ro le of their own und er the new circumstance s o 
The task be f ore them was as much one of utilizing , 
reshaping or abandoning the ol d struc tures and practices 
inherited from the p re -parliament a ry days as of creating 
and develop ing new structures and prac t ices o 
The Cons titutional Liberal Party was governed not by 
a single Pres i d ent but by a 70-memb er S t anding Committee 
( . ..) 22 I . S () ]Oog lln • n addit lon five ecretaries kanji and 
a six-member P olicy Af fairs Res earch Committee 
(seimu choosa-iin) were elected. On 2 September 1890
p 
prior to the electi on of these Party offic ials, a parl-
iamentary group called a Yay o i -kurabu was formed by those 
members who had been e lected to the House of Representatives 
in the first Di et electi on i n Japanese history~ For the 
purpose of investigatory activities this parliamentary 
group was di vi ded in to si Departments rough ly, though 
not exactly , correspon d i ng to the ministeri al divisions 
in the nati onal public service o 23 
The o rg anisati onal innovations introduced by the 
Const itutional L i b eral P ar ty rep r esented two new and 
important developmen s in the t heo ry and practice of 
party pol itics in Japan o One was the realisation that a 
party needed to emphasise organised research into policy 
ma tt erso Wh en in the mi dd le o f 1892 th e Party officially 
established a Pol icy Res earc h Bureau (seimuchoosakyoku) 
at its He adquar ters wi t h a Chairman (shukan) , two 
Sec retaries (riji ) and t en Members (iin) , it had made a 
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signifi cant adv an ce in t h i s respecto The other was the 
tendency for the p arl i ament a ry comp on ent of the party to 
asser t and gradua lly ac quire a role and organisation of 
it s own , separat e from an d, to a certain degree, independ-
ent of t he national par ty or ganisati on o 
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The relative importance and power of the parliamentary 
and the extra-parliamentary components of the party during 
the first Diet session may be inferred from the fact that 
in the Constitutional Liberal Party 39 of the 65 initial 
Standing Committee members, three of the five Secretaries, 
and all of the 28 Policy Affair s Research Committee members 
1 · . 25 were non-par lamentarlan o In other words, a majority 
of the Party officials were not members of the Diet. In 
theory, if not in practice, this ~upremacy of the extra-
parliamentary elements was done away with by an amendment 
to the Party Constitution in October 1891 which was 
inspired by the belief that "a party under a parliamentary 
system of government should be constituted with members of 
1 · . ,,26 par lament as Its coreo 
Another important and burdensome heritage from the 
previous period which called for attention and effective 
action by the Constitutional Liberal Party was the preval-
ence of geographical factionalism. The Party was formed 
through the merger of four distinctive regional groups, 
representing respectively the Toohoku, the Kantoo, the 
Kyuushuu and the Sh ikoku regional factions o I twas inev-
itable that relationships between these groups should have 
been marked by strains and conflicts even after they were 
formally brought together and united In a single party 
organisation o Of the four factions the Toohoku group was 
drastically weakened after its founder and leader, Koono 
Hironaka, withdrew from the Party in February 1897, while 
the Tosa (Shikoku) faction remained the single most 
h . . 27 powerful group throughou ttl s perIod. 
Remarkable as it may seem , considering the situation 
in the Liberal Party, this type of factionalism was almost 
totally absent from the Constitutional Progressive Part yo 
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This difference can be explained by several facts. For one 
thing, the Party had been found ed by Tokyo-b ased groups of 
intellectual s as opposed to the geographical groups which 
had constituted the Liberal Part y o Despite the subsequent 
rapid increase of members from prefectures other than 
Tokyo, Ookuma and other original founders retained their 
control over the relatively centrali s ed power in the Party 
until December 18840 In that year, however, these men 
withdrew from the Barty altogether , and those associated 
with the Oome ikai ~ecame the dominant group and exerted a 
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centralising and unifying influence over minority groups o 
In 1896 the Constitutional Progressive Party led 
other anti-Liberal Party groups to merge their organisat-
ions, and formed a new Progressive Party (shimpotoo). 29 
The Progressive Party was also governed by a collegiate 
body called an Executive Council ( s oomu-iin ) made up of 
five members, assisted by a thirty-member Standing 
Committee (joogiin), while Ookuma remained the de facto 
P Od 30 reSI ento 
It was characteristic of the membership composition 
of the two parties' p arliamentary groups that nearly three-
quarters were former local politicians and that entre-
preneurs and public servants were the next largest cate-
gories . 31 Si nce the e n tr epreneu rs were often local po1-
iticians at the same time , on e may say that an overwhelming 
majority of their members were In this categoryo This was 
one of the most important reason s for the prevalence of 
geographical facti on a lism i n t he Liberal Party, although 
the countervaili n g forc e of cent r alization prevented it 
from growing in the Pro gres s ive Party. 
In June 1898 the Liberal and the Pro gressive Parties 
were united t o form the Ken s ei t oo ( constitu tional government 
party). The leader ship structure of this Party Was char-
acteristically a combination of the Liberal Party and the 
Progressive Par ty models o On the one hand , it dispensed 
with the office of Presid ent and substituted for it an 
Executive Council (soomu-iin) made up of two former 
Lib erals and two P rogressives o On the other hand, a five-
man Board of Secre taries (kanji) was instituted on the 
Liberal Party mode o32 It was only a week after the form-
ation of this short-lived united party that the first 
'party Cabinet' in Japanese history, headed by Ookuma, came 
into being o Only two months after the unification, however , 
the former Liberals and P rogressives were at loggerheads 
with each other over the distribution of Cabinet posts o 
By early November of the same year they had again formed 
separate parties, that of the Liberals continuing to call 
itself the Kenseitoo while that of the Progressives was 
named the Kenseihontoo (true constitutional government 
party ) 0 Both inherited almo st intact the platform and the 
Constitution of the old Kenseitoo and therefore continued 
to be governed by an Executive Council o 
From this time onwards , a quasi-two-party system 
built around two competi tive parties of cons ervative 
persuas i on became an established pattern of Japanese party 
politics . This was the c as e until the middle of 1940 when 
all e isting parties were dissolved and absorbed by the 
Taiseiyokusankai (imperial rule assistance association )o 
After the Second World War the same pa ttern was revived 
but significantly modified by the appearance of a powerful 
socialist part y o 
The S eiyuukai as a P rewar Par ty Model 
Following the split of the Kenae it oo in October 1898 , 
the p o s s ibility hav ing the most eminent statesman of the 
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time, Itoo Hirobumi , lead the L iberal wing of the defunct 
par ty be gan to be seriousl y c onsidered among its leaders o 
In September 1900 this seemingly fantastic plan became 
a rea li ty and the R i kken-seiyuuka i ( c onstitutional assoc-
iation of po litical friends , hereafter referred to as 
th e Seiyuukai) wa s established under Itoo' s leadership033 
As Koo t oku Shuu sui commen ted in hi s famous contribution 
t o the Yorozu- choohoo on t he eve of the Party's official 
. 34 .. inauguratlon, one of the two major partles which had 
publi cly cl aimed t o represent the 'people's' will and 
interests aga inst the bureaucracy dominated by the 
Sat-Choo cli qu e, thus submitted itself to the most illus-
tri ous member of this cli que o The formation of the 
Seiyuukai was accompl i shed c omple tely on Itoo's terms and, 
in fact, took the form of donat i on of the party to Itoo 
by the par ty' s l eaders o 
That the bureaucratic elements clai med equality, 
if not necessar ily super i or ity , of status and power 
vis -a-vis party po liticians wa s symbolically demonstrated 
by t he compos iti on o f t he Found i ng Commit tee appointed 
by Itoo on 25 Au gust 1900 0 F ive of its twelve members, 
. 1 . . 1 d· bl· 35 lnc udl ng the Chalrman , were ea lng pu lC servant. 
In 1913 seven top-ranking publi c servants became offic-
ially af i1iated with t he P art to make its relationship 
wit h t he t op stratum of the b ureaucracy even more 
36 pronounced o 
In subsequen t years th e pe rcentage of high-ranking 
publ ic off icials in t he total membership of the 
Se iyuukai' parli amentary par ty never became higher than 
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about ten per c ent o Their contr i bution to the member-
ship of t he t op p arty leade rship grou p s howed, however, 
a significant inc rease . A t the ti me it was formed in 
1900 their share wa s a mere t h r e e per cent , but by 1920 
38 it had r isen to 16 per c en t e S i n c e the percentage of 
high-ranking publi c servants i n the parliamentary party 
of the S eiyuukai was about eight per cent at the time , 
their share in the top leadership group was about 
double this figure o 
Another aspect wor t h s peci al men tion concerns Itoo's 
deliberate attempt t o base t he new P ar t y on the support 
no tonI y of th e bureaucr a cy bu t a l s o the bus ines s comm-
u n itYi by i n du ci ng promi nent bus i nessmen to join it , 
o r at leas t to be sympathe tic a l l y interested in it . For 
exampl e , Itoo persona l ly i nvit ed Shibusawa Ei ichi , one 
of t he most outstanding bus i nes smen of his time , to be 
o fficially a member of the P ar t y , although the latter 
declined to g o beyond promising assistance from out si de
o 
Or again , Inoue Kaoru, a cting on Ito0 9 s behalf , asked 
t he businessmen asso ci ated wi th the Mi tsui shuukaiio 
t t " " " "t 39 o par lCl pa t e I n 1 0 On t he occa s i on of the P arty's 
~ naugural ceremony , repre sen t a tive businessmen were 
s pe c ial ly invited toge t he r with i ndependent members of 
t h e House of Represent a tives~ l oc a l politicians and 
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admi n istra t or s i wel l -known l awy ers, and so forth o 
Apart from the importanc e of businessmen among the 
Se i yuuka i -aff i l iat ed members o f the House of Repr esen t-
a t ive s (hereafter referr ed to as MeHoR o 9 s ), it should 
be noted that lawyers t o o were numeri c ally signif icant, 
accounting for ov er 15 p e r c en t o On t he other hand , the 
percentage of loc al po litici ans st eadily d eclined from 
over thr e e quarters of t h e tot al number in 190 2 to less 
than hal f i n the 1930 9 s . 4 1 
Org ani sational l y , i f n o t behavi ourally , the 
§e i yuukai was a we ll deve loped pa ty from the beginning. 
23. 
According to its Cons titution and the Rules relating to 
the Branches, it consisted of a Headquarters in Tokyo 
42 and local Branches set up at the prefectural level. 
The Headquarters was governed by a President , an 
Execu t i ve Council (soomu-iin), a S ecretary-General 
(kanjichoo) and S ecretaries (kanji). An annual Party 
Conference (too-taikai) was convened in Tokyo by the 
President and was attended by M.H.R .' s affiliated with 
the Party and delega tes from the local Branches. The 
P resi dent might also convene , when special need arose , 
a M.H .R.' s Meeting (giin-sookai) d uring a Diet session . 
Absent from the original Se iyuukai Constitution 
were provisions relating to the organisation and officers 
of the parliamentary par ty (excepting the M.H.R.' s Meet-
ing ), and - even more important - policy research 
organs both at the Headquarters and in the parliamentary 
group . It was, however , not long beiore additional 
organisational devices were introduced to fil l such 
gaps . In January 1901 practical needs compelled 
President Itoo to appoint five Executive Of ficers of the 
Parliamentary P arty (in'nai - soomu) who in turn nominated 
. S . h Pl· P (.,. k .. ) 43 nlne ecretarles of tear lamentary arty ln nal - an]l • 
From this time onwards it became a rule for a variable 
number of such Offi cers and Secretaries to be appointed 
for each Die t session separately from the Executive 
Council members and Secretaries at the Headqua rter s . 
The amendments of the Constitution in April 1927 provided 
expli c itly for the i r election by the M.H .R.' s Meeting . 
A policy research organ was first set up in the 
S eiyuukai in June 190 1 in a cc ordance with the Rules of 
the Policy Re search Bu reau (seimuchoosa-kyoku ).44 At 
the same t ime , the P arty Conference of 3 December 1901 
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formally resolved to maintain the policy research depart -
ments of the parliamentary party which had been inherited 
from the Kenseitoo o Acco ding to the Rules Relating to 
the Policy Research Department Assignments (choosabu-
zoku-kitei) adopted in Dec emb er 1903 , each M. HoRo affil -
iated with the Par ty might become a member of more than 
one Department at a time , though he might vote only In 
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one of them o This practice has been preserved in the 
present-day LOP o The dual structure of the policy res-
earch organs , represented on the one hand by the Bureau 
and its successors at the Headquar ters (functioning 
mainly during the periods between Diet sessions) and , 
on the other , by the Research Depar t ments of the 
Parliamentary Par ty (operating only during Diet sess-
ions ), continued until January 1911 046 In the years 
between 190 3 and 1910 a series of Special Investigation 
Committees (tokubetsu-choosa- iinkai) were set up to 
deal with specific and topical issues 047 In the mean-
time , by 190 9 it had bec ome customary for the Policy 
Affairs Research Council (hereafter referred to as the 
PARC) of the Headquart ers to establish within itself 
several divisi ons (bu ) dealing with particular problems o48 
By April 1913 ten Di visions had been set up , each headed 
by a Di vision Chie f (bucho o )o49 
Thus , duri ng the first decad e of the century the 
policy-making activities in the S eiyuuka i became well 
organised and systemati c , as indicated by the development 
of the PARC described above o So far as the organisat -
ional framewor of such activities is conc erned , it was 
almost exactly the same as that which one finds in today ' s 
LDP. It was not until March 1928 ~ however , that a dec -
isi on of the PARC came to be regarded as the 
P arty ' s official decis ion , and at the same time 
it became obligatory for all Party officials to parti c -
. th k f th' . 1 50 ipate In e wo r 0 IS partIcu ar organ . I twas 
following this important decision that the PARC began 
to attempt to draw up broad political and economi c 
policy programmes, such as the twelve-point economic 
programme of 1930, the ten-point P arty platform in 
December 1931, the 'Five-Year Industrial Deve lopment 
Plan' of February 1932 , and so for th o 51 
Apar t from the parl iamentary organisation and the 
policy research machinery of the P arty , severa l other 
important cha nges wer e made in the Se iyuuka i' s organis-
ational structure in the first thirty years of its lif e
o 
One of these changes concerned the compositi on of the 
Executive Council o In May 190 3 a 30-member Consultat ive 
Council (kyoogi-ii n ) was set up to take over a large 
part of the small Executive Council ' s functions o 
According to the Rules relating to this new organ , 
adopted by the Par ty Conference of December 1903, it was 
to consist of thirty members, twenty of whom were to b e 
ele~ted by and from among the P arty MoHoRo' s and the 
. 52 remaining ten were to b e appointed by the PresIdent. 
What was significant about this new arrangement was the 
peculiar manner in which its members were n ominated. Ten 
of them, in practice including the Counci l Chairman, 
were appointed by the Pres i d ent , which was obviously a 
device designed to enhance the latter ' s power and author-
ity . On the other hand, the remaining twenty were 'el-
ected from among the MoH oRo' s on a regional basis o For 
the purpose of their election eight regional g roups 
were officially formed and the twenty ava ilable po s ts 
were distributed among these groups according to the 
numb er of Party -affiliated MoHoRo' s returned from each 
26. 
region in the previou s Hous e of Representatives elect-
53 ion . Although the actual plans of distribution have 
54 
na turall y changed subsequent 1 y , t he di v i sion 0 f th e 
country into eight regions has remained almost intact 
into the postwar pe r iod and has been inherited by the 
WP. 
In January 1915 an E lection Committee (senkyo-
iinkai) and in May of the same year a Party Affair s 
Committee (toomu-iinkai) were set up at the Seiyuukai 
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Headquart ers. The latter was set up originally as 
an ad hoc organ, but, after April 1916, it became perm-
t d 1 d d . . . t· 56 anen an great y expan e lt S actlvl les o 
The revision of the Seiyuukai Constitution approved 
by the extraordinary P arty Conference of 15 April 1927 
for the first time specified the method of electing the 
Party Pre si d ent o According to Article 2 of the revised 
Constitution , a Pre sident was to be elected by the Party 
57 Conference for a term of seven years o The method which 
has come to be referred to as koosen (election by the 
Party at large ) was thus for the first time formally intro-
duced (a t least in theory ) as one of the important prin-
ciples of party po litics i n Japan o In practice , however, 
a v ote was never taken for the election of a Seiyuukai 
Presiden t but, instead, a nomination submitted by a 
senior member at the Party Confer en c e on behalf of the 
PartyV s deci 3ion-making organs Was invariably approved 
unanimouslY o58 This evasion of the elect ive method in 
the selection of a P resident was b ound to make the 
Part y Conference essentially a forma 1ityo In th is res-
pect, the model of a P arty Conference built by the 
Sei yuukai was also foll ow ed faithful ly by its postwar 
successo s , until in April 1956 the WP f or the first 
27 0 
time implemented both spirit and letter of the historic 
article of the revised S eiyuukai Constitution by making 
Hatoyama Ichiroo P resident through a genuine election o 
It is nevertheless significant that the basic idea was 
officially accepted by the S eiyuukai as early as 19270 
Combined with the effects of the unusual ly long 
term of office , its extensive power relative to the 
personnel administration of the P arty invested the office 
of Par ty President (in theory) with authority and pres -
tige unmatched in the P art y o In practice , however , his 
power was not quite as great as the provisions of the 
Party Constitution made it sound , for it was restricted 
not only by the particular personality of the man who 
happened to occupy the post but also , as we shall see 
later , by the countervailing , centrifugal influence of 
. f· 1 · 59 Intra-party actlona ISmo 
As the parties ' role in the prewar system of gov-
ernment became increasingly important after the Ru sso -
Japanese War and especially after the formation of the 
First S aionji Cabinet in 190 6 , the centre of power and 
activity in the S eiyuukai shifted gradually from the 
extra-parliamentary to the parliamentary organs o This 
tendenc y was clearly shown in the first t wen ty years of 
that Party ' s existence by the fact that , whereas in 
1900 , nine of its 46 top-leaders (19 . 5%) were non-
parliamentarian , by 1921 the comparable percentage 
had decreased to 2 . 7% (2 out of 72)0 60 0 In fact 
during the period of ' party politi c s ' after the Russo -
Japanese War , the e tra-par liamentary elements ceased 
to be represented to any sign i ficant degree an any of 
the formal organs of the P arty's Headquarters. 
This d i d n ot mean , however , that these extra-
parliamentary elements ceased to playa role in the 
28. 
Party's decision-makin g process or, indeed, in the 
poli t ics of the nation at large. On the contrary, their 
activities became in many respects more organised and 
regularised during this period than previously . On 
December 1903 an Extra-Parliamentary Un ion (ingaidan) 
of the Seiyuukai was officially est ablished. 61 From 
this point onwards, the or ganisation acted as an 
effective pressure group to work on the parliamentary 
62 party, government agencies and extra-party groups . 
Apart from such pr essure group activities, the U~iQn 
als o sent canvassing teams of speakers recruited from 
Party members to various districts of the countr¥ and 
spon sored numerous political rallies and meetings.63 
Li ke the Party itself the Union made it a rule to hold 
an annual Conference in Tokyo to elect its officers and 
d of 64 a opt manl estoes. 
It is diff i cult to assess with a reasonable degree 
of accuracy the influence the Un ion exerted on the 
behaviour of the Seiyuukai and the nation's politics 
in general. There is no doubt, however, that it rep-
resented the or iginal pre-parliamentary party tradition 
which was inevitably overshadowed by the development of 
the parliamentary party and yet refused to pass away 
complet ely under the changed circumstances. In f ac t, 
the tradition has mana ged to survive the vicissitud~s 
of the subsequent war time and postwar years and is still 
vis ibly alive in the LOP. 
One of the most important functions of the Extra-
P arliamentary Union Was to use its members for the 
purpose o f disturb ing and obstructing the electi on camp-
° ° 65 aIgns of candidates from rival partIes and indeed a 
characteristic of this period Was that elections, whet her 
to the National Diet or prefectural assemblies, became 
matters of the greatest concern to the parties. In 1915 
the Election Committee, an organ s pecialising in electoral 
affairs, was established in the Seiyuukai and also two 
important principles concerning the endorsement of can-
didates by the Party were worked out. One was that 
pri ority should be given to an incumbent member at the 
expense of someone who had not previously been a Diet 
member , or had been a member and been defeatedo The other 
was that the Headquarters should have a veto power over 
the local Branches in the selection of Party-endorsed 
candidates o
66 
Both these principles have been fastidiously 
observed by the postwar parties and remain today the most 
respected of the prewar traditions in the practice of the 
LDP. 
The second of these principles relating to electoral 
politics indicated the general pattern of the relationship 
between the Headquarters and local Branches, which was just 
as grossly one-sided in the Seiyuukai as in the LOP. The 
reasons for the inequality which characterised this relat-
ionshi p were found l arg ely in the character of the 
Branches 0 Generally speaking , a Branch formed and operat-
ing at the prefectural level was a group made up almost 
exclusively of a handful of M.HoRo's who had been 
returned from the prefecture and a somewhat larger 
number of prefectural assembly memberso In many cases 
one would find, for example, the post of Branch President 
(shibuchoo) occupied by a MoHoRo and those of Branch 
67 Secretaries (kan.ji) by prefectural assembly members. 
Within a Branch so composed it was, as a rule, the 
M.HoR.'s who held the position of superiority and these 
men were naturally under the control of the Headquarters 
and its 1 e ad e r s • 
30. 
The growth in importance of House of Representatives 
elections led the Par ty leaders to make deliberate efforts 
to broaden and consolidate voter support for the Party by 
winning the support and co-operation of local men of 
influence . The most important of these were local pol-
iticians and administrators, especially prefectural assem-
bly members. Under these circumstances a sharply increas-
ing percentage of prefectural assembly members were led to 
join the major national parties , notably the Seiyuukai and 
the Kenseikai (renamed Minseitoo in 1927). Of those, for 
example , returned to the prefectural assemblies in the 
local elections of 1907, 1911, 1919, 1923 and 1935, 
between 43 and 68 per cent were officially affiliated with 
the former and between 17 and 41 per cent with the latter. 68 
The figures eloquently testify to the extent to which 
local politics and politicians had become part of national 
1 ·· d .. d· h· . d 69 party po ltlCS an organlsatlon urlng t lS perlO • 
At the height of prewar party influence in politics, 
which roughly corresponded to the time of Hara Takashi's 
leadershi p of the Seiyuukai, the regional groups in the 
Party were considered the basic units of opinion and 
interest aggregation and were regularly utilised as su~h 
by the Party leaders. Whenever a controversial issue 
arose , the Party leaders would have Party-affiliated 
M.H oR.'s attend the meetings of the regional groups 
(referred to as the ' village assembly' - 'mura no kai') 
to which they belonged and unify their views in such a 
manner as to conform to and strengthen the positions 
70 preferred by the leaders. Each one of these regional 
groups was led by a particularly influential member _ 
such as Hoshi Tooru and Hara Takashi of the Kantoo group , 
Sugita Teiichi of the Hokushin group, Matsuda Masahisa of 
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the Kyuushuu group, and so forth o The authority and pres -
tige of these individuals was such that they would swc;y the 
backbenchers ' views one way or another with relative ease
o 
Exactly as In the case of postwar faction leaders , 
especially of the LOP , their power depended to a consider-
able extent on the practice of distributing important party 
offices according to their advice on the basis of regional 
representation and balance o A backbencher would need 
their help and recommendation for his promotions in the 
Part yo 
In contrast to the opinion-aggregating function which 
the regional , groups evidently played, the other conspicuous 
role attributed to them was divisive and at times even 
disint egrative o For example in the mid - 1920 ' s a conflict 
developed between Hara and his group on the one hand and 
on the other Matsuda and his supporters . This conflict 
sprang from the traditional hostilities between the Kantoo 
and the Kyuushuu groups as much as from the more obvi ous 
antagonisms between the bureaucratic elements dominant in 
the former and the old party politic'ians associated with 
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the latter o This divisive influence of r egional groups 
remained very pronounced until it was oversh adowed by a 
newer form of intra-party factionalism based on factors 
other than geography . 
The point of transition from the old to the newe r 
form of factionalism in the Seiyuukai may be found in t he 
conflict in early 1922 between groups favouring a Cabinet 
72 
reshuffle (kaizooha) and those opposed to it (h i- kaizooha ). 
This took the form of a conflict between a dominant faction 
led by the Party P resident and Prime Minister , Tak ahashi , 
and a faction led by two dissident members of t he Cabinet , 
Nakahashi and Motoda o It was thus clearly a harbinger of 
32 • 
the postwar type of factionalism, particularly that of 
the LDP. 
As factionalism grew increasingly more prevalent 
and vicious, the prestige and authority of the Party 
President naturally suffered and became less and less 
readily accepted by the faction leaders , whose influence 
was steadily rising. The following conditions no doubt 
accelerated such a process. After the formation of the 
Hara Cabinet in 1918 the central role of the parties in 
the system of government became accepted much more 
wid ely than previously in the name of the 'norm of con-
stitutional government ' (kensi no joodoo). As a result, 
the position of a Party President became a main, though 
nev er quite exclusive, route to premiership. It was 
not , however, the simple fact of being the leader of the 
largest opposition party that determined u~timately who 
shou ld succeed a resigning Prime Minister . What mattered 
were particular personal relationships maintained by the 
compe ting party politicians with the upper stratum of 
the extra-parliamentary, often extra-constitution~l, 
powe r structure repr e sented by the semi-institutionalised 
genroo (council of elder statesmen) , the Privy Council, 
the House of Peer s , and so forth . These two inter-
rela ted conditions led many faction leaders to aspire to 
the post of President and , for the purpose of attaining 
it , to engage in factional manoeuvres against each other. 
Should the incumbent President be found unable to obtain 
the imperial appoi ntmen t to the Premiership for any 
reason, his competitors within the Party would criticise 
him as unfit . Fac t i opali sm na turall y thri ved on thi s 
kind of rivalry and mutual suspicion between influential 
73 members. 
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Following Pr esident Tanaka 's death ln 1929, the 
struggle over the problem of succession was fought between 
Suzuki Kisaburoo and Tokonami Takejiroo o The danger of 
another major split of the Party posed by this conflict 
was barely averted by the intervention of Inukai Tsuyoki, 
but after the latter's assassination in May 1932 it was 
resumed with renewed intensityo As sisted by two younger 
but extremely shrewd 'brains', Mori Kaku and Hatoyama 
Ichiroo , Suzuki emerged victor from the struggle. Partly, 
however , because of illness and partly because of mount-
ing dissatisfaction with his ineffectual leadership he 
was compel led to resign in February 1937 and a collegiate 
form of leadership was substituted for the single Pres-
ident 0
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This device, called a 'Presidential Proxy 
Committee ' (Soosai-daikoo-iin), involved four Party 
leaders - Hatoyama Ichiroo, Maeda Yonezoo, Nakajima 
Chikuhei and Shimada Toshio - and was designed to contain, 
at least temporarily, the intra-party factional strife 
symbolised by the relationship between these four indiv-
iduals o For recisely the same reasons and purposes, the 
device was revived eighteen years later by the LOP in 
November 1955. 
By the end of May 1938, however, pressure for rev-
ersion to the simple presidential system became so great 
that it was evidently impossible to continue under the 
commi ttee system much longer o On the other hand , both 
Hatoyama and Nakajima were determined to bid for the 
post of President as soon as it was reinstated and 
neither was likely to give up the fight0 75 This con-
flict led in April 1939 to the final break up of the 
Seiyuukai into the two separate parties , one led by 
H t h h b N k .. 76 a oyama ' s deputy , Kuhara, and t e o t er y a aJlma o 
By the time all existing parties were absorbed by the 
34 . 
Taiseiyokusan-kai on t he eve of the Second World War one 
of the two major prewar parties was thus irrevocably 
divided and factionalism had become its most conspicuous 
attribute. Furthermore , factionalism had completely 
shifted by this time from a geograph ical to a personal and 
b . 77 monetary aSlS o 
The relationship between the Mitsui House and the 
Meiji oligarchy is legendary, dating back to the first 
years of Meiji when Mitsui Takafuku and Minoura Rizaemon 
were semi-official financiers of the Imperial Court and 
the Meiji 78 government 0 It was, however, fOllowing the 
Russo -Japanese War that the relationship between the 
zaibatsu concerns and the parties became more or less i 
forma lised and accepted almost as a matter of course. 
The sudden and substantial increase in the number of voters 
fol lowing that war made an election a much more costly 
affa ir than previously and drove the parties to seek 
progressively more funds from the wealthy monopolies, and 
so to increase their dependence on themo 
The revision of the Election Law in 1919, which lowered 
the minimum amount of direct state taxes to be paid by a 
qua lified voter from ten to three yen tripled the number 
of voters , while the i ntroduction of the universal manhood 
suf frage in 1925 further quadrupled it from three to well 
over twelve million o 79 The resultant increase in the 
numbe r of voters and the diversification in their socio-
economic backgrounds inevitably resulted in a sharp rise 
in the cost of campaigning o 
Although the relationship between Mitsui and the 
~eiyuukai could not be inferred so easily from the compos-
ition of its leadership g roup as in the case of Mitsubishi 
and the Minseitoo , it was nevertheless clear that some of 
its prominent leaders - Yamamoto Jootaroo, Yamamoto 
Teijiroo and Mori Kaku - were well-known ' Mitsui-men ' and 
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acted as such . Although it is impossible to make an 
accurate estimation of the amount of money that flowed 
from the Mitsui-affiliated firms to the Seiyuukai , it was 
probably in the order of a few million yen per election, 
81 as suggested by one commentator . 
Between the First World War and the May 15th Incident 
of 1932 Mitsui's role as the provider of the Seiyuukai's 
electioneering funds was predominant. This made it poss-
ible for fairly centralised control to be maintained over 
par ty funds by the Party President and Secretary-General 
at the expense of their potential competitors who might 
have wished to cultivate independent sources of revenue 
of their own to compete with the dominant group in the 
Party. As is well known, however~ Mitsui gradually and 
deliberate ly withdrew from active participation in party 
poli tics after the ' change of policy' (tenkoo) in the wake 
of the May 15th Incident. 82 
It was under such circumstances that the role of the 
'newly rising' concerns (shinkoo-zaibatsu), represented 
by Kuhara Fusanosuke' s Nihon Sangyoo (Nissan ), Mori 
Nobuteru 's Mori Koogyoo, and others, rapidly became pre-
dominan t .
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The diversification of the sources of finan-
cia l contributions brought about by the rise of these new 
Concerns rendered increasingly more difficult the ma i n -
tenance of centralised co ntro l of funds flowing into the 
Party from external sources . Such a situation i n turn 
encOuraged the growth of plural factions in the Party , 
each tied to one or more of these sources . Apart f r om 
the emotional and inter-personal factors mentioned 
already, these new deve1opmentsamong the nation ' s business 
circles h a d a consid e rable effect on the state of the 
i n tra-party factionalism o Thu s a situation closely akin 
to what has become so typical of the LOP had already 
emerged by the end of the 1930's o 
The Minseitoo as An Alternative Model 
While the Liberal Party wi ng of the Kenseitoo 
f ormed the Seiyuukai fOllowin g the spl it of 1898, the 
Pro gressive Party wing continued to exist as the 
Kenseihontoo (renamed the Rikken-kokumintoo in March 
1910) 0 Its membership of less than one hundred split 
in February 1913, when half the members joined the newly 
formed Rikken-dooshikai, leaving the other half to continue 
to c all themselves the Kokumintoo (national partY)084 It 
was not until the House of Representati v es election of 
Ma rch 1915 that the Rikken-dooshikai half of the former 
Progressives manag ed to defeat the Seiyuukai 153 to 108 
d d th . . . .. 85 an prove eIr competItIve posItIon. In October 1916 
the Rikken-dooshikai formed the Kenseikai together with 
two minor parties, the Chuuseikai and the Kooyuu - kurabu 086 
The membership composition of the parliamentary 
party of the Kense i t o o and its suc c essors was similar to 
tha t of the Seiyuukai. By far the largest occupational 
category was that of local politicians, who continued well 
in to the 1930's to account fo r over a half of the total 
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number o The rat e of decline of this particular category 
Was not as conspicuous i n t h e Kenseikai and the Minseitoo 
as i n the S e iyuukai o Before the Russo-Japanese War the 
percen tage of pu blic s ervants had been very high , but 
sub sequently it decreased sharply, especially in the 
1920' s o As in the Seiyuu kai, businessmen and lawyers 
We re nume rically most important next to local po l iti c ians o 
The org a n isation of the Kenseikai was also almost 
37~ 
identical with that of the Seiyuukai. All organs found 
in the latter were either expressly provided for in the 
Keiseika i Constitution of 1916 or subsequently created 
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as need arose o There were , however , a few notable 
differences between th~ two parties in the actua l work-
ing of these or gans o 
One difference related to the role p l ayed b y the 
po li cy research organ in the party decision-making proc-
ess and the status accorded to it o While it was not 
unti l the late 1920's that the S eiyuukai began to recog-
nise th e great importance of its PARC , the Kenseikai 
placed a much greater emphasis on the activities of it s 
own PARC from the beginning . It was only two weeks 
after the Part y was formed i n 1916 that a decision was 
made to th e e f fect that any bill wh ich Party-affiliated 
MoHoR . ' s might wish to introduce or have introduced by 
the Party i n the Di et must be submitted to the PARC in 
89 advance for consideration and approval . Here was 
clearly present the concept of a formal party decision 
and a regularised process of decision- making
o 
In August 19 17 the Kenseikai ' s PARC was dealing with 
. h ·f·· 90 elg teen speCl lC Issues o Each of these issues was 
examined in the fi rst instance by one of the Divisions 
(~) set up in the organ and then reported back to the 
plenary meeting of the PARC with concrete recommendat -
. f . 91 Ions ' or further a ct Ion . By October 1918 it became 
customary for the p l enary meetings of the PARC to be 
attended by all l ead ing officials of the P ar ty , including 
the S ecretary - General and S ecre t aries , Advisers , members 
92 of the E ecu tive Council , and so for t h . In terms , 
t herefore , of both the form and substance o f policy res -
earch activities , the Kenseikai after abou t 1920 r esemb l ed 
38 . 
the LOP o f t he mid-1960 ' s even more c l ose l y than did its 
Se iyuuka i coun terpar t on the eve of t he S e cond World Waro 
An other not eworthy aspect of t he actual op e ration 
of t he Kenseikai ' s o rgans concern ed th e r ole of the 
' kambukai ', which was rough ly equ i va l en t to t h e pres en t 
' yak u i n k a i ' (l eaders ' meet i ng ) in the LOP o The practice 
for t he p ri n cipa l P ar t y offi ci als t o meet on a f a i r ly 
regu l a r bas i s was s t arted i n the middl e o f 191 7 . Who shou l d 
par t icipat e i n these consu lt at i on s was n ev e r ri g idly fi xedo 
Regular attend ance was , h owev er , g r a dua ll y limited to the 
sen io r members o f the Exe cu ti ve Counc il, t he Secretary-
General and S e c re t aries , and Adv i ser s, occa s i ona ll y supp-
lemented by the P resident and the PARC Chairman . 93 I n 
con t rast t o the ' Three Leaders ' Mee ti ngs ', thy 'Seven 
Leaders' Mee ti ngs ' and so for t h i n t he LOP, the number of 
officials present a t the ' kambukai' meet i ngs remain,ed 
larger than ten as a rule , often being near ly twentyo 
In the Se i yuukai' s leadersh i p c ompo si tion hi gh - ranki ng 
public servants were accorded high pr io r ity . In co mpari son, 
the rs1ative we i ght given t o fo r mer l ocal p o litici ans i n 
the Kenseikai' s organs was of qui t e i mpres s ive proportions o 
The c omp ara ti ve percentages of the f ive principal occupa t-
iona1 c a t ego r i es i n th~ compo s i t i on of t he two par t ies' 
leadership groups i n three years i n t he Ta ishoo era were 
as fol l ows : 94 
1919 S e i yuukai 
Kenseikai 
1922 S eiyuukai 
Kense i kai 
1925 Sei yuukai 
Kenseika i 
Loc . 
:po 1. 
3 1 0 5% 
46 . 6 
13 0 0 
54 . 5 
2 1. 7 
43 .1 
Pub . Bus i ness o Lawyers Jou r nal . 
S erv o 
15 . 7% 1507% 21 .0% 5 . 2% 
10 . 0 6 . 6 0.0 26 , 6 
13 eO 13 0 0 21.7 26 .0 
6 . 0 9 0 0 6 0 0 15.1 
8 . 6 2 107 17.3 13.0 
7 .8 0.0 9 .8 23 .5 
As the statistical evidence clearly demonstrates, local 
po liticians were by far the predominant group in the 
leadership positions of the Party in these years, while 
the percentage of journalists was also quite substantial. 
On the other hand, businessmen, lawyers and public serv-
ants were relatively few o 
The preponderance of local polit ic ians in the 
leadership composition of the Kenseikai had a considerable 
e ffect upon the relationship between the Party's Head-
quarters in Tokyo and local Branches o In the case of the 
Seiyuukai the relationship was evidently one-sided, as 
we have already seen. 
In contrast, that obtaining between the Kenseikai's 
Headquarters and Branches seems to have been much more 
equa l and deliberately sOo A Branch was allowed to have 
it s own screening committee to decide, (with the ex post 
fac to consent of th~ Headquarters), which particular 
candidates to endorse in a Diet election, although the 
principle of giving priority to an incumbent member was 
95 gener a lly observed o 
The relatively large scope of in~tiative and freedom 
of action which the Kenseikai allowed its Branches to 
enjoy was justified by and further encouraged regularised 
and effective Party activities at the grass-root level, 
and also gro~th of membershipo By early 1925 it had 
Sucoeeded in creating Branches in at least 27 of the 46 
pre fectures and in 4aving regi ona l meetings of Branch 
members held at least once a year in all nine regions of 
96 
the countryo The fact that Secretary Yamaji Jooichi 
publicly announced at the Party Conference of December 
1919 that it had a current membership of 262,260 was symbol-
° ° b h O 97 IC of its interest in the size of Its grass-root mem ers Ip. 
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Apparently prompted (directly or indirectly) by the 
expansionist policy of the Party's leaders in this respect, 
a few dozen or few hundred farmers and shopkeepers from a 
particular v illage or tuwn would become members of the 
98 Party en bloc. 
Combined with the singularly high status accorded to 
the PARC and the functions of the 'kambukai ' in the gener-
al framework of the Party's decision-making machinery, 
the great concern for grass-root support and numerical 
strength mqde the Kenseikai look, if anything, more modern 
than the Seiyuukaio It Was more typically a mass, or mass-
oriented, party and as such resembled the LOP of the mid-
1960's more closelyo 
After the Kenseikai was reorganised and became the 
Rikken-minseitoo (hereafter referred to as the Minseitoo) 
in June 1927 the distinctive air of modernity both in its 
general organisational policy and ideological outlook was 
preserved and even emphasisedo The role of the PARC grew 
in importance and prestige, its work becoming more system-
atic and sophisticated and its broad orientation showing 
If 1·· 99 a distinct preference for we are state po lCles . 
In terms of organisational programmes the Party 
attempted to establish Branches at the township and vill-
age, as well as the prefectural, level and to encourage 
young people in particular to join it. What was more 
interesting from the point of view of our contemporary 
concern was that in the middle of 1936 it published a plan 
to lncrease the number of dues-paying members to 450,000 
as the initial target , and to divide the one-yen per 
head membership fee between the Headquarters and the local 
Branch concerned on a fifty-fifty basis. lOO This plan 
could well have come from the LOP in the 1960' s . In terms 
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of public relations activities of a more general type , the 
Party sponsored a series of ' political education lectures ' 
which were periodically held at the nati on's principal 
urban centres and were attended each time by hundreds of 
prefectural assembly members and other kinds of local 
I " " " 101 T" po 1t1clano h1s was again almost exactly what the 
LOP would be doing thirty years lat er . 
The relationship between the Ktnseikai (and the 
Minseitoo) and Mitsubishi was similar to that between the 
Seiyuukai and Mitsui . In the early days Ookubo Toshimichi 
and Ookuma Shigenobu had been to Mitsubishi what Itoo 
H " b " d I K h d b M"" 102 1ro um1 an noue aoru a een to 1tsU1 . Subse-
quently , however , the Minseitoo-Mitsubishi relationship 
became more direct and personal , as indicated by the fact 
that the Kenseikai ' s first President , Katoo Takaaki , had 
not only been a leading official of a Mitsubishi concern 
but was married to the first daughter of the founder of 
the zaibatsu , Iwasaki Yataroo . In addition to Katoo , 
another top leader of the Party, Sengoku Mitsugu , was also 
a prominent ' Mitsubishi-man', while the Minse itoo Presid-
ent Hamaguchi Yuukoo ' s trusted confida.nt , Shidehara Kijuuroo, 
103 
was married to Iwasaki ' s second daughter o 
Althou gh it is again impossible to estimate the size 
of monetary contributions made by Mitsubishi to the 
Kenseikai or the Minseitoo , it seems clear that the latter 
depended very considerably on them , especially a t the 
time of elections . Such a situation continued until the 
' change of policy' which Mitsubishi underwent in the foot-
steps of Mitsui and which was official~y acknowledged 
in the ' Principles of the Mitsubishi Spirit ' 
seishin kooryoo) i n March 1934 0104 
(Mi t subi shi-
J 
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Surmnary 
As we have seen above , the prewar Jap~nese conservat-
ive parties developed from small local seisha g roups made 
i n i tial l y of ~ c l ass citizen$ . F ollowing the establish-
ment of the National Die t i n 18 90, parliamentary party 
organisations began to p l aya predomi nan t role and the 
bulk of thei r members were recruited from local politic-
ians and entrepr~neurs o In t he first few years of the 
exi st enc e of parl i amentary parties public officials also 
contributed a significant percentage of their members, but 
before long l awyers became numerically more important. 
In the meantime , t he percentage of local politicians g r ad -
ual ly but stead ily decreased from the initial 72 per 
cent to less than 50 per cent after the middle of 1920' s. 
Even in the late 1930' s , however , local politicians were 
the largest sing l e category i n both ma jor part ie s , followed 
by businessmen , lawyers and journalists o 
Conscious efforts to recruit local politicians into 
the party organisation as the core of its grass-roo ts 
membersh i p began to be made by t he Seiyuukai before 1907 
and to receive very s er i ous attention in the Kenseikai 
after 1920. The latter showed genui ne interest in build -
ing the party organisation as a mass organisation and in 
1936 even introduced the idea of collecting membership 
fees from all members o 
Despite these deve lopments , however , there was an 
ev ident tendency in the Seiyuukai from th e outset to 
treat high-ranki n g public servants as a spec i .cd category . 
This tendency was reflected very clearly in the dis -
propor ti onately high pe r centage of them found in the 
Party ' s leadership group o S eeds of 'bureaucratisation' 
of the conservative parties were sown , i n fact , when the 
Seiyuukai was formed under Itoo Hirobumi' s leadership in 
1900. 
On the question of organisation, virtually all basic 
structural characteristics of the postwar conservative 
parties had emerged before the S econd World Waro Before 
1900 the 'Three Leaders' offices - a Secretary-General 
and the Chairmen of an Executive Council and a PARC - had 
all become permanent attributes of t h e basic organisation 
of a conservative part yo By 1911 the PARC of the 
Seiyuukai had come to consist of specialised Divisions 
and in 1928 was officially empowered to make decisions 
on behalf of the Party as a whole o 
The principle of having a Party President elected 
by the Party Conference at large (known as the koosen) 
was introduced in the Seiyuukai in the late 1920' s and the 
peculiar system of collegiate leadership called a 
'Presidential Proxy Committee' was experimented with in 
the late 1930' s o Almost as soon as it was formed in 
1916, the Kenseikai introduced the semi-official highest 
decision-making organ, the kambukai, which was identical 
with the 'yakuinkai' of the LOP o An election committee 
and a party affairs committee had been set up as the 
Seiyuukai's official organs in 1915. 
The subordination of local Branches to the Party 
Headquarters was a feature of the Seiyuukai, especially 
in relation to the endorsement of candidates in elections . 
In contrast, the Kenseikai deliberately encouraged the 
exercise of much more initiative and freedom of action by 
its Branches, especially after 1920~ 
Intra-party factions emerged in the Constitutional 
Liberal Party primarily on a geographical basis and, as 
such, subsequently provided a principle to be applied in 
4Ao 
the filli ng of key party organs o Its t ansfG:1rma tion into 
the more contemporary form of fa c ti oralism - based prim-
arily on factors other than geographical - became evident 
in the Seiyuukai around 1922, and the split of the Party 
i~ 1939 occurred basically because of the effects of this 
new kind of factionalism. 
Relationships b etween one or other of the major con-
servative parties and a zaibatsu concern were well known 
from the earliest days of Japanese party politics. They 
assumed increasing impor tance after the Ru sso-Japane se 
War and reached a peak following the First World Wa~ during 
the era of ' Taishoo Democracy'. This state of affairs 
lasted until early 1930 ' s, wh en Mitsu i and then Mitsubishi 
unde r wen t a ' change of policy' and stopped their active 
intervention in party politics; 
These were the most importan t heritages from prewar 
party politics which on the eve of the S econd World War 
were there to be pi cked up or abandon:ed • . In the next 
chapter we shall see how they survived the big changes in 
the nation's interna tional and domesti c conditions in th~ 
followi ng fifteen years and were transmitted to the LOP 
in 19550 
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CHAPI'ER 2 
THE TRANSMISSIO OF '!BE PREWAR HERITAGE 10 POSTWAR PARTIES 
Wartime Interregnum 
The ' New P arty ' and ' New System' movement of the lat e 
1930 ' s , which eventually led to the creation of the 
Taiseiyokusankai (imperial rule assistance association) 
i n October 1940 , provoked contrasting responses from the 
S eiyuukai and the Minseitoo o When in early 1938 the 
National Mobilization Bill (Kokkasoodoo i n hooan ) was 
introduc ed in to the Imperial Di et by t he First Konoe 
Cabinet , the PARC of the Minseitoo decided to oppose it , 
while a majority in the Seiyuukai wanted not only an 
affirmative vote on the Bill but prompt disso lution of the 
Par t y i tself to facilitate the creati on of a new party 
headed by Konoe . There were i ndividuals i n the former , 
such as Nagai Ryuutaroo , who publicly advoca ted t he New 
P ar t y and New System Plans , but they were a minority among 
t he Di e t members affil i ated with that party , wh e reas thos e 
who opposed them in the Seiyuukai , such as Hatoyama 
Ichiroo , were just as hopelessly outnumbered in that 
party by thos e who subscribed to the pro - mi litary blue -
1 print of a one - party system. For the same reason , the 
' Kazami Plan ' drafted toward the end of May 1940 with a 
vi ew to es t ablishing a new political system called for 
-the creation of a new party without the . part icipation 
of the m~jority in the Minseitoo or the mino r ity in the 
S · k' 2 e lyuu a l e 
Fo l lowing Konoe ' s announcement on 24 June 1940 to 
the effect that he was prepared to lead the movement for 
a new sys t em , the three S eiyuukai groups swift l y proc -
eed ed to disband themselves o In the Minseitoo , howev er , 
President Machid a Chuuji rejected the demand f or the 
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Party's prompt di ssolution submitted to h im by Nagai and 
his followers and forced them to secede on 25 July. It 
was not until 15 August that it was finally c ompell ed to 
bow to the mounting pressures outside the Party for its 
dissolution and association with the Taiseiyokusankai . 3 
Even before it was officially formed this seemin g ly 
national qrganisation faced opposition in the form of 
this kind of resistance from the Minseitoo . 
The Iaiseiyokusankai , which finally emerged In 
October 1940 was initial l y governed by Pr esi den t Ko n oe 
and Sec retary-General Arima Yor i yasu and consisteq of a 
Headquarters and local Branches . The Headquarters was 
mad e up of Advisers (komon) and Standing Advisers 
(jQonin-komon ), an Executive Council ( soomu) and a 
Standin g Executive Council (joonin-soomu) , a nd under 
these offices five Bur~aux (kyoku) , a Central Co-
operation Council (chuuoo kyooryoku kaigi) and a Secret-
ariat (jimukyoku) s taff ed with Counsellors (sanyo) . 4 
Under this initial arrangement the Imperial Diet was 
brought under the supervision of the Diet Bur eau 
(gikaikyoku) and robbed of its independ ent deliberative 
functions . 
In the course of the 76 th Di et (December 1940 -
March 1941 ), however , members b itterly criti cis ed the 
organisation on account of its all - inclusive , monopol-
istic character . The re-organisation undertaken as a 
result of such pressure in April 1941 reduced the numb~r 
of both its organs and funct ions and left it to cont inue 
with only three Bureaux and a Central Training School 
( chuuoo kun renjo ). 5 This re - organisati on no t only put 
an end to the political activities of the Taiseiyokusank~i 
but led to the withd rawal of most members of the Diet 
from it. 
In May 1942 , however , a new body, the Yokusan-
seijikai (imp erial rule assistance political associat-
ion) was established as an all-inclusive pational party 
and on this occas ion only eight membe rs of the Diet 
remained outside i t as . d 6 Indepe n ents . The revived one-
party system continued until March 1945, when two sep -
arate minor groups , the Gokoku-dooshikai and the 
Yokusoogiin-dooshik~, were formed by those who had 
withdrawn from that organisation . At the same time , the 
Yokusan-seijikai was re -named the Dai- nihon-sei jikai 
(great Japan poli tical associ ation ). The Gokoku -
dooshikai was disbanded on 15 August and its members 
rejoined the Dai-nihon-seijikai , while the latter and 
the Yokusoogiin-dooshikai remained alive until early 
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Like the Taiseiyokusankai , the Yokusan-sei jikai and 
the Dai-nihon- sei jikai were national political organisat-
ions with a membership recruited from a wide ran g e of 
occupational groups other than members of the Diet , not -
ably the military se r vices, the bureaucracy , business 
circles and the media of mass communication . Memoers of 
the Diet were only one of the more important categories 
and, as such , did not enjoy a position of superi ority to 
any significant degree . Structurally , however, these 
organisations obviously inherited prewar party models and, 
in fact, the degree to which they were accepted by them 
became more , rath er than less , evident as time passed. 
In the original organisational framework of the 
Taiseiyokusankai as it was founded in Oc tober 1940 there 
were two kinds of party organ ( apart from the post of 
President) directly inherited from the prewar parties 
48. 
namely the Executive Council and the Advisers. The Diet 
Bureau itself had no independ:ent organs comparable to 
8 
those of a party . Its Secretary~General was not the 
conventio~al kanjichoo but a jimusoochoo, while the 
policy research organs were absent until the reorganis-
ation of April 19410 The Yokusan-seijikai inherited 
intact th~ structure of the reorganis ed Taiseiyokusankai . 
It underwent, however, a drastic reorganisation in May 
1943, as a result of which an M.H.R.' s Meeting 
(daigishikai) was set up ~s a permanent organ and both 
the Executive Council and the PARC were greatly stren-
gthened. Moreover, the Bureaux were replaced by the 
fmiliar Divisions (bu).9 As the office of Advisers was 
preserved, the only major difference which still remained 
between either major prewar party and the Yokusan-
seijikai in terms of organisation structure was the 
appellation given to the post of Secretary-General. 
When it was reorganised into the Dai-nihon-seijikai in 
March 1945 , even that difference disappeared and the 
familiar appellation of kanjichoo was revived. 
The re-appearance i n these wartime organisations 
of the more or le ss established models of party leader-
ship structure proceeded paralle l to the process whereby 
members of the Diet re-asserted and, to a certain extent 
regained , their role as one of the central forces in 
the policy-maki ng process of the state . This process 
was started aq soon as the organic tie between the 
Taiseiyokus~nkai and the Diet was severed by the reorg-
anisation of April 19410 As a resu lt of that reorgan-
isation the Diet Bureau was abo lishe d and the 
Taiseiyokusankai itself remained merely as a purely 
administrative agenc y of the state under the direct and 
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exclusive control of the Minister of Home Aff a ir s . 
After the Yokusan- seijikai was formed as its political 
arm in May 1942 members of the Diet became bo ld er than 
before in their bid to recover initiative and independ-
ence o Alt h ough the influence of the burea~crats i n the 
Yokusan- sei j ikai , was no doubt very substantia l, members 
of the Diet also played the leading part in its act i vi t-
. 10 
leS e 
Moreover , once the balance of power In the organis-
ation had been tipped in the party politicians ' favour , 
its existence actually provided them with a convenient 
shel t er behind which to preserve the prewar ideological 
and organisational heritages of party politics and to 
pass them on to the postwar parties formed as soqn as the 
II 
war was over . Despite the apparent war time interrupt-
ion in the development of parties and party politics , t he 
or ganisation and probably also behaviour of the prewar 
parties was thus kept alive and ready to be made use of 
in the postwar years o 
Resurrection under th e Occupation 
If it is surprising that the prewar traqitions of 
party politics were preserved without maj or modi ficat-
ions during the Second World War , except for the imposed 
one-party pattern, it is even more remarkable that they 
should have survived the prolonged period of the Alli ed 
Occupation following the end of the war o The key to an 
understanding and explanat ion of this rema rkable fact 
lies in the timing of the formation of the first postwar 
p~r t ies and th e peculiar le ga l status of a par ty in the 
Japanese sys t em of government o 
As soon as the war came to an end in August 1945 , 
several groups of prewar party po l iticians began to 
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prepare for the f ormat ion of new parties and by t he 
middle of November two major conservative parties - the 
Jiyuutoo (Liberal Party) and the Shimpotoo (Prog~essive 
P arty) - had come into being side by side with some 
thirty other groups all calling themselves ' part ies ' . 12 
A few days befor e the war officially came to an 
end Hatoyama Ichiroo and his associates began to make 
serious preparations for the formation of a postwar 
party . Hatoyama discussed the problem with Ashida 
Hitoshi on 11 August when the latter visited him ~t 
Karuizawa o13 On 15 Au gust , still unaware of the d ec -
ision made by the Supreme Council on the Conduct of the 
War to accept the Potsdam Proclamation, his close as soc-
iates gathered at the office of the Koojunsha in Tokyo 
to exchange their views on forming a new party and d ec -
ideito bring Hatoyama to Tokyo from his Karuizawa hide -
14 
out o Following Hatoyama ' s return to Tokyo on 22 
August, a fifteen - member Founding Committee (S o oritsu -
iinkai) was set up , a platform was drafted and on 9 
November the inaugural meeting was held o15 
The Liberal Party which thus came into being was 
first and foremost Hatoyama ' s party in the sense that 
it could not have b~en formed without his personal lead -
ership and presence o It was also essentially a successor 
to the K~hara faction of the Seiyuukai , as suggested 
by the factional breakdown of the MoH . R o' s in i t i al ly 
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In or gan isation, the Liberal Party was a lmo s t 
identical with both th e two major prewar parties . I t 
had a President , Advisers , an Executive Council , a 
Secretary-General and a PARC o 17 Its original l ead e r ship 
composition had a rather novel aspect in that tw o of the 
four Advisers and SlX of the sixteen members of the 
Executive Council were non-parliamentarian intellect-
uals, public servants and a businessman. As the over-
all organisational strvcture subsequently became 
increa~ingly more complex, however, this factor di~-
appeared rather quicklyo Moreove r , the old m~thod 
of distributing the membership of the Executive Council 
among seven or eight geographical regions according to 
the number of M.H.R.' s returned from each (the method 
Which had been formalised in the Seiyuukai's Consul-
tative Council in 1903) was revived in May 1946. 18 
Before the spring of 1946, when Hatoyama and other 
Party found~rs were removed from their party posts by 
the Purge, the prewar organisational model of a conser-
vative party had been ~ully and effectively re-established. 
In other words, had the Purge come six months earlier, 
it might have caused a genuine break in the evolution 
of Japanese parties and party politics. In reality, 
however, it came too late to prevent the resurrection of 
the prewar traditions which had been preserved, rather 
than destroyed, by the wartime pseudo-party organisations. 
Precisely the same conditions existed for the 
Progressive Party. While the preparations for the form-
ation of the Liberal Party proceeded upder Batoyama' s 
personal and unitary leadership, the initial efforts to 
form the Progressive Party came from three separate 
groups. Those who had formed an internal opposition 
in t~e Dai~nihon-seijikai, including Matsumura Kenzoo, 
Oota Masataka and Ogasawara Sankuroo, first set out to 
build a party to compete with Hqtoyama' s. This grou~ 
e~tablished a Postwar Political and Econ9mic Research 
Association (sengo sei;i keizai kenkyuukai) as the 
basis of its ~arty building efforts. Those who h~d been 
in control of the principal posts in the Dai-nihon-
seijikai, including Ooasa Tadao, Uchida Nobuya and 
Miyoshi Hideyuki, constituted the second group int-
erested i~ forming a new party separate from the Liberal 
Part yo The third group consisted of relatively young 
men, such as Inukai Takeru, Baba Motoharu and Noda Takeo, 
who set up a Research Association for the Construction 
of a New Japan (shin-nihon kensetsu choosakai )o19 By 
early November these three groups had reached agree-
ment among themselves to unite and establish a single 
20 part yo 
On 24 November 1945, when its parliamentary party 
was officially formed, 273 M.H oRo' s were affiliated wit~ 
the Prqgressive Part y o Of them 163 ( 59%) had been 
elected in the 20th election of April 1937 or earlier 
and of these 163 eighty-nine (54%) had been associated 
with the Minseitoo, 39 (23%) with the Nakajima faction 
of the Seiyuukai and seven (402%) with its Kuhara 
. 21 factlon o In contrast to the Liberal Party, which 
was an alliance of the Kuhara faction of the Seiyuukai 
and those elected during the war, the Progressive 
Party was an alliance of the Minseitoo, the Nakajima 
faction of the Seiyuukai and thoo e elected in the war-
time electiono 
The original organisa tional structure of the 
Progressive Party was similar to those of the prewar 
parties and of the postwar Liberal Party. Following 
in the footsteps of the latter, in December 1946, it 
officially adopted the old formula of forming the 
Executi ve Council on the basis of regional representat-
ion, and the prewar principle of hav ing its President 
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elected at the Party Conference . 
Another important factor which contributed to the 
wholesale transmission of prewar heritage to the postwar 
parties was the vague and indefinable legal status of 
th~ parties in the system of government . Most of the 
drastic changes in the nation's social and political 
institutions accomplished under the Occupation took the 
form of revisions of specific existing laws or the 
23 
enactment of new ones. In contrast , it Was impossible 
to 're form' the parties either structurally or b.ehaviour-
al ly because a firm, tangible legal basis was lacking 
for them. Ever since the days of the humble seisha 
groups , the parties had evolved pre-eminently as de 
facto institutions and consequently, neither their org-
anisation structures, their status in the system of 
government nor their basic functions had been explicitly 
defined in legal terms . This made it possible for the 
groups of prewar politicians to model the original post-
war parties on forms with which they were familiar. It 
also led those who took over from them when they were 
retired temporarily by the Purge, to maintain the same 
forms intac L 
This is not to suggest, however , that interest in 
legislating about the parties Was totally lacking in the 
years immediately following the end of the war. In 
fact, as soon as the preparations for the revision of 
the Election Law were started toward the end of 1946, 
the drafting of a political party law (seitoohoo) 
began to be seriously contemplated , particularly by a 
group of Home Ministry officials who were planning at 
the time to experiment with an electoral system based 
on proportional representation . 24 Although their 
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initial attempt was soon given up in the fact of oppos-
ition from most of the parties, the chaos created 
around the time of the 1946 House of Representatives 
election by the emergence of hundreds of purely nominal 
'parties' led the Diet to deal with the problem during 
the first Diet session under the new Constitution. The 
Special Committee on the Political Part y Bill and the 
Election Law, establi s hed in the House of Representativ~s 
in August 1947 examined such specific questions as the 
definition, organisation, and financing of a party and 
its role in the electoral process. 25 A Drafting Sub-
Committee which the Committee set up actually prepared 
a draft of a Political Party Bill and this was supported 
by the four largest parties - the Liberals, the Demo-
crats (Progressives), the Socialists and the National 
Co-operative Party (Kokumin-kyoodootoo}.26 
The opposition of the smaller parties, however, 
notably the Peasant Party (noomintoo) and the Japan 
Communist Party, rendered the efforts of the Sub-
Committee abortive. The bill was shelved and, in its 
place, a National Election Administration Committee 
Bill (Zenkoku-senkyo-kanri-iinkai hooan) was passed. 
In the second Diet a Sub-Committee established to draft 
a bill relating to the p a rties as well as regula:ti 'ort ')of 
corrupt electoral practices ended up by drafting a 
Political Fund Regulation Bill (Sei ji-shikin kisei 
hooan}.27 
The failure of thes e efforts was due partly to 
the fact that the organisational structures and prac-
tices which had been inherited from the prewar parties 
were not particul a rly undemocratic or authoritarian so 
far as their constitution s were conc erned o Also the 
belief was widely shared that parties shoul d be left 
to themselves to develop freely without the interference 
of legal restrictions o For these reasons, it was felt 
that the restrictions contemplated by the draft Bill 
were unnecessary , if not positively harmful0 28 
Und er the circumstances described abQve the first 
postwar conservative parties started thei r lives as the 
direct descendants of the prewar parties o The Pu~ge, 
however, caused a change of far-reaching impo~tance in 
their membership characteristics and in the patterns of 
inter-personal and inter-group relationships both within 
and between them o Its more immediate and short-range 
effect was to make it possible for the postwar politic-
ians, represented by Yoshida S higeru and his close coter-
, ie, temporarily to enjoy almost uncontested hegemony in 
conservative politics of the Occupation period, and to 
build the basis for sustained influence in the politics 
of the post-Occupation period o 
The magnitude of the blow dealt to the two major 
conservative parties by the Purge was clearly indicated 
by the fact that of the 270 M.H.Ro' s affiliated with the 
Progressive Party on 19 December 1945, two hundred and 
fifty (9 2 06%) were purged and of the 45 who bel onged to 
the Liberal Party twenty (44 04%) were likewise affected. 29 
As these comparative figures sug g est , the effect of the 
Burge on the Progressive Party was far more crippling 
than on the Liberal Part Yo Even with the Liberal Party, 
however, the effect was serious enough to cause an 
almost complete change in the composition of the Party's 
leadership group. 
In the Progressive Party, President Machida Chuuji 
and other offi c ials were forced to resign en masse in 
56. 
February 1946 and were replaced by the Party's remaining 
Diet members, supplemented by some who had never been qr 
were not currently members of the Diet. 30 The change ln 
the prewar-postwar ratio of the Progressive Party leader-
ship became even more evident after the 22nd House of 
Representatives election of April 1946. By February 
1947 only three of the ten elected memb e rs of the 
Executive Council had been Diet members before the war, 
while both the Chairman and all four Vice-Chairmen of 
31 the PARC were postwar M.H.R.' SO By early 1947 the 
Party had thus come under the sway of postwar politic-
ians. 
The developments in the Liberal Party were of 
essentially the same nature o What the ~urge would 
mean tQ it was dramatically brought home in early May 
1946, when President Hatoyama was removed from the 
highest party post at the moment it had won the first 
postwar House of Representatives election o To fill the 
post thus suddenly vacated by Hatoyama, Yoshida Shigeru 
h . P 32 was broug t lnto the arty. 
The change in the prewar-postwar ratio of the 
Liperal Party leaders was not as complete as was the 
case with the Progressive Party, but it was nevertheless 
significant. In the party's Executive Council, for 
example, the ratio: of 11 to 4 in favour of prewar Diet 
members in May 1946 had shifted to 7 to 9 by June 
33 1947. By March 1948, when the Party was joined by a 
group of defectors from the Democratic Party (the 
Progressive Party was renamed the Democratic Par~y 
on 31 March 1947) and formed the Democrat-Liberal Party 
(Minshu-jiyuutoo), the prewar and wartime politicians 
had decreased so much in number that they amounted to 
57. 
less than a quarter of the newly elected and appointed 
b f · E "C "1 34 E " mem ers 0 Its xecutive ounci 0 xcept In the more 
or less nominal posts of Advisers and Counsellors, 
prewar or wartime politicians never became a numerically 
significant group in the composition of the P arty ' s 
official organs o 
The wholesale replacement of prewar by postwar 
Diet ~embers in the Liberal and the Democratic (Progress-
ive ) Parties posed a serious problem of personnel admin-
istration to their leaders o The problem arose basically 
from the shortage of experienced professional politicians 
and administrators to guide party activities both in the 
Diet and in the nation at large o 
The seriousness of this problem was magnified by 
the drastic decline at the April 1946 election of those 
35 M. H.R o' s who had bureaucratic backgroundso What made 
the situation even worse was the fact that those few 
former public servants who managed to get elected on 
this occasion had been mostly local, as opposed to 
national , government officials and tended to differ 
little from local politicians both in general outlook 
and in terms of administrative and legislative skills. 
This gap, however , whether by design or by chance , was 
filled at the election of January 1949 by the influx 
o f a large number of high-ranking public servants , who 
have subsequently formed the nucleus of the postwar 
el~ments in both parties o Compared with the prewar 
percentage s of public servants among Seiyuukai and 
Minseitoo Diet members (invariably less than 10%), 
and also with the average of the two conservative 
parties at the April 1947 election , (7.8%), it is 
remarkable that 1704% of the Liberals and 12 .8% of the 
58. 
Democrats successfully returned in the 1949 election 
were former high -ranki ng public servants . Moreover, 
these percentages continued to increase in the sub-
sequent elections until they stabilised at about 25% 
36 
after 1960. 
In the Liberal Party they apparently formed a 
temporary factional group among themsel ve s under 
President Yoshida to counter-balance the power of the 
older prewar politicians. Although the strongly 
individualistic tendencies and the effects of inter-
miniqterial rivalries among them prevented a solidly 
united group from growing , they became rapidly and 
firmly entrenched in the Party's hierarchy and came 
to constitute the core of the dominant faction support-
ing Yoshida against his critics, especially those led 
37 by Hatoyama . 
On the other hand , the steady decline before the 
war in the percentage of lo c al politicians in the 
Seiyuukai and , to a somewhat more limited extent , in 
i 
the Minseitoo continued into the postwar period o 
Except for the first postwar election in April 1946 
their contribution to the membership of the two partie~' 
parliamentary contingents decreased until it became 
stabilised at about 25% after 1955. 
The fact that only one of the opposing Seiyuukai 
factions - the Kuhara faction - joined the Liberal Party 
and that most of the prewar politicians were purged 
meant that it was relatively free from intra-party 
factionalism. 38 The apparent ideological homo geneity 
and emotional unity thus generated among its members 
made it possible for the Liberal Party to identify 
itself almost completely with the Occupation administrat-
ion and all that it represented , particularly the series 
59. 
of reforms including the writing of the new Constitut-
ion. To that extent , the Liberal Party under Yoshida's 
uncontested 'one-man ' rule in the first five years of 
its existence represented a break away from the prewar 
political system and its ideological and emotional 
foundati onso 
In sharp contrast, the Progressive Party was inter-
nally divided from the outset and underwent a series of 
violent conflicts ultimately leading to a major split 
in March 1949. As early as the spring of 1947 rival 
factions , the Taiyookai and the Shinshinkai, came into 
beingo The former was positively interested in unit-
ing with the Liberal Party, while the latter was 
opposed to such a scheme and insisted on building a 
middle-of-the-road party to promote the idea of 'mod-
ified capitalism' against the traditional conservatism 
embodied by the Liberals o39 
Two interrelated aspects of the factional strife 
In the Progressive Party during this period deserve 
special attention. One is that it was based at least 
partially on genuine differences of ideological assum-
ptions and policy preferences between the two groupso 
To generalise , the ' collaborationist' group, represented 
by the Taiyookai , was ideologically and emotionally 
committed to the constitutional and political order 
created under the Occupation, which represented a max-
i~al departure from th e prewar traditions o To that 
extent , this g roup identified itself with Yoshida's 
Liberal Party. On the other hand, the 'oppositi onist' 
group , represented by the Shinshinkai, was dissatisfied 
with the constitu tional status guo for one reason or 
another o Paradox ically , this latter group embodied the 
~ o 
opposite t endenc i es of traditionalism on the one hand , 
and , on the other, fairly rad ical progressivism akin 
to that held at the time by the rightwing Socialist 
groups . This i s seen in the group ' s inaugural pro -
clamation , where such terms as ' patriotism' and 
' progressive capitalism' were juxt apos ed . 40 
The other aspect of factionalism in the Pro gress-
ive P arty was that one of the rival groups persistently 
sought union with the Liberal Party . The possibility 
of unifying the two parties was first suggested offic-
ially in the Progressive Party barely a month qfter the 
first postwar election of April 1946, when Saitoo Takao 
and Inukai Takeru , both members of the Party ' s Executive 
Council, expressed views in favour of such a plan . In 
about a week a positive response from the Liberal P arty 
officially conveyed by its Secretary-General , Koon o 
Ichiroo, led to the formation of a Joint Committee on 
Policy Agreemen t to deal with a series of concrete issues , 
such as the revision of the Meiji Constitution , the f ood 
41 
shortage , inflation , and so forth . In the mean t ime , 
about sixty members from both parties proceeded to form 
a body specifically designed to promote their merger . By 
February of the nex t year President Shidehara was in a 
position to propose official ly t o Yoshida immediate 
'f' . 42 unl lcatlon. Although the lat ter ' s negative response 
on that occasion retarded the pace and changed the direct -
ion of the movement in the subsequent months , the unific -
ation efforts were continued throughout 1947 and 1948 , 
until the purpose was partial ly achieved i n 1950 when 
nearly thirty ' col laborationist ' Democrats joined the 
43 Liberal P ar ty . 
As far as the Liberal Party l eadership an~ th e 
' collaborationist ' Democrats a re concerned , the 
desirability of uniting to oppose the Socialists and 
the Communists was self-evident from the beginning. 
The only problem to be solved was to decide which party 
and which group in either party should control the key 
positions in the proposed unified party. The difficulty 
in reaching agreement on this point, coupled with 
ideological reservations of the 'Oppos itionist' groups 
in the Democratic Party prevented a genuine unification 
from taking place before the situation became complic-
ated by the return ' of the purged poli ticians to poli t-
ical life. 
Du ring wartime it had been plainly impossi0le to 
conduct normal party and electoral activities and, con-
sequently, it was unnecessary for the pseudo-party 
organisations to make large financial outlays. Under the 
circumstances it was no doubt possible to finance the 
greater part of their activities by the contributions 
44 from their own members. After the war came to an end 
in August 1945, however, the situation changed drastically. 
On the one hand, the re-appearance of a competitive multi-
party system made it at least as costly as before the war 
to run . . 1. 45 a party and, especlally, to wln an e ectlon. 
On the other hand, the conditions brought about by the 
series of Occupation-sponsored reforms, especially the 
dissolution of the zaibatsu, made it impossibly for the 
parties to depend on conventional connections to raise 
funds wi th ease. 
Press ed by the grea t and increas ing need for funds 
and unable to continue to rely on connections with such 
prewar zaibatsu concerns as the Mitsui and the 
Mitsubishi, the postwar conservative parties began to 
search for new sources of revenue. As a result of their 
62. 
efforts they no doubt succeeded in establishing links 
with a number of individual entrepreneurs and enter-
prises . The pattern of relationships between th~ con-
servative parties and extra-party groups which thus 
emerged during this pre-independence period was, 
however, basically transitional and unstable . Often 
they were based on purely personal ties and involved 
obscure individuals, rather than established firms or 
busines s associations o 
For example, an important part of the funds which 
went into the building of the Liberal Party by Hatoyama 
and his associates in 1945 are said to have been supp-
lied by a well known nationalist ideologue, Kodama 
46 
Yoshio o After Hatoyama was purged and began to suff-
er from serious financial hardships, it was Hagiwara 
Kichitaroo of the Hokkaidoo Coal Mining and Steamship 
Company who helped him out and made it possible for 
his large faction to begin to operate as soon as the 
P 1 · d 47 urge was lfte. The individual who acted as the 
intermediary between Hatoyama and Kodama , Tsuji Karoku, 
was accused of having received 2.5 million yen from a 
broker dealin g in surplus uniforms from the wartime 
Japanese army, as well as 6 05 million from Kodama, and 
48 
of having passed it on to the Liberal Party. The 
series of criminal cases involving illegal contribut -
ions to the parties by individuals and groups of com-
pany direc tors which occurred during this period test-
ify to the peculiarly personal and secretive characte r 
of the relationships which obtained between particular 
. . d h· f· . 1 t 49 party politIcIans an t elr InanCla pa rons. 
In theory , under the system of government estab-
lished by the new Constitution the parties wer e to play 
6~. 
a leading part in the public decision-making of the 
state o In reality, however , their status was inferior 
and subordinate to the authority of the Supreme Command-
er for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur, and his 
General Headquarters o Moreover, in the Japanese sphere 
of politics and public administration (which was as a 
whole subordinate to SCAP) , it was not the parties but 
the bureaucracy which played a predominant role as the 
official interpreter and executor of SCAP's orders. 50 
Such restrictions tended to discourage various interest 
groups (which numbered over 15,000 in 195051 ) from 
seeking special relationships with a particular party, 
even a party in powero Under the circumstances it was 
much more sensible for a person or group desiring to 
have a specific action taken by a government agency or 
official to approach and bring pressure to bear either 
directly on that agency or official , or petition SCAP 
in some wayo 
The same circumstances which prevented the parties 
from playing a leading role in the nation's public 
decision-making proc esse s also kept to a minimum the 
overt pressure group activities of the large employer 
organisations which had come into being by the middle 
of 1948 0 52 Whatever monetary contributions were made 
by the business g roup s to a party during this period 
came almost invariably from individual firms or, more 
frequently, a particular director or directors of a 
firm. It was not until party politics was freed from 
the legal and psychological restrictions of the 
Occupation period that the large business organisat-
ions began to playa decisive role as the de facto 
representa tives of the nation's business interests and 
6~ • 
principal providers of po~itical funds for the conser-
vative parties o 
Independence and After 
Following the conclusion of the San Francisco 
peace Treaty in 1951, conditions significant ly differ-
ent from those which had existed during the Occupation 
period emerged in the general temper of conservative 
party politics o One of the most important of such new 
conditions in terms of its effects on subsequent dev-
elopments arose from the mass reinstatement of the 
prewar and wartime leaders who had been temporarily 
barred from public office by the Purge programme. 
Between October 1950 and April 1952 the 210,282 pre-
war and wartime leaders who had been involved in the 
P f d f .. 53 urge were ree rom restrlctlons. Many of them nat-
urally attempted to re-enter the arena of active party 
politics by running in the House of Representatives 
election of October 19520 As a result , this particular 
election was characterised above all by bitter compet-
ition between the depurged prewar politicians and 
bureaucrats and the incumbent postwar politicians o 
Signifi cantly , the election itself resulted from 
an unexpected dissolution of the House by Prime 
Minister Yoshida, who obviously hoped to deny adequate 
time for electoral preparations to the depurged polit-
icians not only i n the opposition parties but also in 
his own party, who demanded his replacement by Hatoyama 
54 
as head of the Party and the governmen to Only two 
days before the election the two most outspoken depurged 
opponents of Yoshida - Koono Ichiroo and Ishibashi 
Tanzan - were expelled from the Liberal Par ty on account 
of anti-party activiti es o Thereafter , the anti -Yo shida 
group led by Hatoyama , Koono and Ishibashi campaigned 
independ en tly from the Liberal Party Headquarters 055 
The result of the election , however , confirmed the 
suspected strength of the depurged candidates and 
revealed Yoshida ' s waning popularityo The Liberal Party 
lost 45 seats to the opposition parties o In the mean-
time, the victory of the depurged candidates was spec-
tacular . Of the 329 of them who ran in this election 
139 were successfully returned o Seventy-nine of these 
belonged to the Liberal - P arty and thirty - two to the 
Progressive Part y (Kaishi ntoo ), 56 accounting respectively 
for 33% and 37% of th e new members of their parliamentary 
. 57 partl es o 
Before the e lection of 1952 there had been three 
distincti ve factiona l groups in the Liberal Party -
the Yoshida faction with about 140 Diet members the 
Hatoyama f a ction with 120 members and a loosely knit 
group of about 25 non-aligned members (chuukanha). The 
Yoshida faction had been divided roughly into seven sub-
units within itself , led respective ly by Yoshida himself 
( ,sokI inha), Hi rokawa Koozen , Masuda Kaneshi chi, Inukai 
Takeru , S a t oo Eisaku , Ikeda Hayato and Hori Shig eru058 
The Hatoyama faction had been similarly subdiv ided into 
nine units - the Oono , Ishibashi , Uehara , Kuhara, 
Matsuno, Hayashi , Masutani , Hoshi jima and Dooshi-kurabu 
g roups0 5 9 The 19 52 election d rastical ly reduc ed the 
numerical strength of both the Yoshida and the Hatoyama 
faction s respectively to 105 and 69 , whi le increasing 
that of the non- aligned group to 66 0 I twas, however, 
not until the House of R epresentatives e lection of 
April 1953 that a distinctive pattern of intra-party 
fact ionalism began to emerge o 
As soon as Ogata Taketora entered the scene by 
winning a seat in the House of Representative in the 
Oc:ober 1952 election , Hirokawa' s relationship with 
Yoshida and his other confidants, such as S atoo , Ikeda 
and Hori , hacl begun to show considerable strains . Aft er 
he was defeated in February 1953 by Satoo for the post 
of P arty Secretary-General, he was led to dissociate 
himself definitely from the Yoshida faction and proc-
eeded to create a separate faction of his own. When 
Hatoyama and his followers separated from the Party in 
March of the same year and set up the separatist Liberal 
60 Party , Hirokawa joined themo 
In the Hatoyama faction , on the other hand, ln the 
last weeks of 1952 Opno began gradually to di ssociate 
himself from the more militant anti - Yoshida elements 
among its members . By the spring of 1953 he had drifted 
away from the faction to the extent of refusing to joi n 
the separatist Liberal Party when it was formedo 
After a majority in the Hatoyama and the Hirokawa 
factions was reunited with the Liberal Party towards the 
end of November 1953 the factional divisions ln that 
Party naturally underwent a substantial change o Com-
pared with the conditions which had prevailed about a 
year before , the Hirokawa group had shifted from the 
Yoshida to the Hatoyama camp , while the latter had been 
reduced to a much simpler compos ition by losing four of 
its sub-units o61 At the end of 1953 there were roughly 
eleven factional aggregations in the Liberal Party -
three pro-Yoshida but separate groups led respectively 
by Satoo, Ikeda and Masuda ; the ' bureaucrats ' repres-
ented by Kawarada Kakichi , Asaka Tadao , and others; 
the newly formed Ogata and Kishi factions ; a g roup of 
former S eiyuukai members led by Maeda Yonezoo; the 
former Dooshi-kurabu ; 
. 62 factlon o 
the Oono faction ; and the Hatoyama 
When i n November 1954 the Japan Democratic Party came 
into being through the merger of the Prog~essive Party~ 
the remaining group of the Separatist Li b eral Party (now 
calling itself the Japan Liberal Party) and defectors 
from the Liberal Party , both the Hatoyama and the Kishi 
factions joined it . As a result, the pattern of faction-
al divisions in the Liberal Party was somewhat simplified o 
Factionalism in the P rogressive Party during this 
period was not as complex as that in the Liberal Party. 
Basically, there were only four distinct factional g roups 
in this Party in 1953 and 1954 - the Radicals (kakushinha), 
the Conservatives (hoshuha), the Neutrals (chuukanha) 
63 
and the Independent s o The Radicals consisted of two 
fairly large factions represented respectively by Miki 
Takeo and Kitamura Tokutaroo, while the Conservatives were 
a small minority of only half a dozen members led by 
Ooasa Tadaoo The Neutrals contained two groups , one 
called the 'Collaborationists ' (renritsuha) for their 
advo cacy of collaboration and eventual unif ication with 
the Liberals, and the other called the 'Bureaucrats'. 
Apart from these four distinct groups , there was a fifth 
built around Matsumura Kenzoo which was closely associated 
with the Miki faction o In addition , three individuals -
Tsurumi Yuusuke of the House of Councillors and Matsuura 
Shuutaroo and Oyama Ku ranosuke of the House of Repre sen-
tatives - formed a link between the Miki and the Kitamura 
faction s i n the Radicals' camp o 
Th e factions in the two conservative parties des-
cribed above responded differently to the movement for 
68. 
unification which led to the formation of the LOP in 
November 1955 . Such differences in turn influenced 
the inter - factional balance and relationships in both 
p arties and moulded the dominant characteristics o f 
factionalism subsequently found in the LOP. 
In the spring of 1953 Miki Buki ch i publicly 
stated that he was det 'ermined to work towards a con-
servative merger a 64 This call coming from one of the 
mo st influential conservative party politicians began 
to be taken seriously early the next year both by the 
l ead ers and rank and file of the three rival conservat-
ive parties in existence at the time ~ At their meeting 
of 30 March 1954 members of the Hatoyama faction agreed 
to work towards the same goal, while in April the 
Executive Council of the Liberal P arty official l y 
65 
approved the plan o 
P aradoxically, however , no sooner had the efforts 
towards unification been placed on a non-partisan basis 
than the same old question, on whose terms and under 
whose direction the unification should be achiev ed, 
began to bedevil all such efforts. In both th e Liberal 
an d the P rogressive Parties those who were in control 
of key party positions began to try either to realise 
the unification plan On their own terms or else to 
forestall it . 
In the Liberal Party Yoshida and his confidants 
became increasingly critica l and suspicious of th e 
more ardent proponents of the merger plan associated 
with the three factions led by Ogata, Kishi and Ishi b ashi . 
In order to present themselves as advocates o f th e un i-
fication plan, for which pressures were stead i ly mount ing 
among the rank and file , and at the same time obstruct i ng 
it in the most acceptable manner possible under the 
circumstances, they began to insist on a particular 
formula for unification. According to this , both the 
Liberal and the Progressive Parties would first be 
disbanded, an entirely new party formed and its 
President chosen by ballot. In view of the relative 
numerical strength of the two parties a t the time, it 
was obvious that such a procedure would inevitably 
lead to Yoshida ' s re-election as President. 
Simil arly , the Central Executive Committee of the 
Progressive Party resolved to reject the unification 
plan unless the Yoshida Cabinet would resign firsto 66 
This position reflected the views held by men like 
Matsumura Kenzoo, Miki Takeo and Kawasaki Hideji who 
had always been and were to remain consistently anti-
Yoshida and anti-Liberal. On the other hand, the group 
led by Ashida Hitoshi and those associated with the 
k · t d . f·· 1 . 67 Dooyuu al wan e unl lcatlon at a most any prlce o 
The unification efforts following the initial moves 
of Ap ril and May 1954 centered around the Council to 
Promote the Establishment of a New Party (Shintoo kessei 
sokushin kyoogikai) which came into being towards the 
end of Mayas a joint forum of volunteers from the two 
partieso This non-partisan group was from the beginning 
openly opposed to Yoshida's continued role o68 By the 
time it was re-organised and re-named the Preparatory 
Committee for the Establishment of a New Party (Shintoo 
kessei jumbikai) in September it became to all intents 
and purposes a citadel of depurged prewar and wartime 
politicians designed to or ganise opposition not only to 
Yoshida as a person but also to many of the changes which 
had been accomplished under his administration during the 
79, 
period of the Allied Occupation. 69 On 20 October 1954 
it set up a five-member Directorate consisting exclus-
ively of anti-Yoshida prewar men - Hatoyama, Kanemitsu, 
Kishi, Ishibashi and Ashida. 70 This made it impossible 
for the Yoshida faction to participate in it and , as a 
result, the Japan Demo cratic Party which issued from it 
comprised the Progres sive Party , the Japan Liberal 
Party (separatist) and only a part of the main Liberal 
Part yo 
The creation of the Democratic Party made it poss-
ible for Hatoyama to take over when Yoshida finally 
resigned in December 19540 The minority position of the 
Hatoyama Cabinet, however, made it imperative to continue 
the efforts towards a total merger with the Liberal Part yo 
On the other hand, a minority in the Democratic Party led 
by Matsumura and Miki Takeo did not give up their oppos-
ition to the proposed merger. As late as September 1955 
the Radicals were insisting on making the merger condition-
al on agreement between the two parties to have Hatoyama, 
instead of Yoshida, nominated as head of the new party.71 
The position was subsequently confirmed by five 
Cabinet Ministers representing the anti-Yoshida elements 
in the Party, namely Matsumura, Ooasa, Miki, Ishibashi 
72 
and Koono. When the merger was finally accomplished 
in November, it was despite the persistent opposition 
of this group whose presence was destined to remain a 
disruptive factor in the LDP in the years to follow. 
In the Liberal Party it was the Yoshida faction 
which continued to resist the attempt to unite the two 
parti es o When it became evident that the process lead-
ing to unifi c ation could neither be reversed nor halted 
for long, its members began to insist strongly on the 
71 0 
strict implementation of the koosen principle ( election 
of the Pre sident by the Party Conference) in choosing 
the new P resident o As late as a week before the inaug-
ural meeting of the LOP they kept insisting on postpon-
ing the ultimate merger until that principle was 
explicitly accepted by the Democrat s and Yoshida ' s re-
election ensured o73 
If Matsumura and his faction represented an extreme 
position of prewar elements, characterised by a certain 
dissatisfaction with the status guo in reference both to 
domestic constitutional arrangements and to the emphasis 
in foreign policy, the Yoshida faction and its descend-
ants represented the other extreme, characterised by 
firmer commitment to the 'democratic' system established 
under the Occupation and unreserved co-operation with 
the United States. These two positions could be held 
together in the LOP only because of a del icat e balance 
maintained by the other factional groups which represen-
ted, to a greater or lesser degree, moderating and 
unifying influences o 
The differences in the degree and nature of personal 
involvement in the complex process leading to the merger 
of 1955 had far-reaching effects on the subsequent dev-
elopment of intra-party factionalism in the LDP o As 
already suggested, it was inevitable that the Yoshida 
and the Matsumura factions should remain ideologically 
and emotionally opposed to each othero I t was just as 
natural for this antagonistic relationship to be carried 
on between their respective successors , the Miki -M atsumura 
factio n and the Satoo and Ikeda factions which issued 
from the Yoshida faction . Oono's personal involvement in 
the merger movement after the middle of May 1955 74 
contributed to the consolidation of his faction but also 
led to his estrangement from Yoshida and his close foll-
75 
owers o 
Similarly, it was mainly because of the decision of 
Ogata and Ishii Mitsujiroo to support Oono in his behind-
the-scenes activities designed to help the merger plan 
that a factional unit separate and indep endent from 
Yoshida's crystalized under the leadership of these ' two 
men o Again , it was no doubt in the course of, and in a 
large me asure thanks to, these developments that Koono 
Ichiroo established himself as the number three man in 
the hierarchy of the Hatoyama faction, ranking next to 
Hatoyama and Miki Bukichi. Thus he put himself in a 
position to take over the faction's reins as soon as the 
two older men passed away 0 Nor is it likely that the 
Kishi faction would have registered the phenomenal growth 
rate it showed in the subsequent few years (leading to 
Kishi's attainment of the LOP Presi dency in 1957), had 
it not been for the impressive leadership and political 
tact that he demonstrat ed as the Democratic Party's 
Secr etary-General in assisting Miki in his campaign for 
the mer ger . Fujiyama Aiichiroo ' s ent ry into politics 
in July 1957 as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Kishi 
Cabinet and the resulting emergence of the Fujiyama £act-
ion resulted as much from his personal involvement in the 
76 
merger movement as from his long-standing personal 
friendship with Kishi o 
The conditions of factionalism in the two parties 
on th e eve of the merger in 19 55 were thus essentially of 
r e c en tor i gin 0 It was in the course of a few short 
years between the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty in 1951 and the middle of 1955 that the basic pattern 
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of inter-factional relationships which one would find 
in the LOP in the subsequent years emerged o In this 
evolutionary process the unification issue had a very 
significant catalytic, if not germinal , effecto 
Notwithstanding , however , the obvious aspects of 
novelty it would be impos s ible to dissociate these post-
independence developments completely from the traditions 
and mores of prewar party politics o The decisive role 
played by men like Hatoyama, Miki Bukichi, Oono, 
Matsumura, and others in itself testifies to the import-
ance of the prewar elements in the process involved. 
As we have seen above , many of the factional units 
and relationships between them which could be identified 
in the LOP on its formation in 1955 directly resulted 
from the effects of the return to politics in 1951-2 of 
the prewar politicians , especi al ly Hatoyama and his 
Seiyuukai associates o Even the divisive tendencies , which 
began to appear during this period among Yoshida ' s foll-
owers, such as Satoo, Ikeda and Hori, and which eventually 
led to the emergence of separate factions were either 
caused or cons iderably accelerated by the appearance of 
Hatoyama and his group as the first serious contenders 
for power against Yoshida o In this sense the elementary 
pattern of factionalism in the LOP evolved directly out 
of the clashes between the groups of the prewar and post-
war politicians represented by these two men . 
The unificat ion movement brought about significant 
changes not only in the conditions of intra-par ty fact-
ionalism but also in the role of business enterprises and 
th e ir organisations vis-~-vis the conservative parties o 
Of basic importance in this respect is the fact that the 
four separate national organisations of large employers -
Keidanren , Nikkeiren , Nisshoo and Keizai-dooyuukai -
began to wield a decisive influence both on the internal 
and external relations of the conservative partYo77 
Apart from this general cons ideration, there are a few 
particular aspects of the manner in which the business 
community came to involve itself ln the process of party 
politics which deserve special mention. 
One of these aspects was the compo sit ion of the 
group formed among leading businessmen which subsequently 
guided the employers' organisations in their approach 
and strategy towards the partieso Just as the prewar 
politicians and bureaucrats played a predominant part in 
the movement for conservative unification , so a group of 
businessmen who had been personally connected with the 
Banchookai of the mid-1920's initially led the campaign 
for the same goal among employers o These men included 
Nagano Mamoru, Kobayashi Ataru and Shooriki Matsutaroo. 78 
Although it is hard to prove that the motivations of the 
prewar politicians and the businessmen who now worked 
together towards a conservative merger were identical, 
many of them seem to have acted on the assumption that 
they were. Beyond mere political stability ,79 they shared 
the desire to 'recti fy' the t excesses' of the Occupation-
sponsored reforms , especially those relating to the 
deconcentration of economic power (the Anti-Monopoly 
Law). Unlike most advocates of revisionism in the parties, 
however, the business leader s showed primary interest in 
the practical and material, rather than the ideological 
and emotional, aspects of the problemo Thi s can be 
illustrated by their approach to the revision of the 
Anti-Monopoly Law and the resumption of military product-
ion o Both involved a very substant ial change in the basic 
ideologic a l premises of the whole political and social 
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system erected under the Occupation. Nevertheless , the 
business groups engaged in the revisionist campaigns 
steered almost completely clear of ideological arguments 
80 and c oncen t rated on the practical aspects . 
Another aspect to be taken note of was the tr emen-
dous increase in the function and prestige of large 
employer associations and their national federations as 
the formal representatives of the nation's business 
interests and providers of political funds. The collect-
ivist tendencies, similar to those represented by the 
zaibatsu concerns in prewar days, became increasingly 
evident in the post-independence period . During the 
Occupation per i od it was mainly individual entrep~eneurs 
that were responsible for the bulk of financial contrib-
uti ons to the parties. In the following peri od, h owever , 
various employer organisations were formed on an indus-
trial basis and subsequently their national federations 
began to playa predominant part~ In the case of the 
Liberal Party, for example, only about 20% of the 27.7 
million yen reported to the National Election Adminis -
tration Committee as the total amount of the donations 
received by it during the 1951 fiscal year had come from 
such groups and the remaining 80% had come from indiv-
idual enterprises.
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By February 1955, however, more 
than half of the large donations (half a milli o n yen 
or more) came from industrial associations and national 
. . 82 
organlsatlons. 
Individual enterprises and entrepreneurs still 
remained an important and indispensable source of con-
tributions to the conservative parties, especially to 
factions within them. The role of the industrial assoc-
iations and their national federations l however, was 
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steadily growing , and thi ·s tendency made the relation-
ship between the parties and the business community 
much more stable than previously. In a sense the bus-
iness organisations, represented by the four national 
organisations , were merely a substitute for the p r ewar 
zaibatsu concerns, but with an important difference. 
Because of the large number of enterprises directly 
represented by those organisations and therefore directly 
involved in the financial upkeep of the conservative 
parties , the relationsh ip between the parties and the 
business circles gradually acquired an air of inclusive-
ness and totality , a qual ity which was lacking in the 
prewar party-zaibatsu relationshipso 
Summary 
In the fifteen turbulent years of Japanese history 
from 1940 to 1955 no basic changes were made in the 
traditional framework of conservative party organisation 
inherited from the prewar parties. Not only in their appell-
ations but even in their basic functions virtually all of 
the characteristic par ty org ans identified in the Seiyuukai 
and the Minseitoo i n the 1930' s survived the war and the 
Allied Occupation with remarkably little change. The tim-
ing of the formation of the first postwar parties in rel-
ation to the initiation of the Purge programme and the lack 
of any firm legal basis or definition of a party contrib-
uted more than other factors to th e degree of continuity 
observed i n this respect o 
Re garding membership composition , intra-party fact-
ionali sm and r elationship s with business groups , there 
were some significant new deve lopments in these years . 
The increase i n the numbe r of former high- ranki ng public 
servants among conservative Diet members and the 
corresponding dec rease in the number of former local 
politicians was on e of these developments . The con-
flic ts betw een depurged prewar politicians and postwar 
Diet members not only gav e rise t o the forms of fact-
ional strife basic to the postwar parties but also 
lent to it peculiarly ideolo gical impl i cati ons o Both 
the factional units involved and the pat terns of thei r 
interactions were strongly influenced by the unificat -
ion movement which led to the 1955 merger . As a result, 
factionalism in the conservative parties in 1955 was 
far more complex both structurally and ideologically than 
its prewar counterpart. 
The temporary disappearance of the zaibatsu concerns, 
especia lly Mitsui and Mitsubishi which had finan ci a lly 
supported the two prewar parties, natural ly brought about 
a very great change in the gene ral characteristics of 
rel ati on between conservative parties and business enter-
pri~es ; 
Following the dissolution of the zaibatsu concerns, 
the parties were compelled to look to a number of smaller 
enterprises and individual businessmen for funds. This 
state of affairs no doubt c ontributed to the growth of 
multiple parties and factional g roups within each of 
them. After about 1950, however , lar g e emp l oyers ' 
organisati ons , such as Keidanren, be gan to exert a st rong 
unifying influence both within and on behalf of the 
nation's business community . These oligopo listic ten-
dencies promoted the unifi c a tion of the channe ls of 
po li tical contribution by business enterprises and a sit-
uation somewhat anal o gous to that wh ich had existed in 
the prewar days of zaibatsu ascendancy emerged. There 
was , however , a basic differenceo Whereas the zaibatsu 
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concerns with all their wealth and influence, had rep-
resented only a small part of the total number of enter-
prises in the country, the postwar business organisations 
like Keidanren and the three other national organisations 
represented a much lar ger percentage of the nati on's bus-
iness firms o It became impossible under these postwar 
conditions to associate either major conservative party 
with a particular enterprise or system of ent erprises. 
Despite all the new developments mentioned above, it 
is important to note that their seeds had in many cases 
been sown before the war o High-rankin g public servants 
were consciously recruited by the Seiyuukai leaders from 
the very beginning o Their failure to gain the formal 
affiliati o n of a substantial number of high-ranking public 
servants did not result from any lack of awareness or 
interest ~n the value of their un ique qualifications as 
party leaders o It resulted simply from the fact that a 
high-ranking public servant did not have to join a party 
under the prewar system in order to become a Cabinet 
Minister, a member of the House of Peers , a prefectural 
governor, and so forth~ 
Factions based on inter-personal relationships, 
monetary considerations , ideological differences and so 
on had appeared i n the early 1920 ' s o Furthermore , the 
multipli cati on of zaibatsu groups , represent ed by the 
rise of the f new zaibatsu ' (shinkoo-zaibatsu ) in the 
1930's had diversified to some extent the sources of 
revenue avai l ab l e to a party and groups within it and , 
as a result , had also diversified the factional units o 
It is hard to distinguish the Yoshida-Hatoyama rivalry 
from the Kuhara-Nakajima conflict , since both were b as -
ically inter-personal power struggles within a single 
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party, compounded by temperamental and ideological diff-
erence s . The factiona l st rif e which went on in the Liberal 
and the Democrat ic P arties on the eve of the 1955 merger 
wa s basically the same as its antecedent of the late 1930' s. 
Wh en establ i shed in November 1955, the LOP had an 
enormous amount of tradition and experience behind it which 
it coul d fall back on or which might hold it back. This 
was so in terms of membership composition, organisation 
structure , factionalism and relationships with extra-party 
group s , all of which had evolved over many decades. None 
of this heritage was immutable or indispensable. I thad, 
however , g r own out of a long, continuous evolutionary 
pro c ess . As such it constituted an important part of the 
historical backg round wi thout reference to which it would 
be impos sible to understand or explain much of the LOP's 
behaviour . 
PART I I 
FACTORS U DERLYING LDP POLICY-MAKI G 
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PART II 
FACTORS UNDERLYING LOP POLICY-MAKING 
Against the historical background reviewed in Part I 
specific policy decisions are made by the LOP in response 
to many pressures, some internal and others external to 
the Party in origin. The behaviour of the individuals 
occupying decision-making positions In the Party are a 
function of a variety of factors - from personal psychol-
ogy and idiosyncrasy to the international environment 
surrounding Japan . It is obviously futile to attempt to 
specify and describe all the influences and factors which 
may affect the specific policy decisions made by the Party 
through the actions of these indi viduals . It will no 
doubt be useful, however, to describe and evaluate the 
role of a few of the more important factors in order to 
deepen our understanding of the dominant patterns of 
policy-making process. 
In the following chapters each of the four factors 
selected for examination will be discussed in some detail. 
This will enable us, it is hoped, to explain many, though 
by no means all , of the apparently complex ways in which 
policies are initiated , developed and executed by the 
Part yo 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEMBERSHIP 
At the 17th Party Conference held on 22 January 
1966 the LOP Secretary-General , Tanaka Kakuei, proudly 
announced that during the past year a gain of 200 ,000 
new members had been achieved and that consequently the 
current membership now stood at 1,950,000. 1 Due to the 
definitional problem involved, however, it is not quite 
as easy, as it may appear at first sight, to accept 
this officially announced menbership figure at face 
value nor, indeed, even to talk about membership at all 
with any degree of certaintyo In fact, estimates vary-
ing as widely as from 50,000 to 5,90 0,000 have been 
given on different occasions by the Party itself and 
by others, nor is there any assurance that these two 
extremes really delimit the range of the error to be 
taken into account. 2 If one is to discuss the LOP 
policy-making process in terms of its membership charact-
eristics, it is essential, therefore, to define and 
specify the particular level or levels of its member-
ship structure which are to be considered. 
As far as the formal procedures and requirements 
laid down in the Party Constitution are concerned , any 
person may become an LOP member, provided that he is 
recommended by two or more Party members, fills in an 
application form to be returned either to the Headquarters, 
a Prefectural Federation or a Branch, and then undertakes 
to pay the membership fee of 200 yen per year (or an 
amount to be specified if he happens to be a member o f 
the Diet or of a local assembly or a head of an aut on om-
3 I . ous local government bod~. t IS nevertheless the 
difficulty of enforcing such simple procedural require-
ments and collecting such a nominal membership fee which 
has caused sO much confusion in the counting of the 
party members o Even the relatively modest estimate of 
150 , 000 members frequently cited is believed to be 
grossly inflated because of the inclusion of a sizable 
number of those who have failed to pay the annua l member-
ship fee punctuallYo4 Before we proceed to a discussion 
of the Party membership at large, it will be convenient 
to deal first with three d istinct categories of members, 
which may be figuratively represented by three con~entric 
circles, the radius of the middle circle being approx-
imately 20 times of that of the inner circle and about 
one-two hundredth of that of the outer circle. 
Diet Members as Party Members 
At the centre of the Party membership structure dur-
ing the period from late 1955 to late 1965 there were 
between 280 and 300 LOP M.H.R.'s and between 120 and 140 
members of the House of Councillors (hereafter referred 
to as M.HoC.'s), or an average of 420 LOP Diet members 
in all o
5 
In accordance with the established tradition 
inherited from the L iberal and the Democratic Parties, 
the LOP charges each of its Diet members a special monthly 
fee of 20,000 yen , which is called a 'legislative expense 
fee' and is deducted di rectly from his salary o In addit-
ion there is a special membership fee of 10,000 yeno 6 
Both in terms of regular and punctual membership payment 
and official membership registration, Diet members are 
the most obvious and identifiable members of the Party 
and are often referred to as the Liberal Democr~tic Party 
as such o This is hardly surprising since the Party was 
born in November 1955 from the merger of the 185 Demo crats 
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and 115 Liberals in the Diet, and a predominant role is 
still played by the Diet members in the management of 
party affairs o 
Apart from the f act of their membership in the 
'highest organ of state power', the parliamentary group 
of LOP members is distinguished from the other two cate-
gories (to be discussed later) by their occupational 
background characteristicso Ever since 1955 slightly 
over 25 per cent of the LOP MoHoR.'s have been consis-
tently identified as former local politicians (mainly 
members of prefectural assemblies), another 25 per cent 
as former high-ranking public servants, somewhat more than 
20 per cent as former businessmen, about 10 per cent as 
former journalists, and the remaining 20 per cent as 
mi scellaneous. 7 
This pattern, In fact, had already begun to 
appear in the general elections of October 1952, and 
has changed little over the past fourteen years. In the 
House of Councillors, the pattern has been radically 
different, and also far less stable than that observed 
among the Lower House memberso Taking the percentages 
of LOP Upper House members (including Ryokufuukai) for 
mid-1956 and mid-1965, they were, respectively: local 
politi cians 15 per cent and 20 per cent; public servants 
43 per cent and 38 per cent ; businessmen 20 per cent and 
25 per cent ; miscellaneous 25 per cent and 28 per cent; 
the percentage of journalists was negligible throughout 
. 8 Th' t h t f b t h the perIodo IS means a ormer ureaucra save 
been numerically the most important occupational category 
among the LOP affiliated Di et members in the past ten 
years or so, contri buting in 1965 about 27 per cent of 
the total (followed by loc al politicians with 22 per cent , 
businessme,n with 18 per cent and journalists with 7 per 
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cent) • 
The significance of these figures in terms of the 
source of recruitment of LOP Diet members becomes clear 
when compared with the corresponding figures relative 
to the total work force . Of the 41,128,000 persons who 
were twenty years old or over (potential voters) and 
at work in the middle of 1965,9 national and local pub-
lic servants (exclusive of the military personnel o~ the 
Defence Agency and teachers and police attached to local 
self-governing bodies), accounted for about 855,000 and 
307,000 respectively, or a total of 1,162,000, i.e., less 
10 than 3 per cent . When it comes to high-ranking offic-
i al s, (those holding a position of section chief (kachoo) i 
or above in the national government) , however , there 
were less than 1,780, or about a 250th of one per cent 
11 
of the total work force over the age of twenty. In 
other words, more than a quarter of the LOP Diet memberp 
have been drawn from an occupational group which is 
infinitesimal in size in terms of the total work force 
of the nation . No other group In the society apart 
from local politi c ian s is so grossly over-represented 
by the LOP parliamentary party as the upper echelon of 
the national bureauc racy . 
The occupational c ategory next in numerical import-
ance to the higher public servants is that of local 
politicians. Although the members of the prefectural 
assemblies constitute only slightly over 3 per cent 
of local politicians , they constitute the overwhelming 
majority of the LDP Diet members recruited from this 
. 1 2 It . h th f t part1cular sour c e . 1S not, owever, e pre ec -
ural assembly members at large from whom candidates may 
be recruit ed to stand in a Diet election with LOP 
endor semen t ; for unlike most other kinds of local pol-
itician a relatively high degree of partisanship (i.e., 
official affiliation with the particular national part-
i es) is found among then 0 In 1965, for example , only 
about 4 per cent of them were independents, while nearly 
94 per cent were affiliated with one of the five nation-
1 . 13 a part1es o It is therefore the LOP group of prefect-
ural assembly members (i n which category fell some 
1 , 725 or 66 per cent of their total number) which should 
be regarded as the potential source of recruitment for 
over 20 per cent of the LOP Diet members o The local 
politicians thus narrowly defined constitute about the 
same minuscule percentage of the total work force, i.e., 
about a 250th of one per cent and are just as grossly 
over- represented as the high-ranking bureaucrats. 
Businessmen and industrialists holding managerial 
posts with private concerns , on the other hand , accounted 
for 0.8 and 1 02 per cent of the total work force res-
pective1y in 1955 and 1960 and have in all probability 
represented at least 14 1 per cent in the more recent years. 
That would mean that the 18 per cent of the LOP Diet 
members provided by this group 1S disproportionately 
large and yet far less so than 1S the case with the 
high-ranking public servants or local politicians . The 
same may be sai d about the category of former journal-
ists o Considering that the combined percentage of 
journalist s (in a rather loose sense) and writers at 
large was about 0.1 both in 1955 and 1960 and that this 
figure is unlikely to have changed significantly in the 
last five years or so, the fact that they make up 7 per 
cent of the LOP parliamentary force is certainly a case 
of gross over - representati on, but much less so than with 
the other three categories , ( particular l y the f irs t 
t wo ) 0 15 
Compared with the general occupational divisi on s 
, 
of the p opulation at large in contemporary Jap ane s e 
soc i e t y , the composition of the LOP p ar li ament g roup 
i s very peculiar indeed o On the one hand , t he top 
ranking public servants and prefectural assembly mem-
b ers , t o gether accounting for about l25th of one p e r 
c en t of the working population of the country , provi d e 
just about a half of it , reinforced by businessmen and 
journalists who together account for between 1 and 1. 5 
per cent of the work force but a quarter of the LOP 
Diet force o On the other hand , neither the primary 
p roducers (pri nci pally those engaged in farming and 
for estry ) who account for about 26 per cent of the gain-
fully engaged work force , nor the employees in second a r y 
and tertiary industries (who make up about 58 per cent ) 16 
are represented in its composition except margina l l y . 
Such a situation also contrasts very sharply with t hat 
obtaining in the principal Opposition party , the J a p an 
Socialist Party , of whose 144 R epresentatives and 73 
Councillors in late 1965 less than 2 per cent were 
former high- ranking public servants , about 20 p e r c e n t 
were former local politicians and 52 per cent we r e 
.. 17 
unlonlsts o 
The educational backgrounds of LOP Diet membe r s 
are no less remarkable than their occupations , i n fact 
the two are probably inter- related . In the popul ation 
at large , not more than 5 . 2 per cen t of those 15 year s 
old or over have received university or col l ege educat-
ion , about 22 per cent either liberal ar t s o r vo cational 
education at the intermediary level , while 63 per cent 
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have only primary school education o18 In contrast , 82 
per cent of the LOP Diet members have gone to college 
or university , less than 15 per cent have left school at 
the intermediary leve l and less than 4 per cent went no 
19 further than primary school . These figures are even 
more impressive when it is realised that more than half 
the university and college graduates among t hem ( about 
44 per cent of the total) are graduates of the former 
imperial universities , with an overwhelming maj o rity 
coming from the University of Tokyo o Comparing fuem once 
more with the Socialists, the percentages of LOP Diet 
members from former imperial universitjes with degrees 
are about three times as large as the Socialists and 
those with an intermediary or lower level of educational 
. . 11 20 experIence about three tImes as sma • 
The occupational and educational backgroundcharact-
eristics of the LOP parliamentary party membership as 
shown in these statistics make it very distinctive both 
as a group in the society at large and also among the 
parties o It can hardly be regarded as even remotely 
representative of the average voter in terms of the 
two of the basic sociological factors determining status 
and roles in a modern society o Externally , therefore, 
the LOP' s relationship to the voter tends to resemble 
that obtaini ng between a teacher and ?upils , or even 
that which operated in pre-modern Japan between the 
~ c lass on the one hand and the farmers , artisans and 
merc~ants on the other o 
In order , however, to relate this to the policy-
making process, it is not sufficient to point out th e 
unusual membership composition of the LOP parliament a r y 
group . One must also understand the relationshi p s be tween 
occupation and education and define the nature of their 
interactions both in power and functiona l terms. 
If one relates the distribution of the four or five 
levels of ed u c a tional experience men tioned above to the 
four numerically most important occupational groups 
among LOP Diet members, a very clear con trast appears 
between former high-ranking public servants and local 
politicians with businessmen and journalists falling in 
between the two o Wh ile nearl y 90 per cent of the 
bureaucrats are Tokyo University graduates and almost 
100 per cent are graduates of some university or coll-
ege, local politicians rate 6 . 5 per cent and 60.6 per 
cent respectively o (Journalists and businessmen are 
somewhere in between}o21 This indica tes conclusively 
that it is the presence of the fo rmer high-ranking public 
servants that determines t he remarkable educational 
background characteristics associated with the LOP 
parliamentary part y o 
In other words, the extraordinarily high proport-
ion of graduates of the former Imperial universities, 
especially Tokyo Universi t y , which characterises the 
membership of the LOP parliamentary party merely reflects 
on the one hand the importance of the uppe r stratum of 
the national bureaucracy as a main source of recruitment 
for the ministerial party and , on the other hand , the 
well known fact of the domination of the nati on's offic-
ialdom by the graduates of those particular universities o 
Re garding this latter point , it should suf fice here to 
point out the fo llowing statistical facts. In the most 
recent year for which sufficien t evidence is available , 
19 65 , al l of the permanent vice-mi n is ters (the highest 
ranki ng career pub li c servant s ) of the twelve ministries 
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were without exception graduates of Tokyo University o 
In five Ministries 90 per cent or more of those occupy-
ing the three highest grades of managerial positions, 
i.e o, the chiefs of the bureaux (kyoku ~choo), divisions 
(bu-c hoo ) and sections (ka_choo) , were graduates of the 
former imperial universities, a majori ty coming from 
T k U · . 22 o yo n1vers1ty. In eight ministries the figure was 
80 per cent or more . 
The dichotomy suggested above between the former 
high - ranking public servants and the former local pol-
iticians in terms of their educational backgrounds 
clearly affects the leadership group composition of the 
various party organs , especially of those which are 
directly involved in the formal policy-making process 
in the Part y o On the one hand , the bureaucrats, who 
have consistently formed about 30 per cent of LOP Di et 
members since 1955 , have provided between one - third and 
a half of the Ministers in the succeSS1ve Cabinets during 
that period (the one exception 1S the Third Hatoyama 
Cabinet, of whose 18 members only three were of this 
part~cular category ) 0 23 Even when the Hatoyama Cabinet 
is included, an average of 38.2 per cent of the 267 
Ministers appointed during this period have been former 
high-ranking officials o Regarding Part y offices , it 
should be first noted that not only the three most r e c-
ent Presid ents , i oe o, Kishi, Ikeda and Satoo, have al l 
been typical bureaucrats but three of the seven 
Secretaries - General between November 1955 and June 1965 
. b t 24 were also lead1ng ureaucra s . 
Even more impressive when compared with the local 
politicians is the degree to which the former high 
ranking public servants dominate the deliberative and 
90. 
decision-making organs of the PARC. While not more than 
four of the twelve PARC Chairmen appointed between November 
1955 and June 1965 were former public servants of the 
highest ran k, 25 over 40 per cent of its Vice-Chairmen and 
nearly 60 per cent of the Deliberation Commission ' members 
belonged to that category.26 Simiar1y, in November 1965, 
about a third of the Chairmen of the PARC Divisions, and 
Special Inves ti gation Committees were drawn from the pub-
1 0 27 S 0 0 lC servant categoryo tatlstlcal1yat least, the 
evidence is conclusive that, with the exception of the 
Executive Counci1 ,28 the former high ranking public serv-
ants have been more or less over-represented ln each of 
the executive and decision-making organs of the Party. 
As the statistical tables presented in the preceding 
footnotes amply suggest, the situation of the former local 
politician category has been radically different. While 
they have accounted for over 20 per cent of the total LOP 
parliamentary party membership in the past ten years and 
their percentage ratio to the public servants has been 
somewhat better than 2 to 3 , their share of Cabinet Party 
posts has been very sma l10 In the case of Cabinet 
Minister.s, for example, the average number of former 
local politicians between Novembe r 1955 and December 
1966 was only about 12 per cento This is less than one 
third of the public servants' share in Cabinet posts and 
only slightly over a h a lf of their own percentage share 
of th e Party's Di et membershipo29 Of the five Presid-
ents and the seven S e c retaries -General between 1955 and 
1966, only one belonged to t he local politician category.30 
The degree of under-representation has been almost as 
startling regarding the positions on the PARC, particul-
arly in the case of its Vice-Chairmen and the Deliberatiun 
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o 0 b 31 Comm1 SS10n mem ers o From the vi ewpoin t 0 £ the party 
policy-making process, it is hi ghly significant that 
the local politicians should have been consistently and 
strikingly under - represented in those crucial policy 
initiating and formulating areas where the former public 
servants have been just as consistently over-~epresented. 
It is probably quite wrong to assume th at r etired 
high-ranking public servants have re g arded party pol-
itics as the most attractive arena of activity ; for a 
much higher percentage has no doubt entered private 
business concerns or public corporations than the 
parties. 32 On the other hand there is no doubt that it 
has become one of the main outlets for a significant 
proportion of the top-ranking bureaucrats who often reach 
the highest public service posts of Vice-Minister or 
bureau chief in their late forties or ear ly fif ties and 
then are compelled by the unwritten yet well observed 
rule to retire in order to give way to the younger aspir-
h 1 0 0 1 0 33 ants on t e ong wa1t1ng 1St o Once elected , they are 
almost invariably associated with the nuclear group of 
par ty decision-maker s thanks to their training and exper-
ience which are particularly relevant to the legislative 
functions and responsibilities of a ministerial party 
under the present pa r liamentary cabinet system o In this 
limited sense it is probably correct to say that the 
former publi c s ervants have come to dominate the LOP 
d Oh M O 0 0 34 which in turn om1nate s t e 1n1 s tr1es o 
To cha rac terise the ideolo gical and behavioural 
tendencies a ssociated with any specific occupational 
background categories i n sweeping terms is extremely dan-
gerous an d a degr e e of int e rnal heterogeneity and disag ree-
ment should b e taken for granted o Nevertheless , it seems 
useful to emphasise the fairly obv iou s advantage s of 
a former public servant as a le g islator and a party 
member vis - a - vis t hose who belong to the other occupat-
ional categories, i n terms of his degree of familiarity 
with and access to t he sources of authoritative inform-
ation, personal acquaintance with active public servants , 
and experience in the fine technicalities of administrat-
ion in a specialised field, and so forth . 3 5 As a 
general proposition, many of the professional attributes 
of a high ranki ng public servant acquired through his 
parti cu lar educationa l and occupational experience may 
with good reason be considered as contributing to his 
1 d f . h 1" k" 36 ro e an per ormance ~n t e party po ~cy-ma lng process o 
Considering the nature of his educational and 
occupationa l exper ience, the behavioural characteristics 
of a f ormer local po li t i c ian must be very different from 
those of a former pub li c servanto Because of his intim-
ate relationships with lo cal interests and groups (whose 
support was no doubt essential t o his entry and survival, 
first in local pol i tics and then his election to the 
National Diet) he c an be expected to speak and act as 
boldly as anybod y else in the Party and the Diet where 
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special local interests are at stake . When, however, 
it comes to the t ask of formulating national policies 
and drafting legislative bills, he c an hardly be 
expec t ed to match an experienced bureaucrat in perform-
ance, for the simple reason that both th e information 
and facilities essent i a l for effective execution of such 
a t ask are virtual ly monopolised by the nat ional bureau-
cracy and , as a rule , only the ' ins ' or those who have 
been 'ins ' have easy access to themo 
To the extent t hat educational and occupa tional 
background and exp e rience ma y be expected to affect the 
characteristic p a ttern a nd ef f ectiveness of a person's 
performance a s a nation al l aw-maker an d party member, 
the other three categories, businessmen, journalists 
and 'miscellaneous', may be ex pected to fall somewhere 
between the above-mentioned two o It s eems impossible to 
generalise more specifically about their r ol es and per-
formance in the party policy-making process. I t should 
therefore suffice to point out the generally intermed-
iate and essentially ind e finite positions they oc~upy 
in the dichotomy sugg ested above. If one considers 
national versus local interests, for example, they may 
well be found to approach the public servant rather than 
the local politician. If on the other hand one considers 
public versus private interests it is possible to find 
them opposing the former and siding with the latter, or 
opposing both. 
The behavioural differences, however, which result 
from the differences in occupational and educational 
experience and connec tions have obviously been neutral-
ised by what may be ·called a process of 'professionalis-
ation', which has long been under wayo This process 
tends to reduce differences between the members of the 
same Party and works toward s standardisation. 
Partly because of the well est ablished tradition 
of giving prio r ity to sitting members when candidates 
are being selected for o ffici a l party endorsement and 
partly al s o bec ause of their own natural staying power, 
the same members have tend ed to be re-elected many 
38 times ov e ro In th e Hou s e of Representatives elections, 
for example, the picture has radically changed since 
1946. I n the general election of that year nearly 90 
94 0 
per cent of the candidates sponsored by the Progressive 
and the Liberal Parties and about 75 per cent of those 
successfully returned were ' new faces' 0 By 1955, 
however , the corresponding percentages for the Democrats 
and the Liberals combined had become as low as 16 and 9 
and has since remained much the same in subsequent elec-
" 39 tlons . In other words, about 85 per cent of LDP 
candidates and 90 per cent of those successfully ret-
urned have been either incumbent or former MoH.R.' s. 
In the case of the MoH oC.' s (who have a six-year 
term of office) the ratios of new candidates to re-
1 t d b h b 11 h h " h 40. e ec e mem ers ave een natura y muc Ig erG 
Nevertheless, the tendency for incumbent members to be 
preferr ed to new candidates has been quite pronounced 
even here. In recent election 'old faces' have prov-
ided a majority of both candidates and elected members 
affiliated with the LDP. It should be noted that 'new 
faces ' have been proportionally fewer in the LDP than 
in the other major parties , particularly the Socialists, 
although the same tendency is more or less common to all 
of them . 
Looked at from a slightly different angle , this 
tendency is clearly shown by the fact that in November 
1965, over half the LDP M.H.R .' s had been returned six 
times or more , which means they had been members for 
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nearly fifteen years . Even in the House of Councill-
ors about two-thirds of the 139 LDP members who took 
their seats after the election of July 1965 had been 
returned twice or more and one - third three times or 
42 In other words , two - thirds had been members more . 
for at least six and up to ten years , while one-third 
had been for at least twelve and up to fifteen years . 
95 . 
Under such circumstances it seems inevitable that 
the bheavioural characteristics attributed intially to 
each occupational background category are progressively 
modified by the effects of mutual interaction. In this 
way the original sharp and obvious contrasts between 
those belonging to different categories tend to become 
blurred and virtually disappear as time passes . Without 
denying the differBnt roles played by former public 
servants and former local politicians in party policy-
making, we may say that a stereotyped style among LOP 
Diet members has been gradually emerging out of the 
constant interaction of the various behavioural charac -
teristics they have brought with them o 
In view of the extremely intimate relationship 
of the ministerial party and the nati onal bureaucracy, 
or rather the former ' s dependence upon the latter both 
for personnel recruitment and also in the making and 
execution of policy , the professionalisation process 
has necessarily tended to 'bureaucratise ' the categories 
other than former public servants o The process of Party 
"modernisation" , in other words the more or less bur-
eaucratic rationalization of its structural 43 framework, · 
has been accompanied by a progressive permeation of the 
whole parliamentary party membership by bureaucratic 
. 44 Infl uenc e o 
We have seen already that what makes the LOP 
parliamentary party look so distinctively an elite group 
with a level of educational experience ( and therefore, 
presumably, of intellectual sophistication ) far higher 
th an that of the average voter is the influx of former 
hi gh-ranking public servants and their predominant pos-
ition in the intra- party power relationship , especially 
in the area of party policy-making . The above-mentioned 
process of prof essionalisation cannot but further accen-
tuate th i s elitist aspect of the P arty . If, nevertheless, 
the Party has not completely lost its mass-party ~harac­
ter (or at least pretentions ), this is because of the 
presence of two other very different species of party 
member . But for the presence of the latter , the LOP 
would conce ivably have ceased to exist as an effective 
political force to compete with the Opposition Socialists , 
Communists and Koomeitoo . 
Local Poli tic i ans as P arty Members 
Of the non-parliamentary members of the LOP, active 
local politicians who constitute the middle ring between 
Die t members and grass-root supporters , are the most 
obvious and stable o Wh ether as a sour ce of recruitment 
for the parliamentary group almost as important as the 
national bureaucracy , as the executive personnel of the 
P arty BTanches and Prefectural Federations, or as the 
link between the Party and voters , they play an indis-
pensable part -_ in the survival and growth of the LDP as 
an effective political party . 
The influence of national parties in local politics, 
esp eci ally at the prefectural level, had already become 
quite signif i can t in the period following the Russo-
Japanes e War in the first decade of the century. By 
the end of the Meiji era a fairly large proportion of 
prefectural assembly members had begun to ac t according 
to instructions issued by the headquarters of t hei r res-
pectiv e national parties , such as the Seiyuukai, 
\ 45 Kenseihonto o and so forth . Since the S econd World 
War the prefectural assemblies have been f rom the outset 
under substantial inf lu ence from the na tional parties~ 
Before the parties united in 1955 about 70 per cent of 
their memb~rs were affiliated with one party or another, 
while by 1963 nearly 100 per cent of them were so 
. l' d 46 N 1 affl ~ate • everthe ess, with the outstanding excep-
tions of prefectural assembly members and members of 
the Tokyo Special Wa~As semblies local politicians have 
been remarkably free from regularised a n d effective 
control by the national partieso This is shown by the 
fact that as late as October 1965 about 40 per cent of 
prefectural governors, 80 per cent of city mayors, 95 
per cent of tuwn and village mayors, 60 per cent of 
city assembly members and 90 per cent of town and village 
bl b .. d 47 assem y mem ers were stIll In ependentso 
So far as the LOP is concerned, the tradition (dat~ 
~ng back to the first decade of the century) of regard-
ing prefectural assembly members as an integral part of 
the membership of a national party has been apparently 
accepted as a matter of course from the beginningo In 
the local elections of 1963, moreover, efforts were made 
for the first time to induce candidates for the other 
kinds of local assemb ly &- for t he executive positions to 
join the Party officiallyo In fact, the LOP went so 
far as to start providing material and moral support 
through official endorsement, even of candidates running 
in town and village assembly elections, as well as to 
repudiate candidates in gubernatorial contests unless 
P ,, 48 they agre ed to join th e arty forma11yo After the 
elections, official invitations to join the Party were 
sent to independent members of town and village assemb-
lies throughout the nation in the name of the Secretary-
General and the Chairman of the National Organisati on 
C . 49 ommJ,tteeo Even as a reaction to the similar efforts 
on the part of the Oppo sition parties , it indicate4 a 
much mor e ag gressive recruitment policy on the part of 
the traditionally complacent ministerial part Yo 
Thanks to such efforts as well as to the natura l 
tendency among local politicians to joi n the minister-
ial rather than an Opposition party , near ly 8,500 local 
politicians, or just over 10 per cent of the total, 
had become formally affiliated with the LOP by late 
1965 050 This means that at the prefectural level over 
55 per cent of the governors and 65 per cent of assemb-
ly members belonged to t he LOP, at the intermediate, 
cit~ level just under 15 per cent of mayors and 20 per 
cent of assembly members were so affi lia ted , while at 
the lowe st , town and village , level only about 5 per cent 
or under, of mayors and assembly members belonged to 
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the Party. If , however , independents are excluded and 
only those affiliated with one or other of the national 
parties are counted , another significant aspect of the 
situation emerges : a relatively high percentage of 
ex~cutive heads and a relatively low percentage of 
assembly members had chosen the LOP rather than an 
Opposit ion party , 96 , 78 and 91 per cent respectively of 
the governors , city mayors , and town and village mayors 
were so commit ted as opposed to 69 , 50 and 54 per cent 
respectively of the prefectural , city , and town and 
v i llage assembly members o In the yet very limited areas 
of local politics that have been successfully 'politic-
ised', the LOP can be identified , as a genera l rule, 
wi th the top stratum of the local bureaucracy much more 
in timately than with th e local legislatures o 
Ther e is little doubt that the affil iation of local 
politi cians proves to be an , enormous asset in Diet elect-
ions and elections of other kinds ; for they are, generally 
99. 
speaking, much closer to the average voter both physically 
and psychologically than bureaucrats and, for that reason, 
are 1n a better position to influence his voting qecisions. 
Yet when it comes to the making of decisions on policy 
issues by the Party as such there is no evidence to sugg-
est that any significant contributions are ever made by 
them o In view of the virtually complete control of the 
Headquarters by the Diet members and the domination of 
the policy-making organs and processes by the former 
public servants among them, this is hardly surprising o 
Their participation in the process is merely incidental 
and marginal, and is largely limited to attendance at 
occasional policy seminars arranged by the Headquarters. 
They attend in their capacity of officers of local 
Branches or Prefectural Federations and listen to, 
rather than actively debate with, lecturers who are 
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also nominated by the Headquarters . What is expected 
of them in relation to the party policy making process 
IS obviously not more than support and assistance in 
impaemrotation, as opposed to the initiation and form-
ulation of policy. 
Grass-roots Membership 
Much more difficult to define and describe than the 
above two categories of LOP members are the miltitudes 
constituting the peripheral ring of the Party membership 
structure o It is with this group that confusion often 
inevitably occurs when one tries to m~ke a numerical 
estimate or describe its socio-economic and ideological 
characteristics. Such elusiveness is indeed its most 
obvious and significant characteristic o 
Whereas 109 million was official ly quoted in the 
annual organisational programme as the number of 
100 .. 
53 registered LOP members as of January 1966, the bona 
...---
fide members (those who pay the 200 yen per annum 
membership fee more or less regularly) seem to be about 
54 50 , 000 or one-fortieth of the officially q~oted number. 
The rest are almost purely nominal members, in the sense 
tha t they neither pay the membership fee from their own 
pockets nor are much inter ested even in the fact of 
their affiliation-,,-with the Party .. As a rule, in fact, 
a large proportion of these 'registered' members have 
been passi vely recruited from among the members of the 
800 or so supporters' associations built around individ-
ual Diet members, at the latter's request o The essence 
of the relationship obtaining between a Diet member and 
his sUPPQrters-turned-party-members is realistically 
summed up by the following statement of an experienced 
LOP Diet member: 
When pressed by the Party Headquarters to help 
increase the number of members, each Diet member 
asks some of his supporters to join the Party 
for his sake o To be sure , they have no intent-
ion at all of paying the membership fee them-
selves 0 They are bound to say, "Gh well, I don't 
mind joining, if you pay the money for me." The 
Diet member :·does not want to help much in the 
drive to increase members for obvious reasons .. 
If he persuades one thousand members of his 
supporters ' association officially to join the 
Party, he will be forced to spend 200,000 yen 
for the payment of their membership fee; if 
the number to be recruited is 10,000, he will 
then have to foot a bill for 2 million yen~ 
00.0 The majority of the supporters willing to 
join do not even dream of paying to do sOo To 
them money is something the Diet member should 
spend for them , not something they should be 
expected to spend for him. 55 
A shopkeeper who had lately been recruited into the 
Party in the manner described above was ffirprised when 
told by a journalist that he was a Party member and 
exclaimed, "You say I am a member of the LDP? Well, I 
remember Mr . X, the city assembly member, calling the 
101. 
oth er d ay to ask me to become a member , and I did s i gn 
the form he brought with him o 
that I have ever paid anything 
However , 
11 56 
I do not believe 
As an indi c a tor 
o f the maxima l limit of the nominal ly reg i stered members, 
the figure of 1.9 million is not entirely useless for 
certain purposes. It must be, however , taken with utmost 
caution and qualifications, as the above examples sugg-
est. 
Of the 50 ,000 more or less stable members who reg-
ularly pay the membership fee about 420 are Diet members 
and 8,600 are local politicians. This leaves only about 
40,000 to be consi d ered as part of the peripheral members 
in the sense o~ the words used.here . Considering that 
there are about 2 ,600 Branches of the Party at the city, 
town and village level throughout the country, each of 
whi ch ~ust have a dozen or so officials to maintain it 
for a prolonged period, it is clear that a majority of 
these 40,000 are actually party office-bearers at the 
local level o As such they are no doubt also the most 
~ctive organisers and constitute the hard core of the LOP 
local . . 57 o r g an 1 sat 1 0 n 0 
It is sti ll a valid assumption that a relatively 
high proportion of those engaged In primary industries, 
especially agriculture , t ends to favour the conservative 
LOP to the radical, opposition parties. A study made 
in 1961 revealed, for examp l e , that 67 . 4 per cent of 
the farmers responding to a questionnaire said they had 
voted for the LOP in the House of Representatives elect-
ion of the previous year , as compared with 62 .1 per cent 
o f self-employed merchants and entrepreneurs , 57 01 per 
cent of corpor a tion managers , 38 . 2 per cent of manual 
labourers, 27 . 4 per cent of white collar employees and 
102. 
33.3 per cent of those following p~ofessions.58 In a more 
sophisticated study of the Japanese voting behaviour made 
at about the same time a similar conclusion was drawn in 
the form of an urban-rural dichotomy.59 It is neverthe-
less very important to emphasise the danger of equating the 
grass-roots voter support for the LOP, that is, the scope 
of its potential membership, with the primary industry 
population. The distribution of LOP votes i n the recent 
Diet elections reveals that the level of voter support 
for the Party has been considerably higher than that of 
the population engaged in agriculture, forestry ~nd 
fisheries and the two do not correlate with each other 
"Of" 1 60 very slgnl Icant Yo 
On the one hand, the drastic change in the employ-
ment pattern of the nation qyer the past ten years has 
made it impossible for the LOP to continue to depend as 
heavily and as comfortably as previously on the electoral 
support of the farmers. It would have been a bad policy 
to do so, even if the agricultural population as such had 
remained unchanged in its traditional conservatism and 
antipathy towards the radical parties; for its size has 
drastically decreased both relatively and in absolute 
numbers - between 1955 and 1965 it fell from about 16 
million, or nearly 40 per cent of the total work-force, 
61 
to 11 million, or just about a quarter of the work-force. 
Equally significant, however, is the fact that a substan-
tial proportion of the farming population, especially 
that part of it which is organised in agricultural unions 
~'and co-operatives , can~ no longer be expected to supply 
votes for the LOP as a matter of course. The alienat-
ion of farmers from the LOP in some of the most predom-
inantly agricultural prefectures , such as Aomori, Iwate, 
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Akita and Shimane, has been clearly registered by the gap 
between the percentage shares of the agricu ltural populat-
ion and LOP votes in the recent House of Councillors 
. 62 electlons o 
The organisational efforts made by the LOP in the 
past ten years or so have, in fact, been predicated on 
the well founded assumption that the profound socio-
economic change symbolised by the sharp decline of agric-
ultural population and the increase of floating votes in 
rural constituencies is bound to have seriously adverse 
effects on the future electoral performance of the LOP. 
By the middle of 1963 such efforts had resulted in the 
establishment of some 2 ,600 local Branches throughout the 
country and the appointment of 22,000 Resident Organisers. 63 
These Branches have been the principal and most orthodox 
agepcies through which to recruit new members at the 
grass-roots, though they are frequently supplemented by 
the supporters' associations o Both the organisational 
details and membership composition of the Branches no doubt 
vary from place to place, but they share the common funct-
ion of recruiting new members as well as electioneering for 
incumbent LOP Diet members or potential LOP candidates 
on a semi-permanent basis. 
Acco rding to accounts given in 1960 by several 
Resident Organisers, by early 1960 Branches were formed 
in all but a few towns and villages in Niigata prefec-
ture, the majority of their members being farmers and 
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merchants o Those already affiliated with a Branch would 
calIon their relations and acquain tances to persuade them 
to joino In Yamanashi a Branch was set up in each town 
or village and its members were assigned each to a hamlet 
and it s subdivisions , i.e o , neighbourhood associations~ In 
104 0 
Asahikaw a city in HOKRaidoo a Sub-Branch was set up ln 
each of its seven school districts, each consisting of 
about 1,000 members and further sub-divided into sever-
65 al street committees of about a hundred members
o 
Through the activities of these Branches, the LOP alleg-
edly succeeded in having about ten per cent of voters 
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'register' as members in some prefectures. 
In defining the character of LOP membership at t~is 
level it is particularly important to point out the prey-
alence of indirect or group affiliation, as opposed to 
direct and individual membershipo As typified by the 
instances of 12,000 post-masters, 5 ,000 hairdressers and 
barbers, and 4,500 manufacturers of oils and fats w~o 
67 collectively joined the Party several years ago, a : 
substantial proportion of the Party's members are prov-
ided by the three hundred organisations officially listed 
as groups sympathetic to the LOP, or by their sub-
divisions.
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At the local level youths' and women's 
associations have often been instrumental in inducing 
their members to become party members en masse and in a 
few cases the employees of particular manufacturing estab-
lishments have joined in hundreds . 69 It is indeed diff-
icult to find many specific instances of individuals 
joining the Party strictly of their own accord and inde-
pendently of any group . 
The fact that the Branches of the Party have appar-
ently been as active in the urban as in the rural areas 
in their efforts to recruit new members, and that many 
of the large groups who have joined the Party en bloc 
comprise those engaged in secondary or tertiary, rather 
than primary, industries, suggests that the membership at 
this level is occupationally quite variegated. Far~ers 
105. 
are only one of the major categorieso 
The recruitment of members by indirect affiliation 
and through total or partial absorption of an existing 
organisation necessarily renders the peripheral member-
ship of the LOP singularly unstable , even ephemeral. As 
already pointed out, most have been induced to join the 
Party at the request of a Diet member, a Party Branch 
official or a Resident Organisero Few are interested 
sufficiently in the Party and its general policy pro-
gr amme to pay the membership fee from their own pockets 
or to ~esire continued formal association with it over a 
prolonged period. Hence the repeated calls at annual 
Party Conferences for a more effective collection of 
membership fees and registration and re-registration of 
bona fide memberso 70 Since no more than, say, 20 per 
cent of sympathetic organisations can be expected to be 
interested in a wide range of LOP policies not direot1y 
relating to the allocation of public funds,71 it is 
reasonable to assume that many members drawn from this 
source tend soon to drop out p as soon in fact as their 
specific economic demands are satisfied o 
Nor are those drawn from the supporters' associat-
ions more likely to make stable and permanent party 
members, for their relationships to the particular Diet 
members or would-be candidates are often too personal 
to be transferred easily to the impersonal entity called 
the Party. In fact, there is an element of rivalry and 
even antagonism in the relations between a Party Branch 
and Prefectural Federation on the one hand and a 
supporters' association on the other, which is bo~nd to 
make a person ' s sustained loyalty to the one incompatible 
with his loyalty to the other, especially at the time 
f 1 · 72 o an e ectlon o 
Under the circumstances described above, it is 
extremely difficult to differentiate clearly a nominal 
and sporadic party member from one of the ten million 
who belong to the 800 or so supporters ' associat ions or 
73 or~anisations sympathetic to the Party. It is prob-
ably more accurate to say that many of the 1.9 million 
peripheral members have regular and permanent member-
ship of some such organisation, but are only temporarily 
and inc identally members of the Party . Except for the 
purely nominal act of registering as a party member they 
are hardly distinguishable from non party members assoc-
iated with the former . 
The involvement of the peripheral members in t~e 
party policy-making process is even more incidental and 
marginal than that of the local politician members. As 
a rule, it is limited to participation in the occasional 
study seminars and meetings sponsored by a Branch or a 
Prefectural Federation , and the receipt of a few party 
publications each mon th . Apart from the annual meetings 
of the Prefectural Federations , such meetings are usually 
held for the benefit of two particular categories of 
members, youths and women, to whose role in the local 
party activities has been attached a special importance 
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the official organisational programmes of the P arty . in 
Such semina rs and meetings , however, have been 
primarily designed not to prov ide an opportunity for the 
opinions of grass-roots memb ers to be heamand reflected 
in the formulation of new party policies , but r ather to 
educate them in the policies already decided by the 
Headquarters and to solicit their co-operation in 
propagating them o 
A registered member is entitled in theory to r eceive 
various party pUblications either free or at a nomina l 
cos t. In reality, however, the number of copies avail-
able for each pUblication has been much too Bmall to 
75 reach anything like 109 mil li on members o Despite the 
vast imp rovement of the system of distribu tion reported 
from several prefectures in the recent years , the number 
of copies made available to each prefecture still seems 
f t 11 h h ° ° f dO b 76 ar 00 sma to reac t e majOrIty 0 or Inary mem ers
o 
The fact that participation in locally organised 
seminars and meetings and subscription to party pUblicat-
i ons represent virtually the only regu l arised mode of 
contac t and communication between the Party and a peri-
pheral member shows that the latter's contribution to 
official policy- making at the Headquarters is ext remely 
indirect and limited, if not entirely absent o Since the 
Headquarters is under the virtual control of Diet members, 
it woul d be necessary for an ordinary member or members 
to affect the latter's thought and behaviour in order to 
influence the party policy- making process one way or 
another. The fact, however , that a Diet member does not 
depend primarily on the party organisation for his elec-
toral success (which is his main concern ) but rather on 
th e supporters ' association built specifically as his 
personal electioneering machine , makes it difficult to 
bring effecti v e pressure to bear on him through the 
i ntervention of a formal Party Branch or Pr efec tural 
Federation. Pressure likely to affect his acti ons as a 
policy-make r may be much more effective ly and directly 
applied through his supporters ' assoc i ation o This amount s 
to saying that it is much more sensible and lo g ical for 
108 0 
any body interested in influencing the party ' s decisions 
to join a supporters ' association or associations , 
rather than the Party . Hence the diffic~lties of 
d rastical l y increasing the number of bona fid e members 
and the result i ng numerical dis c repancy between the 10 
mi l l ion associated with the supporters ' associati ons on 
t he one hand and the 1 09 million nominal and 50,000 
dues - paying party members on the other hand. 
Summary 
The LOP was initially formed essentially as ~ 
conservative Diet members ' group but has subsequently 
mad e heroic efforts to transform itself into a ' mas' 
party primarily with a view to avoiding the consequences 
of the drastic change in the employment pattern of the 
nation and its effects on the relative elec toral per-
formance of itself and the rival parties o By 1966 it 
seems to have made an impressive gain in its much pub-
licised efforts to win new members o When carefully 
examined , however , the bulk of the 1.9 million or sO 
members are purely nominal and the size of the effecti v e 
membership still remains at about 50,000 0 Moreover , the 
policy- making power is narrowly concentrated in the hands 
of slightly more than 400 Diet members who constitute 
the inner ring of the party membership and monopolise 
al l party offices at the Headquarters o Bo th as an 
important source of future Diet members and as a link 
to connect the Party with the voter some 8 , 500 loca l 
politicians surround this inner group o Then there are 
some 40 , 000 ordinary members , constituting an outer , 
or peripheral , ring and cultivating and feedi ng th e 
voter support for the Party at the unit leve l o f pub l i c 
administration . The rest of the 1. 9 million may be 
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regarded as a reserve army of regular LOP voters and 
potential members, hardly distinguishable from the 11 
million members of the supporters' associations or the 
comparable numbers associated with various organisations 
and groups defined as sympathetic to the Party. 
The distance between the inner ring, especially 
that part of it which consists of former high-ranking 
public servants, and the middle and outer rings may be 
measured in terms of occupational and educational back-
ground, as well as the completely one-sided distribut-
ion of decision-making power. Just as the two categor-
ies of former bureaucrats and local politicians have 
between them contributed a half of the LOP Diet members, 
farmers and white collar workers have accounted for a 
majority of local assembly members, followed by officials 
of trade associations or civic groups, retail or whole-
sale dealers, and so 77 for th 0 If one may assume that 
the educational level of the LDP lac al assembly members 
is not higher than that of the Diet members recruited 
from among them, the proportion of university and college 
graduates among them cannot be higher than 60.6 per cent 
(as compared with 81.2 per cent of the Diet members), and 
that of those who finished only elementary school cannot 
be lower than 11.2, (as compared with 4.0 of the 78 1 at t er) • 
One may likewise assume that the average educational 
level of the LDP members at the periphery is not signif-
icantly different from that of the population at large, 
and compare the overall figures of 5 0 2 per cent for 
university and college graduates and 63.0 Per cent for 
those with no more than primary education with the two 
. 79 sets of corresponding figures gIven above. Even with 
a fairly large margin of possible error involved in 
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applying the figures for the population at large to the 
local members of the LOP, the contrasts seem to be 
sufficiently sharp and obvious to make such comparisons 
meaningful. The distance between these figures is 
bound to perpe tuate the present monopoly of party policy-
making power by the Headquarters and the parliamentary 
party, while the same factors will continue to ensure 
the generally superior position of the former public 
servants within the inner group , and will perpetuate 
the process of bureaucratisation. 
Ill. 
CHAPTER 4 
PARTY ORGANISATION 
As an organisation, the LOP consists of a Head-
quarter s ( hombu) located in Tokyo and Branches (shibu) 
established at the level of basic adminis tr a tive units 
(such as city, c ounty" town and village) or in various 
1 . . 1 vo untary assocIatIons. These two are the basic com-
ponents of the Part y ' s formal structure, but in addit-
ion to them there has been created an auxiliary instit-
ution designed for the systematic training of party 
cadres and organisers, the Central Ac ademy of Politic s 
(chuuoo seiji daigakuin )0 In the present chapter an 
attempt will be made to de scr ibe in a frame of refer-
ence broadly concerned with policy-making the more prom-
inent characteristics of the formal or ganisati on and its 
individual part~, with a view to defining their na t-
ure and role in party policy - making processes. 
Party Headquarters 
There are t wo particularly conspicuous aspects 
worth noting about the organisationa l framework of the 
Part y Headquarters. One is apparently complete control 
of all official party organs and positions by members 
of th~ Diet . The other is the great multiplicity of 
part y organs and the resulting fragmentation of the 
o r g an i sat ion a 1 s t ru c t ur e 0 
The LOP Constitution requires only a few particular 
categories of the party positions t o be filled exclus-
1 h . 2 i ve y by members of t e DI et , but in practice virtua-
lly every formal position has b een constantly occupied 
by an incumbent Diet membero In Au gus t 19 65 , for 
example, none of the 314 principal party officials 
1120 
(except for nine of the twenty Advisers (komon» was 
outside the Diet and even these nIne Advisers had 
1 b 1 d " f h D" 3 former y een ea In g members 0 t e let. Even 
where the eligibility of non-parliamentary members 
is specifically mentioned in the constitution (e.g. 
' not more than three members of the Party Discipline 
Committee members may be filled from ou tsi de the 
Diet') none has so far been actually appointed. To 
all practical purposes, therefore, the LDP Headquarters 
may qui te legitimately be said to be under the com-
plete and exclusive control of the Party's parlia-
mentary contingento The fact that a substantial 
proportion of its routine work is discharged by the 
non-parliamentary employees of the Secretariat (honbu-
k k) d d " h 1"" 4 jimu yo u oes not contra lC t suc -a genera 1 satlon, 
so far as the centre of power and source of cbminant 
influence in its activities is concerned. 
The second aspect of the structure of the Head-
quarters which strikes an outsider as surprising is the 
degree of functional differentiation and the multiplic-
ation of organisational units. In mid-1966 there aFe 
about twenty organs at the Headquarters o These may be 
classified for convenience roughly under four categor-
i es: the executive, the decision-making, the parlia-
mentary and other organs. ' 
As defined in the constitution , the first of these 
categories comprises the offices of the President, Vice-
President (fuku-soosai), Secretary-General (kanjichoo) , 
Deput y Secretaries-General (fuku-kanjichoo), three 
bureaux and four fun c tional c ommittees . On the face of 
it, this category does not sound particularly c omplex, 
for it involves only four kinds of organ. A closer 
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look reveals, however, that two of the functional comm-
ittees embrace a fair number of sub-divi sions . These 
are the Committee on National Organisation (~enkoku­
soshiki-iinkai) which contains nine bureaux (kyoku) 
sub-divided into 17 Departments (bu), and the Committee 
on Public Rel ations (koohoo-iinkai), which involves 
five bureaux. 
Similarly, the decision-making organs are offic-
ially only three in number: the Party Conference (too-
taikai), the Assembly of the Members of Both Ho~ses of 
the Diet (ryooingiin-sookai), ' and the Executive Council. 
For present purposes, however, the PARC must be 
included in this category, for it constitutes an essen-
tial part of the formal decision-making mechanism, as 
we shall demonstrate later. Whereas there is nothing 
complicated about the three first mentioned organs, the 
PARC is the most complex multi-unit organ of the Party. 
It consists of a Del iberation Commission (seimuchoosakai-
shingikai), 15 Di visions (bukai) and, as of November 
1965, nearly 50 Spe cial Investigation Committees 
(tokubetsu-choosaiinkai). Moreover, the Divisions and 
the Special Committees together involve nearly one hun-
dred sub-units specialising in particular fields of 
investigation or in specific policy issues. 
The third and the fourth categories are fairly 
simple in composition. The former comprises merely the 
Assemblies of the Members of the two Houses and a few 
separate organs set up only in the House of Councillor~ 
while the latter includes the Committees on Election 
Policy and Par ty Discipline , the Audit Board and such 
mis cellaneous organs as the Advisers, the Councillors 
(sanyo), the Resident Organisers (chihoochuuzai-soshikiip) 
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and the ad hoc Organisational Research Council (soshiki-
choosakai). Even here, however, there has been a ten-
dency for the number of the ad hoc Special Organs to 
increase steadily , as suggested by the emergence in 
the last few years of the National Movement Hea,dquarters 
(~min-undoo-honbu), the Anti-Disaster Policy Head-
quarters (saigai-taisaku-honbu), the Public Relations 
Research Committee (koohoo-choosakai), etc. 
It is against the background of these two very 
prominent characteristics of the general structure of 
the LOP Headquarters that the individual organs and their 
functions may be meaningfully discussed in a po1icy-
making frame of reference. Both are bound to limit and 
define the effective roles of such organs and thus give 
a ~pecia1 slant or flavour to the process of party 
policy-making . 
The Policy Affairs Research Council 
As mentioned above, the Party Conference , the 
Assembly of the Members of Both Houses of the Diet and 
the Executive Council make up the formal system of 
policy-making in the Party, while the PARC also plays 
an informal but indispensable part in it. Of these 
four particular organs, the first two are concerned 
primarily with rubber-stamping such general and abst-
ract aims and principles of the Party activity as are 
prepared and presented to them by the latter two org-
ans , and se1dCX'r\,if ever , with specific policy matters 
" " 1" 5 A or initlatlon of a concrete po lCY programme . s a 
result, practically every important policy decision of 
the Party is formally initiated and detennined by the 
PARC or the Executive Councilor by both together. 
According to Article 40, Paragraph 2 , of the LOP 
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Constitution, it is necessary for any bills or plans to 
be examined and approved by the PARC in order to become 
official party policies. Once formally approved by that 
organ, they are passed on to the Executive Council for 
its final decision which can be over-ruled i n theory 
(but never in practice ) by either the Party Conference 
or the Assembly of the Members of Both Houses of the 
Diet . A bill which has passed the scrutiny of these two 
organs normally goes directly to the Diet Policy Comm-
ittee (kokkai-taisaku-iinkai) and through it reaches 
the floor of the Diet,usuallyas Cabinet-sponsored bills . 
As mentioned earlier , the PARC, which plays a 
crucial role in the formal policy-making process of the 
WP, is an extremely complex organ in itself. Under the 
direction of a Chairman (seimuchoosakaichoo) and not 
more than five Vice-Chairmen (fuku-kaichoo) , a Deliber-
ation Commission and fifteen Divisions operate as its 
permanent organisational components . In addi t ion to 
them an indefinite number of 'Special Investigation 
Committees ' are set up on an ad hoc basis to deal with 
specific policy issues that may arise from time to time. 
Ever since the first nine of such Special Committees 
were created within two weeks of the formation of the 
LOP in November 1955,6 their number has steadily 
increased until today it has reached nearly fifty, 
despite sporadic attempts made every few years to red-
uce it to a somewhat less unwieldy level by abolishing 
1 . 1 . t' 7 the re atlve y lnac lve ones . At the same time , the 
fifteen permanent Divisions have also accelerated the 
t endency twoards organisational multiplication and 
fragmentation within the Council by sub-dividing them-
selves into an increasing number of ' sub-committees' 
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which today account for about thirty between them , or an 
average of two each o 
Combined with the effects of monopolistic control 
of the formal organs of the Headquarters by Diet members , 
t he steady multiplication of those parts of t he PARC 
has inevitably resulted in the even wider and thinner 
spread of the limited number of available Diet members 
to fill the increased number of party positions. In 
November 1965 , for example , each of the 421 LOP mem-
bers of the two Houses of the Diet belonged concurr-
ently to an average of 1 07 Divisions and 6 01 Special 
Committees, i.e O) nearly eight separate parts of the 
. 8 Councll o In other words , every LOP Diet member was 
forced, in theory at any rate , to attend to at least 
eight different policy problems simultaneously , in 
addition to all the other kinds of party activity that 
he might be called upon to parti ci pate in as a member 
of the organs other than the PARC o 
Such a situation has been brought about no d oubt 
under pressure from the incre~sing number of interest 
\ 
groups and th e Minis tries and other government agenc-
ies o For every demand of an individual or group in 
the society to be sat i sfi ed by a pub 1 ic action of the 
governmen t, it is necessary tha t it be transla ted ei ther 
into a spec if i c administrative measure explicitly auth -
ori sed by a relevant existing law or a legislative bil l 
establishing a new l aw or amending an existing law o 
Under the present parliamentary cabinet system this 
means that it must be supported either by a sec ti on o f 
the public service or by the ministerial party , f o r i t 
is only the former who may decide legitimately t o sat i s-
fy such a demand within the limits of a relevant existin~ 
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law and th e ministerial party that m~y have it introd-
uced into and successfully passed by the Diet as a 
Cabinet-sponsored bill. Consequently, all kinds of 
demand for public decision are brought to these two 
possible sources of support by interest groups and 
even those which are initially taken to Ministries 
are often referred to the Party for additional support. 
Under such circumstances, the PARC and its sub-
divisions have inevitably become faithful mouthpieces 
of interest groups or particular Ministries. Because 
of the enormous work load imposed on them and the help-
lessly inadequate amount of time available to Diet 
members, it is patently impossibl ·~ for them to formul-
ate independent policy programmes by themselves. The 
increasingly complex technicalities of policy-making in 
a modern and rapidly changing society only add to the 
unfeasibility of their independent policy-making function. 
Another factor which had no doubt contributed to 
the growth of very close relationships between each of 
the PARC sub-divisions and particular Ministries and 
sets of interest groups is the voluntary basis of the 
former's membership affiliation. Ac cording to the Party 
Constitution, only the Chiefs (bukai choo ) and Deputy 
Chiefs {fuku-bukaichoo} of the Di visions have to be 
appointed by the Chairman of the PARC (with the consent 
of the Executive Council) and in practice those of the 
Special Investigation Committees are also appointed 
either by the Executive Councilor the Leaders' Meeting 
(yakui nkai} .9 The other members of these sub-units are, 
however , drawn on an entirely voluntary basis, the only 
restriction being that no member may join more than two 
D . . . . 10 IVISlons at anyone tIme. This has resu lted in each 
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of them attracting only those members who are spec -
ially interested in a particular issue or category of 
issues because of pressures from their constituencies , 
interest groups or sections of the public service . In 
this sense , each and every sub- division of the PARC ' is 
naturally closely and inseparably related to a partic~ 
ular Ministry or Ministries and sets of interest groups. 
The record of the actual performance of the PARC, 
particularly its Divisions , amply confirms the fore-
going suspicions . To give only a few examples , in 
August 1957 the Transportation Division was no doubt 
echoing the demand s of the nation's transportation indus-
try and the Ministry of Transportation, when it called, 
among other things, for a 2,000 million yen government 
loan to Japan Air Lines, some 120,0 00 million yen invest-
ment in the improvement of the National Railways system, 
the spending of 31,600 million yen for the improvement 
11 
of the harbour facilities, and so on. Again, in 
August 1960 the Social Affairs Division finalised a new 
social insurance plan in accordance with the original 
plan presented by the Ministry of Welfare . 12 The ' Road 
Improvement Plan' which the Construction Division dec-
ided to sponsor in September 1962 was merely the 1963 
portion of the three-year plan previously prepared and 
announced by the Ministry of Construction . 13 The list 
of similar examples could be enlarged almost indefin-
itely. 
An important corollary of this dependence on the 
bureaucracy and pre-occupation with economic or budge-
tary problems on the part of the PARC has been the 
exclusion from the deliberations of its sub-d ivis ions of 
more general issues of a political or ideological nature. 
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Such a tendency has been in fact not only recognised 
but also deplored by those party members who have been 
in a position to observ e most closely and constantly 
the manner in which the policy research organ actually 
func ti ons 0 In May 1961 , for example , Kuraishi Tad ao , 
a leading member of the newly established Party 
Organisation Research Council , frankly admitted that 
the PARC was so busy considering budget drafts or 
b i l l s to be introduced by the Cabinet that it was 
impo ssible for it to pay much attention to more funda-
t 1 d 1 1'· 14 men a an genera po ICY Issues . Three years later 
the same criticisms were repeated by three former 
Chairmen of the Council , Fukuda Takeo , Nakamura 
15 Umekichi and Funada Naka o There is little evidence , 
mo reover , that such c riticisms have led so far to any 
effective steps to correct the situation o On the COn-
tra!y , a progressive increase , rather than a decrease , 
of the elements thus criticised seems to be almost 
inevitable so long as Diet members continue to mono -
polise Party positions , including those in the PARC , 
and the Party is compelled to deal with every conceiv-
able demand of the Ministries and other government 
bodies or interest groups. 
According to the party constitution , decisions 
made by the Divisions and the Special Investigati on 
Committees must be reviewed in the first instance by the 
PARC Deliberation Commission o Originally , the Commi ss -
ion was to consist of the PARC Chairman and Vice -
Chairmen and , in addition , not more than 25 members 
1 . t d b th Ch . 16 special y appoln eye aIrman . In November 
1955 the Commission was initially composed of 26 memb-
ers , the Chairman and 10 Vice- Chairmen of the PARC and 
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15 members spe c ially appointed , 12 from the House of 
Representatives and 3 from the House of Councillors o l ? 
However , the number of the last category of members 
quickly increased to twenty-five - the maximum permitted 
by the consti tution - wh i ch mad e it virtually impossible 
fo r th e group to deal effectivel y and prompt l y with t he 
already enormous and steadi l y growing number of specif-
ic poli cy issues submitted to it by the PARC ' s working 
b . 18 su -unlts . Consequently , by early 1959 it became 
cus tomary to have the meetings of the PARC Vice -
Cha irmen largely supersede it as a regular agency to 
review the decisions of the Di visions and the Specia l 
Committees. This was in order to speed up the process 
and avoid the development of sharp divisions of opinion 
19 whi ch would h ave inevitably ar i sen i n th e larger body. 
In the summer of 1961, however , a meeting of the PARC 
Chairman and Vice-Chairmen decided to reduce the number 
of the specially appointed members to about fif teen. 
An amendment to the P arty Constitution , in January 1964, 
formally reduced it to ' not more than twenty ', and today 
it consists of about a dozen members appointed in addit-
20 ion to the PARC Chairman and half a dozen Vice -Chairmeno 
Whereas the members of the Di visions and the 
Sp ecial Investigation Committees are recruited on a 
voluntary basis , as already mentioned , both the Vice-
Chairmen and the members of the Deliberation Commission 
are appointed formally by the PARC Chairman with the 
consent of the Executive Council o In practice they are 
appointed by the Executive Council either independently 
or j ointly with the Leader s ' Meeting o Just as the free 
choice open to the members regarding their aff iliation 
with the Divisions and Special Committees has inevitably 
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turned them into faithful collaborators and agents of 
particular sections of the bureaucracy and of interest 
groupS , the nomination of the Vice- Chairmen and the 
members of the Deliberation Commission by a higher party 
organ has introduced elements of fac t i onalism in thei r 
composition o In the case of Vice-Chairmen , f o r 
example , until the summer of 1963 , it was a well est-
ab1ished practice to have each of the eight or so major 
fa c tions represented by one Vice- Chairman , with an 
add itional few drawn from the membership of the House of 
Counci1 10rs o 21 In accordance with the interim report 
of the Party Organisation Research Council and under 
strong pressure from its Chairman and leader of the 
party modernisation movement , Miki Takeo , in July 1963 
t he number of the P ARC Vice- Chairmen was boldly reduced 
to four and the considerations of inter - factional ba1 -
ance h 
. 1 . 22 
ave been glven up at east temporarl1y o 
On the other hand , in the case of members of the 
Deliberation Commission , the reduction of their number 
to about twelve has evidently failed to affec t t he 
principle of inter-factional ba1ance o In fact , just as 
the ten Vice - Chairmen once virtually replaced the 
unwieldy 36- man Commission before the latter was reduced 
to a somewhat more manageable size in 1961 , the fifteen 
Commission members g particularly the twelve of them 
recruited from the House of Representatives , have now 
been substituted for the Vice-Chairmen as the inte r-
factional co - o r dinators in the policy-making mechan i sm 
23 
of the Part Yo 
The Ex€Cu t i v e Counc i 1 
All policy recommendations initiated by a Divis -
ion or a Special Investigation Committee of the PARC 
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on behalf of particul a r sections of the bureaucracy or 
interest g roups, and then approved by the Deliberation 
Commission acting on behalf of the intra-party fact-
ions, finally reach t 4 e Executive Council to be made 
official party decisions o As pointed out earlier, the 
verdicts given by the Executive Counc il are officially 
final, so far as the Party is concerned; for the 
actual functions of the two higher organs of party 
decision-making, the Party Conference and the Assembly 
of the Members of Both Houses of the Diet, are entirely 
nominal o A draft bill, for example, will be passed on 
directly to the Diet Policy Committee of the Party when 
approved by the Executive Council
o I t wi 11 then be 
introduced into the Diet (normally as a Cabinet-
sponsored bill) unless objections are raised by the 
bureaucracy (represented formally by the Cabinet but ln 
fact by the regular meetings of the Permanent Vice-
.. ) 24 Mlnlsters 0 
The principles which govern the nomination of the 
Executive Council members are rather peculiar. There 
are three kinds of member involved: those elected 
from M.H.R.'s, those elected from M.HoC.'s and those 
appointed by the Party President o The original constit-
ution of 1955 mentioned only the categories and did not 
specify their numbers, but the three strong men of 
Hatoyama's time, Miki Bukichi (then member of the 
Presidential Proxy Committee (soosai-daikoo-iin) ) , 
Kishi Nobusuke (the Secretary-General) and Koono 
I ch i roo (the Mi n ister o f Agriculture and Forestry), 
decided apparently arbitrarily on 17 November 1955 to 
have 30 e lected from the M.H.R o' s and 10 from the M.H.Co's 
so tha t the former Liberals a nd the Democrats might 
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each contribute 20. By early 1957 the distinction 
between the elements formerly associated with the two 
parties became a much less significant factor and the 
present pattern of its compositi on began to appear . 
Und er this new pattern ten of the forty members were 
appo inted by the Presid ent , as required by the Party 
Constitution, 20 were elected from among the M.HoR.' s 
o n a regional basis, and the remaining ten were elec-
ted from among the M. H.C o ' s . 26 Except for the contrib-
ulion of the postwar institution, the House of Councill-
ors in place of the prewar House o f Peers, this was of 
course an exact replica of the composition of the 
Seiyuukai's Consultative Council of December 1903.27 
Although the number of its members was reduced to 
30 in practice in July 1960 and officially in the form 
of a constitutional amendment in January of the following 
year, the basic principles underlying their nomination 
have not changed at all o 28 Eight are appointed by the 
P resident, 15 elected on a regional basis in proportion 
to the number of MoH.R.' s representing each of the n ine 
regions, and seven are elected from the M. H.C.'s. 
Superficially, the selection of at least half o f 
the Executive Council members seems to be governed by 
the old principle of regional representation , or rather 
geographical factionalism , sharply different from both 
the voluntarism which operates in the case of the 
working sub -units of the PARC and the kind of facti on -
alism which determines the composition of its Deliber-
ation Commission . Such an impression, however , does no t 
conform to reality , for regionalism in this instance is 
entirely nominal. It is true that the fifteen members 
are elected by and from the M.H oRo' s returned from the 
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. . 29b .. 11 t th h nIne regIons, ut It IS equa y rue at t ey never 
act as re g ional representatives when voting on specific 
policy issues in the Executive Council. They neither 
consult with the other M.H . R. ' s from the same regions 
prior to making a decision nor report to them the res-
ults of their actions taken in the Council. 30 From the 
point of view of effectiveness, the pri nc iple of reg-
ional representation is nothing but a dead carry-over 
from the past and does not affect the behaviour of this 
organ in any significant way. 
Much more real in influencing the nomination of its 
members have been, in fact, the same pervasive elements 
of non-geographical factionalism and the pressure of 
interest groups, ~st as was the case with the parts of 
PARC o It has been and will be inconceivable for any of 
the factions to be . left without at least one represen-
tative of its own participating in the Executive Council 
In this respect it functions as something of an enlargm 
duplicate of the PARC Deliberation Commission. 
At the same time, the Executive Council has been 
constantly subjected to the pressures of interest 
groups not only from outside but also from within. As 
the Vice-President of the Part~ Kawashima Shoojiroo, 
once deplored, at least some of its members who speak 
in the Executive Council on specific policy problems 
are patently speaki ng on behalf of a particular interest 
· 3 ~ group or groups. When a con flict of opinion devel-
ops between a PARC Division or Special Committee 
(closely linked to an interest g roup or a Ministry) , 
and the Deliberation Commission (which tends to be 
under factional pressure but is relatively impervious 
to interest group pressures), the Executive Council is 
31 
1250 
usually found to stand with the former and to over-rule 
the latter's decision in favour of the interest group 
or the Ministry concerned o It should be noted in 
this connection that any party member may speak before 
the Executive Council, though only its proper members 
have the right to vote, a situation which cannot but 
tempt many members harassed by lobbyist s to take the 
matter directly to it instead of leaving it to the dis-
cretion of the PARC Deliberation Commission~33 
As previously pointed out, a decision made by the 
Executive Council binds every party member as an off-
icial decision of the Party (at least in theory) and 
1S usually passed on to the Diet Policy Committee to 
be introduced in the Diet as a bill~ In practice, 
however, an official party decision thus made often 
gets shelved and kept from prompt legislative action in 
. . . . h C b· 34 the Diet or adm1n1strat1ve act10n by tea 1neto 
This is largely due to the peculiar role of the Cabinet 
as on the one hand the sponsor of an overwhelming maj-
ority of bills introduced in the Diet by the ministerial 
party and, on the other, as the formal representative 
of both the bureaucracy and the Part yo A related fac-
tor contributing to the lack of finality in the 
Executive Council decisions is the intervention of a 
quasi-official decision-making organ called the 
'Leaders' Meeting'o 
The Cabinet 
According to the Diet Law and the Rules of each 
House, a Diet member affiliated with the ministerial 
party has as much right to present a bill on his own 
initi ative as the Cabinet and a Diet member who belongs 
35 
to an Opposition Part yo In fact, individual members 
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of the ministerial party were responsible for half o f 
the bills introduced by the Liberal Party during the 
last Diet session convened by the Yoshida Cabinet on 
30 November 1954 and one third or more of those i nt r o -
duced in the 8th ~uly 1950), 23rd (Novemb e r _ De c emb e r, 
1955) and 25th (Novemb e r December, 1956 ) ° 36 seSS I ons . 
There has, however, been a conspicuous and consisten t 
tendency for Cabinet-sponsored bills to predominate among 
those introduced on pehalf of the min i sterial par ties . 
Consequently a bill sponsored by an individua l memb er 
has come to mean a bill originating i n an Oppos i tion 
party . From the 40 th (December 1961 - May 1962 ) to the 
50th (October 1965 - December 1965 ) session , fo r 
example , 90 per cent of the bil l s introduced by t he LOP 
( and 92 per cent of those which were suc c es sful l y passed) 
were b b o • 37 sponsored y Ca Inet . On the other hand , three 
quarters of the member - sponsored bills introduced dur -
ing the same period originated in the Opposit ion par t-
ies o It had thus become an established rule (in practi ce , 
if not in theory ) of the legislative process unde r the 
present parliamentary cabinet system for an impo rtan t 
bill supported by the ministerial party to b e off ic-
ially endorsed and sponsored by the Cabinet , i nstead of 
individual members , especially if it must be passed 
against strong opposition from the other par ties
o 
If the Cabinet officially represented on l y the 
ministerial party (from which all its members are 
drawn), it would be rathe r difficult for it t o avoid 
prompt legislative or administrative ac t ion on d e ci s -
ions made by the Ex cutive Council on beha l f of t h e 
Part y o Constitutionally , however , the Cabine t is a for-
mal institution entirely separate and independ en t from 
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the Party The Cabinet represents the executive power, 
as opposed to the legislative power exercised by the 
Diet and therefore shared by the Party.38 This inde-
pendent constitutional status of the Cabinet makes 
it very possible for the 20-man body to refuse to act 
as dictated by the Party, if the prospective action is 
likely to lead to bitter opposition from the other 
parties and jeopardise the implarentation of other 
priority measures in its policy programme o A case in 
point was the proposed elevation of the Defence Agency's 
institutional status. 
The Leaders' Meeting 
The Leaders' Meeting 1S defined in the LDP Con-
stitution merely as an ad hoc group consisting of the 
heads of various party organs and other members spec-
ial1y nominated by the President, the function of which 
is to insure co-ordination and co-operation between them. 
Until the most recent revision of the LDP Constitution 
in January 1964 it had been an informal organ (like the 
Government-Party Liaison Meeting (Seifu-yotoo renraku 
kaigi) of late 1958 and its successor, the Senior 
Members Meeting (Chooroo-kaigi) and had consisted in-
itially of six and subsequently seven particular party 
officia1so Hence it was popularly called the 'Six 
Leaders' Meeting' (Rokuyakukaigi) or the 'Seven 
Leaders' Meeting' (Shichiyakukaigi).39 
Despite the ad hoc basis on which it had long 
operated, the Leaders' Meeting and its pr{decessors 
had frequently made very important decisions with no 
apparent delegation of power on the part of the Exec-
utive Counc il o It was the Six Leaders' Meeting, for 
example, that decided in September 1957 to have the 
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Anti-Prostitution Law enforced in its entirety after 
April 1958; in October 1957 it decided to have all 
future bills which might affect the budget presented 
exclusively under Cabinet sponsorship, instead of by 
individual Members ; in December 1957 it allowed four 
LOP Diet members to attend the S econd Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Conference in Cairo; in July 1958 it det-
ermined to reform administrative organisation; in 
October 1958 it agreed to prevent increases of private 
railway and bus fare s o (Many other examples could be 
. d) 40 CIt e 0 Similarly, it was the Seven Leaders' Meet-
ing which decided in April 1959 to have the construction 
of additional underground railways started on two spec-
ified routes in 1960; again in Septemb er 1959 it all-
owed shipping concerns to suspend temporarily the pay-
ment of a significant portion of interest on loans 
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extended by the Development Bank, and so one The 
enlar ged Leaders' Meeting has continued to play such a 
decision-making role after it was made a formal party 
organ in January 1964$ often causing confusion in and 
interference with the official party policy-making 
processes represented by the chain of the PARC sub-
units, the Deliberation Commipsion and the Executive 
Councilo 
Seri ous conflicts can develop between the Cabinet 
and the Executive Councilor, what is the same thing, 
between the dominant and dissident factions, as the 
constitutional status and role of the former described 
above suggesto It is, In fact , by the very possibility 
of such conflicts that the independent policy-making 
function s of the Leaders' Meeting are justified and 
encouraged, whatever elements of irregularity this may 
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mean in terms of the formal party policy-making mech-
ani sm. 
As previously mentioned, both the composition and 
policy decisions of the PARC and the Executive Council 
are determined largely by considerations of the inter-
factional balance coupled with the pressures from inte~ 
est groups and the bureaucracy~ To t he extent that th~ 
reflect the inter-factional balance they are products 
of compromise between the dominant faction or factions 
in control of the Presidency and other key party pos-
itions and the Cabinet and the dissident factions 
excluded from these posts o Such compromise frequently 
involves a degree of concession on the part of the 
former group which it may find to be unacceptable for 
one reason or another o To the extent that they result 
from the pressures of particular interest groups and 
sections of the public service they may cause dissat-
isfaction among other interest groups and other sect-
ions of the bureaucracy who are adversely affected by 
the decisions concerned. This is invariably the case 
with practically every decision relating to budgetary 
., 42 
approprIatIons. 
From the point of view of the dominant factions in 
control of the highest party positions, a decision of the 
Executive Council, of which only eight members are 
appointed by the President (while 15 are nominated on 
a regional basis and seven elected from among M.H.C.'s), 
is not always acceptable and r for that reason, it is 
necessary to have a h~gher organ which is at the same 
time capable of over-riding it and fully responsive to 
their factional interests. In contrast to the composit-
ion of the Executive Council~ the Leaders' Meeting, as 
it IS customarily constituted, consists of up to eleven 
members of whom four are nominated by the President willi 
the consent of the Exe cutive Council and three are 
appointed by the Secr etary-General who is in turn 
appoi nted by the President and i s regarded as the latter's 
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closest collaborator in the Part yo In other words, 
nearly two-thirds of its regular member s are at least 
potentially pro-President and , therefore, any Executive 
Counc il decisi o n filtered through its examination can 
be considered as at least innocuous , if not p o sitively 
favourable, to the interests of the dominant factions o 
Whenever a conflict arises between two or more 
interest groups , an interest group and a Ministry or 
between two or more Ministries, it IS almost inevitably 
transf erred to the Party . This often takes the form of 
a conflict between the PARC Divisions and Special 
Committees and will also involve the Executive Council 
which, as already pointed out , is as sensitive to the 
pressures of external groups as to those arising from 
intra-party factional ism o Under such circumstances 
whatever decision the Executive Council may make on an 
issue, it is bound to be controversial and to threaten 
party unity and the public image of the P arty . This 
makes it essential from the point of view of the domin-
ant factions to have an independent organ higher in 
status than the Executive Council, which can inter vene 
to resolve dispu tes on the basis of conce rn for party 
unity and the maintenance of the s tatus quo , thus assu~ 
ing the continued hegemony of the dominant facti onso 
Party President 
Underlying the foregoing discussion of the raison 
d'et re and role of the L eaders' Meeting was the assumption 
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that the President of the minis~erial party who is the 
highest party official cannot be expected to play such 
a watch-dog role o As far as the constitutional powers 
of the Party President are concerned, there seems in 
fact to be little need for the Leaders' Meeting to act 
on behalf of the top party leadersh ip. The President 
is empowered to 'take the supreme resp ons ibility' for 
the Party and to 'represent and control' it, which 
should mean that he has the power to reject or over-
ride whatever Executive Council decision he may regard 
as undesirable for his own reasons o Furthermore, there 
IS nothing in theory to prevent him from initiating a 
particular policy and having it accepted according to 
his wishes either by the PARC or the Executive Council, 
whereby it will be declared an official party decision
o 
In short, he has the constitutional power to become the 
most important, if not the only, actor in the party 
policy-making process. In reality, however, his powers 
are much more limited and conditional and there are 
good reasons for his finding it difficult to assert 
strong leadership and necessary to have a supplementary 
organ, such as the Leaders' Meeting, to make up for 
the limitations of his personal leadership. 
It is, on the one hand, unlikely that a partic-
ular policy decision will be made by the Executive 
Councilor that a decision already made will be acted 
upon against the President's strong objections and a 
policy fully supported by him is likely to be made the 
official party line and carried outo It is after all 
the President who appoints the PARC Chairman, who in 
turn appoints both its Vice-Chairmen and the members of 
the Deliberation Commission, and every official party 
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decision must be first approved by these organs before 
C . 44 it gets to the Executive ounc11 0 On the other hand, 
however, it appears that he does not in practice fre-
quently exercise this power of veto nor does he posit-
ively identify himself with a particular policy i n the 
face of opposition from a substantial section of the 
Party or public opinion o There are at least two inter-
related factors which inhibit him from aggressively 
asserti ng and exercising his full constitutional powers. 
One is the meth~d of his election and the term of his 
office, and the other is the effects of intra-party 
factionalism o 
According t o the special rules governing the elec-
tion of the LOP President, he must be elected by secret 
45 ballot at the Part y Conferenceo Each Diet member 
affiliated with the Party and one delegate from each 
Pref ectural Federation of the P arty Branches has one 
vote, but only members of the Diet are eligible to 
stand as candidates o If any of the candidates succeeds 
in winning a simple majori ty of valid votes cas ,t in the 
first contest, he is automatically nominated Presid ent 
for a term of two years. If , on the other hand , no c~ 
didate succeeqs in doing so , the two who win the high -
est scores of votes compete between them for a second 
time and whichever wins a plurality in the second 
trial is nominated o 
The old principle of electing the P atty President 
by ballot at a party conference , which was ado pted in 
th e revised S eiyuukai Constitution of 1927, has now 
bec ome not merely an abstract principle but the actua l 
practice of the LOP o Up to the end of 1966 two or more 
candidates have contested the post at the Party Conferences 
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of Decemper 195 6 , J anuary 1959, July 19 60 and July 
19640 Each of these occasions , however , has been char -
acterised by intense inter-factional strife , allegedly 
accompanied by the spending of large amounts of money 
b h f · b . d 46 Y eac actlon to uy uncommltte votes o The recor~ 
of past performance suggests strong ly that cu t-t h roat 
compet ition between the factions _ is unavoidable, unless 
all but one of them can be persuaded to refrain from 
runni n~ a candidate i n the contests, as happened at the 
Party Conferences of April 1956, March 1957 and July 
It also suggests that, g i ven the pattern of mem-
bership dis tribu tion between the ten or so factions i n 
recent years , it is essential for anyone of them to 
secure the support of at least some other factions in 
orde r to con trol a majority of votes o In the middle of 
1966 a majority meant more than a half of the 282 
M.HoRo' 5 , 139 M.H.Co's and 46 Delegates from the Pref e c-
tural Federations, in other words 234 votes o 47 
Because an incumbent P resident or a presidential 
aspirant obviously needs t o depend upon the goodwill 
and co-operation of at least a few factions other than 
his own , he will inevitably avoid whatever course of 
action might threaten to estrange them o Furthermore, 
it is in the nature of factionalism that whether a part-
itular faction will co-operate or continue to co-operate 
with another faction is not determined sole ly by g en-
uine disagreements over specific policy issues but, 
more import antly and frequently , by tac tical consid-
erations of whether such co - operation will benefit it oc 
not. Si nce most of the major factions have among their 
own leaders either the incumbent President or an aspir-
ant for the presi d ential post , they are conce rned most 
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immediately with wh e t her or not co-operation with or 
opposition to anoth e r faction will ma ke it easier or 
harder for them to retain or capture the desired post. 
The presidential position is made even more sus-
ceptible to the influences of factionalism because 
according to the constitution, th e term of his office 
is only two years. This is indeed tw ic e as long as 
the term for the other party offices but obviously too 
short to lnsure stable and a ggressive leadershipo48 
Two years after Kishi Nobusuke had been forced to res-
ign both the party presidency and premiership under 
the pressure of intra-party factionalism as well as 
opposition from the other parties a nd public opinion, 
he reminisced that a President spends his first year 
ln office healing the wounds left by the bitter inter-
factional competition at the last presidential elect-
ion, and his second year preparing for his re-election " 
at the forthcoming Party Conference. 49 Thus he is left 
with little time to think seriously about general policy 
problems , much less to c ope with controversial issues 
at the risk of providing the rival factions with an 
excuse, if not sound reason~ to oppose his leadership 
and obstruct his re-election. Under such circumstances 
it is inevitable that an organ like the Leaders ' Meet-
ing should be called into being to fill the vacuum of 
leadership and s afe guard the interests of the dominant 
factions in the poli c y-makin g p r ocess. Without such 
leadership it is l a r ge ly g ove r ned, as we have seen, by the 
logic of inter-faction al balance of pow e r and interest 
group politics o 
Local Organisation 
As mention ed at the outset of this chapter , the 
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organisation of the LOP consists not only of the Head -
quarters but also of local Branches. These Branches 
are organised in counties, cities, wards of Metropol-
itan and major city areas , towns,villages or any other 
unit areas or unit groups and are united into Pr efec-
tural Federations. 50 In the organisational framework 
of the Headquarters they come under the jurisciction 
of the General Organisation Bureau of the Nationa l 
O . . C' 51 rganlsatlon ommlttee o 
Following the unification of the Liberals and the 
Democrats and the formation of the LOP, one of the most 
urgent tasks the new Party set itself was the prompt 
expansion and consolidation of its national organisat-
iono It was hoped, rather too optimistically it seems 
in hindsight, that a rapid increase in the membership 
through the establishment of Branches at the city, 
county, town and village level would automatically 
mak e it possible for it not only to cope with the com-
petition from the Opposition parties in election camp-
aigns but also to rely on membership dues for a sub-
stantial part of its regular expenses o With such a 
view the Party Headquarters proceeded to have Prefec-
tural Federations of Party Branches formed in eight-
een prefectures by the end of 1955 and in practically 
all remaining pI" efectures by early 1956 0
52 
Character-
istically, the formation of the Prefectural Federations 
preceded that of unit Branches at the lower leve ls, in 
conformity with the t raditional centrifugal pattern of 
the flow of influence in the society. 
By the middle of 1958 unit Branches had been 
established in about 2 ,500 cities , towns and villages 
(about 60 per cent of all these basic units of public 
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admin~stration) and by early 1964 the act~al number 
of such Branches had increased to nearly 3,000 or over 
88 per c~nt of about 3,400 cities, towns and vil~ages 
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then In eXIstence. t the prefectural level these 
come under the forty-six ~refectural Federations, 
each of which has an organisat i on a l s tructure closely 
resembling the Headquart e rs at l~ast superficially. 
Practically every Federation has, for example, such 
standard organs as a President, secretaries, an 
executive council, a policy affairs research council, 
committees on organisation, election policy, etc., 
divisions on public relations, cultural, youth and 
women's affairs, and advis e rs or counc illors. 54 In 
January 1960 the establishment of seven specific 
divisions in each Prefectural Federation, dealing 
with the organisational problems associated with diff-
erent sectors of voters, became compulsory in accord~ 
ance with the spirit of the organisational programme 
55 adopted by the 7th Party Conference. In May 1961, 
the Committee on National Organisation decided to have 
a General Secretary (jimu~y~kuchoo) appointed by ea~h 
Fede~ation as a ful~-time party official paid directly 
by the Headquarters, as a further step toward stand-
ardisation of their or ganisational 56 framework. 
Desp~te, however, the superficial impression 
conveyed by the fore g oin g description tha t LDP l.ocal 
Branches are both ubiquitous and p ~rvasive in their 
influence, as well as hi ghly sophisticated organisat-
ionally, they have certain characteristics which con-
siderably reduce their effectiveness in the Party's 
organisational development and in its over-all policy-
making process. Such characteristics derive largely 
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from their dependence upon the parliamentary party, the 
effects of factionalism and organisational dualism in 
the input-output feedback mechanism at the grass -roots, 
all of which are closely inter-relatedo 
In terms of their leadership composition, it 
should first be noted that over 80 per cent of the 
Presidents of the Prefectural Federations of Party 
Branches have nearly always been incumbent members of 
the National Die t and at least a quarter of the remain-
ing 20 per cent have been former Diet memberso 57 
Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of the rest of 
their officials are, as a rule, local politicians, 
mainly members of the p refec tural assemblies. In one 
rather extreme case (Kanagawa Prefectural Federation in 
1959), there were 82 officials, some of whom held two 
positions concurrently, of whom 10 were incumbent and 
9 former Diet memb~rs (this included both the President 
and Vice-President), 43 were members of the prefectural 
assemblies, seven of city assemblies and one of town 
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assembly o In other words, 23 per cent were either 
incumbent or former Diet members, 52 per cent prefec-
tural assembly members, nine per cent other local pol-
iticians o Thus a total of 85 per cent in all were 
professional politicians . This means that a typical 
Pref ectural Federation is led by Diet members who are 
in turn assisted by Party-affiliated local politicians, 
particularly prefectural assembly members o 
The predominance of national and local politic-
ians in the composition of the leadership groups in 
the Prefectural Federations naturally incline them to 
be pre-occupied with the one paramount concern of pol-
iticians, competition and victory in elections~ This 
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p ar t icular pre- o ccupat ion is what , In fact , mak es it 
inevitable for the factional divisions in the parl -
iamentary party to permeate the behaviour of local 
Branche s o At the same time , it leads to the growth 
of org ani sational dualism at the base of the party 
structure and accounts for the pe cu liarly intimate 
and reciprocal relationsh ip s between Diet members and 
groups of local polit icians o This is because the Diet 
membe r needs to secure the co -operat ion of the influen-
tial residents of his constituency in order to cultiv-
ate and maintain his bailiwicko This he does in part 
by using their familiarity with the voters to his advan-
tag e . Local poli ticians on the other hand are anxious 
to use the Die t member ' s patronage and prestige to 
affect t he results of local elections in th ei r favour . 
In order , however , t o explain the aspects of factional-
ism and dual o rganisational structure , it IS necessary 
to refer also to the influence of the present electoral 
system o 
Under the present House of Repre sentatives elec -
toral system , each cons tituency returns three , four or 
five M. HqR o' s , while the prefectural cons tituency 
system for the House of Councillors returns a minimum 
of two and a maximum of eigh t MoH . C.' s from each con-
o 59 
stltuency o 
I t is inevitable under such a system that a major 
party , such as the LOP and the Socialis t Party , should 
run more than one candidate in each constituency in 
order to win a majority of seats in the Diet . As it 
is l ogically impossible for a single Pr efec tural Fed -
eration to support and help , with comple t e impartial -
ity , two or more mutually c ompeting candidates , it must 
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necessarily work for a particular candidate and 
against the rest. Furthermore , practically every LOP 
candidate in recent years has run with the financial 
as well as moral support of a particular faction, a 
tendency which grows inexorably in proportion to the 
cost of electioneering o This means that a g iven 
Prefectural Federation cannot help being identified 
with a particular candidate and also, through the 
support it gives him, with a particular faction in the 
parliamentary party. This in turn makes it necessary 
for candidates thus excluded from its official supp-
ort to depend for funds and moral backing on a diff-
erent faction, often opposed to the Pref ectural Fed-
eration, and to create an or ganisati on separate from 
it. The latter is the so-called supporters' as .sociat-
ion, which has generally proved much more effective and 
reliable as a vote-getting device from the candidate's 
point of view than the formal organ of the Party. 
The battles between two or more candidates begin 
as a rule over the question of who should be formally 
endorsed by the Election Policy Committee of the Head-
quarters as an official LOP candidate entitled to the 
Party's full support and assistance. In practice the 
Election Committee (which is headed by the President 
of the Party in accordance with constitutional re-
quirements and consists by tradition of all faction 
leaders) instruc ts the Prefectural Federations to sub-
mi t to it by a specified date a li.st of candidates they 
would recommend. It then proceeds to determine on the 
basis of such recommendations the final roll of Party-
endorsed candidates. The Committee invariably accords 
preference to incumbent members and limits the number 
of officially endorsed candidates to not more than 
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the number of members to which each c ons tituency is 
. 1 d 60 entIt e • It usually proves impossible , however , 
for a F edera tion to present to the Committee a 
unified list of recommended candidates whi ch satis -
fies all the potential candidates and their fact-
ional supporters . As a r esult , squabbles usually 
develop first within the P refectu r al Federations and 
then, throu gh factional li nkages , In the Election 
6 1 Poli cy Committee at the Headquarters . 
Apart from their role in electioneering and 
factional conf lict, the local Branches and the 
Pr efectura l Federations engage in vari ous activit-
ies in support of the policy determined by the 
Headquarters . For example , in relation to th e Sec-
urity Pact revision issue a Headquarters for the 
Revision of the Security Pac t (Ampo-jooyaku kaitei 
suishi n hombu) was established in each Federation 
tow ard the end of 1959 and early 1960; in the spring 
of 1960 a series of regional meetings of Prefectural 
Feder~tion General S ecretaries was he ld to strengthen 
the ir organisation and propaganda; finally , in June 
19 60, one of these meetings adopted a r eso lution call-
ing for the earli est possible ratification of the 
revision o
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A more recent exp eri ence was in 19 65 , 
i~ connect ion with another controversia l diplomatic 
issue , the ratification of the Japan -South Korea 
treaty . In S eptember of that year , organised camp-
aj gns by the P refectural Federations supporting the 
government ' s efforts to have the treaty speedily rat-
ified by the Di et began to be discussed in the Sos h i~i 
Joohoo o At this time a Kinki r eg i onru meeting of 
Resident Organisers heard reports abou t seminars 
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sponsored by some Federations to inform local politic-
i ans about the issue and about relevant resolutions 
. d d' 1 bl' 63 Intro uce Into loca assem Ieso On 1 October a bi g 
rally was held in Tokyo with about 3,000 participants 
representing some 600 organisations in order to launch 
an organisation specifically desi gned to promote rat-
64 ification of the treat Yo The role played by the 
Prefectural Federations in organising the local dele-
gations to this rally was no doubt very substantial. 
As a general proposition, however, the lQcal 
Branches, (including the Prefectural Federations) have 
played only a subordinate role in the party policy-
making process and indeed have often been entirely 
passiveo If the Headquarters has frequently ignored 
or reversed the recommendations for candidates pres-
ented to it by the Prefectural Federations, it has 
seldom ev en invited them to contribute their own orig-
inal idea s or plans on policy matterso In this respec t 
the flow of influence seems to have been almost 
entirely downward, from the Headquarters to the Pref-
ectural Federations and, where necessary, to the 
1 000 . B 65 near y 3, unIt ranches o 
Suc h an impression is strengthened by a review of 
the 'Central Special Lectures' (chuuoo tokubetsu 
kooshuukai) held in September 1960 for the education 
of prefectural assembly members, the training courses 
offered by the Central Academy of Politics and meetings 
of various descriptions which have been organised at 
the local level in recent y e ars o66 After examining the 
actual activities of the local Branches and the Prefec-
tural Fede r ations, it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that their ori g inal contributions to the making of 
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official party policy have been neglig ible o Decision s 
have been made by the Headquarters and handed down to 
the Prefectura l Federations for support, propagation 
and implementation. Except to the extent that they 
may have been used by local i nteres t groups as con-
venient linkagep through which to funnel their part-
icular demands into the channels of party policy-
. 67 th h maklng, ey seem to ave been treated by the Head -
quarters with little respect or attention o 
The Movement for the 'Modernisation' of Party Organ-
isation 
The organisation and behaviour of the LOP Head-
quarters and Branches have come increasingly under 
fire within the Party itself in recent years. The 
experience of the anti-Security Treaty riots of 1960 
and the narrowing electoral gap between the LOP and 
the Opposition parties, rather than theoretical con-
cern about the rationale or logic · of the decision-
makin g process, have probably been the most important 
reasons for the growth of a reformist movement, which 
has been associated since January 19 61 with the newly 
formed Party Organisati on Research Council. Neverthe-
less an overall re-organisation of the party structure 
seriously affecting the policy-making mechanism has 
been proposed and may someday cQme about if it 
encounters more favourable circumstances than hither-
Behi nd the establishment of the Party Or ganisa tion 
Researc h Council in January 1961 was doubtless the fear 
that existing party organisation and behaviour was inade-
quate to meet changing needs, as shown by the increas-
ing threat from the Opposition parties. Such feelings 
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have been subsequently expressed very clearly and 
forcefully by the leaders of the Council and of the 
modernisation movement it represents. Kuraishi 
Tadao, then Chairman of the Council , for example, 
bluntly stated in early 1962: 
•••• I say to anybody, whether in the Party 
or outside , that the Liberal Democratic 
Party hardly deserves to be called a pol-
itical party •••• We have been fortunate 
so far in that the Socialists have made 
mistakes from time to time to save us from 
what should have been a catastrophe. If 
they should learn to stand on their own 
feet again and begin seriously to think 
about organisational problems, then I have 
no illusion but that after a couple more 
elections we should lose to them even under 
the present election system ••• 0 68 
Precisely the same view was expressed and dev-
eloped by Ishida Hirohide , then Chairman of one of 
the five sub-committees established in the Council, 
when he wrote a famous article in the Chuuookooron 
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about a year later . Summarising the problems con-
fronting the LOP as those of intra-party factionalism , 
po1itic41 funds , the election system and party organ-
isation , he warned that a projection of the electoral 
trends of the LOP and the Oppo sition parties since 1952 
would suggest that by 1970 the former would be over-
taken by the latter in their respective shares of 
votes. In other words , the proportion of LOP voters 
would continue to run parallel to the decreasing per-
cent age of the population engaged in primary indus-
tries , whereas the percentage voting for the Opposit-
ion parties , particularly the Socialists, would increase 
in parallel to the rising proportion of those empl oyed 
70 in secondary industries and of organised labour. 
As soon as it was established the Party Or ganis -
ation Research Council began to deal energetically willi 
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three broad problem areas , namely party finance, org-
. . d bl· 1· 71 B 6 anIsatIon , an pu IC re atlons . y September 19 2, 
when Miki Takeo was appointed Chairman and gave it the 
appearance of evangelical dedication it had suggested 
the creation of a Finance Committee, reorganisation of 
the Executive Council, establishment of a new policy 
research department to study developm en ts in the 
Oppo sition parties, appointment of Resident Organisers 
d . f .. 72 an expansIon 0 party publlCatlonS a 
In November 1962 , five sub-committees were est-
ablished , in July 1963 an interim report of their 
findings was submitted to President Ikeda , and a final 
73 report was presented about three months latera 
Of the five sub- committees the one on the Party 
Organisation dealt fully (and another on Solidarity, 
partially) with the kind of organisational problems 
considered in the present chapter o According to the 
recommendations of the former~ emphasi s must be shi ftErl 
from the parliamentary party to the national organis-
ation , in other words from the Headquarters to the loc-
al Branches, the elements of leadership must be 
strengthened both at the national and the local levels, 
the practice of delegation and representation should 
be made more systematic , and both the geographical and 
occupational unit g roups shouJd be more effectively 
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organlsedo 
Apart from such genera l recommendations, a ser-
ies of specific changes in particular party organs and 
their funct ions was also proposed , including some which 
would importantly affect the formal policy-making 
mechani sm of the Part Y o In relation to the Headquarters, 
they involved , for example , the Presidency, the P arty 
145. 
Conference, the Executive Council and the PARCo Con-
cerning local or g anisation, they implied a much 
tighter and more organic relationship between the loc-
al Branches and the Headquarters, and the aqjustment 
of relations between formal Branches and the supporters 
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The aims of the modernisation movement repre s ented 
by the above-mentioned recommendations of the Party 
Organisation Research Council are very clear. They 
can be briefly summarised as the transQo ~mation of the 
LOP into what is referred to in the Party and journal-
ist circles as an 'org an ised party'. As such it should 
be capable of coping effectively with the mounting co~ 
petition of the Opposition parties, especially th~ 
Socialists, both at el ections a nd over pa+ticular 
issues, such as, for example, the Security Pact rev-
ision of 1960 and the ratification of the Japan-South 
Korea treaty in 1965. Modernisation in this sense 
has been assumed to involve expanded authority and 
power on the part of the formal party leadership, and 
also more complete a n d effective penetration of comm~ \ 
unities by the party organisation. Both of these two 
broad areas for modernisation have so far proved sing-
ularly resistant to such improvement. In the first of 
these areas not only have difficul t ies been encounter-
ed in exterminating the factions and other informal 
groups which hav e seriously interfered with the form-
al policy-making process, but also the formal . organs 
h . . d 76 themselves ave taken a generally ne gatIve attItu e. 
In the second the continuation of the multi-member 
electoral .system and the predominant role of the 
supporters' associ a tions have prevented the development 
of truly effective branch organisations at the commun-
ity level, although renewed enthusiasm has been shown 
by the ' national movement ' (kokumin-undoo) under the 
dir ection of the National Movement Headquarters est-
ablished i n January 1965. 77 
The ultimate effects of the modernisation movement 
on the structure of the LOP, especially on its formal 
and informal policy-making process , are by no means easy 
to predict~ Despite the fact that so far failures 
have been mOre prominent than successes , some of the 
basic c hanges proposed by the Party Or ganisation Res-
earch Council may yet be realised under the obvious and 
growing pressure of significant changes in the socio -
economic environment of the society in which it operates . 
The increasing competitiveness at national and local 
levels of the Opposition parties , including the fast 
growing Koomeitoo, will no doubt compel the LOP to 
make fairly drastic adjustments both in its electoral 
tactics and in its organisational structure . As the 
awareness of the new requirements (which are already 
cle a rly appreciated by Miki , Ishida, Kuraishi and 
others) becomes more widely shared , certain basic 
changes wi 11 indeed prove unavoi d able . 
Summary 
Without denying the probability of some impor t -
ant changes being enacted in the not too distant fut-
ure , it is nevertheless important to consi der them in 
relation to the structural and behavioural character-
isti cs attributed above to the various party organs, as 
they a r e current ly constituted . The most important of 
the se may be summarised as fol l ows . 
Firstly , the development of pa+ty organisation , 
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particularly of the cluster of policy-making organs 
rep resented by the PARC, h a s shown tha t it is much 
easi e r to multiply a nd fragment the operational and 
functional units involved, than to rationalise and 
stren g then the existing ones. In f ac t, the over-
expansion of these organs has o bviously imposed ex-
cessively heavy strains on the ava ilable manp9wer 
which has been limited, as far as the r e sponsible pos-
itions are concerned, to members of the Diet. No 
change aimed at modernising the policy-making and 
leadership structure of the Party would prove really 
meaningful or helpful, unless it involved effective 
control or reduction of the number of organs and poss-
ibly appointment of non-parliamentary members to party 
positions sO far monopolised by Diet members. In vi ew 
of the steadily increasing volume of demands for pub-
lic decisions which come to the Party, the ultimate 
solu t ion ma y call for a basic re-definition of the 
role of the Party in the system of g overnment, negating 
the view that the ministerial party must not only be 
informed of but actu a lly review and pass judgment on 
every single demand for public decision and action. 
Secondly, the influence of the factions and other 
informal intra-party g roups, i s ' detrimental to the 
assertion of effective leadership by the formal party 
organs and to their smooth functioning , particularly 
the policy-making chain represented by the PARC and 
Executive Council, and the Party Presidency. The 
efforts,however, so f a r made to combat the growth of 
these informal groups have met little success. I f the 
qasic aim of the mo d ernisation movement is t o central-
ise the effective power of policy-making in the hands 
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of the formal party organs, and if the factions, as is 
likely, remain as resistant as in the past to a move-
ment aimed at their liquidation, theF they are bound to 
present the most formidable obstacle to that movement 
and may well ultimately defeat it. 
Thirdly, the ineffectiveness and lack of autho~ity 
of the formal party leadership in the intra-party 
decision-making process has been paralleled by its 
vulnerability and, at times, subservience to the 
influence of external groups , particularly the bureau-
cracy and interest groups. A similar pattern of rel-
ationship has obtained between formal Party Branches 
or Prefectural Federations and supporters' associations 
built around individual politicians. The difficulty 
lies in balancing the need to secure material and 
spiritual support from a wide range of external 
groups (particularly for the purposes of elections), 
and the demand for the Partyl s freedom of action and 
independence from pressures inevitably applied by such 
groupso This dilemma is likely to remain unresolved 
and even aggravated for a long time to corne and may 
prove, like factionalism, fatal to modernisation 
effortso 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE I TRA-PARTY FACTIONS 
In addition to, and often in competition with, the 
formal party organisation and its various components num-
erous informal groups have been formed by and among LOP 
Diet members ever since it Was established in November 
1955. Some of these groups have been interested in prom-
oting the interests of particular external groups, 
usually in the form of facilitatin'g special legislation 
and appropriation of public funqs and, therefore , may be 
regarded as intra-party interest groups. Typical of 
such groups have been, for example, those formed over the 
issues of ex-serv icemen 's pensions, the payment of reward 
to former landowners, the medical insurance administrat-
1 
i on, and others. S ome have been related to external 
g roups only marginally and operated as independent and 
s el f -contained intra-party groups to promote particular 
c auses or policies. These may be regarded as policy 
groups, typical of which have been the Sosh inkai , the 
As ian Affai r s Study Group , and the Afro- As ian Af fairs 
2 
Study Group. Much rarer have b e en regionally-based 
groups, such as the Kantoo MoH oRo' s Association, which 
represent one of the oldest forms of intra-party grouping 
in the history of Japanese parties. 3 In addition to 
these, there have been several groups forme d around much 
more personal interests in sports , the artss and so on, 
u sually on a non-partisan basis . 
Mu c h more obv ious, a c tive and durable than any of 
the a b ove-mentioned kinds, however , have been the fact-
i ons. S o fundamental and pervasive has been their 
, 
in flu enc e both within t he LOP and In contemporary Japan-
es e p ol itics tha t it is essential to define and 
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appreciate their role and functions both ln terms of 
intra-party group dynamics and the party policy-making 
process. The other types of group may be considered 
much more meaningfully in relation to the factions and 
the system they make up in the Par ty than in isolation. 
For these reasons the present chapter will be devoted to 
a detailed examination of the intra-party factions and 
their implications for the policy-making process. 
Factional Configuration 1955-60 
Following the unification of 1955 there were in the 
LOP three d istinctive groupings ' which had originated in 
the former Liberal Party and four somewhat more loose 
groupings related to the former Democra t Party. The 
Liberal groups were represented respectively by Yoshida 
Shigeru, Ogata Taketora and Oono Banboku , whereas the 
Democrat groups were led by Kishi Nobusuke , Miki 
Bukichi, Hatoyama Ichiroo and several leaders of the 
former P rogressive Party, Ooasa Tadao, Matsumura Kenzoo, 
Miki Takeo, Kitamura Tokutaroo, and Ashida Hitoshi. 4 In 
addition, there were several ' non-aligned ' groups, one 
of which consisted of former Liberals and all the other s 
5 
of former Democ rats. Of these groups the four whose 
leaders formed the initial four - man Presidential Proxy 
Committee in place of a President (the Hatoyama, Miki 
Bukichi, Oono and Ogata groups ) plus the Kishi group, 
whose leader held the next ranking post of S ecretary-
General, constituted a 'domi nant ' coalition . On the 
other hand, the Yoshida group , the two conservative 
Progr essives ' groups led by Ooasa and Matsumura , the 
two radical P rogressives ' groups led by Miki Takeo and 
Kitamura and the non-aligned Pro gressives ' group repres-
ented by Ashida formed a 'di ssi dent' coalition to oppose 
6 the former. Most of these groups were alread y 
151. 
fully - fledged factions in the present sense of that word 
and met regularly on fixed dates of the month either singly 
together with other factions . ? or 
Within about a year from the formation of the LOP, 
however , the original Ogata and Miki (Bukichi) factions 
had come respectively under the leadership of Ishii 
Mitsujiroo and Koono Ichiroo upon the deaths of their 
founders . The latter also absorbed the Hatoyama and 
Kitamura factions , while both the Ooasa and Ashida groups 
joined the Kishi faction o8 The divisions of opinion 
both within and between the factions accompanying the 
party presidential election of December 1956 , which Was 
contested by Ishibashi , Kishi and Ishii , led to the 
split of the Yoshida group' into two separate factions 
represented respectively by Ikeda Hayato and S atoo 
E isaku and also , to the merger of the conservative 
Matsumura and the radical Miki Takeo groups of former 
P . 9 rogres Sl ves 0 Dur ing the three and a half years bet-
ween the presidential election of December 1956 (which 
gave birth to the short - lived Ishibashi Cabinet) , and 
that of July 1960 (which following the S ecurity Treaty 
crisis replaced Kishi by Ikeda as P arty P resident ), 
a fai ly stable system of intra - party factionalism 
became firmly established o The eight factions led 
respectively by Ishibashi, Kishi, Koono, Miki and 
Matsumura , Ishii , Oono, S atoo and Ikeda fought and 
c o-operated with one another to form temporary and 
loose opposing alliances of changing membership , one 
suppo tjng the incumbent Pres ident (the 'dominant ' 
factions) an d the other opposing him (the ' dissident ' 
. ) 10 fa ctIons 0 
Facti onal Configuration 1960- 67 
The presidential election of July 1960 registered 
152. 
the open ing of a new phase in the evolution of faction-
alism in the LOP. Within a period of about two years 
the large Kishi faction split into three separate fact-
ions , the Fujiyama faction , the Toofuu- sasshin renmei 
and the Kooyuu-kurabu. 
The Fujiyama faction became a di stinctive and 
independent entity when Fujiyama Aiichiroo entered the 
pres i dential c ontest only to lose with 49 votes against 
Ike d a 's 246 and Ishii's 196 011 
In the mean ti me, the Committee on Party Modernisat-
Ion {Too-kind aika iinkai} which wa s formed around the 
s ame t i me by about twenty volunteers , mainly from the 
Kishi faction , ev entually became the Jimintoo toofuu -
sasshin konwakai in May 1962 and Was renamed the Toofuu-
. . . A f h 12 sasshln renmel In ugust 0 t e same year o 
On 31 Oc tober 1962 the Kishi faction was formally 
dissolved and towards the end of November the 25 of its 
49 members who refused to join the Toofuu-sasshin renmei 
proceeded to form the Ko oyuu-kurabu under the joint direct -
ion of Kawashima Shoo jiroo and Akagi Munenori o13 
The tendencies towards fragmentation of the exist -
ing factions , of wh ich the emergence of these three 
groups out of the Kishi fact ion was sympt omatic, quickly 
spread to the other factions and became especially acute , 
pa radoxi c all~ in the two factions which had prided 
themselves on firmer s olidarity and tighter discipline 
than the others . More than a month before Oono Banboku' s 
death in May 1964 journalists covering the LOP were pre -
d icting that n ot more than seven or eight of its members 
we re cert a in t o remain loya l to Oono so long as he was 
alive and that several others were definitely shifting 
their allegianc e to other factional 14 leaders. Follow-
ing Oono's dea th on 29 May and especially after the 
Cabinet reshuffle of 17 July , the split of its members 
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into two opposing groups became evident. After an attempt 
to reunify its ranks through the intervention of an eight-
man committee failed in early August the two groups emer-
ged as de facto factions under their new leaders , Funada 
Naka and Murakami Isamu. 15 
Di visive tendencies developed just as rapidly in the 
Koono faction long before its leader died in July 1965 . 
As early as May 1964 three rival groups had emerged among 
its members , referred to by journalists respectively as 
the dominant group (Mori Kiyoshi, S higemasa Seishi, and 
others), the dissident group (Yamaguchi Kikuichiroo, 
Matsuda Takechiyo, and other), and the neutral group 
(Nakasone Yasuhiro, Sakurauchi Yoshio, and others). 
Following Kbono's death on 8 July 1965, the conflicts 
gradually became polarized between Shi gemasa and 
Nakasone and despite a temporary truce towards the end 
of August , resulting from mediation by the faction~s 
financial patrons of the Sankinkai,the faction remained 
internally divided with a majority (about 30) support-
ing Nakasone and a minority (about 14) rallying behind 
Shigemasa . 17 By early 1967 the two groups had become 
completely estranged from each other and formed separ-
ate factions under the leadership respectively of 
Nakasone and Mori Kiyoshi . 
In the meantime, the Ishibashi faction ceased to 
function as an effective factional unit after the House 
of Representatives election of 1960 which great ly red -
uced its membership, and it virtually ceased to exist 
after Ishibashi himself was defeated in the next Lower 
House election of 1963 . 18 Towards the end of 19 64 the 
six members of the Matsumura group i n the Miki faction 
dissociated themselves from that faction , allegedly 
because of their dissatisfaction with Miki ' s direct 
r 
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involvement in the nomination of S atoo as Iked a ' s succ -
19 
essor in November of that year . Under Matsumura ' s 
leadership they began to op erate thus as a small yet 
ind epend ent uni t in the system of intra- par t y faction -
alism . I k ed a ' s sud d en d eat h in August 1965 mad e the 
prospects for the survival of his faction as a unified 
group uncertain for a wh il e , but it managed , unlike 
the Oono and the Koono factions, to tide itself over the 
danger of split and to continue not only as a unified 
but also an effecti ve and respected faction under Maeo 
S higesaburoo o 
By early 1967 these structural changes and the 
deaths of some of the most influential leaders had 
altered quite considerably the general picture of fact -
ionalism in the LOP . In the summer of 1960 there were 
four factions head ed by Kishi , S atoo, I k ed a and Oono 
forming a dominant alliance , and three factions led by 
Koono , Miki and Ishii forming an alliance of d issi d ents . 
After the House of R epresentatives election of 29 
January 1967 there were five dominant factions (S atoo , 
Fukuda , Miki , Ishii and Kawashima ), four neutral fact -
ions (Maeo , Funada , Murakami and Mori) , and three diss-
20 i dent facti ons (Fujiyama , akasone and Matsumura ) • 
In the following pages each of thes e f actiona~ 
units will be briefly d escribed to provid e a firm fact -
ual basi s for the more general d iscussion of their 
functions that will follow. 
The S atoo Facti on 
As of February 1967 the S atoo facti o n is the larg-
est of the twelve LOP factions with 49 M. H.R. ' sand 
about 52 M. H . C. ' s assoc ia ted with . 21 1 t • As men t i oned 
earlier, it was originally a twin brother of the Ike d a 
faction , both having issued from the former Yoshi d a 
I 
I 
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faction at the first LOP presidential election in Dec-
ember 1956 . Although until that date only about fifteen 
members of the Yoshida faction had been regarded as 
S atoo ' s followers as against nearly twenty identified 
, 22 . h 
as Ikeda s ~ Its member s ip steadily grew during 
Kishi's premiership (February 1957 to JUly 1960) under 
which Sa too remained the number two man In the Part y 
and his faction was consistently in the dominant 
group . By Sept ember 1957 at least twenty M.H.R. ' s 
were regularly present at the meetings of the two pol-
itical associations run by the faction , the Shuuz ankai 
and the Mokuyookai. 23 The November 1960 House of 
Representatives election increased i t s membership In 
t ha~ House to 46 and even after the Shuuzankai was 
disband ed in January 1964 anything between 70 and 85 
Diet members continued to meet at Sat oo 's office . 
Shortly after this two groups of Diet members, the 
Seiji-kooza and the Seikei kenkyuukai, began to receive 
financial donations from various business firms in the 
name of the faction . 24 
Internally , the S atoo faction had enjoyed a large 
measure of stability and harmony until about the end of 
1964 and even as late as January 1965. Three of Satoo' s 
c losest confidants , Tanaka Kakuei , Hori Shi geru and 
Aichi Kii chi , formed a happy trio and shared the finan -
25 c ial and political responsibilities between them . 
Apart from these three top leaders , Kuno Chuuji, 
Setoyama Mitsuo , Tsukahara Toshio , Masuda Kaneshichi , 
Matsuno Raizoo, and others formed a sub- leaders ' group 
t opping the fa c tion ' s waiting list for ministerial and 
Par ty appointment . The relationship , however , between 
two of t he top leaders , Tanaka and Hori, and their res -
pective sUppo rt ers began to deteriorate in the months 
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hat followed , and after the Mokuyookai ' s successor , the 
Mokuyoo -kurabu , was disbanded in September 1965 (as the 
Shuuzankai had been twenty months before) the conflicts 
became very evident and intense . 26 While Tanaka was 
apparently determined to succeed S atoo as Party P resident 
and Prime Minister with the support of the non-domi nant 
factions (particularly the Ikeda faction ), Hori was 
believed to distrust Tanaka ' s liberal inclinations and 
27 
prefer Fukuda Takeo as S atoo ' s eventual succes sor . 
By early 1967 the air of monolithic solidarity and stab-
i1ity seems to have virtually evaported from the largest 
of the factions just as from most otherso 
The Fukuda Faction 
The Fukuda faction , . which had grown out of the 
Toofuu - sasshin renmei , holds in the wake of the 1967 
House of Representatives election 27 MoHoR.' s and three 
MoH oC o' s and is firmly aligned with the Satoo faction 1n 
d . 1'· 28 a om1nant coa lt1on o As previously mentioned , the 
Toofuu - sasshin renmei was originally founded in July 
1960 as a Party Modernisation Committee o According to 
its leader , Fukuda Takeo , the experience of the Securi ty 
Treaty crisis in the summer of that year led himself and 
his collaborators to organise the committee with a view 
to combating factionalism which , they believed , had 
rendered the LOP entirely impo£ent and ineffectua l to 
. . h f . . 1 . 29 
cope w1th the grow1ng treat 0 1nternatlona commun1sm . 
Resol ved ostensibly to put an end to factionalism , reform 
the electoral system , strengthen the formal party or gans, 
enforce party discipline and build a ' people's front ' 
,. S··· 1 · , 30 th against Chlnese and oVlet 1mperla 1sm, ey re-
organised the committee into a Toofuu - sasshin konwaka i 
in May 1962 , which was soon renamed the Toofuu-sasshin 
renmei 
31 
in early August of the same year . Duri ng the 
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summer of 1962 between 60 and 80 M. H.R .' sand M.H . C.' s 
were regularly present at its frequent meetings and by 
the spring of 1963 it claimed 103 members from the Lower 
House, 27 from the Upper House and seven former Diet 
32 
members as its official members . At that stage it was 
governed by an II-member Pr esiding Committee (Gichoodan ), 
a 19-member Liaison Conference for Co-ordination between 
the Factions (Kaku-ha renraku kaigi) , and a 39-member 
St d o C t k C ° (J. . ) 33 an lng are a ers ommlttee oonln-seWanln . 
It Was characteristic of the Toofuu - sasshin renmei 
and its immediate predecessors that they were a cross -
factional group ostensibly dedicated to the task of pur~ 
ing the P arty completely of factionalism . In fact , all 
but the Koono faction and the Kooyuu - kurabu (later the 
Kawashima faction ) were represented by the Liaison 
Conference for Co-ordination between the Factions of which 
Fukuda was Chairman. 34 After the July 1963 reshuffle of 
the Second Ikeda Cabinet , however, and especially after 
the House of Representatives general elections of 
November of the same year, its leadership group led by 
Fukuda began to exhibit an undisguised hostility towards 
Ikeda and his faction. Henceforth the pretensions of 
this group to a supra-factional commitment to abolish 
al l factions and to enhance the authority and prestige 
of the formal party leadership quickly fad ed ou t. Three 
days after the Cabinet reshuffle Fukuda declared at a 
press conference that he and his colleagues in the League 
had come to the conclusion that Ikeda was not in the 
least interested in the anti-faction campaign and that 
35 they would take the battle to the nation at large . 
In early August the twelve Kooyuu-kurabu members who had 
been so far associated with the group walked out on the 
grounds that it was being used by the an ti-Ikeda elements 
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36 for their factional purposes. In the general election 
of November twenty candidates were elected with the 
endorsement and support of no other factions but the 
37 
League o And , finally , the P residing Committee of the 
Toofuu- sasshin renmei decided t o d issolve it in December 
1963 ostensibly because the LDP Organisation Research 
Council chaired by Miki Takeo had submitt ed to Ikeda , 
the P arty President, in October a recommendation to 
make the League's anti - faction campaign official party 
I " 38 po lCy . 
What emerged out of the Toofuu - sasshin renmei and 
its campaign to put an end to the intra-party factional-
ism was therefore not a genuinely unified party freed 
from factionalism but just another faction led by Fukuda 
Takeo . While it is hard to deny that Fukuda and his 
associates were motivated partly by a genuine desire to 
strengthen the Party so that it coul d compete more 
effectively with the Opposition parties , it seems equally 
clear in retrospect that they were just as deeply inter-
ested ln weakening the existing factions and their leaders 
(especially the Ikeda faction ), and in building a new 
viable faction of their owno 39 Ultimately the anti -
faction campaign of this group repre s ented Fukuda's bid 
for eventual hegemony at the expense of the senior aspi~ 
ants for P arty Presidency, s~ch as Koono and Kawashima, 
and the younger competitors, such as Tanaka and 
Nakasone . That its immediate aim was to replace Ikeda 
by S atoo as Party President and Pr ime Minister became 
even more evident when the Too -ki ndaika giin renmei was 
formed in July 1964 as a joint anti-I keda front by the 
six dissident factions under Fukuda's direction. 40 Even 
in the November, however, after S atoo was nomi nated P arty 
P resident and thus became Pr ime Minister, this organisation 
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continued to exist as a de facto new Fukuda faction built 
on a basis more extended than the existing Fukuda group . 
Through the campaign for a change in the electoral sys -
tern (the institution of a single -memb er constituency 
system) in the winter of 1966 it succeeded in boosting 
its formal membership to about 25 0 Another twenty-five 
or so who were currently and nominally affiliated with 
the S atoo and other factions were said also to be under 
,. 41 Fukuda s lnfluence o 
The Miki Faction 
In February 1967 Miki Takeo leads a large faction 
in the dominant camp with an estimated membership of 35 
M.H.R o' s and 14 M.H oCo' s0 42 
During much of Hatoyama's reign following the con-
servative merger of November 1955 about twenty former 
?rogressives had constituted the embryonic Miki faction 
and led the 'Radical' wing (Kakushinha) in opposition to 
the conservative or dominant wing represented by 
Shigemitsu Mamoru and Matsumura Kenzoo. 43 Expediency 
well as accident persuaded the Matsumura group to join 
the Miki faction a few months before the presidential 
as 
election of December 1956 and, as a result, the original 
Matsumura-Miki faction (subsequently called the Miki-
Matsumura faction) emerged with an initial membership of 
, 44 26 M.H.Ro s o Compared with the other factions, this 
faction from the outset showed considerable interest in 
policy problems and policy research activities . In 
fact, by September 1957 the faction had come to be known 
officially as the S eisaku kenkyuukai and in J uly 1958 
four specialised research groups were formed on a perm -
anent basis , dealing respectively with foreign policy, 
agricultural administration, social security and 
45 
economy o In the meantime , a ' summer school' held 
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for a week every July at Karuizawa where the faction 
members would listen to lectures given by ten or so 
specialists on various subjects became an annual event 
from 1957 0 This example was subsequently followed by 
h f " 46 most ot er act10ns . 
Both tmperamentally and ideologically , however , 
Miki and Matsumura differed from e a ch other too widely 
to continue for ever this marriage of convenience o 
Wh ile ""; Matsumura consistently and relentlessly crit-
icised and attacked Kishi , for example , over the cont-
roversial issue of the revision of the Police Duties Act 
in 1958 , Miki was much more sympathetic towards the 
troubled Pr ime Minister and restrained his followers 
from mounting unreserved opposition to him o47 The pre-
carious coalition survived the crisis of 1960 over the 
Security P act controversy, but finally broke down in 
November 1964 , when Matsumura and five of his followers 
left the faction in protest against Miki ' s support of 
Satoo in the struggle for succession to the retiring 
President Ikeda o The , "s-a:::ession of the Matsumura group 
left the Miki faction largely under the control of the 
pro -S atoo group led by Hayakawa who was reported to have 
threatened for a while to walk out with nearly twenty 
of the thirty remaining faction members but was diss-
uaded by the assurance that Miki would eventually nom-
h " h" 48 inate 1m 1S successor o Both the desertion of the 
Matamura group and Hayakawa ' s bid for faction leader-
ship no doubt had the effect of damaging Miki ' s stature 
as a faction leader and weakening his fac tion's bargai n -
i ~ 
ing power for a while , Ibut the faction ' s relative succ -
ess in the 1967 House of Representatives election leaves 
it one of the crucial groups in the forthcoming presid -
ential contest , whether Miki himself stands or not o 
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The Kawashima Faction 
The Kawashima faction with 18 M.H .R.' s and four 
M.H oC .l s was another party to the dominant coalition o49 
When Kishi announced his intention to dissolve his fact-
ion , the Tookakai, at a press conference on 31 October 
50 
1962 , about 25 of its members refused to join the 
Toofuu-sasshin renmei, which had already been formed 
by Fukuda, and instead proceeded to form a separate 
faction under the joint leadership of Kawashima and 
Ak . M . 51 agl unenorl o According to a leaflet entitled 
'Coaisatsu
' 
( greetings ) distributed by the group in 
February 1963, there were 27 M.H oR.' s and five former 
M.H.Ro's 52 then affiliated with the Kooyuu-kurabu o In 
the House of Representati ves election of the same year 
its membership was reduced to 19 and in January 1964 it 
was officially dissolved as a political association as 
53 defined in the Poli tical Funds R egulation Law o This 
did not mean , however , that the faction ceased to exist 
but merely that it became more of a Kawashima faction 
than the loose federation of the followers of Kawashima , 
Akagi and Shi ina thatt it had beeno In fact , the faction 
resumed its regular meetings after the middle of that 
year and soon became one of the most unified and effect-
ive factions . 54 As of January 1966 , a staff of five 
managed its factional activities , three members were 
assigned to policy research, the faction meetings were 
held normally every other week and more frequently in 
the period from July to September when the annual 
budget-making was in full swing o 55 'Each member paid 
a monthly membership fee of 10,000 yen to finance its 
activities, about fifty editions of the factional organ , 
the S~aku Kenkyuu , had been published . E ach edition 
consisted of nearly 700 copies circulated among business-
men who provided financial assistance , supporting group ~ 
journalists and others , and a four-day' summer school' 
56 
was annually held at Hakone o 
The Ishi i Faction 
A fifth factional unit which falls in this category 
is the Ishii faction with 15 M. H oRo' s and eight M. HoC o ' s 
1 1 " t d wl"th l"t o57 regu ar y aSSOCla e Ishii succeeded Ogata 
when the latter died in January 1956 , but it was not 
until he personally fought the presidential election of 
December that year against Kishi and Ishibashi, allegedly 
spending from his own pocket nearly 100 million yen , th~ 
the faction began to be accepted as a viable entity both 
58 by its own members and others o During the following 
year and a half it existed as a very loosely knit group 
called the Suiyoo-kurabu with about 30 M. H. R o's regularq 
attending its meetings o59 At a meeting , however , atten-
ded by some 45 Diet members on 29 September 1958 , the 
faction was renamed the Suiyookai and a decision was 
made to put an end to the ineffectual five-man leader-
ship and unify the command over the group in the hands 
of Hayashiya Kamejiroo , a senior faction member with a 
seat in the House of Councillors , both with a view to 
making it more competitive and ensuring the success of 
"" '" d "d h f h" 60 Ishll S bl for presl ency at t e ort comlng contest . 
After Ishii lost to Ikeda in the 1960 president -
ial election (196 to 246 in the first ballot and 194 to 
302 in the second ) , however , both the faction ' s member-
ship and influence quickly began to wane . Although in 
early 1966 about twenty of its members still continued 
to attend its weekly breakfast se~sions on Wednesday 
monnings, it had apparently become a relatively ineffect-
ive group in the i ntra -par~y power struggle , especial ly 
because some of its most i nfluent ial members had begun 
" 62 by that time to assert almost complete freedom of actlon. 
1630 
In March 1966 its factional activities , (ap ar t from the 
weekly breakfast sessions ) were limited to the annual 
' summer - school' held at Karuizawa, while factional 
expenses were defrayed almost entirely by Ishii him-
~·e·lf, a l though each member paid a nominal membership fee 
62 
of 2 ,000 yen a month . 
The Maeo Faction 
Of the four ' neutral ' factions , numerica lly by 
far the most important is the Maeo faction with 43 
M.H. R.' s and about 19 M.H . C.' s attached to it. 63 Five 
months after it had separated from the S atoo faction 
(with which it had constituted the 50-man strong 
Heishinkai), Ikeda and about fifteen of his followers 
formed the Koochikai as a factional political associat -
ion o Throughout Kishi' s period as P rime Minister the 
Ikeda faction remained either definitely dissident or 
rather vaguely neutral , while the Koochikai became known 
for its extensive and sophisticated policy research 
activities. Especially after the middle of 1958 the 
g r oup began to meet regularly at weekly policy stud y 
sessions and its Research Dep ar tment ( choosabu ) began 
to engage in investi gat ions of economic and foreign 
1 · 1 64 po 1 cy prob ems e The results of such policy invest-
igations undertaken in the name of the Koochikai by a 
group of specialists attached to the Research Department 
were circulated among its own members and collabo r ators s 
particular l y those ln industry and the bureaucracy , 
mainly in the form of a series of monographs and, to a 
more limited extent, also through the faction ' s monthly 
Sh . 65 organ, the lnroo 
After Ikeda became Prime Minister in July 1960 
the faction's membership considerably increased. In the 
November 1960 House of Represen tatives election 49 of the 
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LDP-sponsored candidates who were successfully returned 
were identified with the faction and the corresponding 
figure at the November 19 63 election was 47. 66 While the 
Koochikai was officially disbanded less than a month 
after the 19 63 ele ct ion in accordance with the recommend-
ations of the LOP Organisation Research Council p
67 
the 
factional activities continued with just as much vigour 
and puhlicity as before. Nor did Ikeda ' s resignation 
in October 1964 and d eath in August 1965 lead to the 
breakup of the faction , as was the case with both the 
Oono and the Koono factions. In fac t , the new year par ty 
held at Ikeda ' s residen ce on 19 January 1965 was reporte:i 
to have been attended by as many as 74 LOP Diet members 
and founded the basis for the continued unity and pros -
perity of the faction under the lead ership of Maeo 
. 68 S hlgesabu roo . It is true that a rift threatened to 
develop on Ikeda ' s death between a group of former 
bureaucrats from the Ministry of Finance , (including 
Maeo , Oohira , Kurogane , and others ), and the rest of 
its members , and also that speculation was rif e at the 
time that Oohi ra was planning to build his own separate 
faction . Nevertheless , it maintained its unity without 
a single defection and quickly proceeded to form a new 
factional association , the Shin zaisei kenkyuukai , ln 
place of the defunct Koochikai . 69 In March 19 66 this 
new group was meet ing regu 1 arl y eve r y Tu esday , ju st as 
the ~hikai had done , and Maeo seemed to be in firm 
contro l of the group with the evident l y willing co -
operation of Oohira , Suzuk i Z enkoo , 
70 
and others . 
The Funada and Murak ami Factions 
iwa Kyo oshiroo, 
Two of the neutral factions in existence in 
February 1967 , the Funada and Murakam i factions , 
165 . 
originated in the former Oono facti on . Just before the 
LOP presidential election of December 1956 , 29 M. H.R.' s 
were said to be followers of Oono and this number 
remained remarkably unchanged until his death in May 
1964. 7 1 The faction was formally named Hakuseikai 
following that presidential election and its office was 
opened at Koojimachi , Tokyo, in March 1957 , but was 
72 
closed six months later . With a view to strengthen-
ing its factional solidarity in order to ensure Oono ' s 
success in the presid ential election of 19ED the 
Hakuseikai was revived as the Bokuseikai . This lasted 
until December 1963 as a political association in the 
sense defined in the P olitical Funds Regulation Law , 
and until well after Oono ' s death as a d e facto factional 
. 73 
en t I ty . 
Oono ' s d eath in May 1964 was inevitably followed 
by bitter power struggles between the senior faction 
members , which for about a month were contained under 
1 f f 1 
. . 74 
the ru e 0 an in orma governIng commIttee . By the 
end of June , however , the struggle had b ecome clearly 
bipolarized with Funad a and Murakami as the protagonists. 
After these two men were chosen to decide the question 
of succession to Oono between themselves in October of 
the same year it became evident that the faction could 
75 
not last very long . The final b reak came about ten 
months later , when , as mentioned previously , the efforts 
of an eight - man med iation committee failed to invent a 
76 
lead ership formula acceptable to both groups . By 
early 1966 the Funada faction has fo rme d a factional 
associa t ion called the I sshink ai and the Murak ami fact -
ion has followed suit by establishing the Ichiyookai . 
In February 1967 the former had a membership of 13 M. H.R. ' s 
and five M.H . C .' s and the latter 10 M. H.R.' s and two 
166. 
H C ' 77 M . 0 0 So The split has naturally rendered both groups 
far less effective in the game of intra- party factiona1 -
ism than the firmly united Oono faction used to be in its 
founder ' s 1ifetime o 
The Mori and Nakasone F actions 
The former Koono faction , from which by February 
1967 there had issued the 'neutral ' Mori faction and the 
' dissident ' Nakasone faction , had during Koono ' s 1ife-
time been one of the largest and the best organised. 
Made up largely of those who had been associated with 
the Hatoyama and the Hirokawa factions of the L iberal 
P arty and the Kitamura faction of the Progressive P arty 
and long organised in an association called Shunjuukai , 
it together with the former Oono faction was regarded 
as the mainstay of the ' politicians " 
78 groups (toojinha) . 
Its membership remained about 50, made up of 35 M. H.R.' s 
and 15 M. H. C.' s until the November 1963 House of 
Representatives election when over 45 of the LDP cand id-
ates sp onsored by the faction were successfully returned, 
79 
thus boosting its total membership to nearly 65 . Und er 
the pressure of the former radical P rogressives , who had 
long been known for their unusually keen interest in pol-
80 icy problems , this faction too engaged in extens ive 
and independent policy investigations of its own since 
relatively early days , especially in the fiel d s of econ-
omic and foreign policy . 8l In more recent years · it had 
become customary for the Shunjuukai to publiffi for the 
benefit of its electoral and financial support e rs a 
commentary on the annual government bud get , (Kotosh i n o 
yosan to watakushi - tachi no kurashi ) each year , in addit-
ion to reports on various lectures given by its members 
d · . d 82 an lnvlte guests . 
As previously mentioned , Koono ' s sud d en dea t h in 
July 1965 immediately caused the conflicts which had 
existed in the faction for some time seriously to 
threaten its factional unity and existence . A facade 
of unity Was maintained by the nomination of Shigemasa 
(largely as a result of pressure from financial patrons 
in the S ankinkai) as the Presiding Secretary (daihyoo-
kanji) in July 1965 virtually to succeed Koono as the 
faction ' s leader . The fact that he won only slightly 
over a third of the votes cast at the election , however, 
clearly indicated the precarious nature of his leader-
ship and a continuation of divisive tendencies . 83 It 
was precisely because of the weakness of Shigemasa's 
leadership that a collegiate form of leadership was 
instituted by the nomination of a nine - man board 
(kanjikai) while , at the same time the S ankinkai 
brought direct pressure to bear on the members of the 
faction to maintain unity . 84 Though its members contin-
ued to meet weekly at breakfast or at lunch and even at 
' policy study seminars ' (seisaku-kenkyuukai) which were 
often held more than once a week , Shigemasa's apparent 
failure to establish a firm grip on the faction , espec -
ially over its junior members (those who had been return-
ed not more than three times) , aggravated by the dwind -
85 ling faction funds , mad e its breakup only a matter of 
time . After the middle of 1966 it in fact ceased to 
exist as a united group and the split became open and 
formal by early 1967 , when one of the groups led by 
Mori stayed with the neutral camp with 12 M. H. R.' s and 
the other group represented by Nakasone joined the 
dissident bloc with 23 M. H . R o' s attached to it o 
The Fujiyama Faction 
In addition to the Nakasone faction , the 
Fujiyama and the Matsumura factions remain dissident 
168 . 
following the January 1967 election . 
The Fujiyama faction claims 16 M. H .Ro' sand 12 
M. H .Co' s as its bona fide members . It came into being 
as a viable factional unit in 1960 , when Fujiyama ran 
for the first time in the presidential election against 
Ikeda and Ishii and lost in the first ballot. 87 Both 
his officially ' non -political ' supporters ' association , 
the Tooyuukai, and the 'polit ical ', fund-raisin g organ-
isation , the Kokusai seiji -keizai -bunka kenkyuukai 
( subsequently the Kokusai seikei choosakai) , had been 
formed, however, almost simultaneously with Fujiyama's 
entry into party politics in July 1957 , when he Was 
appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the First Kishi 
88 Cabineto The faction had at least 31 affiliates among 
the LOP candidates successfully returned in the November 
1960 House of R epresentatives election , 89 but the membe~ 
ship thereafter dwindled steadily as Fujiyama' s personal 
wealth was dissipated, until it reached the low level 
indicated by the figures given already . 
In January 1966 , Fujiyama was still paying the 
faction bill at.most entirely from his own po cket , although 
the Tooyuukai, a majo rity of whose members were busines~ 
men and industrialists and whose monthly magazine 
Kokumin S aron was sold for a nominal price ( 50 yen a 
copy ), was apparently self - supporting o90 The Di et 
members associated with the faction made it a rule to 
meet once a week when the Di et was in session either at 
breakfast or lunch , usually on Thursdays at the Hotel 
New Japan , and to hold a two -day study seminar once a 
year . They were meant for the Diet members , but abou t 
ten former or would - be Diet members also attended fre -
quent ly . In add ition the faction had since S eptember 
1960 co - operated in the organisation of semi-annual 
four-day study sessions for students (the Fuiiyama 
sei ii daigakuin), which had been sponsored and directed 
personally by Fujiyama with the help of the youth assoc-
iation ca lled the Yuuai seinen dooshikai. 9l 
The Matsumura Faction 
The last and smallest and yet in some ways the most 
interesting and militant of the dissident factions in 
February 1967 is that of four members led by Matsumura 
Kenzooe When Matsumura and five others des erted the 
Miki faction in November 1964 in protest against Miki' s 
support for Satoo, he probably hoped not only to diss-
ociate himself from the expressly pro-Satoo majority in 
the Miki faction but also to create a preliminary group 
basis on which to build, if possible, a second conserv-
ative party more forward-looking than the present LOPe 
Matsumura has been known just as much for his consistent 
advocacy of such a second conservative party as for his 
passionate campaign for closer Japanese ties with the 
People's Republi c of China. 92 
As one of his closest associates once publicly 
stated, Matsumura's second conservative party was con-
ceived primarily as a means of preventing the Sociali sts 
from replacing the LOP in the indefinite future either 
by themselves or in coalition with the other Opposition 
part~es, and was obviously modelled after the prewar 
Minseitoo, , . t' 93 the Seiyuukai s conservatlve compe ltor. 
Notwith standin g the obviously backward-looking, even 
reactionary, implications of the plan, it is equally 
clear that he was deeply and sincerely concerned about 
the predominant influence of money and factionalism and 
the resulting subordination of policy considerations in 
the LOP decision-making process, a concern which was 
98 
shared by many others in the PartYe Despite the 
numerical insignificance of his following after the 
January 1967 House of Repre sentatives election, the idea 
of a second conservative party is clearly alive and may 
well be used as a weapon by the dissident factions and 
even the neutra l factions to influence , if not black-
mail , the dominant coalition over particular political 
issues or matters relating to the personnel administrat-
ion of the Part Yo 
The Factions and LOP Members in the Upper House 
The factional divisions of the LOP members of the 
Upper House did not become sufficiently clear to ident-
ify and link them with those in the Low er House until 
about the time of the July 1960 LOP presidential elect -
ion . There had existed the three loose groupings formed 
in 1956 around the three candidates in the presidential 
e lection of that year : the Seishin-kurabu (Kishi ' s 
supporters) , the Suiyookai (Ishii ' s supporters) and the 
Washinkai (Ishibashi ' s supporters) 0 95 As Watanabe has 
pointed out , the reasons for such a state of affairs 
among the LOP MoH oC.' s have , though diverse , been fairly 
evident o Firstly , those who were elected from the 
national constituency depended , as a rule , much more on 
national interest groups , such as the Medical Associ at -
ion or the ex-servicemen's associations , than on the LOP 
factions in the Lower House for financial and organisat -
ional aid; secondly , those elected from the prefectural 
constituencies found it sensible and profitable to cam-
paign with the supra- factional , rather than factional , 
support of the M. H oR. ' s , returned from the area ; thirdly, 
the long six- year term of office made it less urgent for 
a sitting M. H oC o to ' cultivate ' his constituency with as 
much care and spending as his Low e r House counterpart ; 
1710 
fourthly , the fact that every faction leader was an 
M. H.R. dampened the M. H . C. ' s interest in and loyalty to 
a particular faction ; fifthly it had become an estab -
lished custom for a candidate for a governmental or P arty 
post from the LOP in the House of Councillors to be 
recommended by the P resident of the House , and the 
Pr esident and S ecretary- Gene ra l of the Assembly of LOP 
M. B . C.' s instead of by a faction leader; and sixthly, 
it had also become an unwritten rule for three M.H . C.' s 
to be appointed Cabinet Ministers at each Cabinet change. 
This made it sensible to have three, rather than eight 
th b . f h· 96 or more , groups as e aSlS or suc appolntments. 
These conditions continued to discourage complete 
absorption of LOP-affiliated M. H.C.' s by the factions 
formed among Low er House members and to perpetuate the 
three rather loose and cross-factional groupings . By 
the middle of 1962 , however , factional divisions mod-
elled after and organically linked with those In the 
Lower House appeared quite clearly among them and it 
became possible to count each faction ' s supporters with 
97 
a measure of accuracy . The three .cross-factional 
groups still existed , under the same name as before in 
the case of the S eishin- kurabu (the S atoo and the Kishi 
factions) and under changed names in the case of the 
Konwakai (the Ishii , the Ikeda and the Mik i factions ) 
and the Mizuho-kurabu (the Oono, the Koono and the 
F .. f · ) 98 UJlyama actlons . The individual factions , however , 
gradually extended their influence over the LOP members 
of the Upper House and were accepted increasing ly as 
the basic units of intra- party politics by members of 
that House . 
Factions as Units for Distributing Po sts 
As described above , the faction has b e come the 
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basic and apparently permanent unit of association 
within the LOP Slnce the presidential election of 
December 1956 0 Each of the eight or more of these 
groups under successive LOP Cabinets has had its own 
headquarters and a fairly fixed and stable membership 
drawn exclusively from among LOP Diet members . In terms 
both of its daily activities and command of loyalty from 
its members each faction has been in many ways scarcely 
distinguishable from an independent party and obviously 
competed with the formal party organisation o Why such a 
system of factionalism should have come to flourish in 
the LOP and what specific functions it has performed 
must be carefully examined and explained as a pre-
requisite to a full understanding of the party policy-
making mechanism . 
The faction in the LOP evolved essentially aS , a 
device by means of which a member of the Party in the 
Diet hoped to acquire Either a government post , a 
Party post , political funds , or all of these o In other 
words , a Diet member ' s desire for office and money was 
responsible for the growth of factionalism and all the 
benefits or evils associated with it o It is quite 
significant that the era of factionalism in the Party 
was ushered in , (as we have already noted ), by the pres -
idential election of 1956 , on which occasion the three 
candidates , Kishi , Ishibashi and Ishii , and their supp -
orters are said to have spent at least 120 million yen , 
90 million yen and 60 million yen respective l y in buy-
ing votes . 99 That event illustrated most dramatically 
how ambition for office , the magic power of money and 
the game of factionalism could feed and flourish on one 
another . 
According to the LOP Rules relating to the election 
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of Party President , it IS necessary for a presidential 
candidate to win a majority of votes cast by all LOP 
Diet members and the 46 prefectural delegations in the 
first poll , or , failing that , to win either the first 
or the second place in the first poll and then a plur -
ality in the second polIo 100 It IS obvious that the surest 
way to succeed in such an electoral contest bas ed on 
the principle of majority vote is to build in advance a 
sufficiently lar ge and reliable group of one ' s own 
supporters and depend upon their bJoc voting o Should 
one fail to build a single g roup embracing a majority 
of the qualified voters invo lv ed , h owever, it would 
become necessary to induce others outside the group 
(often includi ng members of rival groups of a similar 
kind) , to vote for one . As most LOP leaders thems elves 
would readily admit, everyone of the candidates who has 
run in a past competitive LOP presidential election has 
t d . 1· d . h h· 1 lOlA ac e strIct y In accor ance WIt t IS ru e. s an 
advocate of the popular election of Prime Ministers , 
Nakasone Yasuhiro , once explained , each aspirant attempts 
to keep the votes represented by his own faction from 
slipping away to a compet it o r and at the same time to win 
to himse lf those controlled by other fact ions o As 
Nakasone has pointed out , bribery either in money or 
promise of office has liberally emp l oyed in this proc-
10 2 
ess o 
Just as the few influential leaders who hope to 
win a forth comi ng presidential election in order to 
become the nation ' s Prime Minister and President of the 
LOP have f ound i n th e faction a mo s t effective and rel -
iable weapon , so have the ran k and file seen in it a sure 
guarantee for smooth promotion and the acquisit i on of 
politi ca l funds o According to LOP members themselves , 
174 . 
they feel compelled to struggle for a high government 
or P arty post not so much by pride or ambition as by the 
pressures applied by their constituencies . Even the 
self - assured Nakasone once confessed to great annoyance 
in thi s regard : " •• 00 many M. H oRo I S are t erribly embarr-
assed when asked by their constituencies why they have 
not yet been appointed Cabinet ministers o They them-
selves don ' t care very much really , but it is hard to 
put up with this sort of pressure , especially if other 
Me~bers returned by the same constituency manage to get 
. f'" 10 3 Ab 1 an appolntment lrst . out a month ater Kuraishi 
spoke in a similar vein when he said that a Diet member 
who had been appointed a minister or parliamentary vice-
minister had a far better chance of re-election and that 
to th e majority of Diet members re - election is almost an 
d 1· n . t 1 f 104 en 1 s e 0 
Ever since Ishibashi resorted to the careful dis -
·~ribution of government and P arty offices in such a way 
as both to reward his supporters and collaborators in the 
previous presidential election and, at the same time, to 
maintain the extremely del icate inter-factional balance 
of power (represented by the narrow seven-vote margin he 
had won over Kishi in that election) , factional and inter-
factional considerations have become a basic factor In 
the LOP personnel a dmi n istration . The P r ime Minister 
(who is concurrently P resident of the P arty) ass i gns 
such government posts as Cabinet ministers , parliament-
ary vice- ministers , presidents of each House, as well as 
such P arty offices as S ecretary-General , Chairman of 
the Executive Council , Chairman of the PARC, and chair-
men of various functional committees , not as a rule to 
individual members as such but to the factions . Wi th i n 
e~ch faction , moreover , a waiting list is carefully 
175. 
prepared for the appointment of its members to such 
posts on the basis of the number of times they have been 
re-elected , the length of time they have been associated 
with the faction , the monetary or other forms of contri~ 
utions they have made to the faction or its leaders , and 
105 
so on . It was in the form of such waiting lists tha~ 
for example , the names of ' recommended ' candidates for 
Cabinet posts were submitted to the Prime Minister by 
each faction in December 1960, July 1962 and July 
1963. 106 As the considerations of inter-factional bal-
ance came to be accepted as the criterion for appoint-
ments (t his was more ~ crearl y the case with the posts of 
Deputy S ecretaries-General and Deputy Chairmen of the 
PARC than with any other posts) , 107 it became unavoid-
able for practically every LOP Diet member interested 
in such appointments to associate himself with one fact-
ion or another on a semi - permanent basis. 
A Source of Funds for Members 
Just as important as the allocation of government 
and P arty posts and closely related to it as a cause of 
LOP factionalism has been the financial needs of most 
sitting and prospective Diet members . At the time of the 
1958 House of Representatives election it was said that 
it took an LOP candidate at least¥5 million to win a 
seat ,108 of which¥l million was paid by the Party but 
the remainder was for the candidate himself to raise .
l0 9 
Obviously, many found it extremely hard to collect such 
a sum . It has become even harder in the years since 
then during which costs have increased severa l fold. 
It is in fact not only the electioneering activities 
during the legally defined campaign periods but also 
the continuous and constant ' cultivation ' of his con-
stituency that an LOP Di et members must finance, if he is 
1760 
to make sure his re - election at the next election o 
Whenever a group of voters visits Tokyo from his elec-
torate , he is expected to pay for their meals , their 
fares , their hotel accommodation and , not infrequently , 
to give them some pocket money . A t the time of the 
annual summer Buddhist festival and at the end of the 
year , his local collaborators naturally expect him to 
either buy them drinks or give them a few thousand yen 
for a present (or both ) as a matter of traditional 
courtesyo And in a hundred other ways he is constantly 
110 
under pressure to spend money o 
Under these circumstances the average LOP Diet 
member is compelled to turn to the few influential men 
who are able to exact large sums from various interest 
groups , firms , individual businessmen and industrial -
ists o These privileged few are the faction leaders , 
1 . 1 III . .. h either actua or potentla 0 To mlnlmlse t e tax 
obligations of themselves and their donors the faction 
leaders have constituted their factions into ' political 
associations ' within the meaning of the Political Funds 
R 1 . L 112 egu atlon aw o At election time each of these fact-
ional machines for raising and distributing funds have 
virtually constituted an independent and self - contained 
quasi - party , providing its members with financial ai d 
even more sUbstantial than they have received from the 
Party Headquarters . 
In the House of Representatives election of 
November 1960 , for example , the Ikeda , Ki shi , I shi i 
and Miki factions in the name of their respective 
' political associations ' - the Koochikai , the' Tookakai , 
the Hooankai and the Shin seiji keizai kenkyuujo -
113 
officially expended a total of ¥ 341 ,000 , 000 0 At the 
same time , the Shuuzankai of the S atoo f action and the 
177. 
Daiichi kokusei kenkyuukai of the Koono faction spent an 
estimated total of ¥ 318 million. In other words , the 
combined total of the expenditures made by six of the eight 
factions alone was nearly equal to the total of ¥ 666 mill-
114 ion spent by the LOP Party Headquarters . Furthermore, 
practically all the money s pent by the factions is bel-
ieved to have gone directly to the individual candidates 
either as undisguised ' aid' or as allowances for 'org-
anisati on' and 'politi cal research' 0 Thus on that Occas-
ion about forty supporters of Ishii and twenty-five 
followers of Miki officially received ¥ 2 million each , and 
the seventy-odd Ikeda faction candidates ¥ 1 million each, 
from their respective factions. This was compared with 
the ¥ 500,000 per head which the Party Headquarters managed 
h 320 ·d 115 to and out to the candl ates . 
The role of the factional political associations 
as fund-raising and distributing devices do not cease 
with the end of a legally defined election campaign 
period, for as we have already pointed out, the financial 
needs of the average Diet member are constant and contin-
uous . Thus in 1962 , for example , the nine associations 
run by the eight factions (these include a second assoc-
iation run by the Kishi faction and ca lled the 
Shinyuukai), spent between them a total of ¥ 1 , 286 mill-
116 ion as compared with ¥ 1 , 607 million spent by the LOP. 
As we have already shown , some significant changes in 
the general · system of LOP factionalism had taken plac 
by 1965 and the tendency towards fragmentation and mul -
tip li c ation of factional units was reflected in an 
increase to fifteen in the number of their political 
associations . 117 Between them these fifteen fund-
raising organisations (representing nine factions and 
one quasi - faction) c ollected in 1965 a total of ¥ 1,679 
178. 
milliron, which was approximately half the ¥ 3 , 382 million 
collected by the LOP in that year. Here again it should 
be noted that the bulk of the money r~ised by the indiv-
idual factions was probably distributed among their 
members , whereas a high percentage of that collected by 
the Headquarters was c onsumed in the management of the 
Party at large . Si nce the specific sums made available 
to a member by the Party Headquarters or a faction depen d 
on various factors, such as his position and status in 
the Party, the particular faction to which he belongs 
and his position therein , and the relative degree of 
his financial need , it is difficult to make a signif-
o 1 0 to b thO 118 Icant genera Isa Ion a out IS. N ever the 1 e s s , i t 
seems reasonable to assume that in the mid-1960's most 
LOP Diet members receive about half a million yen per 
year , as a matter of routine, from the Party and at least 
¥ 1 million from the factions . Whe n they run In an elec-
tion they apparently get ¥ 2 million from the Part y and at 
least as much from the factions. 
The Role of the Multi-Member Constituency System 
Another very important factor contributing to the 
growth and prevalence of factions in the LOP has been 
no doubt the multi-member electoral system under which 
each Lower House constituency returns three, four or 
five Members . A party intent on winn ing a majority must 
accordingly enter two or more candidates in each con-
stituency , a situation which inev itably leads to bitter 
compe tition not only between the parties but also between 
those candidates who are endorsed officially by the 
same party . Althou gh the LOP may refuse to endorse 
more candid ates i n the same constituency than are 
likely to be returned, (i n the 1967 election this was 
o 0 )119 lOt the case in more than half the 123 constItuencIes 
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is equally common for extremely bitter internecine com-
petition to develop between two or more LOP candidates 
and for this to continue long after the election is 
over . Under such circumstances the competing candid-
ates have to seek financial and other forms of support 
from rival factions and faction leaders during the elec~ 
ion campaign and subsequently associate themselves with 
the same antagonistic factions on their successful elec -
tion o In other words , the expense of an election forces 
a candidate to seek financial support from a faction , 
while the competitive situation drives the two or more 
LOP candidates standing in the same constituency to seek 
such support from and identify themselves with opposing 
. 120 factlons o 
In an assessment of the effects of the multi-
members constituency system on LOP factionalism two fac -
tors are important : One is the inability of the P arty 
Headquarters to supply each candidate officially endorsed 
by the Party with sufficient campaign funds and the 
other is that each P refectural Federation of P arty 
Branches has traditionally been dominated by a particul-
ar faction . As a result , the pattern of antagonisms bet-
ween dominant and dissident groups of factions , which 
is such a familiar feature of the LOP intra- party pol -
itics at the centre , is reproduced at the prefectural 
and constituency levels , in the form of competition 
between those candidates who are supported by the 
Prefectural Federation and those who are not . Under 
these circumstances the forma l party organisat i on it -
self becomes a tool of intra- party factiona li sm and a 
majority of the Party ' s candidates are led to rely on 
their own electioneering machines (the supporters ' 
) . f f d 1 21 associations for votes and on the factIons or un S o 
180. 
It 1S against this background that the replacement of tne 
present multi-member di s trict system by a single-member 
district system has been seriously discussed within the 
Party in recent years as a possible cure for disruptive 
" I" 122 fact10na 1sm. 
The Size of Factions 
Each of the three pri nc ipal factors that have been 
responsible for the growth of factionalism has defined 
both the size and functions of the factions as they have 
operated in the LDP D A faction with much fewer than 
twenty members has been considered to be rather too small 
to be effective in helping its leader bid successfully 
for the position of Party President and Prime Minister. 
Nor is such a numerically small faction likely to have 
a satisfactory share of the li mited number of government 
and Party pOsts and thus provide its members with the 
incentive to stay within it . A faction "with much more 
than fifty members, on the oth e r hand , will not only 
impose an unbearable financial burden on its leader but 
will also inevitably be faced with difficulties in 
adjusting the competing demands for priorities in the 
factional waiting list for appointments to the more des-
irable government and Party posts. Moreover , in a very 
large faction it is likely that some of its members will 
compete -in the same electorates and , that divi sive ten-
dencies will thereby emerge . As already mentioned , the 
result of such electoral competition and antagonism 1S 
11 1"" f" 1 ff"l" " 123 usua y a sp 1t 1n terms 0 fact10na a 1 1at10n. 
The Factions and Party Policy-Making 
The major functions of the faction should be fair~ 
obvious from the foregoing discussion of the principal 
factors responsible for its development . In brief , it 
operates as the basic unit in the distribution of the 
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important P arty and government posts , inclvding the 
Party Presidency and the premiership , and looks after 
the financial needs of the rank and file Diet members . 
In terms of the party policy- making process , however , 
its ro l e is somewhat more comp l ex and harderlto gener-
alise about . In some important respects it has been 
dysfunctional , but in a few others it has been moder-
ately functional o 
On the negative side should be counted , first of 
all , the general effects of the considerations about 
inter - factional balance of power which have determined 
the appointment of members to the key party positions, 
As has been pointed out by an official committee as well 
by individual members of the Party itself , 124 there as 
IS little d oubt that inter - fa c tional balance has sac-
rif i ced the principle of appointment on the basis of 
individual merit and thus reduced the possibi l ities of 
the most capable and best qualified members being 
appointed to the key Party positions and participating 
in the crucial policy- making process . The factional 
waiting list do es not take into consideration , except 
marginally , the factors of ability and achievement . 
This apparently means that the most influential formal 
Party leaders are not necessari l y the best qu alified 
of its members for policy making . 
Far more critical , however , have been the effects 
of this principle of inter- factional balance upon the 
quality of leadership represented by the P arty P resi d-
ent and the Leaders ' Meeting o Under the circ umstances 
they are not only not the best, qualified but , as po i nted 
h . 125 out in a differen t part of the present t eSlS , are 
seriously hampered in the exercise of the legitima t e 
decision- making powers with which they are entrusted by 
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the Party Constituti9n. Esp ecially important in this 
connection is the fact that the official presidential 
term of office is only two years o Even more important 
are the effects of the familiar pattern of struggle bet-
ween dominant and dissident alliances of factions , which 
logical l y results from the kind of factionalism under 
consideration and is almost bound to cripple party 
leadership when faced with an especially controversial 
issue or difficult situation o As was forcefully brought 
out by the conflicts which lasted almost continuously 
from about September 1958 to July 1960 , under Kishi , 
this form of intra- party struggle may prove vicious 
enough to sap completely the energy of the formal Party 
1 d h " d ·1 " f " 126 ea ers lp an para yze lts unctlons o Given the 
characteristically competitive instinct of the faction, 
a P resident who dares to deal with any controversial 
po l icy issue runs the risk of arousing all the destruct-
ive passions of his opponents in the dissident factions 
and even some of his fair - weather allies and may well 
be found to be digging his own grave . As far as the 
role of the formal leadership group in the party 
policy- making proces s is concerned , therefore , faction -
alism doubtless exerts an inhibitive influence o 
The Faction as a Unit of Intra- Party Communication 
On the positive side , on the other hand , may be 
counted the role of the faction as a unit of intra-
party communi c ation and its general ly decentralising , 
or rather polycentric , effects on the party policy-
maki ng process . While there seems no log i cal reason 
why a formal par t y organ , such as the Executive Counc i l 
or the PARC , cannot be made the effective forum of pol -
ic y deliberations and frank exchange of views for al l 
interested party members (which they are no doubt mean t 
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to be)~ it is true that up to the present, such a 
purpose has been served more by the factions than by the 
127 formal party organs o Whereas a meeting of 400 members 
would no doubt make it rather difficult for each to 
express his views freely and for all to come to agree-
ment on specific problems, a relatively small g roup of 
a few dozen members may find it much easier to satisfy 
such needs. The atmosphere of a faction headquarters, 
located often in a modern and clean office building or 
128 hotel, is much more informal and cosier and there-
fore more conducive to free a n d frank discussion than 
that of the Party Headquarters. Besides, the authority 
of a factional leade r was such, at least in the heyday 
of LOP factionalism, that wh oever objected to a view or 
course of action favoured b y him could be quickly and 
effectively silenced and brought into lineo 129 This 
means that the formal party lead ership ~ represented by 
the President, needed to deal only with a dozen faction 
leaders, instead of 400 member s, when he wanted to have 
a decision made with the full support of the whole 
parliamentary Party. He could rest assured of general 
support, once he had succeeded in winnin g a promise of 
" f h 130 co-operatIon rom tern. 
The theory about the democratising influence of 
the faction, according to which its presence generally 
tends to prevent dictatorship by a particular individu~ 
or group, actually regards weak and ineffective leader-
ship on the part of the Pre s ident and other key Party 
f " " 1 h " "131 of lCla s as In t IS sense a vIrtue. Whether such an 
influence sh ou l d be considered positive or nega tive is, 
ther e fore, essentially a matter of degree and preference, 
as clearly demonstrated by the widely differing evaluat-
ions of Yoshida's 'one-man rule ' which is often cited as 
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an example of a situation likely to develop in the 
absence of plural factions in the LOP. I t may be arg -
ued t hat the presence of factions makes it possible for 
a number of radically different and opposing views and 
poli cy prefer ences to co -exist within the single Party 
and thus justifies the transfer of public (government-
al ) power from one faction to another within the Part y o 
This argume~t springs from the long monopolisation of 
power by the LOP at the expense of the Opposition 
parties. It means that the LOP, from a strictly part-
isan point of view , can pretend to be a self-contained 
party system in itself , embracing a dozen de facto part-
ies within it and ensuring that power pass from one to 
another democratically through periodic presidential 
elections . In short , the presence and nature of the 
factions has made it possible for plural political 
views and attitudes to co - exist at the informal level 
without destroying a 'semblance of party unity at the 
formal level of the P arty organisation o 
Attempts to Di sband the Factions 
Wh ether or no t factions are desirable from the 
point of view of intra-party democracy , the formal Party 
leadership has seen them much more as the agents of diss-
ident ' obstructionism and intransigence than as useful 
means of intra-party communication and co-ordinat ion o 
Following the riotous presidential election of Decemb e r 
1956, t he new President, Ishibashi, and his S ecretary-
General, Miki Takeo , immediately began to call for an 
d of 132 en to fact ional strl e o Governing in a period of 
unbridled factionalism , Kishi Nobusuke attempted in 
S eptember 1957 not only to talk about but also to en-
force the dissolution of the dozen or so fac tional 
groupings , although this failed to produce any tangible 
: ... ' 
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and lasting effects o Following the submission of the 
Organisation Research Council's interim report in July 
1963 (the ' Miki Report'), Ikeda proceeded in December 
to disband nominally his own fac t ional associations , 
the Iseikai and the Koochikai, and thus compelled the 
others either to chang e their names or close down reg-
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ular meeting places . Fi nal ly , Satoo invited all 
faction leaders to a well-known Akasaka restaurant in 
September 1966 to calIon them to liquidate their fact-
ions without delay and announced his intention to do the 
same with his own Mokuyoo-kurabu , an intention whi c h 
was eventually fulfilled but failed to induce the oth e r s 
11 . 135 to fo ow SUlt o 
Everyone of these efforts by successive Presid-
ents and their allies in the dominant group have proved 
unsuccessful o At least two of the most experienced LOP 
1 · . . f·d 1 d· d . 136 I po Itlclans con 1 ent y pre lcte thls o twas 
inevitable ? for all the basic factors responsible for 
their growth - the pressures driving most LOP Di et 
members to seek appointment to government or Party 
posts , their need for funds , and the competition in the 
same constituencie s , still remained unchanged o The 
fact that the assurances given by Satoo and Tanaka in 
1966 that the Patty Headquarters would officially look 
after members ' financial needs (in fulfilment of the 
assurances some 300 rank and file members received a 
uniform ' year ' s-end allowance ') failed to shake their 
loyalty to the factions suggests that all three factors , 
and not jus t 
factions are 
one , 
ev er 
will have to be removed, if the 
to be actually abolished o 137 
The conventional faction as a form of g r ouping , 
howev er , is basically not very stable , for its unity 
and SOlidarity depend almost exclusively upon the loose 
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network of Qilateral ties binding each member to the 
leader in a highly personal relationship. As a rule, 
very little consideration is given to agreement on 
ideological or policy preferences between the leader and 
his followers, while the association between the indiv-
idual members of a faction is often accidental and, at 
least ~n refe+ence to the fac tional waiting list for 
posts, even overtly competitive. As a result, the 
weakening of the leader-follower ties (the extreme form 
of which is the 1eade~'s death) i~ediate1y th~eatens 
open strife between the members which may eventually lead 
~h b k f th f . 138 to ~ ~ rea -up 0 e actIon. 
The Decline of the Factions 
While LOP Presidents and other leaders of domin-
ant factions have often preached self-righteously about 
the evils of factionalism and th~ need to dissolve the 
factions, this has failed to affect the general condit-
ions of factionalism in the Party. Nevertheless, several 
developments in its environment have conspired in recent 
years to produce some noteworthy changes, especially in 
the years following the Security Treaty crisi of 1960: 
Firstly, the various business and industrial 
groups supporting individual factions began to feel the 
strain of the vastly increased monetary contributions 
demanded of them, and therefore pressed for unification 
of the channels of donations. This was first attempted 
with the establishment of the Keizai saiken kondankai 
in January 1955 and then with its replacement by the 
Kokumin kyookai in July 1961. l39 Although the process 
has . been bQth slow and tortuous, this situation has 
m~de it increasingly difficult for the fa~tion leaders 
to raise sufficient funds. 
Secondly, the slow but steady growth of the 
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Opposit ion parties, especially the Japan Soci alist 
Part y , and the relative decline in the effectiveness of 
the LOP as the dominant party (which was dramatically 
brought out in theS ecurity Treaty crisis ), emphasised 
th e need for party- wide , instead of factional , so lid-
arity and encouraged int e rest in ideological and policy 
problems, rather than merely pe rsonal and manipulative 
ski lIs 0 
Thirdly , three of the most effective faction 
leaders , Oono , Koono and Ikeda, died in q~ick success-
ion in 1964 and 1965 0 
All these changes have combined to bring about a 
marked decline in the authority and presti g e of the fact-
ion leaders and a general loosening of factional solid-
" d d" "1" 140 66 arlty an ISC1P Ine o By early 19 , not only the 
Oono and Koono factions but almost every other faction 
was visibly suffering from internal divisions and anta-
141 gonisms . On the other hand , interest in the ideolog-
ical and policy i mp l ications of intra-party groupings 
began to grow at the expense of the traditional emph-
asis on the emotive and financial basis of the factiono 
Most immediately this shift of emphasis appeared in the 
guise of factional ' policy study sessions ', which were 
not new but became much more frequent in the years 
following the Security Treaty crisis of 1960. Even 
more significant l y , however , reinforced by the decline 
of factional unity , the emphasis on policy led to the 
emergence of new cross - factional grouping based on 
po li cy or ideology , such as the two opposing g roup s 
int eres t ed in the China issue and the Soshinkai ident -
ified with the traditionali st and nat ionalist ele-
14 2 
ments i n the P art Yo The fact that affiliation with 
such cross - factional groups has not entailed 
1880 
dissociation from the factions suggests co-existence, 
(possibly involving an element of competition), between 
the two categories of intra-party g rouping, rather than 
supersession of the one by the other. Nevertheless , 
this new situation is bound in the long run to affect 
the basic characteristi cs of the system of factionalism 
in the LOP as it has existed in the past ten years or 
soo 
143 As mentioned in a preceding chapter, much of 
the rout~ne d ecision-making and policy formulation takes 
place with in the framework of the formal party organis-
ation , repre sented by the PARC and its working sections 
and the Executive Council. Ap pointment to the key posts 
in such or g ans has traditionally been invariably affec-
ted by the considerations of inter-factional balance o 
Indirectly but to a ve ry important extent, therefore, 
the faction influ enced their work and, in all probabil-
ity, the content of their decisions wherever factional 
interests were involved. 
More directly, the faction played a critical role 
whenever an especially controversial issue aroseo 
Inevitably opinion wou ld sharply divide over such an 
issue not only between the parties but frequently withm 
the LOP itself and the conflicts often proved insoluble 
by the f ormal decision-making organs. As a result the 
party leadership, interested in having a clear-cut 
decision made one way or the other in the name of the 
Party and with at least a semblance of party - wide con-
sensus to back it up, wou ld resort to an informal and 
extr a -constitutional decision-makin g mechanism, the 
council of faction l eaders . Consi d er ing the basically 
competiti v e and expansionist na ture and purposes of a 
faction , the leadership ran the risk of playing into 
the hands of its open opponents (th e dissident factions) 
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and its potential opponents (the dominant factions), 
who would certainly make sure that no 9Pportunity was 
missed to discredit the leadership and take over control 
of the Party themselves. With luck, however, the Party 
President might persuade the faction leaders to 
co-operate with him in his efforts to create a semb-
lance of consensus and thus to resolve the difficulties. 
In either case, the role of the faction in this kind of 
decision-making situation was direct and crucialo 
Under the changed conditions reviewed above, 
however, the ;.nfluence of the faction leader in the sel-
ection of party officials is likely to decline, although 
the election of a Party President will probably continue 
much longer to be a game of inter-factional power pol-
itics. Consequent ly, the role of the faction in the 
formal party decision-making, which has never been very 
conspicuous, will probably become negligible. 
The growth of cross-factional g roups primarily 
interested in specific policy issues will, moreover, 
deprive the factions of their utility as · an informal 
decision-making mechanism over controversial issues and 
the role will shift to these cross-factional g roups, if 
not to the formal Party organs. Since opinion is bound 
to be divided over certain issues and a single g roup 
cannot conceivably represent two or more conflicting 
views at the same tirre , it is likely that more than one 
cross-factional group will grow over each specific issue 
and that these will fight each other. When the unchall-
enged authority of the faction leaders to impose their 
wills on their followers and generate consensus of 
so;rts (either for their own or the P arty leaders' sake ) 
is gone , it will no doubt become extremely difficult to 
reconcile the opposing views and g roups with each other. 
Under such new conditions the facade of unity and 
harmony afforded by the emotional and irrational ele-
ments of factionalism will be replaced by much more 
harsh and direct, though no doubt rational, confront-
ati o n of ideological principles and political commit-
ments . 
Summary 
The factions have grown in the LOP as a form of 
inter-personal relationship calculated to be mutually 
beneficial to the handful of influential members who 
aspire to the post of Party President and the rank and 
file who desire lesser government or Party posts and pol-
itica l funds. By entering into this special relation-
ship, the leaders have secured a reliable bloc of votes 
in a presidential election as well as other, less tan-
gible benefits, such as prestige and the sense of 
leadership . The rank and file , on the other hand, have 
benefitted by securing opportunites for promotion in 
the intra-Party hierarchy and very significant supple-
mentary income to finance the electoral and other act-
ivitie$ essential to their survival as members of ' the 
Diet . The effects of the multi-member constituency 
system have further encouraged tendencies towards fac-
tionalism by dividing P arty members among themselves. 
As long as these three basic factors remain, the fact-
ions are unlikely to die out , despite the repeated 
calls for their dissolution. 
The most conspicuous of the influences of fact-
ionalism on the Party policy-making process have been 
negative . By introducing elements unrelated to abil-
ity or achievement as determinants in intra-Party 
personnel administration , it has no doubt worked 
against efficiency and rationality. More directly , it 
has interefered with the process of P arty policy- making 
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by setting alliances of dominant factions against 
those of dissident factions on controversial issues. 
The essentially competitive and even antagonistic rel-
ationships betw een the factions, especially between 
those identified with the dominant and those with the 
dissident positions, have made it inevitable for int-
ense conflicts to develop over controversial issues. 
This in turn has weakened ~nd often paralyzed) leader-
ship on the part of formal party organs and officials 
repr~sented by the. Party President and the Leaders 
Meeting. 
Less conspicuous has been the faction's positive 
role as the intermediary units of intra-Party commun-
ication and co-ordination, intervening between the top 
party leadership g roup and the rank and file members. 
The replacement of the more than four hundred individual 
LOP-affiliated members of the Diet as the basic units 
of communication by a dozen or so groups, each led by 
a particularly influential member with a firm control 
over the actions of his followers, has . facilitated the 
growth of some degree of consensus over certain issues. 
A faction leader who is potentially a competitor of the 
incumbent President has at times shown willingenss to 
help the latter by bringing his followers into line, 
provided that the rewards given or promised in return 
have been sufficiently temptingo 
From a strictly partisan point of view, the pres-
ence of the factions has benefitted the LOP also by 
making it possible for the dozen or so quasi-parties 
to co-exist within the single party organisation des-
pite all the genuine or false divisions of opinion and 
conflicts o This has also made it possible for the LDP 
to remain continuously in power despite the many changes 
of Cabinets. Whenever an LDP Cabinet dominated by a 
I 
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particular coalition of factions fell, another LOP 
Cabinet dominated by a rival coalition of factions 
would take over. Thus a quasi-two-party or multi-
party system has emerged and operated within the LOP 
itself , while the Opposition parties have been effect-
ively and p e rpetually k ept from power. 
Whether positive or negat ive, and notwithstanding 
the repeated attempts to do away with them, the factions 
have played a decisive role in the process of Party 
policy-making, particularly when the LOP has been faced 
with issues of a controversial nature. Neither the ge~ 
eral pattern of their inter-action nor their specific 
effects upon Party policy-making will remain the same 
for ever, as several important developments since a bout 
1960 have indicated. Without, however, fully taking 
into account the significance of the influence of fact-
ions, the process of policy-making in the: LOP will be as 
impossible to explain as ever. 
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CHAPTER ~ 
CONNECTIO S WITH EXTERNAL GROUPS 
Types of Connec tions Between the LOP and External Groups 
In order to exist as a viable unit in party polit"cs 
the LOP naturally depends very considerably upo n external 
organisat"ons and groups for support, (which may be 
termed 'input ) in return for services both gene al an 
particular, (which may be termed 'output'). 
Being essentially a parliamentary party with a weak 
grass-roots organisation the Party require above all 
two specif ic forms of support - votes and fundso 
Neither of these are available in sufficient quantity 
within the existing party organisation itself, but both 
are so essential that too little of either would serious-
ly damage its effectiveness and even threaten its sur i~ 
alo Hence the acquisition of votes and funds from out-
side sources, usual y from organised g' ups f var:o s 
kinds~ becomes the sine qua non of its existenceo In 
addition to tangible support , the Party al 0 needs the 
more general moral support of powerful external groups 
as a condition for the effective e ecution of its p c . -
icies. 
Any political party in a system similar to that in 
which the LDP operates needs funds not only to finan~e 
its management and programmes but also to attract -otes o 
Up to a poi n t,t he e £ 0 re, fund s rep res en t r t e sin dis-
guise and this is why money plays a crucial role in 
elections, which are basically contests for v tes o 
The linkages between the LOP and various external 
g r oups have devel oped broadly at two more or less di -
tin c t i vel ev e 1 s - the 1 eel 0 f the i 0 rm-a 1 par t y 0 r g n i "' -
ation and that of individual party memberso At the first 
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level what used to happen was that a f ew hundred e ter-
prises would make separate donati ons to conservativp. 
parties through party leaders, but this p acti ce was 
replaced by a special foundation to co- ordinate th o e 
linkages and take care of the Party U s needs for fu ds 
and public relations in a more systematic mannero Direct 
and persona l connections between individual enter rises 
and other organisations on the one hand and th e f rmal 
representatives of the Party continue, however, to be 
an essential and important part of the system o 
At the level of individual members consolidated 
and extensive ties have been maintained with a large 
number of external groups (mainly enterprises) fo r fund -
raising purposes by the faction leader s~ os t ensibly In 
the name of the factions rather t han themselves o A large 
portion of the funds collected by them has been expended 
on the upkeep of the factions and the welfare of their 
members, especially related to their electora l need2 0 
The basic nature of the linkages remains predominantl 
personal and particularo Similar connections have a so 
been establi shed by less important or influentia l members 
principally for the purpose of raising funds for them-
selveso Their organisations are called U supporters' 
associations l and have 'usually been crue'al t o t he 
success or failure of the politicians concerned o 
Equally important as a linkage between the LOP and exter-
nal g roups at the level of indi idual members has been 
another kind of supporters' association, the primary 
function of whi ch is to collect votes rather than funds o 
For the electoral success of individual LOP member s an 
indirectly of the LOP itselfv this has apparently been 
indi spensabl eo 
Dif ferent again have been a host of groups invol -ing 
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particu l ar party leade rs (such as the Pres ident ), on one 
hand , and prominent industrialists, journalists, public 
servants, and so on, on the othero The reasons for these 
groups, and their purposes and composition have been 
various - some being plainly non-political - but most 
have ei t her supplemented some of the types of linkage 
already mentioned or have provided mo ral , ideological, or 
technical supporto 
These groups usually claim rewards i n the form of 
specific legislative or administrative actions by the 
P arty for support given at the official party level o 
When it comes, however, to relationships between individ-
ual members and their supporters' associations the rewaro 
claimed may be much more personal and private. In the 
case of the former kind of reward the legislative or 
adminis t rative actions which the supporting groups expect 
the P a r ty to take on thei r behalf usually call for much 
more than goodwill and political commitmento They can 
be effectively taken only with co-operation and t e chnical 
faci l ities provided by the national bureaucracy o Thus, 
connections between the P arty and the bureaucracy at bolli 
of the above - mentioned levels are a pre - requisite for 
contacts between the P arty and private external groupso 
Before further geneLal comments are mad e the 
characteristics of the particular organisations and 
g r oups and the nature of their relations with the P arty 
must be examinedo F or the sake of convenience groups 
connected with the LOP at the level of its formal party 
organisation will be dis cussed before those operating 
a t the level of individua l members . 
Connections at the Level of F ormal P arty Organisati on 
S ince 1955 the LOP has always depended heav i ly on 
the d onations of various external groups for a very 
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subs tantial proport ion of its annual income . In the 
first ten years of its e istence , however , relation 
between the LOP as the recipient and eternal group s 
as the donors of po litical funds tended to become less 
particular, personal and unorganised and mor e general , 
impersonal and regu1arised. This change was clearly 
reflected in the r emarkable growth of two particular 
categories of external donor group and a corresponding 
decline of others . 
In 1957 , for example, nearly 30 per cent of the 
donations came f r om about 20 individual enterprises and 
less than 6 pe r cent from trade and prof essional a sso c-
.. 1 latlons. The Keizai saiken kondankai (economic recon-
struction round- table) , wi. ich was established in January 
1955 by the bu siness community as the official channel 
of its poli tical cont r ibutions , accounted for about 60 
per cento By 1962 the situation had unde gone a d rastic 
change o Wherea s , on one hand, the number of individual 
companies involv ed had inc reased six times to 121 , their 
share of the total value of the contr i butions had d ropped 
to about 10 pe r cent. On the other hand, the number o f 
the trade and profess i onal associations had increased to 
38 and their percentage share of the contributions to 
25 per cent. In the meantime , the Ke izai saiken 
kondankai had been replaced by the Kokumin kyookai 
6ationa1 association } which accounted for nearly 60 per 
cent of the donation s , roughly equal to the sha r e of the 
former five years before . 
It was i n the subsequen t few years , however , that 
the most spectacular change occurred in the general sit -
uation of these diff e rent categor ie s of group . The role 
of individual enterprises as a source of direc t donation 
had dwindled to less than 2 per cent by 19 65 and even that 
197 0 
of the trade and profess ional associations had bec ome 
quite inconspicu ous o On the othe r hand , the Kokumin 
kyookai had de initely established itself as the major 
supplier of fun d s for the P arty , handing out in a sing le 
year a total of ¥ 2 , 343 milli on , or 90 per ent of the 
to t al LOP incomeo S ta tisti cally, it i s no exaggera ti on 
to conclud e that this particular organisation is the 
finan c ial p at r on and guarantor of the LOP in the late 
1960' s o 
The Kokumin Kyo okai 
As indicated above , the Kokumi n kyookai succeeded 
the Keizai s aiken kondankai which had been origi nally 
formed in January 1955 and i n the following si years 
had prov ided the LOP with about ¥ 3 , 800 million on behalf 
of the nation ' s bus iness c ommunit y 02 The latter was 
abolish e d i n March 1961 as a resu lt of mounting dis at -
isfaction with its performance among business leaders , 
especially tho se associated with t he Keizai-dooyuukai, 
who felt that the organisation had been a failure on sev-
eral specific cou nts o They thought that the enormou 
amount of money whi c h it had f unne lled i n t o t he P arty had 
been obvi ously misused fo r factional and other purpose , 
that despite its e fforts to unify the channels of polit~ 
ical donations from business indi vi dua l factions contin-
ued to ask firms for additional contributions, and that 
it had com e to be regarded by the publi c as the symbol of 
a spec i a l relationship t y i ng the P arty to big business . 3 
In December 1959 , howeve r , before the Keizai 
saiken kondankai wa s formally dis solved , P r esi den t Ki sh i 
and S ecretary- General Kaw ashima had established a new 
organ i sation called Jiyuu k6kumin rengoo (national union 
for f r eedom) with the collaboration of several business 
leaders , including Sugi Michi suke , Adachi Tadashi , 
1980 
4 Mizuno Shi geo .l Uemu a Koogoroo~ Its basic aim was t o 
create a broad-based mass association to propaga te LOP 
policie s in o ppos iti on t o various popular lef ti st or g -
anisations o The func ti on of r a isi ng funds for th e P arty 
was co nsidered to be secondary and inc idental . 5 When 
the Keizai sa iken kondankai was dis so l ved and it became 
nec essary immediately to create a fund-ralsing gro :P ln 
its place , the Jiyuu kokumin rengoo was quickly r e -
organised into t he Kokumin kyookai, whi ch aimed from the 
beginning to fulfil the dual purpose of building a basis 
for popular part ici pation and of r aising funds . 6 
The Kokumin kyookai officially came int o b eing on 
15 July 19610 7 According to its Constituti o n ( adopted 
one month earlie ), i t was to be governed b y a Pr esident 
and a Board of Di r ectors and each individu al member cou ld 
choose to pay a subscription of 100, 500, 1 ,000, or 
10,000 yen and a corporate member 5 ,000p 10,000, 50 ~000 
8 
or 100,000 yen per mon th o By October 1964 , 4 , 896 
corpor a te membe rs were paying a total of ~ 49 , 225 , 920 
per month in subscr i ptions , while 48 , 225 indi vi dual mem~ 
bers supplemented this sum b y ~ 9 , 218 , 115 . 9 By the end 
of 1965 , there were 6 , 152 corporate members payi ng a 
total of ~ 64 , 770, 814 per month and 58 , 689 individua l 
members contributi ng another ¥ 12,138 , 286 . 10 In addit -
ion to income from regular subscrip tion fees which amounted 
to about ¥ 850 million in 1965 , the organisation managed 
to raise nearly ~ 690 million in special contributions 
and an additional ¥ 1,140 million from other sources , 
v 268 ·11 · 1 1 in other words a total of ~ , 7 ml lon o Of thi s 
last amount , ¥ 2 , 343 million , or 87 05 per cen t , was given 
to the LOP, as has already been ment ioned o 
It is quite evident from the stat i stica l da ta 
cited above that by 1966 the Kokumi n kyookai had rapi dly 
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and effecti ve l y c - ordinated prac t ical ly all groups and 
organisat i ons will ing to make financial donations to the 
LOP as su ch . Although it had not ye t complet ely super-
sed ed the contributions made t o indivi dual fact ions or 
l e aders , it is highly significant that nearly 40 per cent 
o f the 455 enterprises and associations whi ch made don -
ations t o the LOP or its component parts in 1965 handed 
their money d irectly and exc lusive ly to the Kokumin 
o 12 F kyo o kal o rom any point of view , then , it should be 
admi t ted that one of the two basic func t ions the 
Koku mi n k y o okai was built to fulfil has been dischar g ed 
wi t h r emarkab le success in a relati vely short space of 
t i me o 
It is somewhat hard er to assess its achievements 
l n p rov idi ng a mass basis for the ideological and polit -
i ca l p r o g r ammes of the P art Yo Despite , however , denials 
b y i ts officials of any inten t ion to interfere with the 
p o l i c y - maki ng process i n the LDP , 13 i t seems clear that 
eff o rts have not been spared over the politi c al and 
i deologic a l aspects of its task o 
Th e se activities hav e been car ied out mainly 
through o ccasional lecture mee t ings in various local ities 
1 b oo 14 0 and b y p er i odi c a pu llcatlons o The baslc themes of 
these activities have consistently been strong national-
i s m a n d virulent oppos i tion t o communism , to g ether with 
s u ppor t for government p sitions on controversial polit -
ic al and d i pl omati c issues o S ide by side with its 
s p ir it ed verb al c ampaigns against opp osition to the 
v is it o f a Un i ted S tates atomic -powered submarine in 
19 6 4 a n d aga i ns t opposition to the signing of the Japan -
S outh Kor ea t r eat i es on 1 965 , 1 5 it has also campaigned 
enthusi astical l y and e t ensive l y for restor i ng the cus -
tom of f l y i ng the na ti onal f l ag and sin g ing the nationa l 
anthem on national holi d ays , and reinstuting t he old 
National F oundation Day of 11 Februaryo16 The anti -
c ommuni s t postu e of the organisation is shown mo s t 
dramatically by a small booklet called ihon ga moshi 
kyoosanka sh i tara (' If Japan became Communist ' ), 91 
pages , writ ten b y a Japanese ex-member of the Commun-
ist Par t y of the USSR, Takaya Kakuzoo , and published 
by the Kokumin kyookai in June 1965 01 7 This simp le-
lookin g b ooklet , 700,000 copies of which were printed 
and di stributed in the first seven months, tell s its 
read ers tha t a So cialist government would inevitably be 
rep laced by a communist r egime and how all the horrors 
associated with that would visit Japan whi h woul~ be 
destroyed with utmost ruthlessnesso 18 Whether this is 
a gospel of political realism or paranoiac insanity, 
there is little doubt tha t it has been taken with 
absolute seriousness b y the leaders of the organisation 
as well as by at least a p ar t of its read ers o 
Not only as the financial supporter but al 0 as 
the propaganda arm of the LOP th e Kokumin kyookai had 
thus become a p owerful influen c e by early 1966 0 Its 
militan t, reactionary nationalism and crusadi ng anti -
communism cannot but exert enormous pressure on the par~ 
leadership and a f fect the p arty policy-making process . 
While its ideological pronouncements and actions in its 
major campai gns so far have followed , rather th an prec -
eded , party deci s ions , it is conceivable that the relat -
ionship be tween them c ou ld be reversed under c er tai n 
circumstances and initiative pass from the P arty to the 
spons(!)Ti ng organi sat i on o Such an even tual i ty wou ld no 
d ou b t b ene f it the more vehemently nationalist and anti-
commun i st elemen t s wi thin t he Party , b est represen ted by 
the S oshinkai and the 'Old Ri gh t' groups o It is 
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significant in this re s pect that th e Kokumin kyookai IS 
organisati ona l l y i nd e pendent from t he LDP , a l th ugh it 
is ideologi c all y and pro grammati c al ly cl osely r e lated to 
i t. It is therefo e no t subject t o the lat ter' formal 
decisions or discipline except . 19 In a moral sen s e o 
As will be s een later the s op e of its lobbying 
or pressure grou p acti vit ies i s cl early limited because 
of t he condi tions prevai li ng am ong th e most important 
of its members, but there seems little doubt that i ts 
i n flu ence will be a crucial factor in any LDP decision 
over a con t ~ov ersial issue o 
Individual Group s and Organisations 
Mo s t of the c orporate members of the Kokumin kyookai 
belong t o the federations of busines s en t e r p r i s es (which 
are i n turn defi ned as the P arty ' s sympathetic organisat -
ions side by side with a number of professional , ci v ic 
20 
and cultural groups )o As such they get special treat -
men t in the distribution of various P arty publications , 
invitations to P ar t y functions and meetings, and s o on o 
While they refrain a s a r ule from making separate finan -
cial contributions to the P arty ( and , espe c ially to part-
icular facti ons ), many of them apparently continue to act 
as independent pressure groups when it comes t o putting 
thei r specific economic , budgetary and other demand s to the 
P arty . Individua l Di et members are often chosen as th e 
primary objects of t heir lobbying activities , but many 
also maintain dir ect and regular r elations with t he fo r m-
al party organisation and its leader hip o 
Apar t f r om the well - known and widely publi c i zed 
activities of such powerful groups as the six local gov -
. . 21 h Ch h k ' .. , . ernment or g anI satIons , t e uus 00 - IgyOO sel J l renmel 
( small and medi um en terprise poli ical league) , 22 t he 
Nihon ishikai (Japan medical associat i on ), 23 and others , 
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numerous interest groups have maintained special relat-
ionships with the Party mainly , though by no means 
exclusively , under the aegis of the LOP ational Organ-
isation Committee and the various sections of the PARC o 
E specially in the case of farmers' and small business-
mens ' g r oups liaison conferences have been established 
since 1960 to connect them with the appropriate depart-
ments and bureaux of the above-mentioned committee in 
d · . h PC ' . 24 accor ance wlth a provlsion of t e arty onstltutlon o 
Even outside the framework of such official agencies of 
communica t ion P arty leaders have often been present at 
. ., . . 25 
these organlsatlons meetlngs and functlons . 
F rom the point of view of external groups , these 
oppor t unities for formal and informal communication with 
the LOP are no doubt seen as occasions for putting over 
thei r demands o For the P arty , they enable party leaders 
t o r epay financ i al supporters with the promise of action 
and to appeal for g r eater aid in money and votes . 
Although it is largely through the Kokumin kyookai that 
funds flow into the P arty from the external groups , the 
amoun t o f funds depends on the image of the P arty held 
by its individual members. This in turn reflects the 
nature of the relationships (usually direct and personal) 
be t ween the P arty leaders and themselves . Thus the Party 
lead ers s t ill have to maintain close personal relations 
with t he officials of the Kokum i n kyookai and also with 
its indi vi dual members and their representati v es . In 
other wor d s , direc t , emotive ties between particular 
P a r t y leaders and their financial and moral supporters 
outsi d e the P a r ty , very simi l ar to those between con-
s erv ati ve party lead ers and groups of promi nent busines~ 
men b efore the Keizai saiken kondankai was formed in 
1955 , still play an important role today , despite t he 
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growing influ ence o f the Kokumin kyookai o This s itua t-
ion is likely to be further p e rp e t ua t ed by th e obvious 
fa c t that it is dif ficul t f or a sing l e organ i sati on to 
represent at once all the specific , di versi f ied and 
often mutually i ncompatible demands and interests of 
some 6 , 000 differen t g r oups o 
I n this connect ion the role and activities of the 
leaders of the nat i on ' s business community , rep r esen t ed 
by the fou r powerful na ti ona l organisations of business -
men and indu st r ialists , the Keidanren, the Ni kkeir en , the 
Nisshoo, and the Keizai-dooyuu kai, de serve special atten-
tiono As ha s already been pointed out , it was with the 
co-operati on of several leading businessmen t hat both 
t he Keizai saiken kondankai and the Kokumin kyookai 
were originally established o The fact that the larges t 
contributions received by the Kokumin kyookai invariably 
come from the enterprises and tr ade associations whic h 
dominate these organisations shows how important they 
26 
are in its developmen t and activities o 
Connection Maintaine d by Indi v idual Faction L eaders 
The LOP faction leaders continue to maintai n pol-
itical association s (as defi ned in the Poli tical Funds 
Regulation Law) which are largely independent from the 
formal party organisation o These are their persona l 
fund-raising machines, although they are ostensibly 
factional organisationso I n 19 65, for example ~ the 
political associations each official l y collected between 
¥ 54 million and ¥ 668 million , totalling ¥ 1 , 747 million 
27 between t en of them o As seen i n the preceding chapte~ 
it is remarkable t hat th ese enormous amounts of money 
were rais ed almo s t single - handedly by a dozen or so 
faction leaders on behalf of their factional follow -
ings . This provides one of the mai n reasons for the 
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perpetuation of factionalism within the LOP. 
As can be seen from Appendix XIV, many faction 
leaders have formed more than one political association , 
obvi ou s l y for the purpose of tax evasion. In sharp cont-
rast to the r ~q:< d unification of the channels of contrib -
u tions to the P arty (represented by the efforts of the 
Kokumin kyooka i), the bulk of donations to faction 
leaders come directl y from individual 
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Nevertheless , a number of donors' g roups have 
eme r ged, with fairly fixed memberships, although these 
have been far more informal and unorganised than the 
Kokumin kyookai and its predecessors . In Ikeda ' s life-
time , for example , the Koochikai was organically linked 
with several groups of leading businessmen and indus -
tri alists , such as the Kayookai, the Nikokukai, the 
Sueh irokai, and others o29 S atoo maintains even more 
extended relation ships with more than a dozen groups 
of businessmen o The Chooeikai, which is the largest and 
most representative of these groups , alone involved 
near ly 60 leading businessmen by early 1966 , including 
SOme who had been formerly associated with Ikeda ' s 
30 groups . The others also play an important role , but 
especial ly the Misokakai , which involves the top lead-
ers of bus ine ss organisations and the most important 
trade associations, and the Itsukakai, which consists 
ma inly of those businessmen who have been closely 
identified with Yoshida and his followers (sometimes 
called the 'power group ' or .. k h ) 31 lltsuryo u a • Koono ' s 
Daiichi kokusei kenkyuukai was financially taken care 
of large ly by the S ankinkai , the twelve members of 
which each used to contribute a mi ni mum of ~ 20 million 
32 per year . In this fashion several fairly distinctive 
clusters of businessmen and enterprises have emerged 
(admittedly with frequent overlapping of affi li ations ) 
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in response to the financial demands of particular 
faction leader s o Faction leaders are apparently so 
d ependent for survival and success upon this kind of 
support t hat their political behaviour has been ser-
iously affected o 
Despite, however, the seeming stability of these 
connections be tween the LOP faction lead ers and groups 
of busines s men, it should be noted that their relative 
i mpo rtance in comparison with connections at the level 
the official party organisation has been changing over 
the past few years o 
Of the 455 donor groups who made financial contrib -
utions in 1965 , 20 6 (45 02 per cent ) contributed d irectly 
to the LOP itself or the Kokumin kyookai , while 197 
(43 02 per cen t) contributed to a faction leader or 
33 lead ers o Moreover, 52 (11 04 per cent ) split their 
contributions between the LOP or the Kokumin kyookai 
on the one hand and one or more factions on the other o 
This means that a majority of the do nor units had come 
by this time und er the total or par tial control of the 
Kokumi n kyookai and the P arty Headqu a rters and were 
excluded from the reach of the faction leaders o Gener-
all speaking , the largest donors (those who made a con-
tri bu tion of ¥ 10 million or more each) preferred to give 
either to the Kokumin kyo o ka i and a faction or factions 
or to the Kokumin kyookai alone o When they gave only 
to the factions , they characteristically split the 
bounty be t ween two or more groups o In contrast , the 
small donors (those whose donations were worth less than 
¥ 1 million) , obviously found it difficult to s p lit 
their mode st contributions between two or more benefic-
l a ies and gave them either to the Kokumin kyookai alone 
34 
or a single faction lead er o 
All this suggests above all that the growing 
influence of the Kokumin kyookai seriously interferes 
with the fund-rais ing efforts of the individual fact -
i on leaders o This impression lS corroborated by the 
fact that of the fund-raising groups associated with 
faction leaders of whi ch systematic information is 
available in selected years , only S atoo's and Ikeda ' s 
groups managed to increase their total inc omes between 
1962 and 1965 0 Four others suffered varying degrees of 
l oss , ranging from about ¥ 115 million in the case of 
Koono 's Daijchi kokusei kenkyuukai and ¥ 11 million in 
the case of Ishii ' s Hooankai~35 Even more significant , 
however , 1S the tendency on the part of the donors to 
avoid concentrating on a single par ti cular faction 
leader as the object of their sustained financial supp -
ort and instead to di st ribute the favours among as many 
beneficiaries as possible o The comparative behaviour of 
the four categorie s of donor classified on the basis of 
the relative sizes of their contributions indicate that 
those who seem to concentrate on a particular faction do 
so not so much because of their preference for that fact-
ion leader but because they cannot afford to give enough 
to split between more than one o In other words , those 
who can afford to do so tend to oblige two or more 
leaders as well as the P arty leadership either directly 
or through the Kokumin kyookai, as is indicated by the 
fact that only one of the forty - six largest donors of 
36 1965 acted contrary to this general tendency o 
The reasons for this tendency are not hard to 
seek . Factionalism in the LOP is basically concerned 
with the struggle for power, which involves rapid changes 
i n the fortunes of individual fa c tions and their 
leaders (and also leads to an enormous waste of energy 
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and funds) e It i thereforp lo gi c a 1 for an eternal 
group s eeki ng the P rty i s favours to spread its risk by 
contribu t Ong, not to one fact i on alone , but to many . In 
a per iod of rapid and unpredictable change in the fact -
ional situation , as in the years following the anti -
S ecuri ty Treaty cri is of 1960, this type of caution 
and p rud ence has naturally become more p ronounced . 
The instabil ity in re l ations between faction leaders 
and their financi al supporters is shown in the relatively 
low level of consistency on the part of the donor s in 
their of benefi ciaries ~ and is further accentuated by 
the strongly personal and emotive basi on which they 
depend. Whereas , for example , nearly 80 per cen t of the 
groups whi ch mad e donations to the Kokumin kyookai or 
d irectly to the LOP in 1965 can be consi d ered as stable 
and regular supporters , the same may be said of only 
about 53 per cent of those which contributed to a fact -
ion leader or leaders alone o37 Indeed, the percentage 
of regular suppo ters was as low as 44 per cent in the 
case of those who split hejr contributions between more 
than one fact ion leader . From this evi dence it may be 
confidently concluded that less than half of over a 
hund red group (mainly firms ~ whi ch by 1965 regu larly 
gave money to faction leade rs could be counted upon with 
c onfi dence by anyone leader . Any important c hange in 
the balance of power between the factions can result in 
a massive shift of allegiance . 
Su pporter s ' Associations 
L ike the fund - raising organisations maintained by 
the LOP faction leaders , most of the supporters' assoc -
iations (kooenkai) fonne d by LOP Diet members of lesser 
importance a r e regi stered wi t h the Minister for Autonomy 
as p olitical associations in the sense of the term us ed 
in the P olitical Funds Regulation Law. They operate either 
through th e offices of the Di et members at Nagata- choo or 
through separate offices maintained elsewhere . Al though 
it is difficult to generalise about their financial effec-
tiveness , it seems that in the mid -1 960 's most of them 
suc c eed in raising a few million yen per year o A few 
apparently manage to collect more than ~ 10 million ; a 
smaller number , less than ~ 1 million o38 Si nce the r eg-
ular expenses alone of an LOP Diet member reach one mill-
ion yen per month and an election costs him at least 30 
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million y en 9 it is probably correct to assume that the 
incomes from this particular source are quite substant-
ial but yet not sufficient to meet his rapidly increas-
ing expenses . Moreover, only about 80 LOP Diet members 
have actually formed supporters ' associations to help 
supplement their incomes from other sources . Thus many 
are forced to seek help from a faction leader , from their 
own supporters' associations whose primary function is 
to c ollect vote s, or else directly from a particular 
interest group or groups o 
The vote- collecting supporters ' associations 
obviously account for the majority of the 800 or so 
supporters ' associations which had come to exist by the 
middle of 19640 Every LDP Diet member has at least one 
of them to fall back upon as his personal vote- ga thering 
. f. 40 
machlne at the time 0 an electlon o Referring to the 
value of his own association , Fukuda Takeo once said 
with unusual frankness: "When we begin to prepare for 
an elect ion , it is not the LDP that comes first to our 
minds as a possible source of help . 0, we never think 
of the LOP at the time of elections . It is after all 
the 'Fu kuda-kai' to which I turn for help , and it must 
41 be the same with everybody else." 
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The weakness of the formal party 0 ganisation at 
the grass - roots , combined with the effects of the multi -
member constituency system p has inevitably led every 
LOP Diet member and prospective candidate to organise 
a supporters ' association to give him the practical 
help which the P arty cannot offer him . A vast network 
of these personalised and segmented organisations has 
become a central focus of attention and activities in 
LOP electoral strategyo 
Whereas fund-collecting associations are almos t 
42 invariably located in Tokyo , these primarily vote-
gathering machines are necessarily based in the provin-
ces o In their memb ership they also differ rather sharply 
from each other, for the one consists mainly of business-
men and firms and the other of influential local figures 
representing a variety of occupations and groups . 43 
Even so , they are both based essentially on per s onal 
ties between a particular politician and his electors , 
strongly tinged of course by the considerations of 
mutual interests and aid o Where the one operates by 
exchanging funds for legislative or administrative 
action , the other exchanges votes , sometimes supplemented 
by financial help , for a similar political output . With 
as much candour as Fuku da, and in a far more descriptive 
way , another LOP Diet member , Kuraishi Tadao , once 
explained his own supporters' association as follows : 
In my own constituency the small entrepreneurs 
and shopkeepers who are advisers to my assoc-
iation go to various small industrialists ' and 
merchants' organisations to find out what they 
would want me to do for them . It is therefore 
much simpler for them to bring their problems 
and grievances to my office , than take them to , 
say , the Small Industry Finance Fund in Tokyo o 
We refer to the responsible offices in Tokyo on 
their behalf and such offices usually respond 
quite reasonably and promptly to our r equests . 
Another example would be the question of taxes 
0000 This sort of service performed by my offic e 
makes them feel that they should be glad to pay 
5 or 10 thousand yen per month in order to 
finance my political activities DUO This organ-
isation , i . e .~ the Hokushin jichi kenkyuukai , 
as it is called , also sells badges to those who 
come to hear my speeches o These badges a e 
produced at the cost of ~ 20 each , but people 
pay at least 50 or 100 and not infrequently 
as much as 1 ,000 yen for them o 44 
The role played by small entrepreneurs and shop -
keepers for Kur aishi' s group can be played by leaders of 
any other politically significant local groups and org-
anisations o45 Of Arafune Seijuuroo's supporters ' assoc-
iation in Chichibu and its neighbouring areas in S aitama 
P refectur e it was said that virtually all officials of 
the local textile manufacturers' unions, farmers ' co-
operatives , forest owners' associations , parents and 
teachers associations, youth organisations , road safety 
· 1 d . d . h· 46 I . councl s , an so on, were assocIate WIt It . t IS 
well known that to secure the support of the leaders of 
such local organisations is tantamount to having the 
huge bloc of votes under their control committed to one -
47 
self . 
Of critical importance to the organisation and 
activities of a supporters' association of this type is 
the role of local politicians and the quasi - public agen-
cies of local administration called the choonaikai and 
the burakukai. As the nexus between a particular LOP 
member of the Diet and a multitude of local voters , they 
play an indispensable, indeed predominant role . Numer-
ical1y and otherwise the most important local po1itic~ 
ians in this respect are the members of the forty-six 
prefectural assemblies, about 67 per cent of whom were 
48 
Officially affiliated with the LOP by October 1966 . 
According to a recent detailed study of factiona l divis-
ions in the Chib a P refectural Assembly , virtually all of 
its conservative members were aligned with one of the 
members of the House of Representa tives returned by their 
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constltuenCles. At the town , village and hamle t lev-
els , the nominall y independent local politicians who 
control vari ous quasi-administrati v e and functional org-
anisations , notably the choonaikai and the burakukai , are 
at the same time intimately invo lved in the leadership of 
particular supporters' . . 50 assoclatlons . In a Diet elect-
ion they not only themse lves vo te for the LOP candidate 
with whom they ar e aligned but often commi t the large 
number of voters under their effective influence to the 
support of th at candidateo 
As suggested by Kuraishi' s statemen t quoted above , 
these local supporters' associations function i n some 
cases as fund-raising , as well as vote-gathering , mach-
ines o More frequently, however , they are financed by the 
politicians concerned, rather than financially support-
ing them , for, in Satoo' s words, "Each member of a 
supporters ' association may pay ¥ 100, but he receives 
in return ¥ 300 worth of food and drinks from the Di et 
member ._ " 51 • 0 0 It is partly to finance this type of 
supporters ' association, which has proved indispensable 
to electoral victory, that most LOP members are compelled 
to seek funds from the official P arty treasury, a faction 
leader's purse, or one of more interest g roups willing to 
make donations to individual rank and file Diet memberso 
As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the resources 
of the P arty Headquarters are usually far too limited to 
meet their demands~ so that faction leaders and interest 
groups assume critical importance to many LOP back-
bencherso The role of the factions in this respect has 
been fully d iscussed already , but the significance of 
relation s between LOP Diet members and particular inter-
est g roups dese rves a brief mention . 
P revious studies have poi~ted out that the largest 
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and most active interest groups (such as the 
Chuushoo-kigyoo seiji renmei and the Nihon i sh ikai) 
officially endorse and suppor t a few hundred candid-
ates on a more or less non-parti san basis in each impor-
tant election , prov iding them with fairly substantial 
52 
funds . As a result of this practi ce there have emer-
ged several distinc tive clus ters of Di e t members who 
are tied up closely with particular interest g r oups whim 
support them and who engage in extensive and sustained 
lobbying activities within the P arty on behalf of these 
groups o Examp l es are the forty or so members o f the 
Shookoogyoo shinkoo giindan (Diet members t group for the 
promotion of commerce and industry ) established in July 
1961,53 those identi fied with the Ikei-giin renmei (Diet 
members t 54 league associated with the medical association) , 
and those associated with the Kankyoo-eisei giin renmei 
(D b tl f . 1 h . ) 55 iet mem ers eague or enVlronmenta yglene 0 I n 
addition to the two types of supporterst association , prac -
tically every LOP Di et member has been i n volved i n one or 
more of these intra-Party agencies of special i n terests 
in order to fill his needs for adequate material and 
moral support from external sources o 
The linkages maintained by the LOP and its members 
with various external groups which have been so far con-
sidered are designed to provide it mainly with support in 
t he form of f unds or votes . As earlier sugges ted, it is 
obvious that support i s given almo st always on a reciprocal 
basis in re t urn for specific services rendered o From the 
point of view of the LOP or its members, to receive assis -
tance from an external group , whether in the form of 
money or votes , IS to surrender part of its freedom of 
action and to come u n der the donor t s influence o 
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Big Business As An Interest Group 
As the financial patrons of the LOP, the nation ' s 
larger indus trial and business enterprises and thei r 
executives, especially those affiliated with th e four 
represent at i ve busi ness organisations , have naturally 
exerted a powerful , even p redominant , influence on the 
fortunes and behaviour of the P arty leaders , the fact-
ions and the rank and file Diet memberso The crucial 
role played behind the scenes by the leaders of these 
four organisa tions (particularly the Keidanren and the 
Keizai - dooyuukai) , in the 195 4 change of power from 
Yoshida to Hatoyama, i n the merger of the two conserva t-
Ive parties in 1955, and Hatoyama' s re signat ion in 1956 
56 has been described in detail in a previous study . 
P olitical and social stability under a conservat-
lve party government was the basic and minimum demand 
of bi g business at that time and it s till is i n 19 67 0 
If they achieve that , they are likely to find their 
vast contributions to the Party , whether throu gh the 
Kokumin kyookai or otherwise , not ent irely wasted o 
Beyond thi s generalisation, however , there are a host 
of much more specific demands they want to have trans-
lated into public action by the Government , at least 
partly with the help of the LOP o 
A s the history of the Keidanren and the 
Nik~eiren indicates , such demands are extremely diver-
sified and complexo In the economic field they have 
concerned such matters as amendment of the laws related 
to monopolies , taxation and the stock exchange , price 
control , foreign trade and tariffs , the developm en t of 
atomic power and other kinds of ener gy , defenc e indus-
t i es , unemployment , management - labour relations , 
. . d 5 7 internationa l economIC co - ope ratIon, an so on e On 
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each of these varied problems direc t ly affecting their 
material interests, they have n atur ally conveyed their 
views t o t he LOP, whether of ficially or unofficially , 
publicly or pri v atel y . 
As suggested , however , by the 1954-6 situation dis-
cussed by Sh inobu the role of busines s has been espec-
ially important a t times of Party and government crisis, 
such as that ·caused b y a par ticu larly controversial pol-
itical issue or change of top leaders o Its reaction to 
the S ecurity Treaty revis ion crisis of 1960 took the 
form firstly of enormously increased contributions to 
the Keizai saiken kondankai and secondly a c ampaign to 
58 
replace Kishi by Ikeda o When Ikeda res igned in late 
1964, an ov erwhelming majority of top busi n essmen 
swiftly decided to swing their support behind S atoo in 
his struggle against Koono and Fujiyama and it was prob-
ably this particular fac tor, as much as the logic of 
intra - party factionalism , that ultimately determined 
59 the outcome of the contest o There is little doubt 
that under successive c onservativ e pa r ty administrat-
ions of their own choice big business earned handsome 
dividends for its material and moral support , in the 
form of generous consi dera ti on in the annual budget-
d 1 . 1 . 60 making an a success i on of favourable egIs atlon o 
In assessing the role of big business in the Party 
policy-making proc e ss, howev er , it is necessary to 
remember that its interests and opinions have never been 
completely uniform or united o It is probably correct 
to argue , as a grou p of journalists c overing the nation's 
busines s community has done , that big business has been 
in general agreement in the past few years on a few 
fairly specific demand s , such as the stabilisation of 
commod ity prices, improvement of the balance of payments , 
215 0 
the st uctural reform of indi vi dual enterprises to 
increase their internat iona l competitive p owe~ economic 
co -operati on with underdeveloped c ountries , greater 
emphasis on national interests 
ationship with the U oS.A. ; and 
In the c ollaborative rel-
61 
so on o 
On matters~ howeve , relating to the fundamental 
character of the existing economic system and the balance 
of power obtaining between its c omponent units, there 
have been sharp di vis ions of opinion between the senior 
leaders of the Keidanren , represented by its Pre siden t 
Ishizaka , and the relati v ely younger executive leading 
the Keizai-do oyuukai o The bifurcation between the 
'laissez- faire ' approach of the former and th e 'modif-
ied capitalism' do ctrine of the latter has b een fairly 
evident throughout th e postwar period, but it has been 
intensified more recently because of the trend towards 
business consolidation in the st rategic industries of 
. dId h · 1 62 D . h Iron an stee , cars an petroc emIca S o espIte t e 
tendency to fuse the leadership of the two organisations, 
seen in the appointment i n May 1964 of the four top 
leaders of the Ke i z ai -dooyuukai to the Keidanren ' s Board 
of S tanding Directors ~ 63 the differences in ideology 
and attitudes between th em remain evi dent o 
In addition to the fundamental conflicts of opinion 
between the leaders of these two large organisations 
di fferences tend to arise both between and within the 
busine ss organisations over certain particular issues o 
This happened , for instance , over the abortive Emer gency 
Measures Bill for the P romotion of Special Industries 
in early 19630 64 Under the system of free enterprise the 
relationships between individual enterprises or trade 
associations are generally competitive rather than coll-
abora t ive and that often makes it d ifficult for them to 
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unify their lobbying and pressure politi c s v is-a- vis 
the Government r the ministerial party . 
Because of these di v ' sive tendencies within the 
business commun ity , a single unified organisation , such 
as the Keizai saiken kondankai or the Kokumin kyookai , 
cannot represent the whole of that community in consul-
tations and negotiations with the LOP on specific matters 
of legislation or admini s tration affecting the vital 
interests of its members o For this rea son it is likely 
that the role of Kokumin kyookai will remain limited to 
the co-ordination of fund-raising and the advocacy and 
propagation of vehemently partisan points of view, which 
are general and vague , rather than specific. On the 
other hand , the greater part of the dial o gue between the 
LOP and the largest members of that organisation is 
likely to be carried on through such separate channels 
as are offered by t he informal societies of individual 
. . I d . I LDP I'" 65 bUSlnessmen bUl t aroun partlcu ar po ltlclans o 
The Intervent ion of the Bureaucracy 
Whereas the demands of those who make fairly sub -
stantial monetary contributions to the P ar t y or its 
members usually concern matters of a more or less pub-
lic nature and call for legislative or administrative 
action on the part o f their recipients , those who help 
in gathe ri ng votes often seek more personal rewards for 
their contributions . Every LOP Diet member is constantly 
called upon to help a supporter ' s son in his hunt for a 
job on graduation , to help another obtain a loan from a 
bank , to arrang~ a tour of Tokyo for a group of his 
66 
constituents , and so on e This type of service , howeve r, 
is of marginal significance for LOP policy-making o The 
rewards that require more or less official P arty decis -
ions and, therefore , become by definition subjects of 
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its decision-making process are to be considered 
here. Demands for subsidies and loans from the nat-
ional government to all kinds of local public works , 
aid to particular areas hit by natural disasters, and 
so on, fall in this category and are brought to the 
attention of the Party or to particular Party members 
through a variety of lobbying activities on the part 
of the external groups concerned. 
Thus by seeking and recei ving support from exter-
nal sources mainly in the form of funds and votes, the 
LDP inevitably gets caught In an endless input-output 
process of interaction with external groups. In 
order to terminate each round of this process the 
Party must take concrete legislative or administrative 
action . The purpose of this is to reward these groups 
for contributions already made and to encourage their 
continued support in the future. Such acti on , h oweve r, 
requires the participation , not only of the LOP , but 
also of the bureaucracy. 
Administrative action naturally pertains to the 
bureaucracy . Hence both leaders and rank and f ile of 
the Party turn to the public service for he l p In sat-
isfying a large proportion of the demands which come to 
them from their financial and electo r al supporters . In 
order to have a road or river system in one's constit-
uer1J'::y reclassi fied as 'state-admini stered' i nstead of 
'prefecture-administered' , and thus maintained at the 
expense of the national , instead of a prefectural , treas-
ury or in order to have a new license issued to a local 
trucking company, a member of the ' highest organ of 
state ' does not hesitate to bow many times befor~ a 
. 67 
senior publIc servant . 
Ev en , however, in the case of much legislative 
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ac t ion , the help of a relevan t mi nis try has to be 
sought, even though th is constitu tion al ly belongs to 
th e sphere of the Diet and thu s th e parties . As 
68 pointed out in an earlier chapter, neither t he PARC 
nor the Executive Council IS adequately staffed o r 
technically equipped to deal with the needs of legis-
lative preparation. Virtually all reference material 
vit a l to effective law-making is r igidly and jealous l y 
controlled b y the separate ministries and other agen-
cies of the n ationa l public service and are, as a rule, 
inaccessible to Die t members. As a result, nearly al l 
of the few hundred bills introduced to the National 
Diet each yea r are actually prepared either entirely by 
bureaucrats or with very extensive help from them, - and 
the organs of the LOP p lay at the most a supporting 
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role . 
It IS important to note in thi s connection that, as 
IS the case with the support of private g roups , t he ser-
vices of the bureaucracy are not g iven free~ but only on 
a reciproca l basis. In return for favours done by a 
ministry to a formal organ of the Party, the latter 
undertakes to fi ght for increased powers or budgetary 
appropriations for tha t particular ministry throughout 
the period of budget-making each year. For services 
done per sonally and privately by .a senior public s erv-
ant, the politicians concerned often undertake to look 
after him after his retirement from the public service. 
This may involve either helping him enter politics or 
finding an attractive job with a public corporation or 
. . 70 
apr 1 vat e fIrm. 
It is evident that in their rel a tions with the 
bureaucracy t h ose politicians who have themselves been 
career bureaucrats before their e nt ry into party politics 
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enjoy many important advantages v i s - a - vis tho se who c ome 
from ot h er occupational categorie s o 71 heir relation-
ship with their mini tries of origin are in f act fr e -
quently perpetuated by the existence of ' ol d b o y assoc-
iations' 0 These may be confined to t hose ex-bur e au crats 
now active in pa ty politics (a s in the case of the 
li2£rakukai which consists of LOP politicians connected 
with the Welfare Ministry) , 72 or it may include anyb ody 
wh o has been an official of a mini stry , as in the cas e 
of the Kayookai of former Construction Ministry of f ic-
7 3 
i a Is o 
It has long been evident that the technical and 
administrative problems involved in publi c policy-making 
can be effectively disposed of only by or with the help 
of the bureau crac y and , for that rea son , the latter's 
role and influence has been of critical importance in 
d efining the nature of the LOP connections with external 
g r oups . More f undamental philosophical or ideological 
aspects of po1ic -making~however , either at the P arty r 
t he government level , cannot always be adequately dealt 
wi th b the bureaucrats alone o P artly to fil l thi s gap 
in the se vices rendered by public servants and partly 
to k e ep in touch with major trends in publi opini on , 
many LDP Diet members have come to rely on a vari e ty of 
other groups and individuals fo r advice and information 
on either general or specific policy l1l.atter s o 
Connec tions with Other Groups and Ind ividuals 
One of the most common practices in this r espect 
is t o employ a number of secret aries specialising i n 
poli cy affair in addition to the two clerica l secret-
aries provi d ed at public 74 expens e 0 These secretaries~ 
who are hired privately by the poli t i cians concerned , 
not only read newspapers and magazine s for them but 
frequently select books and journals for them t o r ead o 
In som e c ases the work of such se c retaries is r einfo c d 
and supp lemented by more or less regular c onsultati ons 
with journa li s t s , scholars, busines smen, and others, 
" d" "d 11 " 75 In I VI ua y or In g r oupso 
Ikeda' s relation shi p with Shimomura Osamu , Di rec t or 
o f the Dev elopment Bank , who built the th eo re ti cal and 
conceptual fram ewo rk of his ' high- growth-rate ' pol icy , 
"11 76 L"" " IS we known. lkewlse , the VIews co ncern i ng the 
Chi na issue of Matsumoto Shigeharu , Director of the 
International Hou se of Japan, have apparently been t aken 
in t o consideration by Fujiyama Aii chiroo in formula t ing 
his fle ible approach to the P eking regime o In t he 
same way the beli efs and acti ons of Yatsugi Ka zuo , 
S ec'retary-General of the Kokusaku kenkyuukai (National 
Poli c y Researc h Institute) , have d ecisi v ely i nfluenced 
t he attitude s of the lT aiwan and Sou th Korea lobby' , 
d K " h" I h " " h 77 represente by I S 1 , S 11 and ot ers o The S oogo o-
se i s aku kenkyuujo (compo s ite policy research i nsti t u te 
which is a well o rganised group of p romi nen t economi sts 
and economi c journalists, regularly advi ses both S atoo 
and Mik i o78 
Summary 
As the foregoing discussion has demons trat ed, the 
LOP d epends on external groups for th e acquisition of 
the basic forms of support vi t al to its surviva l and 
progre ss . Thi s dependence, which reflects the weakness 
of the P arty's fo rma l organisation and t he peculiariti es 
of it s membership composition~ seriously limits its free -
dom of action and choice in p o licy-mak i ng situati ons o 
Cons ide r ing that private interest g r oups and the bureal-
cr acy suppor t it in order t o obtain, if possibl ,poli cy 
decision s favourable to their i nterests, it is hardly 
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surprising that the Party should be concerned more with 
satisfying their demands 6 than with its own independen t 
po icy-making o In other words , it is compelled t o f unc-
ti on as broker for its two main kinds of patron - a 
state of affairs that is likely to continue so long as 
it depends on t h em to the extent it does todayo 
Despite the importance of contacts between lead-
ing LOP politicians and persons or groups primarily 
interested in policy: the basic pattern of the Party's 
external relationships may be seen as a triangular sys-
tem of interactions and influence between the interest 
groups , the bureaucracy and the P art Yo The system 
operates on the basis of reciprocal give-and-take 
between any two of them, with influence flowing in either 
direction . In these circumstances the Party's dec isions 
(its only valuable output ) are seen primarily as paymen t 
for supp rt received from the bureaucracy and the inter~ 
est groups. To that extent the LOP is subject to their 
interests and wishes o 
Even more important, however , is the fac t that 
the formal P arty organisation and leadership is not dir-
ectly involved in, or responsible for, more than a part 
of these relations. Nearly half the firms and business 
associations that provide funds, and important sect:on. 
of the bureaucracy that supply administrative and tech-
nical assistance, do indeed have more or less direct 
connections with the LOP and its official leaders as 
sucho On the other hand nearly half the donors of 
funds, all the supporters' associations , which take care 
of votes, and a large number of individual public serv-
ants , journalists and businessmen, who c an help with 
broad policy-making, are al l tied direct ly to individ-
ual P arty members and only indir ectly and incidentally 
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t o the P arty . This shows t he P ar t y ' s organisational 
weaknes ev en more d r amatica l y than does the fact of 
i ts overall dependence on e xternal sources of support . 
It also i n d ica te s so me important tru t hs concerning t h e 
relations betwe en the f ormal P arty organ isati on and 
informal intra- party groups , such as the factions t og-
ether with ind i vi d ual P arty members . 
The situation may be summar i sed roughly a s fo ll ows o 
Each member depends entirely on his own vote - g athering 
machine for electoral victory, very considerably on part-
icular f irms and persons co nn ected with him privately for 
fund s l and on personal h elp gi v en by var i ous policy ad-
v isers for ideas and plans. He benefits littl e from t he 
financial assistance o f the Party treasu r y or the ser-
vices of t h e bureau cracy rendered through the formal P arty 
or gans & I n brief, the presence of t he Party is i n c ident -
aI , rather than v'tal , to his el ectoral success and t o 
mu h of his p oliti c al ac t ivities. It therefore seems 
reasonable t o c onc lude tha t t here is no s ound bas is f " r 
attributing a high d eg r ee of prestige p au thority o r 
leader ship to t h e formal Party organs and offic ialso The 
centre of g r avity has tended rather to remain w't h t he 
individual memb ers , and not with P arty organisation as 
an integral entity o 
The success ive campaigns to ' modernise' the Party 
have apparently been aime d at reversing t h is situ ati on . 
Important progress ha s i n deed been achi ev ed i n the 
efforts to cen t ralise the flow of funds int o the P art , 
a is seen by the comparative succ ess of t h e Kokumi n 
kyo ka ' o I f the pre sen t effo rt s are c on ti nue d , as they 
no d o ubt will be , members wil l bec ome g r adually mo r e 
depend ent for financ ial ass i s tan on the of f' ial P arty 
tr ea ur , and their relati o ns with the f o rmal Party 
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leadership wil l change accord ingly. Moreover, the P arty 
as a whole, rather than individual membe s of it, wil l 
become increasingl depend ent on the d onors of fund s and 
subjec to their influence, especially the influence of 
th e Kokumin kyookai and its p rincipal members. S ince these 
are the big business groups, represented by the four 
nation 1 business organisations, this will mean that the 
LOP will become officially and even more intimately 
involved with big business interests. In other word s , 
successful 'modernis ation' of P arty finance wi 11 tend to 
make busines influence less d irect on individual membe s 
but more direct on the P arty as a whole. 
As regards relations with the supporters' assoc-
iations, the bureaucracy and personal policy advisers, 
however, there have been no signs of a drastic change . 
In view of the fact that voters a t large tend to be 
interested only in thena r rowly limited part of an 
electoral contest which they feel capable o f 
influencing by their persona l acts of voting , it 
seems i ne itable that they will continue to i d entify 
themselves , not with the LOP as such but with a 
parti c ular LOP Diet member re t urned by themselve s . 
As a cond ition of their supp ort, moreover , they b ind 
the particular LOP cand idate to work for their inter-
ests in a variety of ways , includ ing the p r o motion of 
specifi c legislative action by the P arty. Thus a 
supporters' association c a n b e formed only b y and for 
a particular member returned b y a par t icular constit-
uenc whose interests he must represent and champion 
in the P arty and the Diet o Si nce this is the case , and 
since the supporters' associati ons have in the past 
almost completely dominated the e l ectoral scene, it 
hard to predi ct any significant change in their status 
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or role in the fore seeable future . 
A similar inflexibility seems l ike ly to prevent 
any appreciable change i n the LOP' s d e p end ence on t he 
bu reaucracy . Desp ite the imp re ssive increase since the 
War in the number of former senior public servants who 
on retirement have become LOP politicians , and t he res -
ulting 'bureaucratisation' of the P arty , the v i ta l 
information and skills indispensable to law-maki ng 
remain an exclusi ve preserve of the bureaucracy beyond 
the ac c es s of Diet members o As the LOP grows organ-
isationally and in the ran g e of its interest aggregat -
ion and articulation functions , its dependence on the 
bureaucrac y i s likely to inc rease rather than dimi nish 
at the levels both of its formal organ isation and of 
the individual member. The role of personal policy 
advisers is unlikely to have a significant effect o n 
this process , althou gh their presence will no d oubt 
help to prevent t he complet e andoligopolistic control 
of the P arty policy -making process by the power f u l 
interest g roups, supporters ' associations and the bur-
eaucracyo 
PART III 
CASE STUDIES 
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CHAPTER 7 
COMPENSATING FORMER LA DOWNERS 
Shortly before 11 porno on 28 May 1965 a co n trov cr -
sial Cabinet-sponsored bill , popularly refer r ed to as 
t~e Farmland Reward Bill, (Noochi-hooshoo-hoo) , wa s pas s ed 
by the House of Councillors and on 3 June promu l g a t ed as 
Law 121, 1965 01 It autho rised t he payment ove r t en 
years of some ~ 145,600 mi l l ion by the gov e rnment t o 
some 1,670,000 former landowners and the i r rela t i v e s 
dispossessed of their property as a re sult of t he lan d 
reform in the wake of t h e Second World War o The oppos i t -
ion to this bill r a ised by the So c ialist s and t he Demo -
cratic Socialists was such, howev er, that it was voted 
through by the LDP majority in the House of Represen ta t~ 
ives Committee on Cabinet on 13 May while a So c ia l ist 
Me~ber was still speaking . 2 Subsequently it was n ot 
until the Upper House plenary meeting on 28th had s at 
continuously for 49 hours that the final v ote was t aken 
at which it passed by 121 vo t es to 690 Why the b i ll 
caused such controversy between the parties is in it se lf 
an interesting problem to explore, but why it was pu shed 
through the Di et despite the controversy is ev en mor e 
impor tant for an understanding of the pattern of po licy-
making in the LDP. In the present chapter an attempt wi l l 
be made to ana lyz e the interaction of the principal fac-
tors involved in the development of the issue, in order 
to explain the LDpt s attitude t owards it and the dec~ 
isions made at different stageso 
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BACKGROUND 
The Landowners' R esponse to the Land Reform 
It is well known that the land reform was one of 
the most important and effective of the many reform 
programmes undertaken under the auspices of the Occup-
ation in postwar Japano In seventeen stages between 
Ma rch 1947 and December 1950 1,526 , 893 choo (1 choo = 
2.45 acres) of farmland and 232 , 910 choo of pasture was 
bought up by the government for redis tribution among the 
3 
actual cultivators, main y former tenants . As a res-
ult , the number of pure owner-cultivators increased 
from 1 , 869 , 298 household s in April 1946 (32.8% of the 
total of farming households) to 3,821 , 531 in Februar y 
1950 (61 08% of the total) while that of pure tenant house-
hol d s dropped from 1 , 637, 0 51 (28 . 7%) to 312,364 (5 0 0%) 
. . 4 In the same perIod. This, however, left approximately 
one million former landowners thu deprived of their 
estates deeply dissatisfied. 5 
The ir resentment has since been expressed both 
privately and publi c ly, with increasing force. In retro~ 
spect it seems that such sentiments on the part of the 
d ispossessed former landowners (who have since made it 
a rule to refer to themselves as 'victims' of an 'unfair 
Occupation policy') were ultimately bound to move the 
government to take concrete legislative steps for at 
least some measure of red ress , despite certain strong 
objections raised by the Opposition parties. 
One of the most immediate and prevalent forms of 
reaction by the d ispossessed landowners to the 1 and 
reform programme was the unilateral cancellation of 
tenancy contracts . They did this in order to cultivate 
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the land themselves, sell it at black-market pr ices ~ or 
d ivide it up between their relat ions, rather than letting it 
be bought up by the gove nment for redistributi o n at a 
f · d . 6 w Ixe pr Ice . hen, however, in March 1947, Iwata 
Chuuzoo ~ (a former memb er of the Ho s e of Peers and 
Minister of Justice in the Higashikuni and the Sh i deha a 
Cabinets ) publi cly disputed the constitutionality of 
the reform programme itself, many began to take the 
matter to the courts on the fundamental issue of con-
. . 1 . 7 
stItutIona It Yo Iwata ' questioned the vali di ty of the 
programme not merel y emotionally but in terms of a bas-
ic constitutional principle~ and thus provided one 0 
the most powerful weapons for the d issatis ied former 
landowners to wield against the government in the sub~ 
sequent years . His views were thus of crucial impo t-
ance in the evolution of the issue . 
In accordance with Article 6, Paragraph 3 g of the 
Jisakunoo soosetsu tokubetsu-sochi hoo (Law Re 1a ing to 
the Special Measures for the Creation of Owne -
Cultivators) , i . e o, Law 43, 1946 (which was the lega 
expression of the land reform programme), the landowne 
were paid by the government fo ty times the legally 
fixed I standard V rent fo their rice land and for t -
8 
eight times the standard rent for their uplandso This 
meant that they received an average of ¥ 7 60 pe ~ 
~ = . 245 acres) for the former and ¥ 450 per ~ 
for the lattero 9 Although a modest amount of ' compen-
sation' money was added to these pri ces , boosting them 
respectivel to about ¥ 980 fo rice land and ¥ 580 or 
10 uplands~ most landowners were v ery unhapp wi th he 
arrangemen , a ccording to whi ch onl part 0 the mone 
was pai d in c ash and the es't was given in gove nmen t 
bonds un edeembable for two 11 In the face of the ea s . 
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rapidly progressing inflation such an arrangement ren-
d red the money actually recei ed by the landowners almost 
worthless and added much to their resentment with the 
who 1 e pro grar.1me 0 
Under such circumstances Iwata referred to Ar ticle 
29 of the Const ituti on , accordi ng to which' the right to 
own or hold property is inviolable 9 and 'pr ivate property 
may be taken for public use upon just compensation there-
for' 0 He argued that the above-mentioned prices had been 
arbitrarily and unfairly fixed by the government and 
therefore could not be regarded as 'just compensation ' 0 
He also pointed out that the maintenance of the same low 
prices over a prolonged period of time in the face of 
drastic decpreciation of the currency made the government 
buying operation even more unjust and unconstitutional o 
These views prompted many groups of the disgruntled 
former landowners to institute suits on this pa ticular 
ground o By the end of June 1950 119 such cases had be n 
brought to the cour ts , especially in the north-eastern 
12 prefectureso Although there was no case where a lower 
court gave a decision condemning the programme as uncon~ 
stitutional , it was not until 23 December 1953 that an 
end was put finally to this basic controversy by a decis~ 
Ion of the Supreme Court which uph eld the full consti t-
ionality of the programmeo 13 
The resentment of the dispossessed landowners waS 
a 1 so ref 1 ec t ed in the proceedings of the ational 
Diet and opinions expressed publicly or privately in the 
parties . Al though both the Liberals and the Democrats 
ultimately approved the legislation , many of their mem-
bers were openly criti cal of both the underlying princ~ 
14 iples and purposes of the programme o The policy plan 
15 
of the Democrat Liberal Party~ which on 22 May 1948 was 
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presented to the Joint Assembly of its Diet Members, con -
tained the following: 
We will resolutely oppose a thi~d land reform 
programme and see to it that the unreasonable 
aspects of the second reform are rectified. 
The prices at whi ch land is bought by the 
government and sold to former tenant s must be 
properly modified. The acreage limits imposed 
on the land cuI tivated by a landlord mu st be 
made more flexib le and the practice of deter-
mining the limitations of such acreage by the 
family should be changed •• 0 Measures to rescue 
the landowners impoverished by the land reform 
must be devised and the cashing of the farm-
land bonds they are given for the land taken 
mu s t be exp ed i t ed • 1 6 . 
One year later a Democrat, Oomori Tamaki, also bitterly 
condemned the programme in the House of Representatives 
17 Committee on Ag iculture and Fore stry . There is 
little room for doubt that such sentiments were wjdely 
shared among the former landowners both in villages and 
in the conservative par ies o 
The Emergence and Growth of Landowners' Organisations 
It was against this background that groups of the 
dispossessed land owners began to organise, first at th 
village and e entually at the prefectural and nation 1 
lev els o 
The small v illage level groups whjch were formed 
d uring 1946 0 typified for example by the Bunka-kyooka: 
of Sumot o in Kumamot P refe ture, the oochi-mondai 
kenkyuukai of Hachiman in Oo ita P refecture, and so on , 
gradually grew into la ger units after 1947, such as 
the Ooi t a-ken noochi kyoo gi kai and the Y amaga t a-ken 
18 jinushi yuushi d an. They demanded from the authorit-
ies an increase in the acreage of land a former land-
owner was allowed to retain, the pe mission to withdraw 
his land from tenanc t o avoid the application of the 
reform programme , a substantial increase in the pri ces 
pai d for the land taken by the government and in extreme 
cases restoration of t he land already redistributed . 19 
Organised action of thi kind did not p ove ve y success-
f 1 d th 0 . 20 u un er e ccupat10n ~ bu t it set the bas jc pat tern 
for pres ure grou p act ivitie b former landowners to b e 
c onducted with increased vigour a£tpr the 0 cupat ion 
ended o 
In August 1952 a na tional organis ation, the Zenkoku 
noosei renmei (nat'ona l agricu::.tural policy league ) wa s 
formed and under it s ausp :ce in o v ember 1953 a Zenkoku 
jinush i dantai kyo ogikai (na ti onal conference of l and-
, ..) d 21 owners organ1sat1 0ns was convene e A year later 
(in December 1954) their sustained efforts towards mor e 
effective unification at t he nationa l level resulted ir 
the formation of the Zenkoku kaihoonoochi kokkahoshoo 
rengookai (national union for gov ernmental compensati on 
for liberated farmland) 0 22 Its first meeting was held in 
January 1955 with the parti ipation of nearly 6 »000 de l -
egates f om the prefectural groups, and its total member-
ship at that time was estimated to be about 100 1 0000
23 
An unbri dgeable gap» however » developed between the maj or -
ity of its formal leaders~ who wan t ed to exact from the 
government adequate monetary compensation for the ma erial 
and spiritual damage caused to them by the land re£o~ , 
and those who per ~isted i n t heir demands for the ~estor -
ation of their title to the land al ready red~ tribut ed . 
These conflicts eventually led the organisation to split 
into three opposing groups - the Z enkoku kaihoo-nooch' 
kokka-hoshoo kiseidoomei (the national league fo the 
compensation b y the s tate for liberated farmland): th e 
Nihon noochi-giseisha renmei (the Japanese league of 
land reform victims) , and the Hibaishuu-noochi kokka-
hoshoo rengookai (the federation for the compensat ion by 
24 
the state to di spossessed lando ner ~ ) o 
It was hrough the mediati on by the Chairman of the 
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LOP Special Inv estigation Committee on the F a r mL.lnd 
Prob lem that the thr ee groups joined hands for a second 
time in December 1957 and f o rmed a new national organis -
ation, initially called the Zenkoku noochi-kaihoosha doomei 
(t he nationa l farmlan d liberators' l eague ) and su bse-
quently r enamed t he Z enko ku noo c hi d oomei (the na ti ona l 
farml a nd league, hereafter referr ed t o as 25 the League ) 0 
It was th is organisation tha t spoke ln the name of the 
'three milli on vict ims of the land reform ' i n the subse -
qu ent prol onged negotiations with th e LOP leadership and 
the government and in its pressure group action a ga i ns t 
t hem o 
Pri or to the formati on of the League the government 
had consistently denied any intention to c ompensate 
former landowners, al thou gh it had at times vaguel y hinted 
that those who found themselves in serious economic diff-
iculties as the result of the land r eform might be helped 
by the special appli cat i on of the so c ial sec uri t y pro g -
26 
rammeo As far as the legal aspects of the land reform 
and its effects were concern ed, the governmen t had insi s -
ted that the matter was alr eady closed and t hat, therefore, 
it was not obliged to make an additional paymen t t o 
former landowners to mak e u p for the all eged ly unrea~ on ~ 
ably l ow prices for which their land had been bought up 
for red istribut ion o Th e onl y possi bility at this stage 
of their ever being paid something b y the gov ernment was ~ 
as Kishi put it a little later ln 27 January 1958 , that 
t he go vernment might act in th eir interests not on th e 
basis of legal argument but ou t of purely political con-
siderations o 
Such an att itude on the part of the gove rnment 
made it necessary for the Le ague first l y to renounce 
their intention to d emand the recovery of the lost land , 
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and secondly to conf r ont the gove nment (and pub li c 
opinion) with concrete evidence that the d isposses ed 
landowners were actually in e c onomic d ifficulties and 
deserved special 'political' consideration o Conse -
quently , they were led to d efine their immediat e objec -
ti ve as t he e tablishment of an appropriate public body 
to collect evidence to just ify their demand s for com-
pen sa ti on out of public funds o 
Nine days after the League c ame into being the LOP 
Special Investigation Committee on the F armland P roblem 
d ecided to seek the es tab lishmen t of a Cabi n et invest-
'" 2 28 IgatIng commIttee of abou t 5 member s o This plan 
failed in i ts original form, but a 28 -m ember Investigat -
ion Committee on the Fa mland P roblem was set up instead 
i n the LOP PARC towards the end of February 1958 to 
1 h " S . 1 C· 29 rep ace t e eXIstIng peC Ia omm J t t ee o Thi under-
took in Sep tember of the same year a survey with a s ampl e 
of about 8 ,000 di s p ossessed lan d owners t hroughout the 
c oun t r y and submitted in Decembe r rec ommend at'on ba~ed 
on its f ind ings to the PARC Deliberation C mmi l un and 
the E ecutive Council o30 As a result of t his t he 
Cab inet attempted to have a bill e s tabli h i ng a Commi ion 
on the Problem of Di posses sed Landowners ( oochi -
hibaishuusha mo n d ai choo akai) passed b th D iet. This 
attempt was unsuccessful du ring the 31 and 32nd Di et 
sessions in 1959 , but f inally suc ceeded in June 1960 
. h' 3 1 durIng the 34t seSSIon o 
The Kudo o Commi ss ion and Its Report 
This Commissi on (popularly referred to as the Kudo 
Commission after it s Ch ai rman, Kuddo Shoosh iroo ) produced 
in May 196 2 a detailed report on th e c nditions of forme r 
landowner s ' households o The report demonstrated , among 
other th ings , that the average living standard of these 
households was not lower but substantially higher than 
that of other h ou eho lds. F or examp l e, 5.9% had an 
annual cash i nc orne 0 f ov er ¥ 1 mi 11 i o n a s c omp a I' ed w ~ th 
1 . 5% of former tenant hou s eholds and 2 . 6% of othe r h ou se-
ho Ids; for taxation purposes 15 . 7% we re c las s if i ed in 
the highest income group as compa ed wi t h 4.0% of fo rmer 
tenant and 4.6% of other hou s eholds ; and onl y 0.4% 
received special government al lowanc e s u n der the L ive-
lihood P rotecti on Law, as compared with 1 02% of f o rme r 
3 2 tenant househol d s and 2.5% of other h ou s eholds. 
It also showed that a substantially h i gher per -
centage of members of former landowner s ' households h e l d 
public offices of one kind or another and we re thu 
influential within their local communitie s . For exampl p ~ 
6 .0% of them were currently city, town o r v illage mayors 
and 33.5% held other public positions, as compared with 
le O% and 17 .1% respectively for fo mer tenant hou sehold s 
and 0. 5% and 9 . 2% respectively for other househo l d ~ . 33 
When it came , however , to evaluating the land 
reform and its effects on their living cond it ions , th e 
findings of the Commission confirmed the allegation 
that former landowners and their families were subje t 
to accumulated frustrations and dissatisfaction s . Whil e 
27 . 7% regarded their present living stand a r d as be tte r 
than the average (as compared with 8.4% of former tenant 
households and 8 . 7% of other househol d s ), 53 . 7% believed 
that they had lived better before the war, as compared 
with 25 . 9% of former tenant households and 31 02% of 
34 
other households. Only 6 . 3% positively approved the 
land reform and 53.6% positively disapproved of it . This 
contrasts with the corre ponding figures of 69 . 60/0 and 4 .0% 
for former tenant househol d s and 17.4% and 7 . 2% for 
35 
other h ousehol d s . 
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On the bas is of these findings th e Commission 
recommended that the government extend special loans t o 
those former landonwe rs ' households that were a c tual l y 
in financial di fficulties and also consider t he grant of 
preferential treatment for the school-age children of 
such households in the application of the scholarship 
36 pro g ramme . A majority of its nineteen member s , however , 
were sceptical about the wisdom of g anting a large sum 
of money to former landowners as a whol e and, conse -
quently, the Comm ission refrai ned from maki ng a d efin~ 
ite proposal in this respecto 
Despite , howev er, he scepticism expressed by t he 
Kudoo Commis sion, the government under the continuing 
pressure from the League proposed another inv esti gation 
of the li ving conditions of former landowners and 
opinions about the compensa tion to be undertaken b y a 
special section to be established i the Office of the 
Prime Ministero 
The Reports of the Special Sect ion of the Pr ime Mini ster ' s 
Office and the F armland Reward Bi l l 
By March 1964 the spec ia l research section (Rinj i 
noochi-too hibaishuusha mondai choosashitsu ) thus est -
ablished in the Of fice of the P rime Mini ter had pr epar ed 
four reportso As regards the relative li v i ng s t andar d 
of former landowners' households, its findings agreed 
substantially with the conclusion of the Kudoo Commis s -
37 ion o Among its findi ngs was also the information that 
999,123 landowners and 885,909 landowner s ' households 
were immediately affect ed by the reform and that of 
these 748, 0 66 landowners were still living in August 
1963 (745, 256 inside 38 Japanl. 
As far as the problem of compensation was conc erned, 
8209% of the former landowners themsel ves , 72 . 60/0 of their 
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rela t ions and 41 . 1% of those who had ne i ther been land-
owners nor had relations or c lose acqua i n t an c ps who had 
been landowners were in favour of compensat i on . 39 
Altogether , 50 . 7% were in favour, 26 .1% were opposed 
and 23 . 3% were uncertain . 40 I t sh ould be note~, however ~ 
that of those who were found to be generally in favour 
of the g ove rnment making some kind of moneta y payment 
to the former landowners, only 23 . 2% thought that a l l 
should receive such benefits, while 59 . 6% believ ed t hat 
the money should b e given only to those of them who were 
actually in fi nancial difficulties. 41 
Despite this' important r ese rvat i on and d esp i te 
c on tinu ed opposition by the S ocialists and the Democrat i 
S . l' 42 h OCla Ists , t e government deci d ed that it was po l it-
ically proper to go ahead with p lans for legislation for 
the di sbursement o f publ ic monies to pay irewardsi to 
43 
all the former land owners . Ac cordingl y , in June 1959 , 
a Bill Re lating to the P ayment 0 Benefits to Dispo s es s ed 
Landowner s ( oochi-hibaishuusha-too ni tai suru kyuufukin 
no shikyuu ni kansu ru hooritsuan ) was introduced i nto th e 
Diet and after two initial abortive at t empts, was finall y 
passed on 28 May 1965, a s mentioned at the beginning of 
thi s Chapter . 
As we shall see below the legislat ion of May 1965 
represented the final ou tc ome of the prol ong ed efforts 
o n the part of the League (with its LOP collaborators) 
to force the P arty L eadership agains the contrary pre 
ure of t he Ministry of F inance and the Ministry of 
Agri cul ture and Forestry to change its negative attit-
ude. It represented a partial victor 0, depending on 
one ' s pa ticular viewp oint, a par tial defea t for either 
side . The alliance of the League and i symp ath i zers 
in the LOP mana ged t o obtain the legislat:on it had been 
worki ng for , but in the process the tot 1 payment had 
b een cut d own from the original target o f bou t ¥ 1 , 000 ,000 
mi l l i on to ¥ l45 ~000 million . Th is was less than half 
ev en of the ¥ 300,000 million once sugge ted by the 
S G 1 f h P T k K . 44 I ec r e t ary - enera 0 t e arty ~ ana a akue l o n 
b r ie f, the result of the extensive campaigns carried 
out b y the League was essentially a compromise not en-
ti r ely satisfactory to either side but better than 
nothing o 
We have so far attempted to describe in broad out-
line the d evelopment of the issue in order to provide 
h istor i cal perspective for our discussion of the LOP 
policy-making p rocess as represented by the pattern of 
the P arty ' s involvement in it . The following discus s -
ion will focus on the behaviour of the Party in its rel-
a t ionshi p to the external groups and on the principal 
facto rs which determined the specifi c P arty decisions 
involved. 
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II 
THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY RESPO SE 
Conflicts of Opin ion and Attitude in t he LDP 
The LDP contained from the beginning a fairly large 
number of Diet member s who were condi t ioned to respond 
favourably to pressure from the groups of former land-
owners (subsequently epr es ented by the League) 0 
Although it was not until Janua r 1957 that a comm-
ittee was formally estab1ished in the LDP PARC to d eal 
specifically with the issue, a group of several L i beral 
P arty members had earlier looked int o the matter a 
45 
early as 1953 . Assisted by an official of t he Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry, S aitoo Makoto , this group 
had recommended to the Par ty! s leaders that c omp ensat i on 
should be made in one way or anothero 
Of the members of thi Liberal P arty group Tan ka 
Man'itsu , who had ceas ed t o be a Diet member befor e the 
LOP officially came into b e·ng in ovember 195 5 , sub -
sequently became P residen t of the League in March 1958 , 
while his trusted collabora t or Tsunashima Se ikoo , who 
remained i n the Diet , led the LOP Commi tte e fir t as an 
active member and afte Dec ember 1960 as Chairman, until 
he was nominated in March 1965 c oncur rent Jy P e j d ent of 
46 the L eague . The LOP's membersh i p contained from the 
outset at least a few like Tsunashima who had alread 
come to be personall y identified with the groups of 
former landowners and their interests o 
It is important to note in this respect that th e 
trad itional relationsh ip be tw een a conservative political 
party and the landlord clas 3 which had constituted the 
basis of the conservative hegemony in prewar local pol~ 
. . 47 h d . d th d t h 1 d f ltlCS, a sur lve e war an e an re ormo The 
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landowners continued to b e regarded as the symbol of 
t · . 1 .. 48 conserva lve power In rura communltles . Thi s fa c t 
wa s no doubt an important influence on LOP members i n 
general in their p er onal response to the pressure o f 
the L eague . It is also probable that a fairl y h igh 
percentage of LOP Diet members had come from the f o mer 
l andlord class and were therefore naturally inclined 
to be sympathetic to the movement repre sented by the 
49 L eague . 
The official attitude of the t o p LOP l eadersh i p, 
on the other hand , remained remarkably consisten t in a 
generally negative response to the demands of the League 
until about the middle of 1962 . 50 Even after the 
Execu tive Council deci d ed in April 1962 (und er the 
pressure of the League and its sympathisers in the 
P arty ) to make the government pay 'rewards ', the P ar t y ' ~ 
top leaders refused f or nearly a year to c ommit th em-
selves explicitly to such a policy o5l 
During the period between Janua r y 19 5 and Jun e 
1962 onl y t hree of the fourteen persons who were n omin-
ated members of that exclusi v e group called the 'Three 
L eaders ' - namely the S ec e tary-General i the Ch airman of 
the Execu tive Council and the Chairman of the PARC -
ever consented to being listed officially in the roll o f 
the L eague ' s Advisers. 52 In view of the fact that the 
P ar ty officials of somewhat lesser importance, such a s 
the r emain i ng categories of the 'Seven L eaders' , were 
apparently as ready to associate themselves with the 
L eague as the rank and file~ th is rigid attitud e of the 
top l eadershi p is even more impre s sive. 
It is very p robable , though not certain , that this 
negative attitud e on the par t of the LOP leadership was 
st r ongly influenced by the views of the Mini stry of 
2,3 9. 
Financ e and the Ministry of Agriculture and For est ry, 
particularly the former of wh i c h Ikeda and his closest 
advisers were trusted fold boys '. E en as 1 t e as 
April and May 1964 the bureaucra ts i n t he se ministrie;:, 
were insisting on cutting the total paymen t to about 
¥ 30 $000 million$ as compared wi th anything b etween 
¥ 285 ,000 million and ¥ 1 ,000,000 mi Jlion earlier 
proposed by the League and its supporters in the P arty . 53 
The objections of th e Mini stry of Finance arose 
mainly from the fear that t his wou l d i n itself add con-
si derab ly to S tate expenditure (a prospect it woul d oppose 
under almost any circums t ance s ) and se t a p recedent for 
mul tifarious demands fo r 'compensati on' for damages 
caused or alleged ly caused by the S econd Wo rl d War and 
the Occupation o The object ions of the Mi nist r y of 
Agriculture and ForestrY1 on the other hand, we e less 
specific . It had been largely responsi b le for the 
execution of the land reform and to make a conces ion 
to the former landowners would be to admit that it had 
committed injustices a gainst them9 Moreover , i t pr in-
cipal contemporary conc ern was t o p r otect the interests 
of the benefi ciaries , rather t han the v ic ti ms, of the 
54 
reform o 
The negative attit des of the min istries concerned 
wer e reflected in the trend of opinion in the two PARC 
Di visions di rectly tied to them - the Division on Fi n~ 
ance and the Di vision on Agricultur e and F orestry o It 
was for this reason that the sympathisers of the League 
in the Party chose i n January 1957 to set up in the 
PARC Sub~Committee on the F armland Problem as a new unit 
separate and i n depen d ent from b ot h Divis ions o The p oss -
ible resistance from th e mi nis tries through thei r agents 
in the Divisions would thus be 'i r c umvented . 
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It was in the light of this situation that the 
L eague had to map out its strategy towards the LOP and 
the government . It was obviously essential for it to 
change the attitude of the P arty leadership if it was 
ever to succeed in winning the d esired legislation o 
The S trategy of the League 
The League (officially established on 12 December 
1957 ) was a federation of forty - six prefectural leagues 
with branches set up in all c ities and counties (gun) 
55 
throu ghout the country o It was govenred by a leader-
ship g roup made up of a Pr esi d ent , a few Vice -Presidents, 
several S tanding Directors (joonin- riji ~ S ecretaries 
(kanji ) and Advisers (komon) recru ited from among Diet 
members affiliated with the LOP , or initially , with the 
. f h H . 1 56 I Ryokufuuka1 0 t e ous e of CouncIl ors o n the 
mi ddle of 1964 its membership was estimated to be about 
800,000 and seems to have remained 600$000 or more 
h h · . . 57 t roug out Its actIve eXlstence o Its inf 1 uence was 
believed by its own officials to be powerful enough to 
defeat at the polls any candidate in a Diet election whom 
it considered as persona non grata , if not to guaran tee 
. . h d 58 A the victory o f every candidate It mIg t en orse o s 
regards its policy orientation~ it explicitly renounced 
any intent ion to und o the land reform or its effects 
in order to re store to their original holders ~itles t o 
-l and already redistr i buted. 59 
As was made clear in its appeal sent in the summ er 
of 1961 to local administrators, poli ticians and leaders 
of various organisations~ it was ready to uphold the 
fundamental spirit of t he land reform and ye t believed 
that many injustices had been don e to former landowners 
and that they had the right to d emand adequate compens-
h " . 60 ation from the gove nment for t o se InJustIces o 
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Accordingly it decided to concentrat e i ts efforts on 
obtaining legislation that woul d benef it the dispcss-
essed landowners by t he payment of government compen-
sation . This poli cy in re trospect seems well calculated 
to avoid u nnecessarily offend i ng publ ic o p inion and , 
possibly , giving rise to serious social d istwbances in 
many rural commun ities o All its subsequent efforts 
were oriented towards the ultimate fulfilment of this 
objective. 
In organising its pres sur e group activities dir -
ected at the LOP members of the Diet the L eague followed 
in the f ootsteps of i t s two pr edec essors o As early as 
November 1953 the Zenkoku ii nush i dantai kyoog ikai had 
decided to engage in extensive lobbying and in th e 
following month about 30 of its repre sent ati ves had 
personally petitioned and exac ted a promis e of co~operat ion 
1 40 " D" 6 1 I from near y c onservatIve members of the Iet o n 
the first half of 1956 the Zenkoku kaihoo-noochi kokka-
hoshoo rengookai had staged a series of deputa tions to 
individual LOP Diet membe rs o 62 The League engaged i n 
similar activities but on a far greater scale, lobbying 
with zest and determ inat i on the whole body of the LOP 
parliamentary par ty . 
The first and foremost point in the L eague ' s 
strategy was to force as many LOP Diet member s as 
possible to commit themselve s to its support by es t ab-
lishing formal relationsh i p s with themo At the very 
outset it appointed Yamazaki Takeshi, a former LOP 
MoH oR o, as its first Pre si den t , and four sitting LOP 
Diet member s as its first S tand ing Ad visers (joonin-
komon ). It also deci ded to re ruit all LOP and 
63 
Ryokufuukai member s of the Diet as Advisers (komon). 
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By early February 1958 it had succeeded in persuading 
about 120 LDP M.HoRe 1 s and 50 M.HoC o ' s to agree to th e 
listing of their name s on the roll of Adv isers o These 
numbers had increased by July of the same year to about 
170 and 80 respectively , or about 60 % of the total LDP 
D o h h ° 64 l et strengt at t e tlme. 
The fact that only between 80 and 130 of them 
frequently attended the ' Advisers conferences' sugg-
ests that a substantial proportion were nominal rather 
65 ° than real g but there lS no doubt that the organisation 
a c hieved a remarkable success within a relatively short 
period i n its efforts to i n: iltrate the LOP o Even the 
number of S tanding Advisers (presumably interested in 
the issue much more genuinely than most of the Advisers) 
increased by January 1961 to 27, of whom 17 were sitt-
ing MoH.R o ' sr three former M.HoRo's and seven sitting 
66 
M. H oC. I so 
P arallel with the efforts to include the majority 
of the LDP Diet members an intensive programme of pres su r e 
activities was conduc ted o A big national rally was held 
in Oc tober 1958 with some 20, 000 people participating, 
including 75 Diet members o Another was hel d in October 
1962 with 25 , 0 00 people attending, including some 200 
67 Diet members. S pecifically to demand the immediat e 
passage of a ' r eward ' bill, about 1 , 200 activists met 
i n Ap r i l 1964 at an indoor rally (attended by 175 Diet 
members ) , and again in March 1965, this time with an 
D o 68 unprecedented number of 251 LOP iet members attendlng . 
Even more effective, however, than mass rallies as a 
f orm of pressure group activity was a series of petit-
lons systematically organised and directed at particul~ 
ar P arty and government official 0 
The first wave of systematic petitioning organised 
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by the L eague cam~ i mm ed ' ately following the mass rally 
of October 1958 , when seventeen 'pet i tioners units' 
( chinjoohan) were organi sed to visit and petition indiv~ 
idual P arty and government leaders o E ach wa s led by t 0 
Diet memb ers and consis t ed of d elegates from several 
prefectures . They visited the P rime Mi nister (LOP Pr es -
ident), fiv e other Cabinet members , the LOP' s S i L eaders ', 
t he Chairman of the PARC Investigation Comm'ttee on t he 
Far mland Problem ~ and t he chairmen of the thr ee Diet 
t d · . . h H 69 A d f s an Ing commIttees In bo t ouses & secon wave 0 
petitions came in early 1959 when the bill establishing 
an Investigating C mmis s:on on the P r oblem of Di spossessed 
Landowners {Noochi-hibaishuusha mondai choosakai 
setchihooan} was bei ng d eba t ed in the Diet . On that 
occasion nine selected o ff'cials were called upon at t hei r 
residence at 7 a . mo n 25 Ap i l by groups of League mem~ 
70 bers, again nearly all led by Diet members o Later on 
the same day a group of d elegates f r om nine prefectures 
1 d L ' P T M' . 71 e by the eague s resident , anaka an Itsu ~ 
stormed the meeting o f the S even Leaders inside the Die t 
Buildi ng o E arly on the morning of 2 December 1959 and 
again on 31 Marc h 1960 t h e P rime Mi nister, Kishi , was 
subjec ted to a p etition by a group f twenty or so Leagu p 
b h · 'd 72 me mer sat 1 s res 1 enc e 0 
In May and June 1964 , the private r esi d ences of 
th e P rime Minister o Ikeda , and the F inance Mini ster, 
Tanaka Kakuei , were scenes of mas s petitions practi cal ly 
ev e r y morning and in these two months an average of 45 
prefectural delegate eng ged daily in this type of a ct-
ivity . 73 F ollowing t h e rally o f 24 March 1965 in the 
last p hase of the pro longed campaign , fourteen p e tit~ 
ioners i units in the Ythird wave ' o f mass petit ion tacti cs , 
244 . 
confronted eighteen key politicians with the demand 
th at they co-operat e w1 th efforts to pass the Reward 
Bill being debated by the House of Represen tati v es 
Cabinet Commit tee . 74 
The Role of the LOP Diet Members Associated with the 
L eague 
Crucial throughout the period of these intense 
pressure group activ i tie carried out by the League 
was the par t played by those of its sympathisers in the 
P arty who were p ersonally a soci ated with i t , as ment -
ioned earlier, as its Advisers or S tanding Ad v iser s o 
In c onnection with th e abortive attempt immediat-
el afte r the formation of the League in December 1957 . 
to bring about the establishment of a Cabinet inve t-
igating c ommis sion the efforts of the S tanding Advisers 
Hara and Koyanagi , reinforced by several active Adv isers: 5 
secured a p r omi se from t he Secretary-General ~ Kawa shima , 
that such a commission would be set up with a budgetary 
appropriation o f ~ 30 m· Ilion in the 1958 fiscal year o76 
As we hav e seen, this plan failed to materialise , but 
their continued efforts d i d result in the estab lishmer~t 
of the 28-member investigation committee in the P art Yo 
In October of the same y ear 10 6 of the Ad iser 
adopted a resolution ~ calling for immediate a i d to th o t 
former landowners' households that were in economic 
difficulties, prompt establishment of a Cabinet invest-
igating commissi on and the enactment of a bill rela ting 
to the financial aspect of the problem o This they pres-
77 
ented to the Party and government leaders o Ther e is 
little d oubt that it was because of pressure exerc ise 
by the more adical Diet members, (particularly the 
S tand ing Advise r s Ha a and Asaka and the Advis ers 
Tsunashima and Katoo ) that in late 1958 the Chief of the 
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Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry's Bureau of Agri c-
ultural Land, Itoo and the Minister of Agriculture and 
F orestry, Miura, had to retract their statements repud-
78 iating the L eague's demands o 
After the Kudoo Commission was final ly set up in 
late 1960 and especially after its report was submitted 
to the Cab inet in May 1962, the role of the LOP Diet 
members as the agents of the League became even more 
conspicuous and decisive. It was d irect ly as a result 
of their face-to-face pressure upon the top P arty leaders 
that the latter in the spring of 1962 for the first 
time indicated willingnes to raise the total amount of 
compensation from about ¥ 30~000 million as suggested 
by the Ministry of Finance to about ten times that fig-
ure o About two years later Tanaka Kakuei~ who had then 
been the LDP S ecretary-General, reminisced as follows : -
There used to be rallies held in Hibiya P ark 
(in central Tokyo) and I believe that succ-
essive secretaries-general of the P arty 
attended them. This time (the rally of 23 
March 1962?), however, it was decided that 
the PARC Chairman should go on behalf of the 
Three Leaders and that is why I had to go 
there o e. About that time each of the Three 
L eader s Was visited by the representatives 
(of the L eague) almost everyeay and one day 
I was asked to meet the depu tation on behalf 
of all three of us. I met Mro Tsunashima and 
the rest of themo They were still insisting 
on obtaining ¥ 1,000,000 million from the 
government , but I told t h em that the sum was 
ridiculous and that they should know that in 
order to make it more or less feasible pol -
itically they would have to cut it down t o 
something like ¥ 200,000 million or ¥ 300 ,000 
milli on. It is the truth that I made that 
suggestion on that occasion O GO It seems that 
they went back to the organisation and told 
its officials that the Three Lead ers were 
ready to take necessary steps (for legislat-
ion), provided that they would accept the 
offer of ¥ 300 ,000 million 000 They (other 
P arty leaders) had wanted me to do something 
about it in order to get ourselves off the 
hook and therefore I coul d not have acted 
otherwise than I dido This is how I have got 
into the present predicament over this issue 
79. 
Instead of getting themselves 9 0 ff the hook' , 
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Tanaka and other le ader s of the Party and the govern-
ment were thus led to agree to do what they had so long 
denied any intent ion of doing, namely to pay a substan-
tial amount of money to the former landowners. This was 
certainly a credit to the perseverance (or obstinacy) 
and loyalty to the L eague of its Diet member Adviserso 
Domination of Party Organs 
In addition to their role as the spearhead of 
pressure activities directed towards particular Party 
and government offi c ials, the Standing Advisers and 
Advisers of the Le ague appointed from among LDP Diet 
members had another important role to play on its behalfo 
This concerned the infiltration and domination of the 
Party's decision-making organs, especially the Investig-
ation Committee on the Farml and Problem set up in 
February 1958 0 
Of the seventeen LOP Die t members initially app-
ointed to membership of fuis body fourteen, including the 
Chairman, Tago Ichimin, and the Vice-Cha i rman , Takeyama 
Yuutaroo, were either St anding Adyi sers or Advi sers of 
the League o Tog ether with five of the additional eleven 
members drawn from among 'men of learning and exper~ 
ience' outside the Diet , they easily con trolled t he 
, h . 80 Committee and turned it into the League s mout plec e o 
The numerical balance between those patently represent-
ing and speaking on behalf of the League and those who 
were at least officially in a position to criticise 
its demands i n the Committee was inherited basically 
unchanged by the temporary LDP Council on the Farmland 
Problem established in April 1962 and embracing all top-
ranking officials of t he Party' s policy - making and 
executive or gans0 8l Of the total of twenty-six member s , 
five had been or were S tanding Advisers and thirt een 
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were Adv isers , making in 0 her words, a balance of 18 
o 8 in avour of the former. The composition of it 
sub-committee was even mo re extreme ; the balance was 
11 to 2 and many of the eleven were the most active 
of the Ad vi sers and S tanding Advisers. 82 
As mentioned earlier ,83 the LOP Invest ig a tion 
Committee on the F armland P roblem thus dominated b y the 
agents of the L eague was p rimarily responsible for the 
establishment of the Kudoo Commission in 1960. Dong 
b efore the latter's report was completed and present ed 
to the Cabinet in May 1962 , however, the LOP Commit tee 
d ecided to go ahead with its own plans to ensure that 
legislative a cti on necessary for the payment of compen-
sation to the former landowners be taken in due c ourse o 84 
On March 23 of that year it decided at its plenary meet-
ing to introduce in the cur ren t Diet session a membe r -
sponsored bill authorising t he payment of be tw een 
¥ 400 , 000 million and ~ 600 ,000 million to t hemo 85 
Although this attempt was b lock ed by the opposition of 
. 86 . It d . the Cabi n et and P a ' ty leadershIp, It resu e In a 
resolution by the LOP Assembly of the Members of Bo th 
Houses of the Diet to the effec t that appropr iate act-
ion shou l d be taken in th e n ex t Diet session in order 
t o satisf 
87 
t he demands of the League o The subsequent 
behaviour of the Committee demonstrated even more con-
clusively that it was merely a mouthpiece of the L eague 
and a cted as an intra-party pressure group vis - a-vis 
. 88 
the P arty leadershlp o 
The extraordinarily intimate i d entification of the 
LDP Investigation Committee and the L eague ( d ramatically 
symbolised by the fact that one of the L eague ' s most 
ardent supporters and future P resi d ent , Tsunashima 
S eikoo, was at the same time the Chairman of the 
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Committee after December 1960) eloquently testified to 
the deg ee oI success the League achieved in its efforts 
t o inIilt ate and dom inate the cruci al nerve-centre of 
the LDP o During the critical year 1964-1965, when it 
forged ahead with d ogged determination in its final 
attempt to secure victory , prac tically all of the P arty 
organ immediately c oncerned with official P arty dec is-
ions and attitudes regarding the jssue has succumbed to 
it s influence and pres s ure o In the Executive Council , 
for e ample ~ those who were openly associated with i t as 
Advisers held a 16 to 14 majority ov er those who were not,89 
while the ormer also prev a i led by 7 to 6 in the PARC 
Deliberation Commission , by about 25 to 16 in the PARC 
Cabinet D 'vision and 39 t o 35 in the Agriculture and 
F D ' " 90 orestry IV1Slon o 
I t is more difficult to be specifi c about the over-
all degree of success achieved by the League in its bid 
to infiltrate and dominate the LDP as a whole . As 
already pointed out , by the middle of 1958 about 250 
LDP Diet members (about 600/0 of LDP parliamentary streng t h 
a t the time) had consented to havi ng their names off ic -
ially l i sted as Advisers or S tanding Advi sers of the org-
an i sa ti ono Furthermore i 31 (7 02% ) of the 429 LDP 
returned during the four and half years between January 
1958 and June 1962 were nominated as S tand ing Advisers 
were listed as Advisers at one time or another during 
the same period o In other word s, 244 of the 429 LDP 
M. H oRo i S (56 . 8%) and 96 of the 191 M. H oC. iS (50 0 2%) 
were off ici all asso ci ated with it g91 Thus by mi d -1962 
not only he key pol'cy-making organs but also a major-
ity of the P ar t -aff i liated Diet memb ers had come und er 
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the influence of the L eague , an achievement that is 
remarkable by any standards o 
Characteristics of LOP Members Associated with the 
L eague 
In terms of the LOP policy-making process two 
facts about the LOP members of the Diet who were thus 
formally associated with the League deserve special 
attention . One relates to the role of former public 
servants . The other concerns the significance of intra-
party factionalism in situations such as those under 
review . 
Compared with other occupational categories of 
LOP membership , the percentage of former public servants 
officially associated with the L eague was generally 
higher than the average , being 63% for M. H .R. 's and 
50. 6% for M.H.C.' s . 92 A cl o ser examination reveals 
that the ' old boys ' from the Ministry of Finance in both 
Houses and those f r om the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry in the Upper House tended to be somewhat mor e 
cautious than others , but the percentage differences 
. . . . f · t 93 were lnslgnl lcan 0 In any event , it is impossible 
to find positive evidence to prove that the attitudes 
of the two particular ministries seriously inhibited 
the behaviour of the former bureaucrats associated with 
them d espite the efforts of the L eague and its sympath-
isers in the P arty . The statjstical evi d ence available 
suggests , on the contrary , that they co - operated with 
the L eague as willingly as others and helped it to cope 
with the intransigence of the officials of the two min -
istries , rather than the other way rou nd. At the min~ 
i mu m their presence was evi d ently u seful t o the L eague 
just as much as t o the ministries as links o f communic-
ation and in the behind - the - scenes negotiations which 
were essential to the ultimate compromiseo 
It is significant in this context that , the former 
Finance Ministry official , Ueki Koo shiroo , and the for-
mer Agriculture and Forestry Ministry official , Shigemasa 
Yootoku, were included in the initial membership of the 
six-man PARC Sub-Committee on the Farmland P roblem in 
January 19570 94 S i milarly , the membership of the Inves-
tigation Committee included in March 1964 three former 
bureaucrats - a former Ministry of Finance official, 
Maeo Shigesaburoo , an official from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry , S akata E iichi , and a Ministry 
f H Af f · f f· . 1 K . M k · 95 o ome alrs 0 lCla , oyangl a leo In the mean-
time , a majori ty of the' old boys' from the two Min i s-
tries , 14 out of 26 from the Ministry of Finance and 8 
out of 15 fro m the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
were persuaded b y the middle of 1962 to become the 
L eague ' s Advisers 096 
R egard ing the role of the factions, it should be 
first noted that , excep t for the Koono faction , 97 a 
majority in every faction were app ointed Advisers of 
the L eague and , except for the Miki faction , each con~ 
tained at least a few who were willing to d evote more 
time and energy than others to helping the League as 
its S tanding Advisers o98 On the other hand, the lobby-
ing activities systematically undertaken by the L eague 
in collaboration with its agents in the P arty were never 
directed specifically at any of the faction leaders as 
such0 99 These facts point to the irrelevance of the 
factions in the policy-making situation under rev iew, 
largely no doub t because the issue d i d not develop into 
a sufficiently controversial one as far as the LDP wa s 
concerned t o make it feasible for a d issident faction or 
faction s to take advantage of it in order to d amage the 
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prestige and autho r ity of the dominant faction s . lOO 
The consensus which emerged within the Party as a res-
u lt of the intense campaigns of the League and , espec -
ially, the conversion of the former Fi nance and Agric -
ulture Ministry bureaucrats removed the issue effectively 
beyond the influence of factionalism . 
The League as a Provider of Votes 
The relationship between the League as an inter-
est group and the LOP cannot be fully explained in terms 
solely of the functions of the factors of LOP policy-
making internal to the Party. There is little doubt that 
the effectiveness of the pressure g roup technique adopted 
by the Le agu e depended considerably upon its actu a l or 
assumed ability to provide the Part y with specific and 
concrete support. In other words, whatever success the 
League achieve resulted, in the final analysis, lar ge ly 
from the widely shared belief that it controlled a size -
able bloc of votes and therefore was in a position to 
influence seriously t he results of an election . In the 
li ght of such evidence as is available that belief was 
not completely justified but was sufficiently well 
founded to be accepted by most LOP Diet members or pros-
pective candidates. 
While there is no firm evidence to suggest that 
the League systematically invo lved itself i n any House 
of Representat ives election , it is known to have under -
taken to ensure the victory of four LOP candidates 
s tand i ng for the national constituency at the June 1959 
House of Councillors election. On that occasion it 
assi gned several prefectural leagues (branches) and a 
101 
team of campai gners to e ach . In the next House of 
Councillors election of July 196 2 exactly the same 
kind of arrangements were made for four selected LDP 
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candidates running in the national constituency -
Konishi Hideo , Shi g emasa Yuuzoo, Hitotsumatsu S adayoshi 
d Sh · . Y 102 I .. an lmoJoo asumaro. n addltlon , each prefect -
ural league undertook to work for one or two particular 
LDP cand idates in each prefectural constituency who 
were believed to be especially helpful to the organisat-
ion and its objectives. Thus a total of 48 candidates 
in the prefectural constituencies as well as four in 
the national constituenc y section stood with the offic -
ial support of the League and 41 (85 . 5%) , of the former 
and 2 (50%) of the latter were successfuly returned . 
Considering that the average survival ratio for 
all LOP candidates standing in the prefectural constit-
103 
uencies was 78 . 6%, those who were officially suppor-
ted by the League did appreciably better than the average. l04 
The same does not seem to apply to the national constit-
uency candidates, where the average LOP survival ratio 
was 53 . 8% compared with 50.0% for the four officially 
endorsed by the League . This was, however, because one 
of the two unsuccessful candidates was chosen by the LOP 
E lection P olicy Committee very much against the will of 
1 . 1 105 the Le ague and its support was therefore pure y nomlna • 
As far as the results of the 1962 House of Counc~ 
illors elections are concerned, there is little d oubt that 
the L eague ' s endorsement made an appreciable difference 
to the performance of the cand idates concerned compared 
with those who did not receive su c h support . It is also 
evident that it s influence in this respect was not lost 
on a majority of the sitting LOP Di et members or pros-
pective candidates . Before venturing a generalisation 
about t his particular aspect of the Lea gue ' s activities, 
however , it is important to consider the nature of its 
support. 
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In sharp contrast to the kind of support the LOP 
receives from most external groups sympathetic to i t 
(especially business firms and trade association s), 
the support given by the League in connection with 
ele c tion campaigns has been almost entirely in the 
form of votes and not furrl s o Of the 52 candidates , 
for example , who ran with its official backing in the 
House of Councillors election of 1962, only one _ 
Nakano Bunmon of Hyoogo Pr efecture - is known to have 
officially received any financial aid from the organ -
106 isation, and the amount involved was a meagre ¥ 30,00 0 
In fact , it does not seem to have ever been in a po s -
ition to give money away, since its annual budget was 
only about ¥ 6 million, out of which wages had to be 
paid to six full-time members running the secretariat, 
in addition to its substantial administrative costsol0 7 
In any event , it is evident that the LOP's co-operation 
was won not in return for financial contributions but 
for the several million votes the League was believed 
to have under its control o 
M .. 1 108 oreover , as mentIoned prevIous y , the number 
of the landowners direc tly affected by the land reform 
and alive in mid-1963 was 745 , 256 , according to the 
report of the special research section established in 
the Office of the Prime Minister o This was 1 02% of the 
total population of qualified voters {58 , 28l , 64l in 
November 1963),109 which appears to be an insignificant 
proportion o One of the L eague 's slogans , however, at 
the 1958 Lower House election was 'Let each of us sec-
ure f h . h t th polls' , 110 whI·ch ten votes or t e rIg t man a e 
implied that most of these former landowners were cap~ 
able of influencing a certain number of other voterso 
Whe ther or not ten votes per head was a reasonable 
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approximation to reality , it IS clear that the number 
of votes they were in a position to influence deci sively 
was far greater than their own number . In part thi s 
was because the former landowners had families who had 
presumably shared the same hardships and therefore had 
a good reason to act with them o Another factor was 
the special position many of them occupied in local 
politic s and the functions they performed as opinion-
leaders , especially in connection with the organisation 
and activities of the individual LOP Diet members ' 
supporters' associations o 
According to data collected by the special res-
earch section of the Office of the Prime Minister, in 
October 1963 the former landowner's household had an 
average of at least 5 0 3 members and an average of 3.3 
members of twenty years old or over, who were qualified 
• III 
voters o Each former landowner , therefore, was prob-
ably in a position to commit about three votes , includ-
ing his own , from his household to the support of a 
particUlar candidate o 
It is more difficult to assess with precision the 
extent of the influence that he could exert on other 
voterso His relations"however , with the supporters' 
association of an LOP Diet member no doubt played a 
very important part in that member ' s calculationso As 
112 pointed out in a preceding chapter , every LOP Diet 
member or pro s pective candidate depends on the work 
of his supporters ' association operating at the con-
stituency level for votes in an election o It is a 
variety of local notables especially local politi cians l 
administrators, leaders of trade , professional and 
civic associations that playa predominant role in the 
organisation and activities of such a supporters ' 
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association and it is , ln turn , the former landowners 
and the ' old middle-class' represented by them that 
supply the greater proportion of such local notables. 
Accord ing to the Kudoo Commission ' s report, for 
example , the percentage of former landowners' house-
holds from which a member or members had been elected 
or appointed public officials in the postwar period was 
as high as 33 . 6% ; the percentage of those of which a 
member or members were currently (from 21 November to 
7 December 1961) occupying such positions was 20 . 8%.113 
S ince the total number of the former landowners directly 
affected by the land reform and living in 1963 was 
745 , 256 , presumably at least about 150,000 members of 
their househol d s were available to participate in and 
lead the supporters' associations . Each of them within 
the special framework of activities associated with the 
supporters' associations must have influenced at least 
a few vo t er s • 
For these two reasons , it seems quite reasonable 
to suggest as a very conservative estimate that 
each former land owner was in a position to influence 
an average of four voters, that is , five including him~ 
self . If this assumption is acceptable for purposes of 
our discussion, then we may base an estimate of the 
L eague ' s strength as a vote - gathering machine on the 
hypothesis that the 745 , 256 former landowners could , 
at least potentially , determine the attitudes of about 
3 , 726 , 280 voters , including themselves , or 6 . 3% of 
the total number of qualified voters . This figure 
is p robably not very far from the kind of approximat ~ 
ions ma d e by many LDP Diet members or prospective can-
d i d ates in mapping out their strategies for a future 
election and deciding how to respond to the demands of 
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the League. This was , then , the key to the relative 
success achieved by the organisation of former land-
owners in its attempt to make the LOP satisfy its dem-
ands b y pushing through the unpopular legislation 
through the Diet o 
Summary 
The grievances of the landowners who were dep-
rived of their property as a result of the land reform 
undertaken during the Allied Occupation led to the 
emergence of organised pressure groups among them , 
which were eventually unified in the National Farm-
land Leagueo The issue considered in this Chapter 
developed largely in the context of the relationship 
between this particular external group and the LOP o 
The top leaders of the P arty persisted until 
about 1962 in their negative response to the demand of 
the League for monetary compensation o The influence 
of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Agricultur e and Forestry~ which were both firmly 
opposed to the proposed compensation , probably 
de termined the attitudes of these P arty leaders o 
With a view to forcing the P arty leadership to 
change its attitude and co-operate in the passage of 
an appropriate bill9 the League attempted successfully 
to build a sufficiently large group of its supporters 
in the P arty by appointing as Advisers as ma~y of the 
Diet members affiliated with the Par ty as possible o 
These supporters in the P arty in turn succeeded in 
controlling the key P arty organs , particularly the 
PARC and the Executive Counci l o 
Despite the opposition of the Mini stry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fores try , 
former high-ranking public servants in the P arty 
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actively associated themselves with the League and its 
lobbying activities either as Advisers to the Leagu e 
or members of the appropriate Pa ty organs, especially 
the PARC Investigation Committee on the Farmland 
P roblemo Those from the two particular ministries 
seem to have been del iberately used as intermediaries 
to facilitate communication between the League and the 
reluctant officials in the ministrieso 
The role of the factions, on the other hand, was 
almost entirely negligible o There is no evidence to 
suggest that an LOP Diet member's response to the 
pressure of the League was influencm significantly by 
his factional affiliation o Moreover, like the top 
P arty leaders, all faction leaders uniformly avoided 
personal involvement in the campaigns conducted by the 
League o An important reason for this irrelevance of 
the factions in the development of the issue was prob-
ably the fact that it did not prove sufficiently con-
trove rsial within the P arty to make it attractive as 
a weapon for dissident factions to exploit in their 
opposition to the dominant factions. 
The League and its collaborators within the 
Party had very definite and clear-cut ideas as to who 
were the decision-makers that really mat tered con-
cerning the resolution of the issueo Almos t invar-
iably c hosen for systematic lobbying were , as we have 
seen , for the Cabinet - the P rime Minister (P arty 
Pre si dent) , the Chief Cabinet S ecretary and the Minis-
ters with direct jurisdiction over the matter involved 
(Min isters of Finance and Ministers of Agriculture 
and Forestry ) ; for the Party , the S ix or S even Leaders 
and the Chairmen of the appropriate PARC committee s ; 
and for the Diet - the Chairmen of the appropriate 
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stand ing commit t ees of both Houses . Thi s def ines 
clearly the group of the principal decision-makers In 
policy- making situations of the kind under review. It 
shoul d be noted that all of these decision- makers des-
igna t ed b y the interest group were f ormal officials 
of the three entities involved but that neither the 
members of the PARC Deliberation Commission nor those 
of the Executive Council were included as such o This 
was probably an indication of the somewhat ambiguous 
ch a racter of the issue itself , which was evidently 
not a sub j e c t of purely routine policy- making and yet 
neve r assumed a truly c ont r oversial character within 
the P arty . 
Finally , the basis of the L eague ' s influence on 
the LOP c oncerning the disposit i on of the issue was 
the votes over which it was believed to have effective 
control . It was largely the significance of the 
nearly 4 milli o n voters who we r e believed to be sub -
ject to its influe n ce and who could make a significant 
difference t o the per f ormance of the ind ividual LOP 
Die t members in elec tions that d eterminm the attitude 
first of the r ank and file and eventual l y of the top 
leaders of the LOP . 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISI ON 
Blaming the most flagrant of the social, economic and 
political weaknesses found in Japan in the wake of the 
Allied Occupation lar ge ly on the 'mistakes ' committed by 
the latter ' s initial policies, the LDP made an official 
and publi c pledge at its inaugural meeting on 15 November 
1 1955 to amend the Constitution of Japan. The course of 
action envisaged by its leaders for the fulfilment of 
this pled ge was outlined in the General P olicy P rogramme 
adop ted on that occasion o While making an assurance, 
on the one hand, that the basic principles of the exist-
ing Constitution, such as democracy, pacifism and popular 
sovereignty , would remain unchanged , it proposed to have 
a special commission officially ,established and inves~ 
tigations of the problems involved undertaken without 
2 delay o The Cabinet Commission on the Cons titution , 
whi ch began to function In August 1957 and subsequently 
provi d ed the main arena of the controversy between rev -
isionists,&anti-revisionists , resulted directly from the 
LDP commitment at its inaugural meeting o 
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine 
the particular manner in which the P arty has acted or 
fai 1 ed to act on the pI edge and to rela te it to the gen-
eral pattern of the interactions between the four sel-
f LDP I , k' 3 ected factors 0 po lcy-ma lng . 
I 
BACKGROUND 
Japanese Resp onses to the Cons titution o f 1946 
Bo th the con t ent of the new Constitution of Japan , 
p romu l ga t ed on 3 Nov ember 1946, and the special circum-
stances under wh ich it was drafted were des tined to make 
it a subject of emotional and i d eological controversy , 
sO that t he po ssi b ility of its revision bec ame a great 
polit ical issue in postwar Japan. When made pub lic in 
its or iginal form on 6 March 1946 , its draft text wa s 
rec e ived by the press (wh ich represented such articulate 
publi c op inion on th e subject as existed at the time), 
in par t wit h enthus ia sm and praise bu t also with crit~ 
icisms and . , 4 s c ep tIC 1 sm . 
Commen ti ng on what subsequently bec ame the cont o~ 
versia l Articl e 9, the Yomiuri-Hoochi S himbun had the 
fo ll owing to say in it s editori al of 8 Marc h 1946 : 
Nor are we wi t hout some misgiv i ngs conc ern ing 
t he other fo c us o f thi s Constituti on, th e eterna l 
renunci ation of war. We are convinc ed, to be 
sure, that an aggressive war sh ould b e banned 
f or al l ti me , but should we not be left with 
the r ight t o fight a war of liberation , in case 
a foreign power should c ommit aggres si on agains t 
us and attemp t to subje ct us to a state of 
slav ery ? If t he right to wage a war should be 
totally given up, th en t he nati on should have 
a status of permanent neu t ral ity recognised, 
as is the ca se wi th Swit zer land, and guaranteed 
by t he United ations , by force if necessary. 
While we would be the firs t to vot e for the 
pe r pe t ua ti on of peac e and abol iti on of war, we 
would a lso d efend our nation ' s life and inde-
pendence even at th e co s t of our blood .0. 5 
No par ticula r objecti ons were ever raised to the 
drast ic change proposed in the GHQ draf t in t he sta tus 
and p owers of the Emperor , although almost exclus ive 
attention had been pa i d to this problem in the p reced-
ing sev eral months in relation to the prospect ive revis~ 
i o n of t he Imperial Consti tution . 6 In a dd ition to the 
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war-renounci ng clause , however, a few other s pecific 
provisions received critic al c omments o The greatly 
inc eased power of the a ti onal Diet was, for example , 
considered by some to pose the danger of d ictatorship 
by the majority and abuse of power by parties o 7 The 
excessive emphas is on t he rights and the lack of em-
phasis on the duties of the individual vis-a-vis the 
society and government was condemned by a Tokyo Univer -
sity profes sor as typi c al rather of the 19th century 
8 mode l of democracy than that of the 20th centuryo 
Dro Takano, who had wr itten the draft of a repub lican 
constitution , advoc ated proportional representa ti on in 
the uppe house elections , administra iv e tribunals , a 
national referendum on the new Cons titution within ten 
years of its promulgat ion , and so forth o 9 
Just as important as these criticisms of the sub-
s ance of the GHQ draft were those which rela ed t o its 
form and language and the manner in which it had been 
prepared. The comments made by two readers in t he Asahi 
of 24 Apr il 1946 , for example , concerned the first of 
10 
t hese aspects . Both deplored the lack of precision arrl 
elegance in the colloquial style Japanese language used 
i n the translation of theGHQ draft, and one of them 
pointed out th e repet itiveness and d iffuseness that 
occurred especially in the P reamble and Chapter III . 
Criticisms of the manner in which it had been prepared 
wer e typified by the brief remark attributed to a membe 
of the Soc ialist P arty's Central Executive Committee, 
Koono Mitsu. While praising the progress i ve nature of 
the GHQ d raft, which sharply contrasted with any of h e 
draf ts written by Japanese (including his own par t y ), he 
wished hat it had been prepared 'democraticall ' and 
11 
no t 'beh ind closed doors ' 0 Although its reference was 
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not to the procedures which had been already followed but 
to those which might be followed in future , the opening 
sentence of the Yomiur i ' s ed i tor i al call for the convoc -
ation of a special constitutional assembly reflected the 
same kind of sentiment . It stated that ' a democrati c 
12 
constitution must be established by democratic means . ' 
S o did the delicately cir cuml ocutlonal editorial of the 
ihon Ke i zai 5 himbun titled 'Sorrow over the Graci ous 
. . , 13 ConstI t u tI on . 
If the press c omments which appeared after the pub-
lication in March 1946 of the provisional translation 
of the GHQ draft , followed in April by the colloquial 
style v ersion , reflected art iculat e publ ic opinion at the 
time, the at ti tudes of the parties also corresponded 
roughly to its various shades o Although they tended to 
be mu c h more self - consciously couched in generali ties 
i noffensive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers , the opinions expressed in the Diet during the del -
iberations over the drafts clearly demonstrated the pres-
ence in the parties of a sign i ficant amount of dissat is -
faction as well as goodwill o As a fore-taste of t he 
pattern of party attitudes after independenc e, 1 t 
was t he S ocialists who found the GHQ draft most agreeab le 
and the Liberals and the P rogressives who found it most 
14 distasteful. 
The d ifference in the Socialist and conservative 
response to the GHQ draft when it was debated in the Di et 
was impor ant . F rom our point of view , however , it is 
even more important to note that conservative criti cisms 
were left entirely unheeded und er the pressure of the 
Occupation administration o The c ritics were never com-
pletel c onvinc ed that their vi ews had been basi c ally 
wrong or that t hose embodied in the GHQ d raft we eight. 
The i r opp o s i t ion was s ilen c ed first under subtle psyc ho l-
og ic a l pres s u r e and la t er by t he more d i rect me t hod 0 
remov al f r om pub li c of fic e ( i nclud i ng Diet membership 
and par t y posts ) , and a total ban on t heir poli t ica l 
ac t iviti e s o 
Once the content s of the GHQ d raft were made known, 
lead ers of the conserv a tive part i es made a sudden a b out-
face in t he ir publ ic pronounc ement s c onc ern i ng the prob -
l em of constitut i onal revi s i on o Th i s indi.cated the d egree 
of psychological pressure which they felt under the cir-
c ums t ances rather than a genuine c hange of heart. When 
Ha t oyama c ommented on behalf of the L i beral P ar ty t h at 
he was grea t ly enc ouraged by the 'maintenance of t h e 
Emp eror system, safeguards for fundamen t al human r ights , 
the r enunci a t ion of war and the es t abl i shmen t of a demo -
c ra tic sys t em of government ' which characterised bo t h t he 
15 GHQ d r af t and ' the pr i n ci ples under l y i n g ou r own da ft ,' 
he was surely exp r ess i ng onl y part of wha t he mu st have 
t hought was t he tru t h . The for c ed dupl i c i ty was ev en 
more ob v ious, i f anything , in t he s t atement of S a i too 
Takao , Chairman of the Executi v e Council o f the Pro gres~ 
i ve P a rt y . He was quo t ed as saying : 
In c onnec tion wi t h t he rev is i on of the Cons tit -
ut i on , our P a rty has alway s insisted on t he 
preservation of the national polity and ( t he re -
fore) we support it (the GHQ draft ) wholeheart ed ly . 
E spec i ally we l come, as fa r as we a r e c oncerned, 
is the fact that the oneness of the Emperor and 
t h e p eop l e, which has be en characte r isti c of the 
n at i on sinc e i t was founded, is gi v en in i t an 
exp l i ci t fo rm , t hus providin g the basis for its 
further grow t h and d evelopment with the i mperi a l 
family a s i ts c en t re . Also welcome is the fac t 
t ha t t he renunc iati on of war is st i pulated in 
t he sup reme law of the land and highest moral 
symbol of its people 0 . 0 0 16 
If the restr icti ons imp osed on such prewar po lit -
i ci ans as Ha t oyama and S ait o o had remained ind i rect a nd 
general (as was a c u a ll y t he case with t he latter), t he ir 
gr i evanc e s conc e r n i ng t he cons t itut i onal r ev i s i on of 
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1946 might not have been so emotion- charged and explos-
ive as they became several years later . Their personal 
involv ement in the P urge ensured that their reaction, 
when eventually exp e ssed freely , would be anything but 
frien d ly t o ward s many of the Occupation sponsored ref-
orms , particularly the Constitution . 17 In retrospect , 
sO far as the climate of opinion over the constitutional 
issue is concerned, the Purge programme accomplished a 
forced silence in the short run only to prepare an even-
tual explosion of suppressed feelings in the long run . 
The deliberations of the National Diet over the 
draft of the new Constitution lasted from 25 June to 7 
Oc tober 1946 . Apart from those initiated by the GHQ 
its elf,18 only a few significant alterations in the orig-
inal texts were made by the Diet , namely the add ition of 
the vaguely qualifying phrases in the war-renouncing 
Article 9 and of several new articles in Chapter III 
provi d ing for the rights and duties of the individual. 
In evaluating this apparently meagre achievement of a 
Diet under the almost c omplete sway of the conservative 
partie s , 19 it is necessary to take into account the 
fact that , thanks to the P urge programme , its member -
ship had been cleared of those prewar and wart i me ele-
ments who could have been potentially the most vocal 
d issi d ents . Of the prewar M. H.R.' s elected in the 
first postwar election of April 1946 Hatoyama was dis-
qualified in early May and two of his most trusted 
c onfi d ants , Miki Buki chi and Koono Ichiroo , were fo ced 
20 
t o resi gn 1n June. 
What is significant 1S not so much t h at their pres-
ence woul d have ma d e any i mp or tant d ifference in the 
actual hand ling of the issue by the National Diet - a 
possibi li ty whi c h was ather slight under the circumstances 
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- as that those politicians who were thus excluded from 
the official debate on the new Constitution were , as it 
were , absolved of responsibility or its making o On 
the streng t h of this , they could with little incon-
sistency or guilty conscience, later join with such 
purged public officials as Kishi Nobusuke , Kaya Okinori , 
Ino Hiroya and Aoki Kazuo in a campaign for revision of 
the 1946 Constitution o 
Considering the background to the making of the 
GHQ draft and the general political conditions prevail-
ing in the early phase of the Occupation , one is struck 
by the extent of the criticisms that were voiced or 
implied in the course of the Diet deliberations o 
Although the debate centred on the provisions relating 
to the national polity , the Emperor system and the 
renunciation of war , it extended also to the other sect-
ions, especially those concerning the rights and dutie 
of the indivi d ual0 21 If one takes into account the 
points raised in the press and elsewhere , including the 
proposal , which appeared in an economic journal p22for a 
presidential system in the election of the top national 
executives (the direct election of the P rime Minister 
and Deputy P rime Minister) one may conclud e that all the 
essential arguments which the post-independence revis-
ionists were subsequently to em p loy to support their 
positions had alread y been o ffered by the end of 1946 0 
These criticisms all arose from three basic , inter-
related p ropositions : (i) That the Constitution of 
Japan must be establ ished by the Jap anese p eople them-
selves ; (ii ) that not only universalistic p rinciples , 
such as d emocracy and freedom , but also the 'unique' 
histo y , trad itions , indivi duality and national chara-
cter of the Japanese nation must be incorporated; and 
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(iii ) that the Constitution must be both practi cal and 
ff . 23 e ec t 1 ve 0 
Once the Cabinet - sponsored draft, which was a 
Japanese language translation of the original GHQ draft, 
was approved by the Diet with a few significant amend-
ments and many minor ones and was duly promulgated on 3 
November 1946 , the constitutional issue became dormant 
almost overnight and remained so until about the middle 
of 1950 . The reasons for the virtually complete absence 
of revisionist agitation during the three and a half 
years are not very far to seeko The following condit-
ions were mainly responsible for this situation . Firstl y , 
the fact of continuing Occupation itself discouraged 
criticism of the Constitution which was well known to 
have originated fr om the GHQo S econdly , the Purge had 
driven f r om the public debate most of the nation ' s prom-
inent opinion leaders and their place had been filled by 
those who benefitted, in one way or another ~ by the new 
Constitution and the 'Occupation R egime '. Thi rdl y , people 
were gene r ally much more concerned with immed iate econ-
omic prob lems t h an with the functions of the Constitut ion o 
Fourthly , they were still confident in the adequacy of 
its provisions , regarding it as the symbol of a new 
Japan o And , fifthly , they were busy trying to under-
stand the meanings of its provisions and d id not feel 
sufficiently conversant with them to offer better alter~ 
. 24 
na t lV es . 
The Birth and Growth of Revisionism 
When the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 
led General MacArthur on 8 July to instruct the Japanese 
government to create a P o l ice Reserve F orce o f 75 ,000 
men and an increase of 8 ,000 in the size of the Maritime 
S afety Agency ~ the constitutionali t y of the nation ' s 
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r earmament ln relation to Article 9 inevitably became a 
c ont roversia1 25 is sue . As the original P olice Reserve 
Force (which officially came into being on 10 August 
1950 ) was renamed the S afety F orce two years later and ln 
June 1954 became the S elf-Defence Forces (made up of 
three fully - fledged services ), the logics of this ser-
i es of faits~comp1 is began to be felt wit h increasing 
force . Under su ch circums tanc es it became unavo idab le 
for the government and the ministerial party that they 
should cons i der in earnest amendment of Arti c le 9 , if not 
a total revision of the whole Constitution o26 
P olitical and military developments in the Far 
East , particula rly the establishment of the P eople' s 
R epubl ic of China in 1949 and the Korean War , provi ded 
the objectiv e basis for a re - consideration of Art icle 9. 
The return to public life after the outbreak of the 
Korean War of the politicians and public servants who 
had been purged , provi ded emotional backing for the 
revisionist movement o As pointed out in a previ ou s chap-
ter , in the April 1952 House of Representati ve s election 
the depurg ed politi c ians managed to win a total of 139 
seats and accounted for 33% of L iberal M. HoR.' sand 37% 
of P rogressive M. H. Ro ' s . 27 As it later turned out , the 
most dynamic and powerful impetus , both for a conservat-
ive merger and for constituti onal revision , was provided 
by a group of these prewar and wartime leaders . 
As earlier sugges t ed, many of them who had been 
for c ed into silence ov er public issues by the Purge were 
critical of the Occupation- sponsored reforms , par ticu1-
ar1y the new Constitution o This was not only because 
of their basic d isagreement with the reforms , but equally 
bec ause they felt that they had been prevented under 
duress from e pr e ssing their vi ews when the reforms wer e 
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pu tin to e f f ec t • It was characteristic of the sudden 
upsurge of revisi onism in the first few years after 
independence that its emotional dr ive was generated 
di rectly by the personal experience and resentment of an 
injured party. Such was the basic tone of the views 
expressed , for example, by men like Hatoyama and 
I h · b h · f t th d f hOt· 28 W ·1 s I as I a er e en 0 t e ccupa Ion. hI e the 
fact of Japan's rearmament presented a practi cal and con-
crete case for an amendment of Art icle 9, the emotional-
ism introduced by the mass ' come -back ' of the prewar 
men gave rise to controversies over the origin and 
authorship of the new Constitution and put it in its 
entire ty to a critical and questioning review . 
In terms of inter-party relationships, the bifur-
c ation be tween the prewar and postwar approaches to the 
'Occupation Reg i me' in general and the Constitution of 
Japan in part icular took the form of di 'sagreemen ts and 
c onflicts between a majority in the Liberal Party on the 
one hand and , on the other, a minority in the same party 
and a majority in bo th the Progress ive Party and the 
Ryokufuukai (the green breeze society in the House of 
Counci llors) 0 In the one group the postwar elements 
held control and in the other the prewar elements uled, 
so far as the constitutional issue was concerned o 
Yoshida ' s negative view of an early revision of 
the Constitution remained consistent throughout the 
post-independ ence years up to the merger of 1955 and, 
ind eed, long after that. In the middle of 1952 , when 
the Progressi ve P arty had already officially committed 
itself to 'a total reconsideration of the laws and 
insti utions established under the Occupation , including 
the Constitution' , constitutional revision could not be 
loudly talked about in the L i beral P arty because of 
Y h "d ' k "to 29 o s 1 a s nown OppOSl 10n o 
The anti-r evis ioni st posture of the L iberal P arty 
bec ame more pronounced du ring t he two periods when the 
minority and revisionis t Ha t oyama faction and Kishi' s 
followers stayed out of the Party to run a separate 
party of t hei r o wn o The first of these per iod s las ted 
from the middl e of March to the end of November 1953, 
when a majority of the Democratic League membe rs led by 
Hatoyama formed the separatist L iberal Part y o The sec -
ond lasted from late November 1954 to the conservative 
merger of November 1955 0 During this period the Ha toyama 
and the Kishi factions formed the Democratic P arty 
together wi t h the P rogressives and the small Japan L ib -
eral Part Yo Although the opposi tion of the Liberal 
Pa ty as a whole to the suggestions of co nstitutiona l 
revision was very much toned down and even reversed dur-
ing the period s when these revisionist groups chose t o 
stay with it , Yoshida himself remained remarkably con-
sis t ent i n this respect and continued to exert enormou 
restraining influence on the Party's execu tives o On the 
eve of the 1955 merger , for example, he made it pub l i cly 
clear that he was still firmly opposed to an early rev-
ision h C " " 30 of t e onstl tutlon o The same position wa s 
mai ntained in h i s four-volume autobiography and in his 
letter sent to the Cabinet Commission on the Constitut-
. 31 lon o 
De spite Yoshida's negative attitude , s tep s 
inspired by and supportive of th e revisionist po sition 
were tak en by the Libera l P a rty , particularly duri ng 
the twelve months between November 1953 and ovember 
1954 when the revisionist facti ons stay ed with ito In 
accordanc~ with t he agreement made between Yoshida and 
Hatoyama on the latter ' s retu n to the L iberal Party , in 
De cember 1953 a Commit tee on the Con s ti ut i on as wel l as 
a Commi tt ee on F o: e ign P olicy wa s established i n the 
party and Ki shi wa s appointed its Chai r man o 32 S ignific-
an t ly , Yoshida absen t ed himself from the Committee' s 
inaugural ceremony at which Hatoyama and Kishi emphas i soo 
the need for the earl i est possible revision , referring 
to the abnormal circumstances under which the e ist i ng 
Cons ti tu t ion had been drafted o 
By the middle of Sep tember 1954, the Commi t tee 
concluded (as many had anticipated) , that revision had 
to be t o tal , with special emphasis placed on Art ic le 9 , 
the de finition of the Emperor ' s constitutional status , 
the balanc e between the rights and dutie s of the ind iv-
idua1 , and the relationship between the Constitution and 
. t . 1 . 33 ln e natlona treatles o Finally , the joint ses s i on of 
its five Sub -Commi ttees approved a tentative draft of 
the revision on 18 October , which incorporated the abov~ 
mentioned points and was published as an 'Outline of. a 
Draft of the Revised Constitution of Japan ' ( ihonkoku-
kempoo kaiseian yookooan) on 5 November . 34 
The mov ement for constitutional re ision dur ing 
t his period was inseparably related to the movement f o r 
the unif ic ation of the conservative parties . Behind 
bo t h were the s ame groups of prewar politicians and 
former high-ranking public servants o It is quite nat~ 
ural that they should have been so inter-related , sinc e 
the prima y objective of both movements was to change 
the status quo identified with the Occupation Re gime 
and Yoshida's ru1e o Furthermore , one was clearly used 
as a means of achieving the other and vice versa o In 
the L i be al Party Kishi , who was the driving f o rce for 
the 'New P arty Movement' (the unification of the conser-
vative pa tie s ), was known even before he was elected to 
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the House of Representatives in April 1953 to be d eep l y 
interested in a drastic change in the poli tical arrange-
ments established under the Occupation. A Japan Recon -
struction L eague {Nihon saiken renmei} had been formed 
under his leadership as soon as he was freed from the 
restrictions of the P urg e toward the end of 1952 and one 
of its five principal objectives had been consti tutional 
35 
revision. When his close friends met at his invitat-
ion in November 1953, the reason for their intere st ln 
uniting the three existing conservative parties was 
reported to be so that they cou ld achieve constitutional 
36 
revision. Fi ve months later he was one of the anony-
mou s sponsors of a Volunteers' Meeting for the Creation 
of A New Conservati ve Party {Hoshu - shintoo yuushi 
kondankai} at which forty - four M. H. R.' s affiliated with 
the Liberal P arty adopted a five - point platform for t h e 
would-be new party which included revision of the 
' Occupation- made Constitution ' as well as the perfection 
37 
of the nation ' s defence arrangements . No other member 
of the Liberal P arty personified as dramatically as Ki sru 
the correlation between interest in the conservative 
merger and in constitutional revision , but a majori ty of 
those who were positively identified with both movements 
shared that characteristic to a greater or lesser extent. 
When the anti - Yoshida factions led by Hatoyama and 
Kishi walked out of the P arty for a second time ln 
November 1954 to join the Democratic P arty , the work of 
the Liberal P arty Committee on the Constitution was 
abruptly interrupted . In the ten- point policy pro g ramme 
prepared for the general election of F ebruary 1955 the 
top executi v e s of the P arty {who had been hand-picked by 
Yoshida} dec lared that no early attempt at constitutiona l 
38 
revision would be made b y them. In the course of the 
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election campaign Ogata, who had succeeded Yoshida as the 
new Party P resident, assured an audi ence at Morioka that 
he was definitely opposed to revision. He also charged 
the P rime Minister and Presiden t of the Democratic P arty, 
Hatoyama , with contemplating not only an amendment of 
Article 9 but possibly also the reinstitution of con-
o 0 39 I 0 0 
scrlptlon . t lS admlttedly hard to assess the attit-
ude of the Liberal P arty during this period solely by 
its public pronouncements, especially those made in the 
course of an election campaign. It is possible that the 
Party 's real position was much closer to that of the 
40 Demo crats than it appears from the press reports. Its 
negative tendencies were, however, sufficiently evident 
to contrast it with the attitude of the Progres sive 
Party (subsequently Democratic P arty). 
The Progressive Party came into being in February 
1952 through the merger of the National Democratic Party 
(Kokumin- minshutoo) and several minor groups , including 
the Shinsei-kurabu (new government club) of the former 
members of the prewar Minseitoo led by Matsumura Kenzoo. 
The Party committed itself from the beginning to the 
earliest possible revision of the Constitution. As 
already indicated, Po int 5 of its platform called for a 
total reconsideration of the laws and institutions est -
ablished under the Occupation, explicitly including con-
stitutional o 0 41 reVlSlon . Although the creation of the 
Progressive Party Committee on the Cons titution did not 
come until the spring of 1954 (nearly five months after 
the establishment of its Liberal Party counterpart) , COfr 
crete steps toward constitut ional revision had actually 
been taken by the Party in July 1953 when it had estab-
lished a Special Committee on Defence (Booei tokubetsu -
iinkai).42 During the election campaign in the spring of 
, 
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1953 the Progre ssive P ar ty leaders , led by Ashida Hitoshl 
and Kiyose Ichiroo , propounded the v iew that r e -armament 
was compatible with Arti c le 9 . 43 The introduction of 
this view exerted a cons iderable moderating influence and 
was responsible , at least indirectly , for the de lay ln 
the creation of t he P ar t y Constitu t ion Committee o 
Nevertheless , it seems evident that , in sharp contras t 
to the situation in the Liberal Party , the revisionists 
were a maj or i ty in the Progressive Party and divisions 
of opinion over this particular issue were neglig i bl e at 
44 
the time . 
The Demo c ratic Par ty (minshutoo) resulted in 
November 1954 from the merger of the P rogressive P arty 
and t he ant i -Yo shida , revisionist groups in th e L iberal 
Party . It embodied the most pronounced of the rev ision-
ist tendencies among the parties and in the National 
Diet at the time . Po int 2 of its Policy P rogramme 
(s eisaku - taikoo) adopted at the inaugural meeting prom-
ised to amend the Constitution , ' considering the c ir-
cumstances of its establishment and experience of it in 
practic e ', although without sacrificing ' the princi ple s 
of pacifism and democracy '. It also proposed to set up 
in 45 the Diet a de liberative c ommittee on the Cons titutio~ 
In the 'Outline of the Basic P olic i es ' (kihon- seisaku 
taikoo) subsequently ratified by the Party ' s Execut ive 
Counci l and ac cepted by the Hatoyama Cabi net on 14 
December 1954 , the pledge to undertake constitutional 
revision was repeated , together with a parallel call to 
46 
strengthen the nation ' s defence system . 
Once , howev er , he had been elected Pr ime Minis ter 
as well a s P resident of the Democratic P arty p Hatoyama 9 s 
referenc es to the c onstitutional issue became at t ime s 
so c autious and circumspect that he was charged with a 
, 
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ch a nge of heart by his Socialist and Liberal opponents In 
D . 47 the let . On the other hand , an ex tr eme revisionist 
view , according to which the Constitution of 1947 was 
essentially null and void because of the peculiar cir-
cumstances under which it had been enacted began to be 
voiced in the Party with Hatoyama ' s restrained but ob-
vious 48 encouragemen t. In any event , his Cabinet proc-
eeded in the summer of 1955 to introduce in the Diet a 
bill establishing a Cabinet Commission on the Constitut-
ion. After an initial failure in the Special Di et of 
March-July 1955, this bill was finally passed about a 
year later under the Third Hatoyama Cabinet in June 
1956. 49 
The merger of the two conservative parties in 
November 1955 represented the culmination of the revis-
ionist upsurge which had started, as we have seen , in the 
last phase of the Occupation with the mass re-instatement 
of prewar and wartime leaders . As the most dynamic and 
influential proponent of the merger scheme , Miki Bukichi, 
declared i n a public statement in the spri ng of 1955 , 
the merger was conceived primarily as a means by which to 
achieve constitutional revision as well asanendment of 
L . ·1·· 50 the El ection aw and expansIon of def ence facl Itles. 
The differences of attitude towards the merger did not 
strictly correlate with the d ivisi o ns of opini on on the 
constitutional issue in either party. It is nevertheless 
significant that the groups most consistently revision-
ist - the Kishi, Ishibashi and former ' eutral' factions 
in the Democratic P arty - provided the motive power for 
the merger movement as well o On the other hand , the 
merger movement was persistently opposed by the Li beral 
P arty's Yoshida faction , which was also known to be 
least interested in constitutional .. 51 reVISIon. 
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It should also be noted that the strongest pre s s-
ure for constitutional revision came during this per-
iod from the party out of power and the dissident g roup s 
in the party in power . This fact reveals the partisan 
and factional causes andimplications of the revisionist 
movement, which have continued to characterise it in 
more recent years . 
Extra-Party Groups and Public Opinion 
If the prewar-postwar dichotomy and the less clear-
cut yet relevant factional divisions typified the pattern 
of responses to the constitutional issue in the conser-
vative parties , the conditions of opinion outside them 
were equally characterised by divisions and conflicts. 
On the one hand , the left - wing parties, especially the 
S ocialists , were consistently and fiercely opposed to 
the suggested change , particularly (though by no means 
exclusively ) , of Article 90 On the other hand , repres-
entative business and industrial interests , especially 
those associated with Keidanren, were deeply interested 
in a de facto , if not de jure , revision of that partic-
ular article o They helped the creation of a united con-
servative party in the hope that it would prove powerful 
enough to push the matter through the Diet o As if sand-
wiched between these two extreme and articulate posit-
ions , public opinion remained indecisive and even indiff-
eren t . 
The opposition of the Communist Party to constit-
utional revision may have been tactical rather than fund-
amental in view of its public commitment to l abolish the 
. I 52 Emperor system and establish a democratic r epublIc . 
That of the Socialists was , however , much more genuine 
and consistent , though there were obvious differences in 
emphasis between the R ight and the Left wings prior to 
') 
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their unifi c ation in October 1955 . 53 The latter's posit-
ion on the issue was officially confirmed in the policy 
programme of the unified Socialist P a -· ty and subsequently 
led to concre te actions both with in and outside the Di et 
under the direction of the P arty ' s Special Committee on 
the Defence of the Constitut i on (Kempoo - yoogo tokubetsu-
. . ) 54 llnkai • 
The aims and efforts of big businesses were the 
exact opposite of this . Their degree of interest in 
the earliest possible resumption of 'defence production ' 
and their commitment to Japan ' s re-armament was embodied 
in the work of the Keidanren ' s Economic Co - operation 
Round - Tab Ie (Kai zai - kyooryoku kondankai) . 55 I t was under 
the pressure and with the advice of this organisation, 
especially its Defence P roduct ion Committee , that organ-
ised research in the gui ded missile field was initiated 
in 1954 , the produ c tion of jet fighters (F- 86-F and 
T - 33 -A ) was officially started in 1955 , and a joint Def -
ence P rod uct i on Liaison Council (Booei - seisan renraku 
kyo ogi kai) was established in 1956 to co - ordinate the 
opinions and efforts of the government , the ministerial 
party and industry . 56 Against this background it is not 
surprising that those leaders of Keidanren who were 
personally involved in the activities of the Round-T able 
shoul d have also been keenly interested in encouraging 
the revisionist movement in the parties and , with a view 
to promoting it , in helping their merger and consolid-
. 57 
atl0n. 
In sharp contrast to the contrasting pos i tions of 
the Socialists and big business , public opinion remained 
i gnoran t, indifferent and , at the best , indecisive . 
The result of an opinion poll involving a samp l e of 
3 ,000 whi ch was conducted by the Asahi in Februa ry 195 2 , 
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for the first time laid bare the harsh realities of what 
had come to be ac c epted as the basic and ultimate crit-
erion of the soundness of public policy under the new 
'democratic system'. To the embarrassment of both rev-
isionists and anti-revisionists , 67 per cent of the res-
pondents admitted that they had never read the text of 
the Constitution , 19 per cent had read it in part and 
only 14 per cent had read the whole of it. 58 In the 
subsequent polls undertaken by the Research Section 
( Shingi-shitsu and , subsequently Choosa- shitsu) of the 
Cabinet S ecretariat the percentages of DK responses in 
this extreme sense fluctuated between about 20 per cent 
and 45 per cent . The Asahi survey of ovember 1957, 
59 however, again reported a shocking 61 per cent . 
The results of these and other opinion polls 
when classified according to the affirmative versus 
negative division , instead of the ' know ' versus ' don't 
know' division, have demonstrated that a substantial 
proportion of the DK respondents were ready to take 
sides in the controversy . The general tenor , however , 
of public opinion as revealed by these polls could 
hardly be considered as a positive factor from the 
point of view of either of the opposing positions o 
Furthermore , so far as the more articulate and 
organised section of public opinion was concerned , the 
actual balance between the two positions was evidently 
more favourable to the anti - revisionists than to the 
revisionists . While the P eople ' s Confederation for the 
Defence of the Constitution embraced as many as 135 org-
anisations and groups with an aggregate membership of 
at least a few million , 60 the revisionist position was 
supported by only one small group led by a few politic-
i ans , 
o d 0 61 journalists, universlty professors an wrlters . 
") 
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The attitude of the press was somewhat more encouraging 
to the revisionists on the eve of the conservative 
me rger ~ but even here opinion was sharply divided and 
revisionism never became a majority view among the 
largest of the nation ' s d aily newspapers except , prob-
ably , briefly in 1954. 62 
On the eve of the formation of the LOP there were 
thus factional and ideological d ivisions of opinion 
within the conservative parties themselves and a parallel 
lack of consensus between the articulate extra-party 
groups and among the media of mass co mmunication. Pub lic 
opinion in general was singularly ignorant and indiffer-
ent . It was under such political and psychological con-
d itions that the inaugural pledge to bring about constit-
utional revision was made by the leadership of the newly 
formed LOP. By SO doing , the Party imposed upon itself 
an apparently difficul t and politically dangerous task, 
as its leaders were soon to realise. 
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II 
THE LI BERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY RESPO SE 
Negative Facto rs 
Art icle 96 of the Cons titution of Japan specifies 
the requirements for amendments as follows : 
Amendment s to this Cons titution shall be 
initiated by the Die t ~ through a concurring 
vote of two-thirds or more of all the 
members of each House and shall thereupon 
be submitted to the people for ratification, 
which shall require the affirmative vote of 
a majority of all votes cast thereon , at a 
special referendum or at such election as the 
Diet shall specify .0 •• 
S ince the LDP came into being in November 1955 the 
Party has never s~cceeded in satisfying the first of 
these requirements , for the percentage of its members 
returned in successive Diet elections have never reached 
63 
two-thirds . In the light of this fact the first of 
the hurdles to be cleared if constitutional revision wa s 
to be achieved has remained unsurmountable u The second 
hurdle might have been somewhat easier to clear until the 
late 1960' s , if one may assume that the split of votes 
in a referendum on constitutional revision would gener-
ally follow party lines as in an ordinary Diet election. 
In the four House of Representatives elections held 
between February 1955 and ovember 1963 the LDP inv ar-
64 iably gained a majority of votes cast . Even here, 
however , the LDP' s edge over t ~1e 'anti-revisionist part-
ies steadily decreased and in the January 1967 election 
it failed for the first time to gain a majority of 
65 
votes . The prospec ts for a revisionist victory in a 
special eferendum have thus become doubtful. 
According to the consolidated results of variou s 
public opinion polls on the issue , revisionists enjoyed 
g eater g ass- oots support than anti- evisionists before 
., . 
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the merger of 1955, but they have since lost their 
superiority, the shift of their fortunes becoming 
. . 1 1 . 66 1ncreas1ng y c ear after the m1ddle of 1957. More-
over, the change in the climate of public opinion has 
been accurately reflected in the attitudes of the 
press which , as we have already seen, became extremely 
cauti ous in 1955 after a short-lived revisionist spree 
in 1954 . In 1956 the ratios of revisionist , anti-
revisionist and uncomitted daily newspapers became 
something like 5-6-23 and it has since remained bas-
ically unchanged. 67 
To make the situation worse from the revisionist 
point of view , big business circles, best represented 
by Keidanren, ceased to show so much positive interest 
in an early revision of the Constitution as previously. 
There 1S little doubt that , as pointed out in a preceding 
chapter, business groups have been in a position to 
influence the policy-making process of the LOP more 
effectively than other extra-party groups.68 The gen-
eral direction of their influence regarding this issue 
in recent years , however , hardly seems to have been 
towards an early a chi evement of the lDP ' s inaugural 
pledge. An important cause of this apparent change in 
the attitudes of many businessmen may be found in the 
increasingly wide acceptance of de facto re-armament 
(or at least acquiescence in this) , in the sense of 
de facto revision of Artic le 9 , on the part of public 
opinion and the press and, ultimately , by the Supreme 
Court. 69 In view of these developments business 
circles probably continued to regard revision as a 
desirable goa l , if it could be achieved without much 
sacrifice . They ceased , however, to consider it essen-
tial . Businessmen had been concerned from the beginning 
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not so much with the ideological need to change the 
' Occupation Regime' as wi th the prospects for substan-
tial defence contracts . S o long as the latter were 
forthcoming without the formal amendment of the Const-
itution , there was no compelling reason why they should 
identify themselves with the unpopular cause of revis-
ionism. 
The Attitude of Top Party Leadership 
Despite the evidently adverse conditions described 
above the LOP's official enthusiasm and optimism for an 
ealry constitutional revision was maintained for about 
half a year after the merger of November 1955. In 
December of that year Ogata, then a member of the ini tial 
four-man P residential P roxy Committee defined it as a 
principal objective of the unified party, while the Prime 
Minister , Hatoyama , who was also a member of the Pres-
idential P roxy Committee, confidently promised to attain 
70 the goal without delay . Half a year later in June 
1956 the S ecretary - General , Kishi , appealed to a meeting 
of the heads of the P arty ' P refectual Federations to 
ensure that the P arty win a two - thirds majority in the 
forthcoming House of Councillors election in order to 
. . 1 71 
make constitutIonal revision posslb eo In the mean-
time, the Commission on the Constitution Bill was intro-
duced into the Diet in Feb r uary and was passed against 
bitter S ocialist Party opposition in June 1956 . 
Once the Cabinet Commission on the Constitution 
was established, however , the official attitude of the 
P arty's top leadership group became much more moderate 
and , at times , even negative concerning the issue . This 
change has been reflected , for example , in the treatment 
of the subject in the occasional public pronouncements 
made in the name of the P arty in connection with Diet 
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elections and annual P arty Conferences o Although refer-
ences have been made to the issue in a number of such 
pronouncements , a comparison of the terms and expressions 
used in them reveals that , so far as the essential arg -
ument s are c oncerned , each was more or less a rei teratim 
h · . 72 of t e pOInts prevIously mad e . Furthermore , the gen-
eral tone of the arguments presented has become progress_ 
ively more mod erate and ambiguous . 
The official organ of the PARC , S eisaku Geppoo , hM 
carried a fair number of so l i dl y revisionist theses as 
if t o make up for the inaction o f the P arty ' s executives 
repr esented b y t he L eaders ' Meet i ng o A careful examin-
ation of these theses shows , however , that a majority of 
them have been written by one theoretician on the staff 
73 of the PARC , Miyamoto Yosh i o, a former purgee o Admitt-
ed ly persuasive though many o f h i s revisionist arguments 
are , they impress the reader more with thei r increasing 
moderation and eclecticism than with the consistency of 
'" h' 74 t heir reVISIonIst emp aSIs o 
Consi d ering the rigid constitutional requirements, 
which t he P arty ' s fai l ure to contro l mo r e than two-thirds 
of seats i n both Houses of the Diet has made it imposs -
ible to satisfy , and the generally a dverse situation of 
opinion outside the P arty , the deliberate evasion of the 
issue by the P arty ' s top lead ers may have be en tactically 
sound and even unavo id able o A greater emphasis on rev-
isionism would probab l y have estranged a significant 
number of votes from the P ar t y and intensif i ed the oppos-
ition o f the other parties to the other parts of its 
policy programme o This negative a t t i tud e of the P arty 
leaders , however , has not put an end to r evisionism 
wi t hin the P arty but mere l y driven it in temporary abey-
ance o Its proponents have been associated first with 
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the LOP Committee on the Constitution , then with the 
Cabinet Commission on the Consti tut ion and more recently 
with the informal intra-party group , Soshinkai . 
The LOP Committee on the Constitution 
As soon as the LDP was formed in November 195~ it 
officially set up a Committee on the Constitution (Kempoo-
choosakai) to continue the revisionist movement which had 
been an impo tant reasqn for the merger o By the end of 
the same year this Committee had d ecided to start in 
January 1956 a serious investigation of the problems 
involved and to prepare by May 1956 a provisional d raft 
.. 75 A 
of t he reVIsIon o s none of the permanent Divisions or 
exis ting Investigation Committees of the PARC were com-
petent to deal with this particular kind of issue , the 
establishment of the Committee on the Constitution was a 
step n ecessary in order to make any course of action , 
whether revisionist or anti-revisionist , official party 
poli cy o As ind icated in Chapter 4 , the P arty ' s official 
attitude towards the issue could be determined only when 
a d eci sion recommended b y the newly established PARC su~ 
di vision was approved first b y the Deliberation Commis ~ 
ion and then by the Executive Council . The above-
mentioned decisions of the Commit tee were clearly p ed-
icated on the assumption hat it was t o fu lfil the role 
of pol icy-initiator and promoter in the organisational 
framework of par ty decisi on-making o 
In reality , however , the Committee on the Con~ 
stitution has never produced a draft of the revision o 
Moreover , in July 1956 its Chairman , Yamazaki Iwao , 
e plicitly a ccep ted the p ropo sal of the t op par ty leadern 
conveyed to him by the S ecretary -General , Kishi , and the 
Chairman of the Executive Council , Ishii Mitsujiroo , to 
the effect that all concret e preparat ions for revision , 
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including the drafting of a revised constitution , should 
be left entirely to the Cabinet Commi ssion and that the 
work of the Party Committee should be confined to the 
education of public opinion and dissemination of infor -
o 76 Th matlon. e record of its subsequent behaviour proves 
that it has faithfully observed this agreement. Although 
it has not been formally dissolved, it ceased to function 
from the middle of 1956 until early 1961 and there is no 
evidence that it even met officially during that period. 77 
It began to meet with some frequency in early 1961, but 
until the latter half of that year the meetings were 
devoted largely either to business of a procedural nat-
ure or to lectures given by invited guest speakers on 
subjects more academic than practical , such as the con-
o 0 f 0 0 78 
stltutlons of orelgn countrles. 
Originally , the main support for the Committee no 
doubt came from the group of prewar politicians and bur-
eaucrats such as Hatoyama and Kishi, who had brought to 
the early revisionist mo vement both leadership and emot-
ional drive. It seems , however , that the initial enthu&" 
iasm and sense of dedication which had characterised 
their call to rectify the ' Occupation Re gime ' , of which 
the Const itution was a basic part , dissipated rather 
quickly . S oon after the formation of the LOP the three 
most ardent revisionist leaders of the pre-merger period 
- Ha toy ama, Ishibashi and Kishi - all began to behave 
just as any prudent leaders of dominant factions would 
have behaved wi th a vi ew to minimi sing causes of int ernal 
fri ct ion and estrangement of public opinion and to stab-
ilising the status quo . The steady decrease of prewar 
elements in the overall conservative force in the Diet 
also tended to reduce the importance of their role in the 
285 . 
policy -maki ng process of t he P arty in general . 79 
Under these ci r cumstances the Commit tee was grad -
ually d ivest ed of the emotional influence of the prewar 
men and came under t he control of former high-ranking 
publi c servants , until by the end of 1965 nearly half its 
members were drawn from that parti cular category of LDP 
80 
member . The disp r oportionately high percentage of 
former pub lic off icia ls and t he d isproportionately low 
percentage of former lo c al politicians has indicated a 
tendency towards polarisation of ideological attitude s 
on this issue between these two categories . 
In terms of the fact ional d i stribution of its mem-
bers , on the other hand, no single faction had a con-
spicuously higher perc entage of members affiliated with 
the Committee than the others. 8l L ike mos t other forma l 
party organs the faction led by the current P res i dent 
(Ikeda) contributed a somewhat larger share than others , 
but the difference was insignificant . S o far as its 
membership composition is concerned , it is impos sible to 
i den tify it with any part icular faction or fact ions o It 
was, in fact , this v ery fact of impartiality or indi f f-
erence in terms of intra-party factionalism that has 
eventually led to a shift of the focus of revision is t 
activity from the official Committee on the Constitution 
to an informal intra-party group, the 5 0shinkai . 
The Factional Implications of Revisionism 
This distribu tion pattern of the members of the LDP 
Committee on the Constitution seems to imply that fact-
ionalism has been irrelevant to the development of this 
issue in the P arty . A closer examination reveals, 
however , that it has played a critic al role in the pro c ~ 
ess jus t as it has done in many other instances of party 
poli cy-mak"ng. 
When the attitude of he top pa ty leadershi p 
toward s t he issue c onspi c uously softened only half a 
year af t er the 1955 me ge r , mos 0 tho s e who wou l d 
subsequen tly repl ace the prewar men as leaders of the 
revisionist mov emen in the P arty were associated with 
the anti-Ha toyama c oa li ti on of d issi dent factions, the 
. k d k' 82. . J l kyoku- on an al. S Inc e thls coalition was led by 
t he Yoshida faction , it was difficul f o them to 
adv o cat e i mmed iate constituti onal revision , wh ich 
wou l d have d is p leased the major ity in that fac ti on 
and c onsequently undermined t he un ity of the diss i d ent 
factions bu ilt u p o v e r ano ther contro v ersial issue , 
the normal is a tion of d i p lomatic relations with the U. S . S.R. 
When eight more or less stable fac ional units 
emerged ou t of the b itter presiden ti al c ont eBt of 
De c embe r 1 956 , many of t he po tent i ally mos t agg r es sive 
revisi on i sts were associated with two of t hem, t he Kish i 
and t he I shi i . 83 f a c t 1 ons. Bec ause Kishi replaced 
Ish i bash i as P rime Mini ter a ft e r t wo months and h i 
a c ion a cqu ired the st a t us of a dom i nant faction, 
instead of d i ss i den t one, the revisionist s asso ci a ted 
wit h h i facti on were pu t in a posit i on where it wa 
d ifficult t o br ing up this cont oversia1 i ssue since 
hey ran t he risk of intensif ing intra-par ty con licts 
as well as conflicts with o t her part i es and thus threat-
ening t he ir own factional hegemony . On the other hand, 
h e rev i sionis s in the r e lativ e ly smal l Ish ii faction 
could no t launch an effective c ampaign b th ems el ves. 
F ind ing it d i ff icu1 for these reasons o c arry 
on revisionist agitati on w i hin the P arty , some of hem 
turned to the Cabinet Comm i ssion on t he Cons titution wh en 
i was es ab li shed in August 1957. With a hope t o m k i ng 
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it an official and respectable pressure group desi gned 
not only 'educate public opinion ' but beyond that also to 
prepare a concrete bluepr int of actual revision , they 
flocked to the Commission and tried hard to make it 
serve their purpo se . Because , however, of the resi s -
tance of a small but determined g roup of anti-
revi sionist members led by Chairman Takayanagi Kenzoo, 
they were made to real is e before long that the Commis s -
ion alone could not be relied upon as an effective press-
84 
ure group o It was just when they were about read y to 
give up the attempt to turn the Cabinet Commission into 
an effective vehicle of revisionism that the Kishi 
Cabinet was replaced by the Ikeda Cab inet in the wake of 
the anti-Security Treaty riots of 1960. The consequent 
change of factional pos itions freed the revisioni sts 
associated with the Kishi faction from the rest rictions 
which had bound them so long as they had been the domin-
ant factions . 
Now that they were dri ven to the position of dis s -
i dent fact ions it became not only possible but tactically 
d esirable ( in terms of the game of inter - factional com-
petition and compromise) for the revisionists in the 
Kish i and Ishii factions to challenge openly the Ikeda 
fact ion and other dominant factions by raising whatever 
controversial issues were likely to embarrass and weaken 
the latter . Consti tut ional revision was well suited to 
this purpose and it was there for e most natural for the 
revisionists in the d issi dent factions to seize upon it . 
Under t hese changed circumstances they attempted to re-
vitalise the P arty Committee on the Constitution and 
also to build an entirely new dis si d ent and revisionist 
group crossing factional lines , and independent from the 
sai d Committee . 
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The first sIgn of a systematic attempt to bring the 
Committee on the Constitution back to life again was 
given in December 1961 when the more militant of its 
members succeeded In having a decision made in its name 
to bring pressure to bear upon the party leaders so that 
they should take an unequivocally revisionist stand in 
th f th . H f C . 11 . 85 e or comIng ouse 0 ounCI ors electIon . Al though 
this wa s firmly rejected by the Leaders' Meeting , which 
was, like most formal organs of the Party, under the 
effective control of the dominant factions , the Committee 
became thereafter a mu ch more articulate and active body 
. 86 than prevIously. 
The attempt by the revisionists associated with 
the d issi dent factions (especially the Kishi and the 
Ishii factions) to make the official Party Committee the 
princi pal base of their factional , as well as revisionist, 
activities faile d primarily because of its factional 
implications . Like most other forma l Party organs it 
was under the control of the dominant factions . In the 
spring of 1964 1 for example , the Fukuda (former Kishi) 
and the Ishii factions contributed between them only 
16 . 6% of its members and the addition of the S atoo 
87 faction's share would not bring the figure above 30%. 
It was no doubt for this reason that they turned their 
attention to the possibilities of buil d ing a new intra-
party group~ the S oshinkail as a substitute for the 
Cabinet Commission and the P arty Committee. 
S oshinkai 
S ometime in 1959 about thirty revisionist LDP 
members of the Diet began to meet informally but regul-
arly to exchange views on various controversial issues , 
. .. 1 . . 88 includ Ing constltutlona reVISIon . This group was 
named Soshinkai (as s o ciation of pure hearts) in June of 
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the following year and by early 1966 had grown into a 
well established intra- party group of some 100 members, 
. . t b' . b D' 89 a maJorl y elng lncum ent let members. Like any 
other signif icant political group in contemporary Japan , 
it professes above all deep commitment to ' true demo-
cracy ', but its more immediate concern IS with the res-
toration of the traditions of the Japanese nation and 
. 90 
communIsm. control over international Although it 
has interested itself in a wi d e range of ideological 
Issues - the system and content of school education, 
national de fence , the ratification of the ILO Convent-
ion 87~ etc . - constitutional revision has been one of 
its basic and central objectives. 
It is hard to imagine that this aggressive anti-
communist line , compounded with traditional Japanese 
puritanism and moralism, which has been advocated by the 
leaders of the S oshinkai, will be accepted by a majority 
even within the P arty , let alone by public opinion at 
large. 9l As an intra~par ty pressure group , however , it 
no doubt has a very significant degree of influence on 
the policy-making process and has used it in effective 
ways . In addition to frequently 'advising' the Prime 
Minister as well as other members of the Cabinet on 
issues of its primary interest , the group presented its 
views, for example, on constitut ional revision and the 
restoration of the prewar Empire Day (kigensetsu) to the 
Par ty leaders before the 17th P arty Conference of 
92 January 1966 . 
As in the case of the Party Committee on the 
Constitution the percentage of former public servants 
has been very high in the membership composition of the 
S oshinkai . In the middle of 1963 , for example , fifty-six 
LOP- affiliated M.H . R o' s were officially associated with 
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it ~ of whom forty could be positively identified . Of 
these forty presumably most active members twenty-two 
(55%) were former high -ranking public servants , as com-
pared with 4 (10%) each of former local politicians and 
b · 93 USlnessmen . In the case of the twenty -two M. H. C o ' s 
associated with the group at the time fifteen could be 
positively identified . Of this latter number only four 
(26.6%) were former public servants , but it should be 
noted that even this percentage was twice as high as that 
of either the former local politicians or businessmen am 
that three of the six classified as ' miscellaneous ' were 
former military leaders with backgrounds analogous to 
those of high - ranking civil servants. In any event, 
the numerical predominance of bureaucratic elements in 
the membership of the So shinkai is as evident as in the 
case of the P arty Committee . 
Just as significant (though very natural) is the 
fact that the group has had a special relationship with 
the two particular factions respectively led by Fukuda 
(formerly Kishi) and Ishii . The percentages of the 
members of these two factions officially associated with 
the group in 1963 were respe c tively 37 . 5% and 35 . 7%, 
both figures being mo e than twice as high as that of 
any other faction o94 Be tween them they constituted 35 
per cent of the group's i d entifiable members with seats 
in the Lower House of the D iet ~ a ratio which is quite 
remarkable considering the fact that their combined 
share of the P arty - affiliated M. H.R. ' s at the time was 
a mere 13 . 6%. If one adds the S atoo ' s faction 's share 
of 17 . 5%, the three d issi den t factions easily controlled 
a majority of members in the Soshinkai . 
Summary 
The revisionist pressure which had grown largely 
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out of the rei nstatement of prewar and warti me leaders In 
the arly 1950' s constituted an important part of the 
i d eological and po li i al justification for the conser-
v ati v e merger of 1955 0 It was inevitable that he init -
i a l p rogramm e of the LOP shoul d have included an explicit 
c ommitment to the earliest po ssible attainment of con~ 
stitutional revision ~ c onsidering the historical back-
ground of the me rger movement 0 The establishment of 
both the LOP Commit te e on th e Consti tution and the Cab-
inet Commis si o n on the Constitution under t he Hatoyama 
Cabinet Was a natural and logical con s equen ce of the 
historical process o 
Almost as soon as the latter c ame into being, 
howev e r , t he attitude of the P arty ' s top leaders became 
mu ch more cautious , and negative o This change resulted 
from ' t he desire on the part of the dominant factions 
( r ep r esented by the successive P residents) to ensure the 
c ont inuation of their own hegemony in the inter-party 
and int ra- party power s trugg le . This they attempted to 
do by avoi d ing such c ontroversial issues as might cause 
or intensify conflicts and destroy the minimal degree 
of consen sus required for the maintenanc e of th e status 
quo . R elevant in this respect were the r igi d constit-
u ti onal r equ iremen t s for r evisi on , the host ility of the 
Opposition parties and groups ~ the generally negati ve 
state of publi c opinion and the d ecline of support fo r 
positi ve revisionist action from business circl eso These 
factors combined to make it not only unrealisti c but also 
pol i t ic ally d angerous for the P arty ' s lead ers to emphasise 
the issue . 
The negative attitud e of the Barty leadership in-
hib it ed t he acti viti es of the P arty Committee on the 
Constitution , bu t it ha s not put an end to revisionist 
, 
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p . es sure in the P art Yo New groups of revisionists , who 
have largely replaced the p r ewar and war ti me leaders, 
have been drawn mainl y from the o ccupat ional category of 
former publi c serv ants o Just as significant is the fact 
t hat they have been asso c iated with two part icular fact-
ions - the Kishi (subsequently F ukuda) and the Ish ii 
facti ons . Bec ause of t h is fa c ti onal implication of their 
a ctivjties , their a ttempt to use the P arty Committee on 
t he Cons titution as t he princi pal base of their operat-
ions has failed o S ince the centre of their activities 
shifted to the newly formed unofficial intra-party group, 
the Soshinkai ~ the elements of factionalism have become 
more pronounc e d than pr evi ously . In this respect a 
consistent and recurring pattern has appeared wh ich de s-
erv es special attentio~ o 
S trong and o v ert revisionist pressure has emana ted 
i nvariabl y from dissident factions and th eir leaders . 
Once they hav e succeeded in having one of their own fact-
ion leaders elected P arty P resident , thus putting them-
selves in the pos ition of dominant factions , they have 
c eased to press aggres siv e ly for an immediate or early 
revision . Considerat i ons about the continuation of 
t he i r own rule in t erms of the inter-factional balance 
of power hav e always proved more d ecisi ve than t he ir 
i d eological commitment to the cause of constitutional 
revision o S ince the pre- merger days there has not been 
a single exception to this general rule o ow that 
S atoo has been nomi nated P ar ty P resident and both the 
Fukud a and the Ishii factions have become automati call y 
the hard - c ore of the new coaliti on of d ominant factions , 
this fami l iar pattern seems likely to repeat itself o 
With the c hange in the fortunes of the factions involved, 
the emphasis i n the a ctiviti es of the S oshinkai will aloo 
prob ably change o The LOP as a whole is no nearer today 
to fulfilling its inaugural pledge than it was a few 
months af er it was formed . 
) 
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CHAPTER 9 
RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
In the history of Japan ' s foreign relations no 
issue has received such attention from her leaders and 
her people as relations with her vast continental neigh-
bour, China o The S econd World War merely incr eased 
the complexi~ of this centuries -old problem which IS 
bedevilled not only by the differing attitudes of 
Peking ~ Washington and Taipei , but also apparently 
irreconciliable divisions of opinion among the Japanese 
themselves o The issue has not only divided the part-
ies from each other but has even divided the LOP it selfo 
Indeed, conflicts seem to exist within the minds of 
many LOP memb er s o 
In the present Chapter we shall first describe 
the development of the issue in general and then con-
centrate on the patterns of LOP involvement . 
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BACKGROUND 
Ph ase I (1949-52) 
Relations between Japan and the People! s Republic 
of China may be di vi ded into five fairly dist inct phasese 
The first phase lasted from the establishment of the 
Peop le ' s Repub lic in October 1949 to the middle of 
1952 , when the first private trade agreement was con-
cl uded o 
In the first months after its establishment, the 
relations of the P eople's Repub lic with Japan were far 
from am i cable o Its hostile attitude to Japan was 
symbolised by the S ino-S oviet Treaty of Fr iendship , 
Alliance and Mu tual Assistance (signed in February 
1950 ) whose first article Was directed specifically 
1 
against Japano Bo th the content of the Japanese 
P eac e Treaty (concluded in S eptember 1951) and the 
manner in which it was prepared were bitterly opposed 
P . 2 by ekIng . N e i th er the U 0 S 0 S • R on 0 r the P e 0 p 1 e' s 
Republic of China signed that treaty and the separate 
peac e treaty conclud ed with Nationalist China by Japan 
in April 1952 naturally exacerbated Japan ' s relations 
wi th Pek ingo 
The exchange of persons and goods between main-
land China and Japan dur ing this period was negligibleo 
Between 1949 and 1951 fifteen Japanese visited mainland 
Ch i na , and no mainland Chinese visited Japan until 
19540 3 Japan was bound during this period by the trade 
embargo enforced by the United S tates and her Western 
allies through the Consulta tive Group (C oGo ) in P aris 
and COCOM and CHINCOM established under it . 4 The 
embargo l i st which was applied to Japan was far mo e 
, . 
296 0 
e t ens i ve than the' international ' or 'Paris ' list 
prepared by and applied to the European members of 
C. Go , which she joined in S eptember 1952 ; for she 
accepted a more restrictive Ii st presented by the 
United S tates a t th e c onference on F ar Eastern t ade 
held in Washington in July and August 19520 5 
Under the ci r cumstances Japanese trad e with 
mainland China fell from 6% of her total exports and 
306% of her total imports in 1947/48 to 0 004% and 
0 073% in 1952 (ci. the 1930- 39 average of 21.6% and 
16 . 6% respectively l 06 
This d ecline of Japan's China trad e involved 
a drasti c change in her sources of basic raw materials 
and foo d s tuf f s . Japan ' s purchases of soy beans, 
coal and salt from the United S tates in 1951 increased 
by a factor of three , sixteen and eighteen over the 
prev i ous year o On the other hand , the values of her 
i mports of the same items from mainland China In 1951 
were 5 . 5%, 808% and 3 . 7% of those of the previous 
7 
yearo 
P hase II (1952-1958 ) 
The second phase opene d with the conclusion of 
the f i rs t private trade agreement in 1952 and lasted 
unt i l early 1958, when the 'Nagasaki flag inci d en t ' 
tempo rarily interrup ted the e xchange o f persons and 
goods between the two countrieso 
After 1952 it bec ame customary for P eking to 
invite v arious Japanese groups to the mainland on the 
occasion of the annual Nationa l Day celebration , and 
the numb er of Japanese visitors to China st e a d ily 
i ncreased until it reached a pe ak of 1 , 24 3 in 1957 . 8 
In the meantime, o ver one hund red Chinese visited 
Japan annually betw ee~ 1955 and 1 957 0 
Trade between the two countries was governed 
during this per i od by three non-governmental trade 
agreemen ts , the first of wh ich was signed in June 195 2 0 
The sec ond was signed ln October 1953 by a non-partisan 
d elegat i on of the Nitchuu-booeki sokushin giin renmei 
(Diet members' league for the promotion of S ino-
Japanese trade) and the Ch ina Council for the Promo tion 
of International Trade0 9 The third agreement (the 
first to be signed in Tokyo) was signed in May 19550 10 
While the target envisaged in these three agree-
ments was in each case £ Stg 30m o each way, the rates of 
th e fulfilment were 4% for Japanese exports and 6% for 
Japanese i mports under the first, 2707% for exports 
and 41. 0 % for imports under the second and 36 . 7% for 
expor t s and 9103% for imports in the f i rst year of 
11 
th e third agreemento 
De spite the Korean ceasefire in July 1953 and 
the dr a stic relaxation of the embargo against the 
U.SoS.R. and the nations of East Europe in Augus t 
1954, r i gid int ernat i onal control against trade with 
Ch ina Was c ont i nued unt il the middle of 19570 12 Under 
the c irc umstances it was impossible for Japan to ex-
por t man of the industri al ma t erials, equipment and 
mach i nery designa ted in the agreements as Category~A 
(koo-ru i ) and this was largely responsible for the 
relatively low level of the Japanese exports . 13 It 
was no t until July 1957 that the Japanese government 
freed 170 of the 450 it ems listed in the CHI COM 
l i st and not until one year later that the new embargo 
l ist ( the current COCOM list) was further cut by 
abou t 70 items o14 In other words , it was impossible 
un .i 1 the latter half of 1957 for Japan to in: rease 
signi ic antly her exports t o Ch ina since these by the 
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nature of the economy and resources consisted mainly 
of manufactured goods and indus rial equipment. 
Desp ite , however, the barriers erected by the 
international trade embargo, various steps were taken 
in Japan during this perio d to encourage the growth 
of Ch ina trade. Follomng the conclusion of the third 
agreement, a ?pecial Committee for the Promotion of 
Trade (booeki-shinkoo tokubetsu - iinkai) was established 
in the House of Repres entatives on a non-partisan basis. 
P rime Mi nister Hatoyama promised' support and co-
operation' in the implementation of the agreement, 
and the first Chinese trade fair was held in Tokyo 
and Osaka in October and December 1955 9 which was recipro_ 
cated in the following year by a Japanese trade fair 
in P eking and S hanghai . F inally , a Nitchuu yushutsunyuu 
kumiai (Japan-China export-import union) was set up 
with the official blessing of the government and the 
.. . f b 240 ' f . 15 partIcIpatIon 0 a out prIvate Irms. 
The situation changed in February 1957 , however , 
with Kishi Nobusuke ' s succeed ing Ishibashi Tanzan as 
P rime Minister of Japan . After the new P rime Minister 
visited Taipei in June and reportedly encouraged the 
Generalissimo to realise the reconquest of the main-
16 
land , the attitude of P eking began gradually to 
revert to the early hostility and distrust towards 
17 
the Japanese government o 
This sudden change in the climate of S ino -
Japanese re la tions naturally interfered with the 
efforts to conclude a fourth trade agreement , neg~ 
otiations for which were started in S eptember 1957 , 
were interrupted in November and were resumed in 
February of the following year o Al though the agree-
ment was finally signed in P eking on 5 March 1958 , 
') 
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the attitude of he Japanese government was far from 
en husiastic, pa t icular l y because of the provisions 
it contai ned conc erni ng the stationing of permanent 
trade mi ssions in the two cap itals and the accompany-
ing memo radnum spelling out the legal privileges they 
would be entitled to rec e iv e from the respective gov-
18 
ernments. 
Chinese anger at the generally negative attitude 
of the Kishi government was ignited by a brief note 
th e la t ter gave to the three Japanese signatories to 
h A 01 19 t e agreement on 9 prl • In this note Kishi prom-
ised 0 give support and co -ope ration 'within the 
l i mi ts 0 relevant Japanese laws, on the bas i s of the 
unders t anding that she (Japan) did not recognise it 
(the government in P eking) , and considering existing 
international relations , In his lengthy telegram 
of 14 April an Han-chen bluntly rejected the 'o ffer ' 
20 of support couched in these qualifying phras es o 
To make the break even more definite , two 
Japanese ind ivi duals pulled down the Chinese national 
flag a t t he site of a Ch inese postage stamp and colour 
print exhibition in agasaki on the afternoon of 2 May 
1958 .
21 
The incident in effect brough t the second 
phase of relations between the two c ountrie s to an end, 
and for about two years following it the Kishi govern- · 
men t adopted a 'wait and see ' attitude , while P eking 
promulgated 'three principles' of future S ino -Japanese 
o 22 
relat I ons . 
P hase III (1958-1960) 
The sudd en resumption of the ' col d war ' be t ween 
P eking and Tokyo was reflected in a d ecline both in 
the exc hange of p ersons and in trade . Compared with 
195 7 when 1 »243 Japanese visited Ch ina and 140 Ch ine e 
r isi t ed Japan , only 19 1 Japan ese and not a single Ch inese 
d i d so in 19 590 23 I n the mean ti me, the v a lues o f 
Japanese exports to and i mpor ts f r om Ch ina in 1959 
d opped r espectively t o one-twent i e th and less than a 
quar t er of what t hey had been in 19570 24 In the proc-
es s a total of 1,262 export and i mpor t c ontrac ts , 
involving about 110 Japanese manufacturers and trading 
fi ms and v alued at £ S tg 35m . wer e cancelled, not 
only c aus ing enormou s financi al loss to th e companies 
concerned bu t - probab ly more important in the long 
r u n ~ acting as a deep psychologi c al shock to Japanese 
25 bu siness circl es in general o 
Despit e, however , its open and relentless at t a c k s 
on the governm en t of Japan , Pek ing c on tinu ed t o encour-
age the visit s to Ch ina o f Japanese ind ivi duals and 
groups known to be oppo sed to Ki shi either on i deol-
ogical or par tis an grounds o Th i s dualism in Pek ing ' s 
po l "cy became increasingly e vi dent as the controversy 
in Japan over the proposed revision o f the US- Japanese 
S e cur ity Trea ty i n t ens ifi ed in 19590 
In Mar ch 1959 a So cialist P arty d elega ti on led 
b S ecre t a -General Asanuma visited P eki ng and caused 
b oth Jubilat ion and d ismay in Japan and elsewhere b y 
pub lic b y denoun ci ng 'US i mper i alism' as v the c ommon 
26 ~nemy of the Japanese and t he Ch inese peoples' 0 In 
June th e Ni tchuu-yuukoo kyookai (Japan-China fri endship 
associ ation , establ ished on 1 October 1950) and the 
Nihon_chuugoku bunka kooryuu kyookai (Japan-China cul-
ural exc hange associati on , formed in Mar ch 1956) sen t 
their representatives t o China and issued a joint st a te -
ment with t he Chinese P eople's As s oci at i on for Cul tural 
h F " C " 27 Relat ions wit orelgn ountr l es o More s ignifican t 
or th ir long~ r ange pol itical i mpli c at i ons were the 
') 
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visi s of two LOP politicians' groups a few months 
later . In S eptember Ish i bashi Tanzan went to Peking 
accompanied by two other LOP Diet members , 28 and in 
the next mon th Matsumura Kenzoo and his party followed. 29 
The personal involvement of these leaders of dis sident 
LOP factions in people-to-people diplomacy during the 
crisis set an important prec edent for the development s 
in the next phase o 
P ha se IV (1960 -1964) 
T~e fourth phase , which began with the replace-
ment in 1960 of the Kishi Cabinet by the ' low posture' 
and ' economic-minded ' Ikeda Cabinet , saw a resumption 
of the trend towards increased trade and communication 
a the non-governmental level that had become evident 
in the second phase . 
On the occasi on of the National Day celebration 
of 1960 twelve Japanese groups were invited to Peking 
where they joined eight Chinese organisations in 
issuing an appeal for increased trade and an official 
30 governmental trade agreement o This was followed by 
Chou En-la i ' s three-point proposal (usually referred 
to as the 'three pr inci ples of S ino - Japanese trade') 
made during an interview with Suzuki Kazuo , the Wan-
aging Di rector of the itchuu - booeki sokushinkai on 
31 27 August 1960 0 Hereafter a formula called 'friendly 
firms trade' began to be accepted as the principal 
type of S ino -Japanese trad e o Before: how~ver, this 
had been formalised by the signing of a protocol in 
De c ember 1962,32 another formula was initiated by a 
memorandum si gned on 9 December by a Japanese business-
man and LOP Diet member , Takasaki Tatsunosuke , and 
a Deputy Chief of the S taff Office of Foreign Affairs , 
") " 
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L i ao Cheng- ch ih 033 Si no-Japanese t ad e in the ensuing 
.five years has developed large ly i n ac c ordanc e with 
the terms of hese two basic formulae . 
The Liao -Takasak i memorandum on a long-term 
S ino -Japanese trad e programme envisaged import and 
expo rt transactions amoun ti ng to an annual av erage of 
$US 180 m"llion for the nex t fiv e years , China export-
ing mainly c oa l , i on o re , soy beans, maize, salt, ti n, 
et c o 1 and importing steel materials, chemical fer tilis er, 
agricultu al c hemi c als, agricuJtural machinery and var-
ious 34 kinds of indus trial planto 
Under the arrangements based on the protocol 
(' fr i end ly firms trade' formula ) and the 1962 memoran-
d um (referred to as the 'LT trade' formula) , the volume 
of tr ade be t ween ma i nland China and Japan increased 
qu ickl from the low level of 1960 and by 1965 rec-
orded £ S tg 88m o for Japanese exports and £ Stg 8lm o 
s t erling for Japanese i mports , or 2 09% and 2 . 7% respect-
ively of t o t al Japanese exports and imports in that 
35 
In 1964 Japanese exports t o and imports from earo 
the mainland each overtook those to and from Taiwan. 
By the mi ddl e of 1966 mainland China had become one 
of Japan v s most i mpo t ant export markets & the fifth 
1 " " 1 36 larges t supp ler of her raw materla s o 
In the steady growth of S ino-Japanese trade 
under t he Ikeda Cabinet par ticular significance 
a tt a c he s t o the c onclus ion in July 1963 of an export 
c on t a ct between the Ku rashi k i Rayon Company and the 
China a ti onal Technic al Impor t Corporat i on o Thi 
involved the sale by t his well-known Japanese extile 
manu fac urer of a vi n Ion plant worth about £ S tg 7 . 4m . 
on a f j e~ ear de ferred payment basis at 5 . 5% inter-
es t 03 7 B the mi dd le of 1964 about a dozen similar 
contrac ts were either being negotiated or con idered 
by Japanese manufactu r ers and appropriate Chinese cor-
porations o These included another viny10n plant 
offe ed by the Dai~ ihon Booseki Company , a urea fert-
i1iser plant offered by the Tooyoo Engineering Com-
pany , a 12~500 ton freighte to be built by the 
Hi a ch i Shipbuilding Company, and others . 38 
The v forward-looking ' view expressed in S eptember 
1963 by Japan v s four most influential employers' organ-
isal i ons - Keidanren, Nikkeiren , Keizai-dooyuukai and 
Nisshoo - thruugh their joint research machinery , the 
Nihon keiza i -choosa kyoogikai (Japan economic researc h 
c ou nc il) indicated the degree of enthusiasm shared by 
Japanese industrialist 
ing China trad e o39 
and businessmen for the grow-
Even more dramatic and revealing was the attitude 
of Japanese political and economic leaders to an Han-
chenis vi sit to Japan on the occasion of the Chinese 
trade fair held in Tokyo and Osaka in 1964 0 The Chair-
man 0 the China Council for the P romotion of Internat-
iona1 Trade was met individually by such LDP leaders 
as S atoo Eisaku , Koono Ichiroo , Fujiyama Aiichiroo , 
Miki Takeo, and such prominent businessmen as Uemura 
Koogoroo and Suga Reinosuke of Keidanren , and Kikawada 
Kazutaka , Nakayama Sohei , Usami Makoto, Mizukaffii ' Tatsuzoo 
K ' 'd k,40 and Inayama Yoshihiro of the elzal - ooyuu al a 
Furthermore , in accord ance wi th the memo andum 
signed b Liao Cheng-chih , now P resi d ent of the China-
Japan Friendship Association ( established in October 
1963), and Matsumura Kenzoo , a team of five Chinese 
trade representatives led by Sun P ing-hua arrived in 
Tokyo in August 19640 41 In return in January the 
following year a three~man Japanese mission led by a 
mino offi c ial of the Ministry of International Trade 
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and Industr vi si t ed Peking. 42 In ac c ordance also 
with the same memorandum fourteen Japanese corres-
pondents , n i ne of whom were to stay in Pek ing for a 
year and the remaining five only temporarily , arrived 
in Pek i ng on 29 S eptember , while on the same day seven 
Ch i nese c orrespondents arrived in Tokyo . 43 
Despite , however, these promising development s 
up to the latter half of 1964, it gradually became 
evident in the following two and a half years that 
po stwar S in-Japanese relations were undergoing yet 
another i mportant change and entering a fifth phase . 
Phase V (1964-1967 
The P eople ' s Republic of Ch ina with which the 
S atoo gov ernment (which replaced the Ikeda government 
in Nov ember 1964) was to deal had now grown much more 
formidable a power for Japan bo th ideologically and 
mi1itarily o 
The progress of the S ino -Soviet dispute , China ' s 
nuc lear armament and the Great Pro letarian Cu ltural 
Revolu ion hav e c ombined to cause an une pected basi c 
re-alignment among the Japanese groups interested in 
t he issue. On the one hand, the JCP and groups under 
its influenc e, whi c h had always played a lead ing part 
in pos t war S ino-Japanese relations until late 1965 , hav e 
made a rema kab1e about-face and come to be regarded 
as P eking's 'enemy number one' In Japan . Less surpr is -
ing bu t just as significant , P eking's relationship 
wi th the S atoo gove nment and the dominant groups in 
the conse r v ative political hierarchy that it represents 
has also steadil dete iorated. 
On he 0 her hand , the dominan t groups In the 
J SP and , to a somewhat more limited extent , a minor i ty 
i n the LOP have vi tuall eplaced th e JCP and its 
front-groups as the ma in reservoir of goodwill and 
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uppor t for China i n Japan o 
In oppos iti on to Ch ina's per istent attacks on 
Mos cow and he efusa1 to co-operate with the Soviet 
ev i sionist' leaders (espec ia ll y in supporting the 
South Vietnamese National L iberation Front and the 
North Vietnamese Workers' Party ) the JCP began toward 
the end of 1965 to press openly for the creation of a 
broad 'anti-imperialist' front linking the Commun ist 
and Wo kers' P arties of China, North Korea, North 
Vietnam, Japan and the Uo S.SoRo44 The exchange of 
opinion be twe en the JCP d elegation led by S ecretary-
General Miyamoto and the Chinese leaders in P eking 
in Ma r c h 1966 f a iled to produce agreement and on their 
return a series of articles openly critical of Ch inese 
p olic y appeared in the official party organso 45 
Much Jess unexpected and spectacular has been 
the de erioration in the relationship between the two 
go ernments in the most recent period o Barely ten days 
af t er the new S atoo Cabinet was forme d in ovember 
1 964, it deci ded to turn down an application for 
Japanese visas made by a Chinese Communist P arty del-
egation to be led b y the then mayor of P eking , P eng 
46 
Chen. When in August 1965 an Han-chen openly 
c iticised the policy of the S atoo government , the 
Vice-Minis ter of Foreign Affairs , Shrmoda , responded 
with an ext aordina ily strong denunciation of his 
ac ion as a f agrant case of interference with Japan's 
inte nal affairs . 47 When a few months later oppos-
ition in Japan to t he ratification of a treaty nor-
ma1izing Japan's diplomat ic relations with Sou th Ko rea 
became in ense s P eking demonstrated its objections to 
the treat much mo e forcefully than other c ommun ist 
48 bloc governments o 
b 
The a t t itud es of the two governments have also 
not been very c onci liatory with regard tradeo In cOn-
trast with t he Ikeda Cab i net wh ich in 1963 allowed the 
Ku ash i ka Rayon Company t o use the c red it of the Expo rt-
Impor t Bank (a government co~poration ) to financ e its 
export of a viny1 0n p l an t to China, one of the f irst 
a c i ons t he S ato o government took i n relation to 
S i no-Japanese trade was on 21 January 1965 to deny the 
same faci lities t o t he Da i-Ni hon Booseki CompanYo49 
Less th an a week la te r the Minister of Internat i onal 
Trade a nd Industry , S akur au chi , announc ed another 
Cab ine t deci s i on denying the Bank's credit t o Hi tachi 
wh ich was negotiating for the e port o f a freighter 
50 
to Ch ina. 
These d ecisi ons were followed on 8 F ebruary 1965 
by a r e f erence by the P r i me Mi nister in the course of 
debate in t he House of Represen t atives Budge t Committee 
to the 'Yoshida letter' of May 1964 i n wh ich Yosh i da~ 
a former P ri me Mi nisters had prom i sed the National 
Ch inese government t hat th e cr ed it s of the Export-
Import Bank woul d not be used to finance Japanese 
e ports to mainl and Ch ina, at least throughou t 1964. 51 
In pro est against these decisions and the attitude 
of t he Japanese gov ernmen t L iao Cheng-chih on 6 Ap ril 
announc ed t he nullification of t he contract with 
Hitachi , a nd 30 Ap ' il he canc el led the contract with 
D " °h B k" 5 2 al- 1 on o ose 1 . 
The jncreasing alienation be t ween P ek ing and 
t he JCP (and groups under its in fluence) together with 
t he dominant groups i n the LDP, has led to the emer-
gence of the lef t -wing groups in the J SP and t he p 0-
P eking minority in the LOP as t he main prop on the 
Japanese side of the relation sh i p between the two 
0 7 . 
c ountr i e s o 
Just as the trad itionally pro-P eking J SP groups 
(rep esented b y the Shakaishugi kenkyuukai of the 
S asak i faction , the Heiwa-dooshikai and the offi ci al 
Spe ci al Committe e for the R estoration of S ino-Japanese 
Relat ions (Nitchuu kM~l~o ka ifuku tokubetsu- iinkai)) 
53 have formed the AA- kenkyuuka i with in that party , the 
pro-P eking elements in the LOP have or ganised th em-
sel ves in the A jiya-Afurika mondai kenkyuukai (Afro-
Asian affairs study group , hereafter referred to as 
the Afro -A s i an Group) 0 In c ompetition with the anti-
P eking group , the A iiya mondai kenkyuukai (Asian 
affairs study group , hereafter referred to as the Asian 
Grou p), wh ich had c ome into be ing a few weeks earlier ~ 
t h is group has become a principal vehicle in the P arty 
for the movement for closer relations between Japan 
and the P eople ' s Republic of China . 
Against th e histori c al background d rawn above , 
we shall at t empt in the follow ing pages to ana lyse 
the ma in feature s of t he LOP' s response t o the issue o 
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II 
THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY RESPONSE 
The Heritage of the Liberal and the Democratic P arties 
Before the conclusion of the S an F rancisco P eace 
Treaty in early S eptember 1951 the leaders of the gov-
ernment and the Liberal P arty had taken generally po s -
it ive v iew s of Japan's elations with the newly estab-
lished People's Republi c of China . 
Pr ime Minister Yoshida , in reply to questions in 
the Diet , expli cit ly rejected the extremist views of 
people like Kiku chi Yoshiroo and advocated a closer 
relati onshi p with P ek ing especially, but not exclu s -
54 ively , in the field of trade o That he and his go v -
ernment were not happy about the circumstances which 
compelled them to sign a separate peace treaty with 
the Nationalist government in Taiwan in 1952 seems to 
be be ond doubt o In 1963 Yoshida elaborated on this 
a s follows: 
As fa r as the Japanese government was con-
c erned g increased fr i endship and improved 
economi c relations with Taiwan was naturally 
most we1come o On the other hand , it was 
our wish to avoid , if possible , going too 
far in that direct ion and manifestly ren -
ounce the P eking government 0 Consering , 
however, t hat the ationa1ist government 
had been the principal belligerent in the 
conflict with us from the beginning , that 
it held an important place in the United 
Nations and that we were obliged to it for 
the peace ful repatr iation of Our nationals 
at the end of the war , we found it imposs -
ible just to ignore it . Then suspicions 
(about Japan's intentions concerning the 
choice between P eking and Taiwan ) had been 
e pressed by the United S tates S enate o 
While the relationship with mainland China 
was admittedly ve y important to us , it 
would have been intolerable to have the 
atification of the P eace Treaty inter-
fered with b y it . We had to make u p our 
minds in a hurry on the question with which 
gove nment we shoud conclude a peace 
t eaty , and under the circumstances we 
coul d not but c hoose the ationa1ist 
go ernment o 55 
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Following the conclusion of the peace treaties, 
howev er, the official att i tude of the Liberal Party 
beC ume a ppreciably more negative and cautious. In 
fact, two days after the c :: c l ~lsiOl of the San 
Francisco P eace Treaty and more than half a year 
before the peace trea ty with Taiwan it publicly 
warned against optimistic exp ec tations for a signif-
ic a n t in c rea s e in Japan's trade with the mainland and 
g a v e ass u ranc es that Japan could hope to develop 
suffi c iently large markets in Southeast Asian coun-
o 0 56 trIes Instead. 
In the subse quent years the Liberal Party's 
at t itude gradu ally moved to what has been defined as 
the do c trine of the separation of politics and econom-
ICS in Sino-Japanese relations. The report of its 
Investigation Committee on Foreign Af fairs (gaikoo-
choosakai) published In September 1954 rejected an 
early recognition of the Peking government but called 
for efforts to increase trade and the exc hange of per-
s ons concerned with t r ade between Japan and the main-
5? 1 and . 
The policy of the Democratic Pa r ty (Pro gressive 
Part y ) before the conservative merger of 1955 had not 
been radically differen t from that of t he Li beral 
P arty. On the one hand, in 1951 Miki Takeo , the 
party's S ecretary -General, had been expressing his 
scepticism about the future of the Peki ng government 
d J ' 1 0 h 0 0 h 0 58 0 th th h d an apan s re a tlons Ip WIt It. n e 0 er an, 
Kitamura Tokutaroo, Ch airman of the Party's Policy 
Af f airs Research Council, declared in 1952 that 'nobody 
who cared at all about Japan 's economic independence 
would ever contemplate her separation from mainland 
C' 0 ,59 n Ina. Although it was never forced t o make a 
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clear- cut and public decision about which government 
to choose as the legiti mate government of China, there 
IS no doub t that it faced the same kind of dilemma as 
the L iberal P arty . Wh en it came to power at la~ ~ 
towards the end of 1954 , Hatoyama and his advisers 
indeed had plans for the normalisation of diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union and hopes for improved 
relationship with the communist bloc nations generally. 
It Was under the Hatoyama Cabinet and its successor, 
the I shi bash i Cabi ne t, t ha t the pr e- 19 60 peak in bo th 
trade and exchange of persons with mainland China was 
reached and at that time Peking-Tokyo relations were 
most corcial . It seems equally evident , ho~eve~ that 
they had no definite plans whatsoever for a dras tic 
change in Sino - Japanese relations as part of their 
I' ddt f ' 1 . , 60 Th In epen en orelgn po ICy programme . e rec-
ommendations of the Party' s P o licy Affairs Research 
Council, Jishu-heiwa-gaikoo hoosaku , published in 
January 1955 contained no specific proposals about the 
China issue , 61 except for a call for increased trade . 
Theirs also was essentially a policy aimed at encour~ 
aging trade as mu ch as possible but with no political 
involvement . 
When the LOP was formed in November 1955 , the 
only elements in the new party's China po li cy inherited 
from its predecessors was the doc t rine of the separ-
ation of politics and economics (or rather trade). 
This had been developed by the Li berals , but Was now 
taken over by the LDP led by Hatoyama and his Democra t 
associates . In the actual practice of Japan ' s foreign 
policy , however, this simple principle alone was not 
sufficient as a guidepost . Both the international 
and d omestic environment wa too complex to allow the 
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ministerial party and the government under its con-
trol to drift forever with the tide without making 
some painful decisions and choices from time to time
o 
Internationally, the attitudes and policies of the 
United S tates and the Nationalist Chinese g o vernments 
in parti cular have compelled them to think and act 
in certain specific ways o 
International Factors 
Ever since General MacAr thur ' s famous statement 
of 2 S eptember 1949 , on the prospects of S ino - J apanese 
d 62 . U' S tra e succeSSIve nlted tates governments have 
always opposed both the recognition of the P eking gov-
ernment by Japan and also large-scale Japanese trade 
with mainland China o In recent years this view has 
been reiterated forcefully by such American leaders as 
Assistant Secretary of S tate Harriman and S ecretary of 
63 
S tate Ru sk o In view of the degree of Japan ' s econ-
d . l' U· S 64 omic an ml Itary dependence on the nlted tates 
and the belief which is still widely shared among 
Japanese conservative politicians that one must above 
all be acceptable to Washington in order to make good 
in Japanese politi cs , 65 there is little doubt that 
this attitude of the United S tates government has not-
ably inhibited Japanese initiative in developing trade 
and communications with P eking o 
P robably more direct and tangible has been the 
equally restrictive influence exerted by the ational-
ist Chinese government o P olitically and morally, 
Japan has been bound to Taipei not only by the peace 
treaty of 1952 but also , as many LOP Diet members have 
argued , by obligations personally owed to Chiang Kai-
shek for hi s ' magnanimous ' trea tmen t 0 f Japanese so 1-
dier s and ci vil ians on the mainland at the end of the 
66 S econd World War. 
312 0 
Economically , Taiwan has never been a major trad -
ing partner of Japan . However , it has been considered 
an ext r emely important market f or Japanese overseas 
investment and also as a s t epping stone to the vast 
though yet not fully developed market lying to its 
south o Between April 1951 and June 1964 , for example , 
39 of the 87 foreign cap ital investment projects set 
up in Taiwan have been Japanese (another 39 having 
been American) and 78 of the 117 technical joint ven -
tures launched have been with Japanese firms 0 67 A 
number of large Japanese manufacturers have been In-
volved in these investments and joint ventures , such 
as the Tooshiba Electric, the Hitachi Manufacturing, 
the Nissan Automotive Industry , and so on o 
On the strength of such moral , political and ec -
onomic ties , further reinforced by the connections 
centring around the United S tates and binding both 
Japan and Taiwan with the 'Free World' in an anti -
communist alliance , the Nationalist government has 
actively interfered wi th Japan ' s efforts to increase 
trade and communication with P eking o 
As early as Jul y 1952 the ationalist govern-
ment's Foreign Minister i Yeh Kung-chao, made it clear 
in the Legislative Chamber that it woul d regard Japan's 
formal resumption of trade with the mainland as a 
violation of the peace treaty and in the following 
month an Osaka - based Japanese trading firm had its 
contrac t for the import of salt from Taiwan cancelled 
on the grounds that it had made i nquiries with an 
import and export corporation in Peki ng for possible 
. 68 t ransactlons o 
More recently , Taiwan ' s active involvement in 
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the efforts to prevent Japan ' s export of plant to China 
on a deferred payment basis has attracted much attent-
ion . In the summer of 1963 , when the Ikeda Cabinet 
decided to approve finally the Kurashiki Rayon's pro-
posed sale of vinylon plant to China , the Supervisory 
Chamber in Taipei adopted a strongly worded resolut-
ion in protest and the Nationalist government ' s ambass-
ador to Tokyo, Chang Li-sheng personally pressed Japan's 
Foreign Minister~ Oohira Masayoshi to cancel the 
C " "" 69 ablnet deC1Slon . 
In order to assuage Taipei's anger over this issue, 
which was further complicated a few weeks later by 
h Ch H h " 70 P"" " t e ou ung - c lng case, former rlme Mlnlster 
Yoshida visited Chiang Kai-shek in February and Foreign 
Minister Oohira followed in July 19640 71 These 
Japanese visits were reciprocated in August by Chang 
" Chun's visit to Tokyo to confer with the government and 
72 
LOP leaders o In early 1965 , it became known that one 
of the principal purposes of the Oohira and the Chang 
visits had been to confirm and expand the Japanese 
government 's pledge made in Yoshida's letter to Chang 
of May 1964 that it would not authorise further Export-
Import Bank financing of plant exports to mainland 
China0 73 It was this particular undertaking that has 
come to determine so effectively the Japanese gover-
nment's attitude toward P eking o 
Dome stic Climate of Op inion 
While the most obvious international influences 
affecting the behaviour of the LDP leadership have thus 
inhibited positive efforts on the part of Japan for 
i ncreased trade and political communication with the 
P eople ' s Republic of China , the principa l domestic 
factors seem to have had a much more complex and com-
posite effect . Judging from the results of various 
3140 
public opinion polls , it IS probably correct to 
assume that a majority of ordinary Japanese have been 
favourably disposed In recent years toward increased 
trade with mainland China and her early admission to 
the United Nations , while those opposed to this have 
remained a very small minority (a few per cent concern-
ing trade and less than ten per cent regarding admiss-
ion 74 to the U . N . ) . 
Regarding the choice between P eking and Taipei , 
signicantly more respondents have preferred Peking , 
but a majority of those who have held articulate op-
inions one way or the other have opted for the ' two 
Chinas ' formula , if such an alternative is available o 
In other words , a majority of Japanese with opinions 
on the issue have wanted an increase in Japan ' s trade 
with the People ' s Republic of China , her speedy 
admission to the United Nations and the general accep -
tance of the idea of ' two Chinas ' 0 
The natural friendliness toward China and the 
Chinese (embracing , though not necessarily exclusively , 
the P eople ' s R epublic) , demonstrated by a majority of 
Japanese voters has on several occasions caused the 
National Diet and local assemblies to act to prove 
their interest in the issue o As early as May 1949 a 
non - partisan Nitchuu - booeki sokushin giin r enmei (D ie t 
members ' league for the promotion of S ino - Japanese 
trade) was established from both Houses of the Diet 
75 
with an initial membership of about 90. Between then 
and 1958 th~s organisation sponsored a series of actions 
by Diet members aimed at promoting trade and exchange 
of persons between the two countries , including Diet 
resolutions , non - governmental trade agreements , lobby-
76 ing the Cabinet and the P arty leaders , and so on . 
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After the Nagasaki flag incident it ceased to be non-
partisan because of an informal instruction issued by 
the P arty ' s S ecretary-General , Kawashima Shoojiroo , 
ord ering the withdrawal of LOP Diet members , in accord -
ance with which most of them walked out . Nevertheless , 
the organisation not onl y survived the crisis but by 
early 1964 had recovered its n on- partisan character , 
. 1 50 LOP D· t b h d .. d· 77 SI nce near y Ie mem ers a reJolne It . 
At the lo cal level , prefectural and city assembly 
members ' leagues for the promotion of Sino -Japanese 
trade began to appear throughout the country in late 
1952 and they were brought together in June 1953 into 
a national organisation called the itchuu- booeki 
sokush in chihoogiin renmei (local assembly members' 
league for the promotion of S ino-Japanese trade) . 78 
It was obviously under the influence and guidance of its 
members that a series of resolutions have been adopted 
by some local assemblies on China trade and the res -
toration of diplomatic relations . This finally prov-
oked the LOP Executive Council to issue an official 
refutation against them in March 1964. 79 
From the point of view of the LOP a rather dis-
turbing aspect of these movements , which have consid-
erable support from public opinion , has been that the 
Opposition parties , particularly t he JCP and the JSP , 
have been closely involved in many of them . Until 
its open break with the Chinese Communist Party became 
public In late 1965 , the JCP had been b ound to the 
latter by ' fraternal' ties which looked unshakable to 
an outsider o 
Except for the familiar factional d ivis ions of 
op inion , almost precisely the same would apply to the 
J SP, as the joint statements of its offi cia l dele gations 
visiting China and the Chinese People's Institut e of 
F . A f f . b . 1 ·· 80 orelgn aIrs unam IgUOUS y IndIcateo ot only 
the organisations specifically aiming at cultural and 
politi cal rapprochement with China but also those prim-
arily interested in increased trade have been under the 
t . fl f h . 81 s rong In uence 0 t ese two partles o 
The Bureaucracy and Business Groups 
The decisions and behaviour of the LOP and its 
members have been influenced by the international and 
domest ic environment as created and defined by the 
attitudes of these and other interested groups o 
Frequently, however, these influences have been filtered 
through the bureaucracy and business enterprises financ-
ing the Party or its individual members o These are the 
two principal groups which are external to the Party but 
nevertheless intimately related to it and its policy-
making process . 
The official position of the Ministry of Fore ign 
Affairs on the China issue in recent years has been quite 
simpl e 0 It has maintained that the formal diplomatic 
relations with the Nationalist government should be 
continued and developed but that unofficial , de facto 
relations with Peking, especially in the field of trade, 
should be encouraged on the basis of the separation of 
politics (formal diplomatic relations between the gov-
ernments) and economics {unofficial trade) o82 In the 
final analysis , this policy is obviously the formula 
popularly known as 'two Chinas ' 0 It is probably the 
most logical response to the si tuation of two opposing 
governments and is an expression of the desire to deal 
with both in a way as advantageous as possible to Japan 
economically and otherwise o 
Applied to the p ractice of Japan ' s diplomacy on 
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China ' s admission to the U. No , the principle led her 
up to the 15th General Assembly (1960) to back efforts 
t h 1 Ch ' , d' . 83 o seve Ina s a mlSSlon o S ince the 16th General 
Assembly ( 1961 ) she has jointly sponsored resolutions to 
define the issue as , important ' (as that word is used In 
Article 18 of the U. No Charter) , so that a decision 
woul d require a two - thirds majority vote for adoption 
(16th and 20 th General Assemblies) , or has opposed res-
olutions to replace Taipei by P eking (17th- 19th General 
Assemb lies l0 84 
When applied to Japan ' s trade with mainland China , 
this policy has meant that short of the conclusion of 
a governmental agreement an increase in ordinary comm-
. ' . d h . bl 85 o d lty transactIons IS encourage as muc as POSSI e o 
When , however , it comes to the questi o n of plant 
exp ort involving d eferred paymen t arrangements and the 
use of Export - Impo rt Bank credits , the Foreign Office has 
taken a much more negative attitude o By early 1963 
und er the d irect or implied pressure of the Nationalist 
Chinese and the United S tates governments~6 it had 
formula t ed three general principles to guide it in det-
ermining its atti t ude toward s p ecific cases to arise : 
(i ) That the terms of treatment accord ed to mainland 
China by the Japanese government in this matter should 
b e e quivalent to those granted by most nations o f 
Western Europe ; ( ii ) that the Export - Import Bank ' s 
cred its should be used for aid to those und e rd eveloped 
nations which belong to the Free World and withheld as 
much as p ossi b le f r om China trade ; and (ii i) t hat the 
exp ected react ions of the United S tate s and the Nation-
a l ist Chinese governm ents to Japan ' s tran s actions with 
main l and China involving deferr ed payments sh ould be 
. t 87 full y taken Into acc oun 0 
·f f 
, Pf> 
rf 
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These basic po sitions , which have emerged through 
a series of int ens ive del iber a tions bo th among the 
Minis try of ficials themselves and b y non- official coun-
cils spec i ally set up to advise the Minist y of Foreign 
Affairs
88 
have become the basis of Japan ' s China policy . 
The main guideposts thus established by th e 
Minis try of Foreign Affa irs concerning Japan ' s proper 
relationship with Pek ing have been generally respected 
by succes sive Cab ine ts o However , the relative emphasis 
placed on politi cal and i deological ties with Taipei and 
economic and personal ties with Peking have v aried con-
siderably from Cabinet to Cabi net o With such changes 
in the emphasis of Japanese pol icy the attitudes of 
P eking and Taipei have also changed and it h a s been this 
cont inua l interaction that has determined the character 
of S ino - Japanese relations at any parti cu lar time o 
Fu rthermore , the preoccupations of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs with the reactions of Washington and 
Taipei have been sharply criticised from time to time 
by other sections of the bureaucracy , parti cu larly the 
Minist ry of International Trade and Industry (hereafter 
89 
referred to as MITI ) • In S eptember 1963 , in the face 
of s trong protests from the Mini st ry of F orei gn Affairs, 
MITI let t wo of ficia ls partici pate in the Okazaki trade 
d elegation to China . One was Murakami Kimitaka , a 
d irector of the government-subsi d ised Japanese Export 
Trade Organisation (JETRO) and former official o f MITI , 
and the other was Oowada Yuuji , S ecretary-General of 
the Japan-China Export -Import Union o 90 In January 1965 
a minor but acti v e off icial of MITI was appointed head 
of the permanent Japanese trade missi on in P eking with 
that Ministry ' s obvi ous encouragement and support 09l 
There was also a division of opinion between the two 
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Ministries concerning the export of the Kurashiki Rayon ' s 
" 1 1 " 6 92 vlny on p ant In 19 3. 
The division of opinion within the bureaucracy ha s 
had its parallel among those businessmen closely rel-
ated to the LOP or its members . On the one hand , a 
dozen or so prominent entrepreneurs , especially from the 
Kansai district (which Was heavi ly dependent upon China 
trade before the war)93 have consistently advo c ated 
greater efforts to expand Japan's trade with mainland 
h " 94 0 h h C Ina . n t e ot er hand, there have been those typ-
ified by the presidents of the most influential 
employers' or g anisations , Keidanren and isshoo , 
Ishizaka Taizoo and Ad achi Tadashi . In the wake of the 
Nagasaki flag incident in 1958 Ishizaka made it very 
clear tha t he was opposed to the attempts to expand China 
trade at the expense of Japan 1 s existing political 
commitments .
95 
His sceptical attitude has been shared 
no t only by Adachi but also by several other prominent 
business leaders , such as Ishikawa rchiroo ( issan 
Chemical Industry) , Nagano S higeo (Fuji Iron Manufact-
ur ing), Sat o o Kii chiroo (M itsu i Bank) and Shinohara 
Hideo (Mitsubishi Chemicals) . 96 
As pointed out already, such scepticism and neg -
ative foreca sts about the future of China trade gradually 
gave way to a much more positive , even enthusiastic , 
attitude among the nation l s business leaders during the 
first half of the 1960 1 S , especial l y after the LT-
memorandum was signed i n ovember 1962 . 9 7 Nevertheless , 
ther e is no evidence to suggest that the division of 
opinion has di sappeared . On the contrary , there is 
evidence that leaders like Ishizaka and Adachi have 
maintained and even strengthened their opposition to 
deliberate efforts to increase Japan l s tr ade and other 
relations with mainland China at the risk of offending 
Washington and especially Taipei . This seems, for 
instance, to have been the case regarding the activities 
of the semi-official organisation working for J apan-
Taiwan co - operation , Nikka kyooryoku iinkai (Committee 
for the P romotion of S ino-Japanese Co - operation). 
This organisation was formed in 1956 following the 
visit to Taiwan of a Nikka-shinzen shisetsudan (Sino-
Japanese friendship delegation) led by a senior LOP 
member of the National Diet , Ishii Mitsujiroo , and con -
sisting of about two dozen politicians , businessmen and 
b .. 98 pu llClstS. In the course of its half-yearly meetings 
held alternately in Tokyo and Taipei the ationalist 
government 's tough attitude towards Peking and criticisms 
of Japan ' s friendly relationship with it have come to be 
accepted by the Japanese members with increasing apprec-
iation and confidenceo 
The initial Japanese response to Taipei ' s milit-
ant anti -P eking stand was apparently one of cynical 
scepticism and caution o 99 In June 1958 , because of 
Japanese resistance a Nationalist Chinese proposal to 
adopt a joint resolution against further increase in 
Japanese trade with mainland China was flatly rejected , 
while a resolution on political co-operation adopted 
at the fifth meeting in October 1959 admitted that the 
method s chosen by the two governments to cope with comm-
. f 100 unist aggression might naturally be dlf erent o 
More recently , however , the Japanese members 
have gradually come round to accepting and advocating 
many of Taiwan ' s poisitions concerning the relationship 
between Tokyo and P eking o The resoltuion adopted at 
t he ninth meeting in December 1964 , for example , con-
tained the following sentences: 
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(I) On the basis of common beliefs in freedom, 
democracy and the cultural traditions of 
E ast Asia both (Japan and Taiwan) ought to 
undertake to adhere steadfastly to the 
uncompromising renunciation of the ideol-
ogy of communism and oppression and to 
relieve and libe ate those peoples who 
continue to live in misery behind the iron 
curtain; 
(2) Japan undertakes to reject government-
supported trade in any form with the 
areas under communist Chinese control and 
to deny financial and banking facilities 
to Japanese firms trading with such areas 
101. 
At the tenth meeting of Decemper 1965 both sides agreed 
also to ensure by all the means at their disposal that the 
China's seat in the United Nations should be retained by 
102 the Nationalist government 0 
In the development of the Commi ttee and its anti-
communist programme a central role has apparently been 
played by Yatsugi Kazuo, Standing Director of the Kokusaku 
kenkyuukai, while several LOP politicians (to be discu ssed 
103 later) have played a substantial part . It should 
be noted , however , that Horikoshi Teizoo , S ecretary-
General of Keidanren and Ishizaka's right-hand man D 
has been one of its most active members from the beginn-
ing, and both Ishizaka and Adachi have been the official 
leaders of the Japanese delegat i ons to the successive 
1 1 1 · 104 ha f-year y consu tatlons o Sp eaking in his capacity 
as the head of the Japanese delegation and chairman of 
the tenth meeting in December 1965, Adachi referred to 
mainland China as a ' madman in arms' and ' veritable 
10 5 destroyer of world peace ' 0 
In view of these divisions of opinion and attit-
u de, both between foreign governments and in Japanese 
publ ic opinion (especially within the bureaucracy and 
business circles) opinion has also inevitably been 
d ivi ded with in the LOP on this complex issue o At one 
end of the spectrum stands for instance Ishibashi Tanzan , 
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Matsumura Kenzoo and Utsunomiya Tokuma , while at the 
opposite end stand such men as Kishi Nobusuke , Ishii 
Mit sujiroo and Fukuda Takeo. Others like Satoo Ei saku , 
Oohira Masayoshi, the late Koono Ichiroo and the late 
Ikeda Hayato, have stood somewhere in between . I f one 
were to examine closely each individual ' s opinion , it 
would be possible to place the Party ' s 420 or so Diet 
members across the whole range of the pro-Peking _ pro-
Taipei continuum . 
The Pro-Peking Group 
None of the LOp Diet members identified as pro-
P eking has ever supported communism or Marxism as such , 
but most have argued that the basic force in contemporary 
China has been nationalism rather than communism . They 
also claim it is quite possible for a liberal democracy 
and a communist state to co - exist in a mutually benefic-
ial relationship and that the creation and maintenance 
of such a relationship between mainland China and Japan 
is vital to the peace of Asia and the world , regardless 
of one ' s ideological preferences . Following his visit 
to China in 1962 , Matsumura said at a private meeting : 
To be sure , it will be necessary for us to be on 
the alert .ee But once we have pledged that we 
will not interfere with each other's 
political system , is it not very natural that 
we should promote economic and cultural 
exchanges? .00 Whether Cina will or will not 
eventually give up her communism is beyond 
me , but I suspect that her communism , if that 
is what it is cal led , will be very Asi an and 
significantly different from the European 
model eoo We feel that it is after all the rise 
of national consciousness and , if so , it is 
going to be lasting , though mere communism 
as such would be bound to fail soon •• o 106 
Utsunomiya t s views have been based on similar 
assumptions , as h i s numerous published op inions have mad e 
it ve ry clear . Writing in early 1965 after his visit 
to China and Nor th Vietnam , he sai d: 
It would be impossible to understand th e 
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north - south problem in Asia without under -
stand ing the new nationalism rising there , 
especially nationalism in China 000 In brief , 
what is happening in China and orth Vietnam 
today has arisen from the very simple and 
basic national desire of the peoples to have 
a S hanghai or a S aigon of their own 000 The 
grea t er the resistance to national independ -
ence and the mo r e the basic c ondi tions for 
mod ernisation are lacking , the more radical 
the method of achieving independence and 
mod ernisation tend s to be •• 0 107 
About five years ea lier he declared that he had explic -
itly made it clear to the Chinese leaders he had met 
during his visit to P eking in 1959 that he Was neither 
a communist nor a socialist but just a liberal interested 
in the p ossibilities of peaceful co-existence between the 
. 108 two countries o 
It seems evident that the views which favour 
closer ties with P eking on the basis of similar assum-
ptions to these have been shared fairly widely in the 
Furui Yoshimi , who has been led by Matsumura to 
interest himse l f deeply in the China problem , has expressed 
more than once his belief that P eking is sincere when it 
says that peaceful co - existence with Japan is just what 
it wants o He argues that P ek ing ' s attitud e concerning 
this matter is governed essentially by se curity con-
siderations o 10 9 Acco rd ing to Matsumoto S hun ' ichi , "most 
Japanese know by intuition and common sense that Japan 
a n d communist China must co - exist in peace" and "main-
t enance of friendly relations between the two countries 
110 will work as a safety valve for world peace o" S ome-
what more vaguely the same ideas have been put forward 
also by two faction leaders other than Matsumura , namely 
I I I Fuj iyama Aiichiroo and Miki Takeo o It woul d not be 
d i f f i cult to a d d a dozen or more examples of LOP membe s 
p u b licly taking similar positions o 
Apart , howe er , from the common general interest 
i n br inging mainland China and Japan closer together 
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economically and in other ways , the motivations behind 
their p ositive views are extremely diverse and the con-
crete steps they a dvocate concerning the most d ifficult 
aspects of the present relationship between the two 
c ountries (particularly regard ing the future of Taiwan 
and the Nationalist Government ) are more often than not 
too vague to be spelled out . 
It would be impossible to explain Utsunomiya's 
d evotion to the cause of S ino - Japanese friendship with -
out referring to the influence of Marxism (in which he 
was keenly interested while a university student) and his 
f th ( G 1
· th b 1 · f . A· . ) 112 a er a enera WI a strong e Ie s In SIanIsm . 
It is no secret that he carries on self - consciously 
what he believes to be the spirit of his father's will 
which envisag ed s Oli d arity of Asian and African peoples 
against Western influences o 
Matsumura ' s interest in China also dates back to 
his stud ent days at Waseda University where he was a 
stud ent of the Chinese language and came personally to 
kno w the well-known China - specialist o f the Minseitoo , 
113 
Nagai Ryuunosuke o He visited China for the first 
time in 190 4 , and has since returned there about ten 
times , both as a memb er of the Minseitoo and later as 
. LDP b 114 a senI o r mem er o 
Fujiyama ' s cultural interest in Ch i na became very 
evid e nt around 1937 , when he sponsored a China S tudy 
S ociety (Chuugoku k enkyuukai) and set out to collect 
s ome 60,000 books On modern China in the fiel d s o f local 
history , nove l s , poetry , t 11 5 e c o These examples show 
that the mo t i vations for the interests of p rominent 
LOP members in the China issue are above al l particular , 
p erso nal and d iverse o It would b e idle to attempt to 
gene r alise a b out them i n the familiar organisational or 
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i d eological te ms. 
Much of the pro-Peking feeling exhibited by LOP 
members has been general and emotional rather than 
specific and logical and , as a result , it is hard 
to pinpoint what they propose to do about concrete 
political arrangements with Peking or the future 
of Taiwan. Fujiyama , for example , who , as mentioned 
above , has been interested in developing friendly 
relationship with Peking argues : 
Putting aside the problems of recognition , and 
so on , I doubt whether it is desirable from 
the point of view of world peace to keep 
the 600 million Chinese people from the 
international community •• 0 Without referring 
to recognition , admission to the United 
Nations , and so on .00 would it not be a good 
idea to give her opportunities to speak on 
the official platforms of international 
politics 000 Frankly, I am not thinking in 
terms of recognition of the government or 
admission to the U.N . 116 
Fuji yama 's ambiguities and eva ~ iveness have been 
shared by many , in fact by most, of those who have been 
.. po . h LOP 117 E M IdentIfied as pro- ekIng In t e • ven atsumura 
has not gone mu ch further in specifying his programme 
than to reiterate his wish that Japan should playa med-
iating role between P eking and the governments of 
. d S t 11 8 Western powers, especially the UnIte ta es . Only 
Ishibashi and Utsunomiya have produced specific plans 
concerning the political aspects of S ino - Japanese relat-
ions o Regardless of whether these are realistic or 
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feasible , they des e rve attention because of their rarity. 
Neither of the two inter-related plans advocated 
by Ishibashi is very original o On the one hand , he calls 
for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between four 
nations (o r possibly five nations with Taiwan as an 
additional party ), namely the U oSo Ao, the UoSoSo R o, the 
P eople ' s Republic of China and Japan - a plan which , he 
has claimed , was accepted by P eking in 1963 0 On the 
other hand , he proposes to mediate between Peki ng and 
Taipei , so that Chiang may be accorded by P eking the 
status of generaliss imo and the two governments may thu s 
b Of ° d 1 19 pOd e unl Ie ° rOVl de that they were accepted by the 
governments concerned , these plans would be ideal from 
the Japanese point of view . There IS no evidence , how -
ever , t hat there is any possiblity of their being re-
ali sed . 
Utsunomiya f s plan for the solution of the Taiwan 
p roblem has emphasised much more boldly the need for its 
acceptability to Pek ing o It woul d involve making 
Taiwan a ' high l y autonomous ' province , ' somewhat resembling 
Byelorussia or the Ukraine in the U.SoSoRo' ~ with powers 
over internationa l trade , immigration and, possibly , 
even defence o It might even enjoy an independent seat 
120 in the United National General Assemb1y o Such an 
arrangement , however , would be of temporary duration and 
after the United S tates military establishments and 
troop s were withdrawn th e possibility of a d ifferent 
d 1 0 121 ar r angement woul natura l y arlse o 
Wi th much emotional enthusiasm and few c oncrete 
plans, the se pre-Peking elements in the LOP p r oceed ed 
in early 1960 to form informal intra - party grou ps called 
Chuugoku - mondai kenkyuukai (China problem study group) 
and the Nit chuu kaizen kenkyuukai (study group for the 
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improvement of Si no -Japanese relations) led respectively 
by Matsumura fac tion members , and Utsunomiya and 
I . b h · f' 122 I D Shl as 1 actIon members . n ecember of the same 
year , these were unified into a single Nitchuu - mondai 
kenkyuukai (Japan-Ch ina problem study groups) , but soon 
ceased to be active due to the pressure of the Party 
leaders who insisted that debate on the issue should 
take place within the official Investigation Committee 
F . Af f' 123 F 1 h . on orelgn aIrs o our years ater , owever , In 
January 1965 , this group was revived as the Afro- Asian 
Group, following by about a month the formation by a 
rival ' pro-Taiwan ' group in the Party of the Asian 
Groupo 
Sponsored by 24 of the most active pro-Peking 
members , including Matsumura , Utsunomiya and 
Fuji yama , the Afro-Asian Group initially consisted of 
104 members from both Houses of the Die t and set out to 
deal with such problems as Japan ' s attitude towards the 
forthcoming second Afro-Asian Conference , the Vietnam 
issue , the Malays ian dispute , and so on , as well as rel -
ations with the P eople ' s Republ ic of Chi na . 124 By the 
middle of 1966 seven sub-committees specialising in 
different areas had been set up under a loosely organ-
ised governing body made up of nine ' caretakers ' 
( ) 5 .. ( . . k .. ) 125 sewanin and standIng dIrectors Joonln- an]1 0 
S o far as the China issue is concerned , it pro-
pos es : (i) to have the P eople's Republic of China 
admitted to the United ations ; (ii) to refuse in 
future to support any U •• resolution to regard China's 
representation as ' important '; (iii) to encourage d ir -
ect contact between the two governmen ts through amb -
assadorial talks and other means ; and (iv) to expand 
126 trade by the conclusion of an official agreement o 
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Apa t from its week ly study sessions , attended by 
127 anything between ten and thirty of its members , the 
Afro- Asian Group in May 1965 sent a si -man delegat ion 
of its own members to Indonesia at P resident Sukarno's 
" " "128 "d Invltatlon g organIse a widely publicised three-day 
' teach-in' on the China issue in May 1966 , 129 informally 
sponsored the visit to Ch ina of an eight-member LOP 
delegation in August and September 1966 , 130 and fol1ow-
ing its return organised a signature-collecting camp -
aign against Japan ' s co-sponsorship of the D. N o draft 
resolu tion on the designation of China's representation 
as an 'important ' " 131 quest Ion. As , however , is suggested 
by the fact that by February 1966 the original membership 
of over 100 had diminished to about 80 132& the number of 
its members present at the above-mentioned ' teach-in' 
was "d t h" h" 133 " sal 0 ave varIed between one and t lrteen, It 
failed to make much headway during the first two years 
after its formation o 
The P ro - Taipei Group 
In contrast with the above - mentioned group of pro-
P eking LOP members represented by Matsumura and Dtsunomiya, 
a numerically larger group, including such senior members 
as Kish i , Fukuda and Ish ii , has taken a generally anti-
P eking , pro-Taipei position o 
Just as none of the pro - Peking members have ever 
advocated communism or Marxism , whether Chinese or oth er-
wise , few of those associated with the anti-Peking 
group have opposed trade relations with mainland China o 
Fukuda has said , for example , that he welcomes positi ve 
efforts to expand Japan ' s trad e with China , provided that 
134 her independence and freedom of action is firmly upheld o 
The same idea was in fact expressed a few years before 
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by another fervent advocate of the anti -Peking line, Kaya 
Okinori. He declared: 
(Japan) ought to trade with any and every country. 
She cannot survive without importing raw mat-
erials. From such a point of view , it must be 
said as a matter of principle that she must have 
peaceful trade . In this respect a communist 
nation cannot be exclud ed ••• 135 
In contrast to the pro-Peking group, however , they 
insist that such trade should not be expanded at the 
expense of the basic principles of Japanese foreign pol-
icy , which include above all , in their view , the mainten-
ance and development of friendly relations with the 
Un i ted St ates and Nationalist China. Thus Fukuda foll-
owed up his statement in favour of encouraging mainland 
trade with a blunt endorsement of his questioner ' s sus-
picion that he would rather see such trade completely 
terminated than allow Japan to yield to ' unreasonable' 
. 136 
ChInese pressure . Nor would Kaya ever agree to 
giving P eking terms in business transactions mOre fav-
ourable than those Japan grants to Free World nations. 
He would not tolerate Japan's dependence on the commun-
ist bloc for basic and essential raw materials, nor the 
abandonment of the principle of the separation of politics 
and economics , nor violation of the COCOM restrictions 
and 13 7 so on. 
Whil e those associated with the pro-Peking group tend 
to emphasise the nationalist elements in Chinese communism 
or Maoism, the anti -Peking group tends to view the relat-
ionship between Japan and mainland China under the present 
regime essential l y as one of struggle between a liberal 
democr acy and a doctrinaire and d estructive communist 
power. This leads them to the position that in the inter-
ests of Japan ' s securit y , Nationalist China as well 
as South Korea should never be allowed to fall prey 
to communism and that, therefore , the ationalis t 
government should be helped to keep going by all means 
" 138 
possIble . Such considerations about Japan's security 
interests are mixed with the emotional argument that 
at the end of the S econd World War, Chiang Kai - shek 
treated the Japanese in China, including prisoners-of-
war, with unparalle led magnanimity, and that the 
J 11 b d h " k' 139 apanese are mora y oun to repay IS Indness. 
As the Committee for the Promo tion of Si no -
Japanese Co-operation has become more and more openly 
and militantly anti -Peking , 140 the most active of the 
LOP Diet members who fall into this category have ass -
ociated themse lves with it. Whereas until the middle 
of 1958 only Funada aka had been officially associated 
with it and a senior member of the Japan Socialist 
P arty , Matsuoka Komakichi , still retained his affiliat-
ion with it , by late 1959 there were half a dozen LOP 
men among its official members and by early 1961 the 
141 number had increased to about a dozen. Through 
this organisation they have been directly connected 
not only with official and business circles i n Taiwan 
but also with those Japanese business leaders who have 
constituted the hard-core of the anti-P eking groups in 
the nation's business community , such as, for example , 
Ishizaka and Adachi . 
At the same time, they have acted as intermed-
iaries between the Nationalist and the Japanese govern-
ments , thus providing a semi -official line of communic-
ation between them . Following his attendance at the 
eighth meeting of the Committee in May 1963 , Funada 
Naka ' conveyed ' - to the Japanese Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and of International Trade and Industry 
Taipei's strong objections to Japan ' s expor t of plant 
to mainland China , to the Japanese leaders ' personally 
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meeting visiting P eking officials, and so 142 on . The 
significance of the influences exerted by the Committee's 
members in the making of Japan's Chi na policy has also 
been implicitly acknowledged by an official of the 
M· . t f F . Aff · 143 lnlS ry 0 orelgn alrs . 
Even more significant, however , was the formation 
in December 1964 of the Asian Group in the LOP. Organ-
ised under Kaya's leadership with an initial membership 
of 98 LOP Diet members , it took from the beginning 
fairly clear-cut positions about Japan's future relat -
ionship s with P eking and Taipei , which may be summarised 
ro u gh 1 y as follow s : 
(i i) 
( iii) 
(i v) 
The People' s Republi c of China must not 
be admitted to the United ations so 
long as it persists in its 'aggressive ' 
in ten t ions ; 
For reasons of Japan ' s own security, among 
other things , Taiwan must be kept from 
communist take-over; 
The problem of China's representation in 
the United Nations must continue to be 
regarded as an ' important ' question , 
requiring a two-thirds majority vote for 
adoption ; and 
Trade with mainland China must be conducted 
on the basis of the separation of politics 
and economics without involving the use 
of Export-Import Bank credits or terms more 
favourable than those applicable to Japan's 
trade with S outh Korea, Taiwan or other 
'Free World' nations. 144 
Apart from its ad hoc study sessions held on the 
average every fortni ght , the Asi an Group sp:msored the 
formation of an Asian Parliamentary Union in February and 
its first conference (in Tokyd in December 1965 at which 
34 delegates from nine non-communist nations in the reg-
. 145 
ion par ticlpated . By the end of February 1966 six 
regional sections were established in the Group and by 
May of the same year the number of members had increased 
146 
to nearly 170. In S eptember 1966 , when the eight-man 
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team of the Afro -A sian Group members was visiting the 
P eople's Repub lic of China and North Korea,Kishi led a 
19-man-delegation recruited from the Asian Group to 
S ou th Korea to attend the second conference of the Asian 
P 1 · t U· 147 ar lamen ary nlon o 
As we have seen above, all the positions that the 
Asian Group has publ icly advocated so far are basically 
d efensive of the status quo on the China issue o There 
is little doubt that its minimal and most fundamental 
deman d is the prevention of Taiwan ' s falling into the 
hands of P eking . Its active sponsorship of the Asian 
P arliamentary Union suggests , however, that its intent-
ions are probably somewhat more vigorous o In many res-
pects this new Union inherits the tradition of the anti-
communist popular front or ganised in 1954 by Chiang Kai-
shek, Syngman Rhee, etc o and seems to have been des i gned 
to replace the neutralist tradition of the Bandung 
Conference in order to link up the non- communist states 
in the region in a grand anti-communist , anti-China 
alliance e 148 Apart from its natural connections with 
the Committee for the P romotion of S ino-Japanese Co-
. 149 
operatlon , the wider international linkages it main-
tains through the Asian P arliamentary Union and the close 
intra-party ties which bind it to the traditionalist 
1 . S · · 150 d f· th b . h nation a 1st group , o shlnkal , e lne e aS1C c ar -
acter and purposes of the Asian Group o 
LOP P olicy-Making 
Between these two opposing groups nearly half of 
the LOP members have remained more or less uncommitted 
or floating in their attitudes toward the issue o Typ-
ical have been , for example , the late Koono Ichiroo and 
151 
the late Ikeda Hayato o S atoo E isaku , Oohira 
Masayoshi , Ishida Hirohide , Shiina Et susaburoo , and 
o thers have all been equally non-committal and vague in 
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their public pronounc ements on the subject . 152 Desp i t e , 
however , the numerical impor t ance of this neu tral g roup 
and the mediative influenc e which it is potentially cap-
able of exerting on the antagonistic groups , opinion in 
the P arty concerning the issue has become increasingly 
polarised and t he decision-making process has been com-
pli c ated by the actions of the two groups and conflict s 
between them. 
As alread y pointed out , the motivations of indiv-
idual LOP members for associating , or not associating , 
with either of the two opposing groups seem too diverse 
and personal to p e rmit generalisation . I tis n ever the-
less important to emphasise the sign ifi c ance of the i r 
occupational backgrounds as one of the factors involved. 
Most conspicuous in this regard is the behaviour 
of former public servants of whom in the House of 
Representatives 46 .5% belong to the Asian and only 
153 
about 11% to the Afro -Asian Group . They are by far 
the largest component (36.1%) of the former ' s membership , 
and near l y the least signficant element (14%) in the 
latter. Fo rmer journalists and businessmen, on the other 
hand, tend to prefer the Afro -A sian Group, an over-
whelming majority of the former and nearly half the 
latter being associated with it and together constit-
uting 40% of its total membership. Former local pol-
i ticians prefer the Asian Group , by a ratio of about 
t hree to two, but due to their overall numerical size 
are the largest single category in the Afro -A sian Group, 
supplying about a quarter of its membership. It should 
be also noted that the former public servants and 
journalists are relatively the most articulate and 
committed. 
The contrast b etween the two groups in terms of 
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the relative proportions of different o ccupational cate-
gories in their membership composition , (symbolised and 
personified by Kaya in the one and Matsumura and 
Utsunomiya in the other ), largely defines their res-
pective relationships with the bureaucracy over the 
issue o F rom the foregoing description of their opposing 
positions it is clear that th e As ian Group's views are 
basically the same as those publicly taken by the Ministry 
of F oreign Affairs , whereas those of the Afro -Asian Group 
are basically opposed to them o This means that one 
operates with the support and co - operation , direct or 
ind irect , of the Ministry , while the other has to act 
in the face of its actual or potential opposition and 
resistanceo This contrast no d oubt tends to strengthen 
the position of the Asian group in relation to that of 
the Afro -Asian group and a situation similar to that which 
exists between the LOP and the J SP at the level of nat-
ional politics arises between them within the organisat-
ional framework of the single party . 
What , however , makes the relationship between the 
two groups so complicated and charged with emotion as 
it has apparently become is not only ideological and 
poli cy diff erences arising from differences in occupat-
ional experience and background and other factors ; it 
IS also closely bound up with intra-party factionalism . 
Certainly both groups are cross-factional in the 
sense that their members are drawn from all but two fac-
154 tional units identified in the P art y o Very signif-
icantly , however , over 60 per cent of the members of the 
Asian Group have come from the Ish ii , Fukuda , Miki and 
Sato o factions and only about 5 per cent from the former 
Koono and none at all from the Matsumura factions o On 
the other hand , nearly a half of the Afro -Asian Group's 
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members belong to the last two factions and only about 
10 per cent to the other four factions combined o In 
the two extreme cases 85 . 6 per cent of the Ishii fact-
ion members and 100 per cent of Matsumura's followers 
belong re spectively to the Asian and the Afro- Asian 
Groups 0 
Between these two extreme s all factions (with the 
single exception of the Fujiyama fa c tion) conform to the 
basic pattern that the higher the percentage of members 
associated with one group , the lower (in relative but 
not absolute terms) the percentage of members assoc-
iated with the other group o Regard ing the distribution 
of the non-committed or floating members, there also 
appears an equally consistent pattern : the hi gher the 
perc entage of those committed to one or the other group, 
the lower (again in relative terms) that of non-committed 
or floating members . 
The relationship between the membership composit-
ions of the two China groups and of the factions as 
indicated by the above-mentioned patterns assume ing~ 
ular i mportanc e ~hen it is realised that since S atoo 
became P rime Minister towards the end of 1964 (which wa s 
when both Ch ina groups were formed ), the four factions 
supplying the As ian Group with the bulk of its members 
have consti tuted the d ominant inter-factional alliance 
(together with the Kawashima faction) while the two 
which provide the Afro-Asian Group with a half of its 
members have formed the hard-core of the d issident fac-
o • 0 155 C tl tional alliance in OpposItIon to It o onsequen y , 
the competition and antagonisms between the two groups 
inevitabl y -take on the character of familiar inter-
factional rivalries between dominant and dissident 
alliances. This is why the competition tends to become 
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highly personali sed and emotional as well as prog r amma t I c 
d Od 1 ° 1 156 an 1 eo 0 g 1 ca. 
Ano t her i mpor t an t fact about the two groups c on-
cerns the r ole of the formal P arty organs i n the mak i n g 
of the Par ty's China pol i cy. To be noted first of all 
in this re s pec t is the fact that no formal party decis -
ion on the China issue has ye t been made. In c onnec ti on 
with the prospect i ve con c lusion of the fourth pr ivate 
trade agreement in ea r ly 1958 the Execut iv e Counc il to o k 
the step of officially advising the Cabinet to make 
sure tha t the text of the agreement should not inc lude 
a provision which might be interpreted as a gesture o f 
157 recognition by Japan of the Pek i ng government. Al so, 
it was the semi-official decision-making organ, the Six 
Leaders Meeting , which decided in June of that year t o 
h ° h b k O ° 0 0 01 5 8 disband t e NItC uu- ooe 1 sokushIn glln renmel. 
S ince then, however, the issue has been considered by 
the Party almost exclusively at the level of the PARC 
Investigation Committee on Foreign Affa i rs, brief ly 
supplemented i n 1959 and 1960 by a PARC Special Comm-
s o J T 159 ittee on I no- apanese rade. 
The del i berations on the part of the Inves i ga t ion 
Commit t ee on Fo reign Affairs hav e been decisively gov e rn-
ed by the fact that members are di v ided with pro-Tai pe i 
(an ti-Pek ing) members predominatingo In its membersh i p 
compos i t i on the numer ic al balanc e of the t wo group s 
ha s been somewhat exaggerated in favour of the Asian 
Groupo This group (or before its formation those who 
wou l d have favoured its position) has contributed over 
two-thirds of those Committee menbers knownto be c omm-
° ° h 160 A It f itted t o one posIt I on or the ot er. s a resu 0 
this membersh op composition the Committee has inev i tably 
found it i mpossible t o produ c e c lear-cut opinions or 
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decisions, and when compelled by circumstances to outline 
its position, it has emphasised the views of the majority, 
whi ch are generally opposed to closer political ties or 
communication with P eking o 
An early example of its deliberate refusal to take 
a stand on the issue was when in May 1957 it included 
the Ch ina issue in a five-point investigation programme 
but omitted it from the final report which emerged out 
f th · .. 161 o e Investlgatlono In August 1960, it prepared 
a 'Basi c Policy on Foreign Affairs ' which advised that 
the issue be properly deal t with, "carefully taking into 
account both the attitude of Communist Ch ina and changes 
. . t t· 1 d·· 11 162 In In erna lona con Itlons 000 The paper produced 
in May 1961 by the China Sub-Commit tee (established 
within the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 9 April 1960) 
has since been known as the ' Interim Report'. This 
would have become the first official Party decision on 
China, for it was dul y approved by the Executive Council 
163 
and was reported to the Cabinet o It presented , 
however, no policy 'decisions' or specific proposals 
but merely enumerated and described the mutually con-
flicting and contradictory views heard in the course 
of its deliberations o The only conclusion it contained 
at the end of the report was exactly the same as the 
'B asic Poli cy on Foreign Affairs' of the previous 
164 
summer 0 
It IS obvious that the ambiguities of wording in the 
interim report of 1961 d irectly reflected the conflict 
between the majority and members such as Ide Ichitaroo 
and S akurauchi Yoshio, who argued that an official 
trade agreement should be concluded between the two gov-
ernments to encourage trade, and Utsunomiya Tokuma and 
Nohara Masakatsu, who went further to call for an immed~ 
165 iate recognition of the P eking government b Japan o 
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More recently , following the French recognition of that 
government in January 1964 its "meet ing of 22 January 
saw an open cl ash of views be t ween Utsunomiya and Maeda 
Masao over the question of whether the Japanese govern-
ment shoul d follow the F rench example or pers ist in its 
refusal to deal officially with P eking. 166 
The internal division of opinion , however, has not 
always prevent ed the majo rity point of view from being 
made known to outsiders and the Committee as a whole has 
exerted an inhibitive influence on the growth of a p ro -
P eking climate of opin i on in the P arty and official 
circles at large. At the time the negotiations on the 
fourth trade agreement were being conducted in earl y 
1958 the Party leaders were no doubt aware that a maj-
ority of the members of the Committee were strongly opp-
167 osed to some provisions of the draft agreement . When 
a delegate from the Tokyo Prefectural Federation of the 
Part~ speaking to a meeting of branch officials in 
March 1961 , referred to the need to put forward ' pos it -
ive ' views on China in order to win votes for the P arty 
at the polls , the Committee ' s Chairman , Nomura 
Kichisaburoo , emphatically stated that most of its 
members neither regard ed Taiwan as part of communist 
I P " 168 China nor agreed to Japan ' s' flirting with eklng . 
Be f o re he left for P eking in 1962 to sign the LT-
memorandum , Takasaki Tatsunosuke was ' invited' to meet 
the Committee and reminded that its members did not 
want him to arrange with the Chinese leaders a trade 
relationship which might benefit the communist bloc , 
especially a trade relationship that woul d involve 
169 deferred payments . 
In view of the tendencies typified by these exam-
pIes it is hard ly surpr ising that the Asian Group 
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claims that it represents the official P arty line and 
insists that the only official P arty line is what a 
majority in the Committee defines to be such , while , on 
the other hand , the Afro -A sian Group prefers to stay 
170 
away fro m the Committee . In fact , it was precisely 
because of this anti -Peking inclination exhibited by 
the official P arty organ and the difficulty of changing 
it that the pro -Peking elements in early 1960 first 
formed the antecedents of the Afro -A sian Group o 
In early 1965 , following the formation of the two 
groups , the number of Vice- Chairmen of the Committee was 
increased from three to twelve in an attempt to force 
them to carryon the debate within the framework of the 
o fficial organ . Two members representing each group were 
b . t d tV· Ch· 1 71 Th . to e nomlna e 0 lce - aIrmen . IS step , however , 
has apparently proved a failure , if its purpose was to 
prevent the controversy from developing outside the off -
icial organ and , therefore , beyond the Party leaders ' 
direct control . As we have seen already , both Groups 
have subsequently intensified , rather than reduced , their 
opinion- forming and policy - making activities and seem 
bound to continue to d o so in the months to come o The 
Asian Group remains a numerically dominant group in 
p ower while the Afro- Asian Group continues as an ideol -
o gical l y radical and militant minority perpetually out 
of power and unable t o secure a majority . 
Given the conditions described above , characterised 
pred ominantly by divisions of opinion and attitude both 
among the bureaucracy and the financial patrons of the 
P a r ty and , more i mportantly , among its members them-
selves , the LOP has been unable to make its own de c is-
i ons o r put forward policy proposals concerning the 
Ch i na issue . The only notab le exceptions have been the 
p o lemical statements attacking each of the successive 
joint communiques issued by J SP d elegations which have 
visited P e k ing since Apr il 1957 , and the 'Unified Views ' 
handed out to local assemblies to dissuade them from 
adopting or publishing resolutions calling for the early 
normalisation of d iplomatic relations with P eking o172 
Apart from the extraord inarily aggressive language 
used in the attacks on the suspected role of the J SP as 
P eking' s mouth~piece , the positions taken by the Party 
leadership in the 'Unified Views' and other off icial 
p ronouncements have all been a mere reiteration of the 
M" "t f F " Aff" I b " " " 173 InIS ry 0 orelgn aIrs aSIc proposItIons . 
They amount to the appli cati on of the principle of sep-
arating the official , governmental relations (which 
shoul d be maintained with the Nationalist government and 
must not be established with P eking) from unofficial 
relations , especially trade (which may be , if necessary , 
maintained and d eveloped with mainland China as well) o 
In other words , the LOP has never made a policy of its 
own but merely followed the lead of the bureaucrats o 
The divisions of opinion arising from the peculiarities 
of the P arty's membership composition , magnified and 
complicated by the complex ties it maintains with extra-
p arty groups and the influences of intra-party faction-
a l ism , have made it impossible for its formal decision-
making organs to exercise significant initiative or 
leadershipo 
Summary 
The policy toward the P eople's R epublic of China 
p red icated on the assumption that official diplomatic 
relations and unofficial economic relations may be sep-
a rated and that the latter should be promoted without 
the former has been inherited by the LOP from the L iberal 
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P art yo The conflicting international and domes tic infl -
uences have since prevented the P arty from developing 
its own policy beyond this general , somewhat ambiguous 
doctrine. 
Internationally , the attitud es of the two govern-
ments most closely associated with Japan and most immed-
iately interested in her treatmen t of the issue , those 
of Nationalist China and the United S tates , have both 
restrained active attempts by the Japanese government to 
increase trade and communication with P eking , not to 
speak of normalising diplomatic relations o Domestically, 
however , both public opinion as reflected in various 
opinion polls and the national and local legislatures 
a ct ing gene r ally in accordance with the trend of public 
opinion have worked as a pressure towards increased con-
tact and exchanges with mainland China , at least at the 
unofficial level o 
Much more decisive from the point of view of the 
LOP policy-making process has been the fact that opinion 
has remained sharply d ivi ded between the ministries , 
especially between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry , and 
among leading businessmen o In so far as the bureaucracy 
and the business world are related to the P arty as the 
sources of its material and technical support , the div-
isions in them have inevitably int r oduced simi lar con-
flicts of opinion within the LOP o 
The pro -Peking group , represented after Januar y 
1965 by t he Afro-Asian Group established as an i ntra-
Party group , has ad vocated a policy line much more pos -
iti ve than that so far pursued by the Mi nis try of F oreign 
Affairs o This group has , however , r emained a minority 
in the parliamentar y party and has not been able to go 
c7·ff 
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mu ch further t han opposin g the more negati v e major i ty 
line . 
The pro-Taipei g roup , represented by the Asian 
Group , on the othe r hand, has been insisting on maintain-
ing the c l ose poli tica l and economi c ties with National -
ist Ch ina and preventing Peking from being admitted to 
the U. N o at the expense of Taipei . Outside the P arty 
this group has been associ ated both with the ikka 
kyooryoku iinkai and the Asian P arliamentary Union and 
withi n the P arty with the Soshinkai o 
In terms of occupational categories , former high -
ranking pub lic servants have tended strongly to assoc-
iate themselves with the Asian Group and forme r journ-
alists and bu sinessmen with the Afro-As ian Group o 
Forme r local politi cians have shown a fairly neu t ral or 
non- commit tal attitude o 
In terms of the intra-Party factions , the one group 
has been supported by the dominant fact ion s under Sa too t s 
presidency , the Ishii , Fukud a , Miki and S atoo factions . 
The other group , on the other hand , has been closely 
identified with the two most articulate dissident fact-
ions , the Matsumura and former Koono factionso The fact-
ional implications of the conflict have naturally tended 
to make it mu ch more bitter and emotional than it woul d 
have been otherwise . 
It has been the Asian Group which has succeeded , 
thanks to its majority position , in dominating th e offic-
ial P arty organs , particularly the PARC Investigation 
Committee on F oreign Affairs . The sharp division of 
opinion , however , h as prevented the higher decision -
making organs , the PARC Deliberation Commis s ion and the 
Executive Council , to make clear - cut and explicit dec is -
ions in favour of one or the other posi ti on . As a re s -
ult , the LOP as a whole has never been able to pronounce 
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an ind ependent policy of its own regard ing the issue 
but has simply followed the lead of the Ministry of 
Fo r e i gn A f fa irs . 
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CONCLUS I ON 
As we have seen in the foregoing nine chapters of 
the present thesis , policy-making in the Liberal-
Democrati c P arty involves an extremely complex process 
of interaction between the four factors which have been 
chosen for our intensi ve examination o The pat te rn of 
interaction between these four factors and other less 
conspicuous and stable variables is e v en mo re complex 
and diffi cu lt to formula t e into neat generalisations o 
It will nevertheless be useful to summarise and integ-
rate in a series of expli ci t propositions such findings 
and c on c lusions as have emerged from the present study 
which have so f ar been left impl ici t o These generali s -
ations may not necessarily explain the Party ' s behaviour 
i n all actua l situations of policy - making , but they will 
probably provide at least elementary clues to a fuller 
descript i on and explora t ion o 
A fact of basic importance to be taken into con-
siderat i on in a discussion of the LOP is that in terms 
of both of its membership structure and or g anisationa l 
c harac t eristics it is a typical parliamentary party . We 
have seen that i t s non - par l i amentary membership is 
large l y nominal and ext r emely unstable , that its local 
organisation is weak and ineffective and that all pos -
i tions at t he Head quarters are cont r o l led exclusive l y 
by members of the Di et o Two important character istics 
of the P arty's behaviour in policy - making situations 
derive from this f a ct o 
F or a ll practica l purposes the f ormal po l icy-
mak i ng process of the P ar t y may be regard ed as a closed 
c i rcu it originating and terminat i ng wi t h i n t he confines 
of the parliamentary part y o I t is hard l y influenced t o 
any signifi cant extent by the wi ll s or act i ons of the 
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non - parliamentary members or the local Branches , neither 
of whom are in a position to determine party decisions 
more effectively or directly than extra-party groups or 
ord ina y vot ers . In none of the cases rev iewed have they 
ever played a role of any significance . 
The other fact to be not ed in this connection is 
that , because of the weakness of its non- parliamentary 
membersh i p and local or ganisation , the LOP is compelled 
to depend upon various extra- party groups for the 
acquisition of funds and votes which are vital to its 
sur v ival as an effective party or gan isation operating 
under a competitive system o A corollary of this situat-
ion is that an important part of the P arty ' s policy-
making activity is necessarily concerned with the task 
of rewarding such extra- party groups as are capable , 
whether act u ally or potentially , of supp ly i ng it wi th 
funds and votes o It was as much because of the votes 
believed to be under its control as of its intense 
l obby ing activ i ties that the National Farmland L eague 
finally moved the LOP to take steps necessary for the 
disbursement o f pub l ic monies for the sake of its members 
despite the opposition of the other parties and the 
Mi nistries concerned o Conversely , the reason why it was 
dissuad e d f r om taking positive measures in connection 
wi th the constitu t i ona l issue was par t ly the disappear -
an c e of enthus i asm on the part of business circles o 
The technical needs of such po l icy- making 
a c tivity o n behalf of the prov i ders of funds and votes 
require the ass i stance of the various ministries of the 
na ti onal pub lic serv i ce . The a c ceptance of the latter' s 
he lp i n turn ob li ges the P ar t y to heed their wishes and 
i nter a l ia to unde r take legislative acti ons ' d esigned t o 
enlarge their p owers and budge t ary app r opr i ations o One 
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of the reasons why the LOP leaders showed reluctance to 
deal speedily with the demands of the National Farmland 
League was the opposition of the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry . The dominant 
view in the LOP on the r elationship with the People' s 
R epublic of China has been st rictly in agreement with 
the guideposts established by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs , embodied in the doctrine of the separation of 
politics and economics and implicit commitment to the 
t two China s ' formula o In both cases the Party has been 
bound by the attitudes of sections of the bureaucracyo 
The policy- making organs of the P arty tend to be 
pre - occupied with satisfying the demands from these two 
broad categories of extra-Party groups o The interests 
and opinions of those who belong to neither are much 
less likely to become the subjects of the Party's offic-
ial policy- making activity . 
O f the principal kinds of policy decisions made by 
the P ar ty in accordance with the wishes of interest 
g roups or the bureaucracy , the bulk may be regarded as 
'routine' and non-controversial o These are dealt with 
by a chain of formal policy - making organs consisting of 
the fifteen Di visions and the Deliberation Commission of 
the PARC~ and the Executi ve Council. When declared as 
'Party decisions' by the last , they are usually intro -
duced as Cabinet-sponsored bills into the Diet by the 
LDP Di e t Policy Committee , or referred to the appropriate 
ministry for administrative action . In this process 
former high- rank i ng public servants , who have unique 
educational and occupational experience , playa leading 
role , while former local politicians tend to playa 
subordi nate and much le ss conspicuous role . The fact 
t hat each ministry has i t s parallel Division in the 
PARC symbo li ses the r elationship between the Party 
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po li cy - mak i ng process and the bureaucracy in routine 
po li cy- making situations o 
If the issues involved a~e con troversial , decision s 
c annot be easily made th~ough this chain of formal 
policy - mak i ng organs o The PARC Divisions are much too 
occupied with r outine policy - making to deal adequately 
wi th such issues o It therefore becomes necessary for a 
controversial issue to be dealt with by an ad ho c 
Invest i gation Committee set up within the PARC separately 
from the Divisions o The Investigation Committee on the 
Farmland Problem , the Committee on the Constitution and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs (esp ecially its Sub -
Commi t tee on China) were all set up for the purpose of 
dealing with specia l and more or less controversial i ssues 
which could not be disposed of by the existing Di vis i ons o 
The role of former public servants is as prominent 
in relation to a c ontroversial issue as in routine 
po l icy - making situations o It is evident that a number 
of former bureauc r ats were used b y the ational Farmland 
L eague as its official representatives in negotiations 
wi t h ( or blackmail against ) the r eluctant ministries o 
In connec tion with the constitutiona l issue one of the 
most prominent aspec ts of the official LDP Committee on 
the Constitut i on and the unofficial intra- party g roup , 
t he S osh i nkai , has been the preponderance of former 
bureaucrats o They also provided the hard - core of the 
pro - Taipe i, anti -Peking group , represented by the Asian 
Group whi c h works with the support and co - operation of 
t he Mi nistry of F orei gn Affairs o Apart from the tend enc y 
among them to assoc·fate with one of the two opposing intra-
par t y groups over t his i ssue , i t should be po i nted out 
that ; together with former journalists , they have been 
t he mos t ar t icu l a t e group . In this respec t they have 
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contrasted sharply with former local politicians~ 
The factions (which have grown up as the basic 
units for distribution of government and party offices) 
tend to divide themselves into two opposing alliances _ 
an alliance of dominant factions and one of dissident 
factions. A controversial is sue is apt to be used by 
the latter as an excuse to intensify its opposition to 
the former. Hatoyama and Kishi were most outspoken 
advocates of constitutional revision so long as they 
found themselves leading dissident factions challenging 
the hegemony of Yoshida. More recently, the Fukuda and 
the Ishii factions used the same issue at least partly 
to discredit the dominant factions led by Ikeda, until 
they succeeded in establishing themselves as part of 
the newly formed alliance of dominant factions led by 
Satoo o Similarly, the dissident Matsumura and former 
Koono factions have called for a drastic change ln 
Japan's policy towards the People's Republic of China 
and formed the Afro-Asian Group to compete with the 
alliance of the dominant factions represented by the 
Asian Group which has committed itself to the maintenance 
of the status guo o The pattern is well established that 
those associated with a dominant faction tend to avoid 
involvement in a controversial issue, while those of 
a dissident faction attempt to use one as a weapon in 
the inter-factional power struggle by emphasising the 
need for 'positive' action on it~ 
In order to be attractive to a dissident faction 
as such a weapon, however, the issue must be sufficiently 
controversial within the Party as well as in society at 
large . An essentially ideological and political issue 
l i ke constitutional revision and policy towards China 
is likely to develop into a controversial state much 
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more easily than a basically economic or budgetary matter 
such as the compensation of former landowners o In the 
latter case a majority in all but the Koono faction was 
officially associated with the National Farmland League , 
while no fact ion leaders were ever chosen as such for 
intensive lobbyist activities of the League . Factions 
were irrel evant to the policy-making process involving 
this essentially budgetary problemo 
The PARC Deliberation Commission and the Executive 
Council are both constituted on the pri~ciple of inter -
factional balance , co-ordi nation and compromise . For 
this reason they frequent l y find themselves unable to 
make decisions when opinion is divided between the fact -
ions , especially if the division is between the dominant 
and dissident alliances o Concerning the China issue , 
the Deliberation Commis sion has never officially expressed 
its own views , while the Executive Council did so only 
on a few occasions around 1958 in connection with the 
negotiations for the conclusi on of the fourth private 
trade agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of LOP 
members from the Diet Members ' L eague for the Promoti on 
of S ino - Japanese Trade o 
Generally speaking , the role of the factions in a 
policy-making situation involving a cont roversia l issue 
is negative , although it may be of decisive importance o 
Built neither on the basis of ideology nor policy , they 
are seldom capable of function ing as units of positive 
action in such a situation o For this reason an intra-
party g roup primarily interested in positive action 
co ncerning a controversia l issue tends to be formed 
separately from the existing factions and on a more or 
l ess c ross -f actional basis o This Was true in all three 
cases reviewed in this study . 
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Factionalism considerably weakens the authority 
and prestige of the Party President , particularly becau s e 
of the manner in which he is selected and his short term 
of office (two years) . As a result , the President is 
usually unable to exercise strong leadership concerning 
decisions in controversial situations . The office of the 
P resident played a decisively role in none of the three 
cases examined . 
In order to cope with the adverse effects of fact-
ionalism and make up for the weakness of presidential 
power , a semi-official decision- making organ controlled 
by the dominant factions , the Leaders Meeting , supple-
ments or supercedes the Executive Council (and frequently 
t he PARC Deliberation Commission as well) when the Party 
faces a controversial lssue . Thus an alternative c h ain 
comprising an a d ho c PARC Investigation Committee , the 
Executive Council and the Leaders Meeting (or simply a 
PARC committee and the Leaders Meeting ) has developed . 
The intervention of the Leaders Meeting , however , 
does not prevent a division of opinion from developing 
in the P arty over a controversial issue but merely min -
imizes its vicious effects . There still remains the 
possibility of suc h a division being exploited not only 
by opponents outside the P arty ( especially the Opposition 
P arties ) but also by the dissident factions within the 
P arty itself o This prospect discourages the top Party 
leadership , represented by the P resident and the 
L eaders Meeting , from advocat i ng or identifying them-
selves closely with a cont r oversial issue . Even in the 
l eas t c ontroversial of the t hree issues discussed in the 
p resent study , the compensation of former landowners , 
t he Thr ee Leaders were invariab l y non-committal. In the 
case of constitutional revision the negative attitude of 
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the top leaders seriously interfered with the work of 
the Committee on the Constitution and drove the more 
mili tant revisionists to seek a new base of operations 
i n the unofficial S oshinkai o On the issue of Japan's 
poli cy toward s Ch ina the LOP top leaders have never gone 
beyon d general l y following the lead of the Mini stry of 
F oreign Affairs . To get the P arty to deal officially 
with a controversia l issue against the resistance of 
the top leadership takes enormous efforts on the par t 
of the interested i ntra-Party or extra-Party gro up o 
The above-mentioned functions of the four prin -
cipal factors of policy-making in the LOP and the pattern 
of interaction between them show a degree of stability 
and rigidity , if not immutability , because they have 
emerged from a gradual process of historical evolution 
originating in the first years of the Meiji era when 
parties and par ty politics were first introduced into 
Japn o The r emarkable staying power which they have 
proved befo re , du ring and after the S econd World War in 
spite of the gr ea t and drastic c hanges i n both Japan's 
international environment and her domestic conditions 
point s to their continued relevance to the basic char-
acteristics of policy- making in the LOP and , pos s ibly , 
in any other conservative parties that may emerge i n 
future o 
In the actual development of an issue and the LOP' s 
response to it factors other than those discussed in the 
present study no doubt p l ay an important , often decisive , 
roleo The problem of the compensation of forme r land -
owner s arose primarily from the effects of the land ref -
orm which was execut ed by those not rel ated or only 
mar g inally related to the LOP, long before th e P arty was 
formed o None of the fou r factors c onsi dered . i n relation 
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to LOP policy-making was , up to a certain point, immed-
iately responsible for the origin and development of the 
issue . The requirement that the Constitution of Japan 
may be amended only after it has secured a two-thirds 
majority in each House and been approved at a referendum 
exists independently of the LOP and its policy-making 
process . The attitudes of the press and public opinion 
on whether the Constitution should be amended have been 
determined only very indirectly by the characteristic 
behaviour of the four factors. The same has been even 
more true as regards the attitudes of the governments of 
the United S tates or Nationalist China which have largely 
delimited the scope of action on the part of the Japanese 
government and other groups in their relationship with 
the People ' s Republic of China . 
Furthermore, personal motivations re"sponsible for 
the specific behaviour of individual LOP members in actual 
policy-making situations are much more complex, diverse 
and particular than a few gross conceptual categories may 
adequately represent and explain o The personal decision-
making involved on the part of , say , Utsunomiya Tokuma, 
Matsumura Kenzoo and Fujiyama Aiichiroo in relation to 
the China issue is not explicable primarily in terms of 
any of the four variables examined in this study or the 
generalised pattern of their mutual interaction . 
Provided , however , that one is aware of these ob-
vious limitations , the series of inter - related general-
isations presented above will be useful to an under-
standing and more sophisticated analysis of the behav-
iour of the LOP . To the extent that the LOP has been 
continuously in power since it was formed in November 
1955 and is likely to remain so for some time to come , 
these generalisations will also give at least initial 
clues to a discussion of governmental decision-making in 
c ontemporary Japan . 
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